the use of the word ‘pain’ is to express rather than to describe the sensation — Richard Floyd
In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd
... sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. — Richard Floyd
It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain". — Luke
All right, I'm not worried, I've hit myself with a hammer enough times to know what it feels like, and also to know that there is never any tokens for me there. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain. — Luke
You're right, neither of us can. We can't have the class/category. We can only have tokens or instances of that class/category. — Luke
Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to. — Luke
Is there not a different instance of pain each time you hit your hand with the hammer? — Janus
No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. We do say things like this though, but Wittgenstein is demonstrating that this is a way of speaking which is like an illness that needs philosophical treatment. — Metaphysician Undercover
Isn't the word 'pain' itself a description? From it we know that the sensation is not pleasant, that it is something I want alleviated rather than prolonged. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein thus claims that the word ‘pain’ does make reference to a sensation, but does not describe it. So the actual sensation that you feel does not affect the meaning (ie public use) of the word, but whether or not there is a sensation being felt does. — Richard Floyd
A diagnosis is aided by a description of the sensation, its severity, where it is located, whether it is sharp or dull or throbbing, sudden or continuous, tender to touch, whether better or worse with activities or conditions heat or cold, — Fooloso4
In the same way, we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd
Refer directly to the sensation of what? The pain? It would be odd if the word pain did not refer to pain! — Fooloso4
It makes no sense to say that we each have a type called "pain".
— Luke
I think this is exactly what he believes. We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share. — Srap Tasmaner
Why do you think that? — Luke
If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, there are not many different types or classes of pain.
— Luke
That's obviously wrong. Clearly there are many different types of pain. That's exactly what being divisible into many different types means, that there are many different types of the type which is divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover
If I don't have the type, and you don't have the type, then where is the type? I think you're wrong here. A type must be somewhere, if it has any existence at all. I think that types are within my mind, and they are within your mind as well. They do not exist in some realm of Platonic Forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
Correct, but - in this example - a "sensatIon" is a token of the type "inner experience". And each subtype will have its own tokens. That's the mere taxonomy I was referring to.
— Luke
No that's not true, because you are again using sensation to refer to a type of inner experience. — Metaphysician Undercover
But, as Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258, "a sensation" cannot be identified as a particular thing, due to the lack of a criterion of identity. — Metaphysician Undercover
244. How do words refer to sensations? — There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and name them? — LW
If you took some time to analyze your own inner experience, and sensations, through introspection, as Wittgenstein did, you'd probably come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein does at 261 " he has something—and that is all that can be said". Inner experience is "something", sensation is "something", but we surely cannot say that it consists of tokens. — Metaphysician Undercover
261. What reason have we for calling “S” the sign for a sensation? — LW
No, because no pain exists as "an Instance", so it's equally wrong to say that different pains are different instances of pain. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do you think that?
— Luke
I was describing MU's views, — Srap Tasmaner
I think most people tend to dismiss the ("inner") sensation completely (it "drops out of consideration") and presume Wittgenstein to be identifying a sensation only with its expression.
— Luke
Yes, I agree with this. — Sam26
Ah, I misread you. — Luke
That seems absurd to me. Say last week I had a headache, and now today I have a headache. They are two different occasions or instances of having a headache. They are not the same headache, as they would be if it had persisted the whole time. — Janus
Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke
I agree the type exists only as in knowing how to use the word "pain" correctly; as the definition of the word "pain"; or as our agreed usage of the word "pain". — Luke
he word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. — Luke
I disagree with this reading. The word "sensation" as it is used in our public language does have criteria of correctness. And he clearly indicates at PI 244 that our reference to sensations is unproblematic: — Luke
He is referring here to the mistaken idea that "the connection between the name and the thing
named" can be established privately. He is not saying that this is a problem for the words "sensation" or "pain" as these are words of our public language. The problem is with the putative private word/sign "S". — Luke
That is, what reason have we for calling the private sign "S" the sign of a sensation, given that the word "sensation" has a public meaning? — Luke
If there are no instances of pain, then there is only the abstract concept of "pain"; only the meaning of the word with nothing (no tokens) that belongs to that type. That obviously contradicts how we use the word. — Luke
Wittgenstein thus claims that the word ‘pain’ does make reference to a sensation, but does not describe it. So the actual sensation that you feel does not affect the meaning (ie public use) of the word, but whether or not there is a sensation being felt does. — Richard Floyd
... sensation words do not have sensations themselves as their meaning, and in fact the exact nature of the sensation has no bearing on the meaning (use) of the word whatsoever. The word merely indicates that a certain kind of sensation is present.
I think what he means by "directly" here is that the word 'pain' cannot refer to the "exact nature" of the pain — Luke
OK, but by that logic I can say that the headache I had last second was not the same headache as this second. Or we could say that it changes by the nanosecond, or Planck length. Luke and I went through this already. — Metaphysician Undercover
...but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence @Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence.We each have our own type system, each have different meanings for the words we share. — Srap Tasmaner
Srap is right in saying — Banno
I was describing my guess at MU's view, — Srap Tasmaner
If I can make a reasonable distinction between the headache I have now and the headache I had then, then they are different instances of headache. — Janus
All those pages about tokens and types miss the point. — Banno
I was describing my guess at MU's view, so you agree with him rather than me. — Srap Tasmaner
but this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word; and hence Metaphysician Undercover sees the philosophers task as somehow identifying that essence. — Banno
To which I said "this is clearly false".Yes, there are many different types or classes of pain (these are the subclasses), but there is only one type or class that is "pain". — Luke
It does more than just refer to a sensation. If it just referred to a sensation the word 'pain' would play no role. 'Pain' and 'S' are not the same. Pain, however incompletely, describes the sensation. — Fooloso4
To indicate the kind of sensation that is present is what the sensation word pain means. — Fooloso4
What is the exact nature of the pain? — Fooloso4
...we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is: if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). — Richard Floyd
It's unclear to me what it is a description of. — Luke
... it is not necessary for a pain to be present or expressed in order for us to use the word. — Luke
...we can see that the word ‘pain’ cannot refer directly to the sensation, because only I could know what that sensation is — Richard Floyd
if the word did refer to the sensation, the word would mean nothing to anyone but me (as a word in a private language would). — Richard Floyd
That "pain" may be defined in different ways indicates very clearly that there is not just one type or class which is called "pain". — Metaphysician Undercover
You seem to be overlooking the reality of the situation, that most of the time during language use we do not proceed based on "agreed" definitions, or "agreed" usage. — Metaphysician Undercover
If this is what constitutes the existence of a "type"... — Metaphysician Undercover
What I've been telling you, is that in common usage of "sensation", the thing sensed, the object of a sensation (something seen for example), might be called a token of a type. — Metaphysician Undercover
Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the problem is not with the "private word/sign 'S'", as you state...
The use of the proper noun, "S" as a name to name a particular sensation, which is a supposed private thing (token for you) cannot be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover
But I take a step further, where you refuse to go, to say that the so-called PLA demonstrates a problem in naming any objects, private or public. — Metaphysician Undercover
One thing of note in your posts is their mercurial nature. — Banno
Then help me to work out if naming is part of a language game or not. — Banno
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