Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.”
Dennett believes that our conception of conscious creatures with subjective inner lives - which are not describable merely in physical terms - is a useful fiction that allows us to predict how those creatures will behave and to interact with them.
Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). — Nagal
In Spinozan terms, the "consciousness" we are talking about, our experiences, the existence of experiencing entities, the causation of these things, etc., is extensa. — TheWillowOfDarkness
f one actually reads Dennett, the "illusion" is actually the substance of mind, rather than conscious experiences themselves. What he's really trying to break down is the idea of the ineffable conscious subject, as if our presence as existing conscious beings was somehow inexplicable or nonsensical. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Consciousness is material-- i.e. states of the world. — TheWillowofDarkness
What Dennett is trying to draw out is the controversy over "what is a likeness" is a red herring. There is no such thing as that substance of mind. Experiences exist, and felt as they are (i.e. have a "what is a likeness" ), but that this doesn't amount to a substance of mind and subject contrary to body. All it means is that, for example, a conscious experience of a bat exists and it among to living through a feeling. — TheWillowOfDarkness
I agree. It is as if consciousness would have to remain beyond explanation and current scientific principles, no matter what. No reconception, clarification, nor scientific discovery under currently accepted principles would be enough. But who are they to know?..they are more interested in creating a problem of meaningless than what is being argued about consciousness. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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