Then, when it's pointed to, we can see it as an example of a type. — Metaphysician Undercover

“An example of a type” is an instance of a type, i.e. a token. The toothache or toe pain you have on a particular day or for a particular period of time is a token, or an “example of a type”.

Your “pointing to” stipulation is something you’ve just made up.

You seem to misunderstand. An expression, such as "I have a headache", is not a token of the type "pain". It is an expression, which you (mistakenly) take to represent a token. It does not represent a token, it explicitly states I have a sensation which is of the type, "headache". This is what Banno attempted to do earlier, remove the separation between the expression, and what the expression indicates, to say that the expression is the pain. But this proved to be nonsensical.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. .

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction.

An expression, such as "I have a headache", is not a token of the type "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

Right, an expression is not a token of the type "pain". What is a token of the type "pain" is an actual instance of pain (e,g, actually having a pain). Perhaps you will understand it if I say that the type "pain" is like Plato's Form of "pain"; the pure idea of pain. However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. This is why having a toothache is a token of (the type) "toothache", and why having a sore toe is a token of (the type) "sore toe". I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache".

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. — Metaphysician Undercover

I simply assumed that you have had instances/tokens of pain before. You said as much when you mentioned your nightly toe pain. Do you want to say that you've never had any instances of pain?

That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. . — Metaphysician Undercover

Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then?

One more try, because I'm tired of your inability to grasp the type/token distinction. — Luke

You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language.

However, there is no such Form, there is only the word/concept/type "pain" that we use to refer to actual instances/tokens of pain. — Luke

As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens.

I can have a toothache and you can have a toothache and so can everyone else, and we can all refer to it as "a toothache". — Luke

You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain.

Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind.

Lying about what? That you've had pain before? You could be lying, but you could also be telling the truth. What then? — Luke

You really do not understand what a token is. Suppose you name a type, "beetle", and I say, yes, I have one of those at home. The thing I have at home does not serve as an example of a type, and therefore cannot be called a "token", until it is displayed as such.. Since a token, by definition, is an example, used to demonstrate a type, anything which does not serve that purpose cannot be called a token.

This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type. So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token".

You don't seem to understand the fact that the type/token distinction cannot be applied in the context of the private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I hate to break it to you, but "pain" is a word in our public language.

As I said, I do not believe there is any such a thing as an actual instance of pain. You'll have to show me one before I believe you. That's how you're using "instance", to signify an example of something, a "token". A token is an example of a type. So you'll have to show me your example. To talk about the existence of a token is insufficient, because you are telling me about a type, "pain" and insisting that there is such a thing as examples of this type, "tokens" without showing me these tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover

I would be more than happy to show you an instance of pain if you would let me. Otherwise, try pricking yourself with a pin (see PI 288).

You are insisting that you have something in your box, a token of the type "beetle" (in this case, a token of pain), But to be tokens of a particular type, they must serve to exemplify that type. Since you cannot use what's in your box, as an example of the type you are talking about, "pain", to demonstrate that type to me, we cannot truthfully say that what is in your box is a token of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not using what's in my box. I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. You keep avoiding this very straightforward question. Now you are pretending not to know what the word "pain" means.

Do you understand the reality of the type/token distinction? A token is an example of a type, by definition. If there is something which cannot serve to exemplify a type, such as an inner, private sensation, it cannot be called a token. Otherwise, you could make up all sorts of fictitious types, and claim that there are real existing tokens of those types, like unicorns and flying spaghetti monsters, but all the tokens are in your mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think that tokens of pain are fictitious, then you don't know the meaning of the word.

This means that we can have real existing things which are not tokens. You seem to be bogged down by some type of dichotomous thinking within which everything must be either a type or a token of a type — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token.

So you do not recognize the fact that I can claim to have something, and even call it by the name of a type, "a pain", yet it is not a token of that type because I cannot use it to exemplify that type, as required by the name "token". Therefore it is not a token of that type, as required by the definition of "token". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word.

I have asked you several times whether you have had any instances of pain before. — Luke

I answered this. No. My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token.

You cannot have a token that is independent of its type. That is, I don't think it makes any sense to talk about tokens unless you are talking about them in terms of their type, or in terms of the type/token distinction. And I don't think that everything is a type. To repeat, I introduced the distinction to raise your awareness of two different possible meanings of the word "same": the same type or the same token. — Luke

Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words..

I am not avoiding the question. I have answered it. No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance".

If you have something, and you call it a "pain" when it is not a pain, then you are either lying or misusing the word. — Luke

Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. . — Metaphysician Undercover

My pain does not exist as an instance, or as a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"?

Yes, and it was you who insisted that the same token, or instance, of pain could not go away and come back at a later time. My pain usually goes away and comes back at a different time, when I sleep for example. Therefore I have concluded that my pain cannot exist as a token or an instance, as you are defining these words.. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not insist that. Our discussion on the subject began with the definition of types and tokens, and with what a token is for Wittgenstein's diarist. You refused to acknowledge that Wittgenstein was talking about the recurrence of a sensation, despite Wittgenstein's explicit use of the word. I then reminded you that in Wittgenstein's scenario, he states that he writes "S" "for every day on which I have the sensation." This implies that he writes "S" either one or zero times per day.

Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. For example:

I will grant you this one point. It is possible for someone to have the same pain for several days in a row, and we might consider this to be a single token or instance of pain. Admittedly, I had assumed that the sensation 'S' was fleeting and was presumed to last less than a day. Whether we call it a different token or not makes little difference, however, because the problem remains: how can you be sure that you are remembering it correctly as the same sensation after you have stopped sensing it for a while (e.g. after you have slept or lost consciousness)? In other words, are you correct to still call it 'S'?
— Luke

OK, I'm glad we're finally getting to the point. Whether or not you believe it is possible to have the same token of a type of sensation on numerous occasions, is not what is at issue. What is at issue is that the private diarist is claiming this, and is claiming to mark down S every time the very same token of sensation occurs, "a particular sensation". Whether it is possible for the person to actual have the same particular sensation is not the issue. — Metaphysician Undercover

I also coined the term "broken token" for such an example, and more recently stated that you might tell the doctor you've had the same pain for weeks, months or years.

No, I have never had an "instance" of pain as you are using "instance". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a much weaker claim than your earlier insistence that "There is no such thing as a "token of sensation"". Anyway, as I've acknowledged several times and as per my quote above, I am not using "instance" or "token" any differently than you. Moreover it seems that, given the absence of response in your latest reply, you are no longer defending your assertion that I am applying the type/token distinction to "pain" in the "context of a private language". Therefore, you apparently still want to deny that you have pains at all. Maybe you express them without having them?

Yes, I told you lying is a real possibility which proves that what you are asserting is false.

You invalidly concluded that I must be in possession of a token of that type (beetle in the box), from the fact that I assert that I have something of that type. That your conclusion is invalid is evident from the fact that I could be lying. .
— Metaphysician Undercover — Metaphysician Undercover

And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false.

We need to explore further. What a tangled web we weave, though. Invent new words at your leisure, some might catch on. Because there are salvations as yet unconceived.

Words can be so soothing, but they don't necessarily correlate to their definitions. Sleep, for instance, such a soothing word, while "love", in my opinion, seems rather coarse. "Evil" is empowering, yet maligned.

There are hints of potential words that just soothe an aching conscience. Speak in tongues.

You said that "A token is an example of a type, by definition." So that means your pains are not examples (or instances) of the type "pain"? — Luke

Yes, my pains are not instances nor examples.

Furthermore, you are being dishonest because I acknowledged on more than one occasion that a token could be defined as lasting longer than a day. — Luke

Perhaps I am lying. How would you know?

And, as I indicated in my response at the time, the possibility of lying implies the possibility of telling the truth. If it is possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are a lie, then it is also possible that your tokens (or "somethings") of pain are not a lie. Which proves that your assertion "There is no such thing as a token of sensation" is false. — Luke

This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token..

This is an invalid conclusion. That there is a token, an example, or instance of pain which is referred to when I say "I'm in pain", requires that I am not lying. The possibility that I am telling the truth when I say "I'm in pain", does not necessitate that there is a token, instance, or example, being referred to, because it's only a possibility. It is required that the token actually serves as an example, to be a token.. — Metaphysician Undercover

A token is an instance is an example. Either you have pains or you don't. Are you claiming that you lie about it in every instance? You seem to be claiming you don't have pains. I guess this is all you have left to say.

I claim to be in pain. Yet the question remains, either I have pain or I don't. Where do you think the token is? My claim is not the token.

I guess this is all you have left to say. — Luke

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain which you seem to believe is so real.

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain — Metaphysician Undercover

What is a token of the type "pain" is an actual instance of pain (e,g, actually having a pain). — Luke

I am waiting for you to produce this token of pain which you seem to believe is so real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking for being tortured?

You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it.


Yeah, I'm masochist and Luke readily submits to my desires. But Luke only submits because he thinks I'm feeling pain, when I'm really feeling pleasure.

You can tell me about your claimed token all you want, that's a far cry from producing it. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself?

246. In what sense are my sensations private? [...]
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — PI 246

Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying:

250. Why can’t a dog simulate pain? Is it too honest? Could one teach a dog to simulate pain? Perhaps it is possible to teach it to howl on particular occasions as if it were in pain, even when it isn’t. But the right surroundings for this behaviour to be real simulation would still be missing. — PI 250

Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? Note Wittgenstein's distinction between pain and its expresssion (pain-behaviour), such as at 281, 244, 245, or, again, at 246:

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. — PI 246

I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist?

Just saying, if you want a token of pain, just give me your hand and a hammer. I can easily combine those two things in a manner that will produce a token of pain for you.

You want me to produce my sensations? Do you not have them yourself? — Luke

I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token".

Do you want to contradict Wittgenstein and say that you doubt whether you are in pain? Also, what do you make of the remarks at 250 which relate to your comments on lying: — Luke

I am not discussing Wittgenstein's expressed point of view on this matter, we are discussing whether sensations can be considered to be tokens. And I often doubt whether some of my sensations ought to be called "pain" or not. That's a common experience for me.

Also, I don't see how the comments at 250 are relevant to the argument I made . You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. I don't see how the question of whether a dog could perform such a pretense is relevant.

Is a dog so honest that it cannot help but express only real pain? — Luke

Why would I think that? How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? Are you simply writing this as an intentional distraction? You can use the dog as a token of a dog, but how do you use a dog as a token of pain?

I cannot show you my sensations because sensations are private. Wittgenstein's is not a private sensations argument (unless you count PI 246-251, where he acknowledges that sensations are private). Did you think he was a behaviourist? — Luke

I can't understand this contradictory mess. You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private.

Wittgenstein clearly indicates at 253, in what sense you and I can be said to have the "same" pain. Read it again, before you continue to insist on what Wittgenstein is saying. If your pain and my pain are distinct, as two distinct chairs are, but are of the same type (to use your word "type", not Wittgenstein's who says "exactly the same as"), then in this sense of "same", you and I might have the "same" pain.

But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. And if we want to talk about distinct pains as if they are distinct tokens, then we need to produce these tokens, lay them out on the table, or some such thing, so that we can compare them, to see if they truly are "exactly the same". If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? You are simply talking about imaginary tokens, as if they are real.

Just saying, if you want a token of pain, just give me your hand and a hammer. I can easily combine those two things in a manner that will produce a token of pain for you. — Olivier5

i don't see how you could produce a token of pain with a token of hammer and a token of hand. You could create a token of 'damaged hand', or 'injured hand', but where's the token of pain?

i don't see how you could produce a token of pain with a token of hammer and a token of hand. You could create a token of 'damaged hand', or 'injured hand', but where's the token of pain? — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't worry, you'll know where it is as soon as I start smashing your hand with that hammer.

I have sensations, but as I explained to you, they do not consist of tokens, if I maintain consistency with the way you use the word "token". — Metaphysician Undercover

What way is that (or what do you think it is)?

You said that if I express "I am in pain", then it is necessary that I have a token of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said that.

But you accept that the expression is not itself the token. So you seem to completely overlook the possibility that I might be intentionally lying. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens".

How is a dog's supposed experience of pain even relevant to what we're discussing? — Metaphysician Undercover

What reason might there be to think that dogs or other animals are ever in pain? Why even call it "pain"? After all, it's not as though we can compare their sensations with ours.

You seem to be saying that Wittgenstein argues that sensations are not private, yet at 246-251 he acknowledges that sensation are private. — Metaphysician Undercover

He argues that a private language is impossible, not that a private sensation is impossible. He takes it as given that sensations are private.

But if this is the case, we are talking about a type, called "pain", not tokens of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Pain" is the type. That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it.

If we have no means for comparison how can we even talk about whether they are one token or two? — Metaphysician Undercover

Either you and I each have pains (and therefore we each have tokens of pain) or else we don't and so we cannot correctly call either or both of them "pains". In the latter case, what we have is simply not of that type, so we would be miscategorising what we have or misusing the word "pain".

Geez, these arguments over tokens and types are torturous. :lol:

Don't worry, you'll know where it is as soon as I start smashing your hand with that hammer. — Olivier5

All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there.

I don't care if you're lying or not. It's not about me trying to work out if you genuinely have pains. I directly asked you whether you have pains. I already know that you do, and you have already said on multiple occasions that you do. I do not understand why you are refusing to refer to separate instances of having pain (or any other sensations) as "tokens". — Luke

That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token.

That there are two of them - you have one and I have one - and that they are both "pain" means that we each have a token of that type. It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". There is only one type called "pain" and we each have a token of it. — Luke

We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". There is consistency between my usage and your usage due to our outward expressions, as Wittgenstein explains, how we all justify our use of "pain". There is absolutely no need to assume the existence of tokens of pain.

The consistency in our usage is not produced from tokens, examples of the pain itself, it is produced from our outward expressions which are not themselves tokens of the type, but they represent the type in a way other than the way that a token represents the type. So the type is recognized and understood through means other than tokens (examples). And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. To be a token of pain would require that the sensation conform to some criterion of correctness. Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain..

Yep. And pointless.

That's right, I think it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token".

We each have a type of sensation which we call "pain". Why do you say that this makes no sense? When I have a sensation of the type I call pain, I call it "pain". When you have a sensation of the type you call pain you call it "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't each have our own types of "pain". There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". There is not your type of pain and my type of pain; there is your token of pain and my token of pain and they are both tokens of the same type: "pain". Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang".

We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain".

In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". That is, for us to have different types, if you have a pain, then I must not have a pain. Moreover, you cannot have a type. A type is a category or class. You can only have instances or tokens of a category or class. I don't understand your resistance to this mere taxonomy.

And, as Wittgenstein explains at 258, it would not even make any sense to think of the sensations which I call "pain", as tokens, because there is no criterion of correctness by which to judge whether the sensations I call "pain" are really of the type pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language.

Therefore they are just sensations which I say are of the type pain, but do not qualify as tokens of pain because there is no correctness as to whether they really are pain or are not pain.. — Metaphysician Undercover

As a word of our public language, the word "pain" has a criterion (or criteria) of correctness.

In the interests of "re-railing" the discussion, I came across this article only this week. I found it to resonate with my own views on the PLA:

https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument

See what you think.

Thanks.

I'll go along with the private language argument being a special case of a more general argument for rule-following not being a private activity.

I think we can go a bit further than Floyd. If we are to take seriously the suggestion that we look to use rather than meaning, then we might run into difficulties if we set out use in terms of following rules. For a rule is inherently statable, and so just yet more language. Hence we must understand rules not as stated, but as enacted (§201 again - it really strikes me as the pivot of the book).

But in what way could tall of a private sensation be enacted?

Thanks Banno, I agree with you about enacting rules. I guess I should have specified my interest in the article, which I thought was a somewhat unique take on Wittgenstein's Beetle:

At §293 the ‘beetle-in-the-box’ argument itself suggests a similar but more general conclusion. Public words that refer to inner sensations do not get their meaning from the sensations themselves. All these words tell us is that there is a sensation, not what the sensation is. To Wittgenstein, linguistic meaning is the use of words, and as mentioned above, the use of the word ‘pain’ is to express rather than to describe the sensation:

“Suppose everyone has a box with something in it: we call it a “beetle”. No one can look into anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box...The thing in the box has no place in the language game at all”

What Wittgenstein is saying is that the word ‘beetle’ cannot be referring to the beetle itself, because if it did then only I could know what I meant by the word ‘beetle’, as only I know what is in my box. In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is: if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). Clearly our sensation words have to tell us something about what kind of sensation they’re referring to, otherwise it would be difficult to see any difference between ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’. But what Wittgenstein is trying to show is that what we actually feel – which no one else can really know – is irrelevant to the meaning of the word.

Wittgenstein’s position therefore seems to be that sensations definitely are private, and that sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. The word merely indicates that a certain kind of sensation is present. — Richard Floyd

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.

it's nonsensical, incoherent, and inconsistent with the definition of "token", to call pain a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fair enough. The token-type distinction is overblown anyway.

That doesn't answer my question of what you think a token is, or how you think I am using the word "token". — Luke

Sorry Luke, I can't demonstrate to you, the way that you are using a word. If you can't remember, reread the posts.

There is only one type, which is "pain" - i.e. the category or class called "pain". — Luke

No, there are many different types of pain.

Likewise, if you had a Ford Mustang and I had a Ford Mustang, then there would not be two different types of car (yours and mine); instead there would be two different tokens of the (one) same type of car: "Ford Mustang". — Luke

There are many different types of Ford Mustangs.

We cannot possibly have different types of "pain" in the way you suggest. In order to have different types we might call your type "pain A" and my type "pain B". But all that distinguishes pain A from pain B is that one is yours and one is mine. Either they both still refer to what we were previously calling "pain" or else we are no longer talking about "pain". — Luke

That's obviously not true. The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding.

In order to be different types, if you had something of the type "pain", then I would need to have something of a different type that is not "pain". — Luke

Again this is obviously false, as a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. "Pain" is described in many different ways, sharp, ache, throb, etc., each referring to a different type of pain. That we have different types of pain does not imply that one type is not "pain", this is like suggesting that if we had different different "types", one could not be called a type. But that denies the whole point of having different types, which is to allow that a class can be divided into subclasses.

Moreover, you cannot have a type. — Luke

This is what is nonsense. If I can't have a type, then neither can you. And if no one can have a type, then where are all the types? Are they existing in a Platonic realm of eternal Forms?

Wittgenstein does not mention the word "pain" at all at PI 258. He mentions only the word/symbol "S", which has a supposedly private use in a supposedly private language. — Luke

Right, now maybe you're catching on. When I apply "pain" to refer to an inner experience, what we've been calling a "sensation", I might follow some sort of criterion. Use of the criterion ensures the appropriate classification as to the appropriate "type.". However, nothing indicates that whatever it is which I "have", is a token. I might simply have a type, which I class as a subtype, by placing it into the proper category, through reference to the criterion.

Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. We further divide to another type, the one specified by the diarist as "S". Each division produces a new type, and at no point is a token produced. Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. Whenever criteria is applied we simply divide the established type into a further type, coming up with a new type, but never defining "a token".

No, there are many different types of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

a type, or class, is often divided into subtypes, or subclasses. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are right that the type "pain" can be divided into subtypes. But the type "pain" is not its subtypes. There is only one type or class that is "pain". Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. There are many different subtypes and subclasses of pain.

The type of pain which I have could easily be different from the type of pain that you have, especially if I have a different type of injury from you. And, the fact that we'd be talking about different types of pain, does not imply that we are not talking about "pain" any more. If you and I are talking about different types of Ford Mustangs, that does not mean we are no longer talking about Ford Mustangs. This fact is a big reason for the existence of misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not talking about types of pain, which are subtypes, but the type (or class) itself: "pain". This includes all things/tokens that we classify as "pain".

If I can't have a type, then neither can you. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category.

Look, "inner experience" refers to a type. Then we have specified a type of inner experience as "sensation", so we have just named a new type. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.

Now, the diarist wants to say that the thing referred to with "S" is a token rather than a type, but there is no criterion (other than the law of identity which Wittgenstein has rejected as nonsense) as to what constitutes a token. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. Now you're catching on, and seemingly starting to get what the word "token" means. It's only taken several pages. Except the diarist is supposed to create a type ("S") from the tokens; from the recurrence of the sensation.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/58/The_Private_Language_Argument — Luke

Thanks for the article. It raised some very interesting points.

I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression. — Luke

Yes, I agree with this.