I don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case. — Sam26

It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. I like the epistemological as opposed to the ontological approach. When do we tend to agree that someone is in pain? Imagine, if you must, some essence of pain that outsiders can never access. Fine. Useless, but fine. So how do we actually judge ? Any of us could brainstorm some indicators (he's limping and grimacing, he tells us his leg hurts, etc.)
'Beetles' are something like phlogiston or the ether.

There is no way to know if our inner experiences are the same except through our common reactions to these experiences....We can't peer into the mind to observe these inner experiences, and looking at brain activity does little to help in the way of describing the experience. — Sam26

Indeed, and we've embraced a use of "inner experiences" that makes them useless apart from this uselessness. (Or an ordinary kind of thing was rarefied into a metaphysical cliché.)

The sensation of pain does have direct bearing on the meaning of the word pain. Suppose there is one of Wittgenstein's tribes, one whose members do not feel pain. The term 'pain' would be meaningless. It is only because we have had the sensation of pain that we understand what the word means. — Fooloso4

Really? I find that claim strange. Imagine a boy who knows very little about female anatomy. He does know that women get their monthlies, and he knows that this is used as an explanation of moods, or as a reason to need privacy in a hurry.

Aren't we talking about the sensation of pain? What many different ways are there to define "pain" in this sense? (I'm not asking what many different types of pain there are). — Luke

Consider: pain definition1, unpleasant bodily feeling, and pain definition.2, suffering of the mind. Each of these two have distinct subtypes, which do not cross from 1 to 2 because 1 is distinct from 2. If we were to say that 1 and 2 are both types of a further category "pain" in general, then we'd have to have a third definition, "pain" in general. a definition which included both 1 and 2. We might propose "unpleasantness", and suggest that pain is unpleasantness, of which there are two types. However, there are other types of unpleasantness which do not qualify as "pain", so the class of "unpleasantness" contains things other than pain, so we cannot define "pain" in general this way. Therefore 1 and 2 are different ways to define pain, not different types of pain. Plato made a very thorough demonstration (in the Gorgias, or Protagoras, I can't remember which one now), showing that pain is not the opposite of pleasure, therefore pleasure is not simple a release from pain.. Likewise, we cannot simply say that anything unpleasant is pain.

Yes, common or conventional usage constitutes the existence of a "type". Like when Pluto was declassified as a planet. "Planet" is the type, the definition of the word. The rocks in our solar system are the concrete particulars that we classify as planets or not planets. — Luke

Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. That's why there's a difference between justified and true.

So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. We might say that imagination, as as a mental activity is real, and existing, but it is incorrect to say that the things imagined (in this case the "type") are real and existing.

Therefore, if anyone such as yourself, claims that a "type" has existence, and this claim of "existence" is supported by, or justified by an appeal to conventional usage, we must conclude that this is an invalid attempt at justification. That is because common, or conventional usage is insufficient to necessitate truth. Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things.

What I've told you multiple times is that the type-token distinction is independent of "things sensed"; the distinction is merely classificatory, distinguishing a class from its instances; a name from the things named. — Luke

This is false. If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types.. But that's not how you use "token", nor is it the common or conventional use of "token", to talk about a type as a token of another type.

And, if we were to be very strict in our usage, and enforce that the distinction is just classificatory, then we could not apply "token" to any thing whatsoever, because a token would always be a type, and a "thing" is not a type.

He says there doesn't seem to be any problem of words referring to sensations, and that "we talk about sensations every day, and name them". Where does he "explain how there really is a problem" with words referring to sensations? — Luke

Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations..

You start by saying the problem is not with "S" but end by saying the problem is with justifying the use of "S"...? — Luke

Exactly. We use words all the time without justifying our usage. There is no problem with such usage. Likewise there is no problem with the private language, which names sensations privately without justification. Justifying one's usage though is a completely different matter altogether. So the private language is shown to be useless in the public sphere, because justification requires translation from private to public.

As explained above, we talk about "types" all the time, no problem whatsoever, but when we are asked to justify such use, demonstrate what sort of thing we are referring to when we say "type", then there is a problem. You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. This is a very real and epistemologically significant issue, despite your assumption that it's metaphysical nonsense, and your subsequent refusal to consider such nonsense.

So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. The problem is in making the private language compatible with the public language. Here, the private language will necessarily be negated, annihilated, because there is no such thing as altering the public language to make it private, yet the private may be altered to make it public. But upon such alterations, it cannot be called a private language. Ever watch a baby learn how to talk? The entire process is a matter of trial and error, the baby producing and annihilating the private language, because it is incorrect.

Meta's public language argument(!), which demonstrates the logical impossibility of a public language.

...All stated in a public language. — Luke

Obviously you misunderstand. That the assignment of a specific name to a particular object cannot be logically justified, does not make public language impossible. It just means that our common practise of naming things proceeds in an unjustified manner. That I name the vessel which contains my coffee today, a "cup", rather than a "mug", is not justified. It's a habit. As stated above, we use language all the time without justifying our usage, and this does not make communication impossible. It is your implied requirement, that the naming of an object must be justified for language use to be intelligible and communication to be successful, that is what would make public language impossible.

Imagine a boy who knows very little about female anatomy. — hanaH

Wittgenstein's "tribes" are isolated peoples. Unlike the boy who knows something is happening that he does not quite understand, no one in this imagined tribe feels pain. There would be no pain behavior and no word for something that does not exist

It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. — hanaH

It can't be useless. For example, if there were no inner experience of pain, then there would be no language of pain, no outward sign. It depends, I guess, on what you mean by useless. Even the beetle has a function, albeit not the one most people think, in terms of meaning.

It can't be useless. For example, if there were no inner experience of pain, then there would be no language of pain, no outward sign. — Sam26

Note, though, that you assume that there is a singular held-in-common experience of pain. But this is "inner experience," which can't be compared and is "grammatically" invisible to reason and science. It's as if (quietly) we are after all reasoning from the undeniable singularity of the public token (category of marks and noises that are all classified as 'pain') to some singular referent.

If it weren't so common, I think we'd see the absurdity of it.

Shall we then call it an unnecessary hypothesis that anyone else has personal experiences? -- ... is this a philosophical, a metaphysical belief? Does a realist pity me more than an idealist or a solipsist?

Also:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another. What am I to say about the word "red"?—that it means something 'confronting us all' and that everyone should really have another word, besides this one, to mean his own sensation of red? Or is it like this: the word "red" means something known to everyone; and in addition, for each person, it means something known only to him? (Or perhaps rather: it refers to something known only to him.) Of course, saying that the word "red" "refers to" instead of "means" something private does not help us in the least to grasp its function; but it is the more psychologically apt expression for a particular experience in doing philosophy. It is as if when I uttered the word I cast a sidelong glance at the private sensation, as it were in order to say to myself: I know all right what I mean by it.

You might say that philosophy got in a strange rut, the idea of private experience, while rarely noticing the impossibility of being rational or critical or scientific about the idiosyncractic-by-definition.

Wittgenstein's "tribes" are isolated peoples. Unlike the boy who knows something is happening that he does not quite understand, no one in this imagined tribe feels pain. There would be no pain behavior and no word for something that does not exist — Fooloso4

Interesting point, but I suggest that we have no way of knowing that we mean the same thing by 'pain' if we insist on acting as if we can be rational about something that is private by 'definition.' If you think of pain as a mysterious private something, you open the door to p-zombies, solipsism, and so on.

To be clear, I have the usual intuitive sense that I know what it's like to 'feel pain.' My point is that this is way too fuzzy to serve as the foundation of a theory of knowledge.

...the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why?

As I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no "principal criterion of identity".

But you don't. Hence my critique, that you cannot see that

The point here is that there is no absolute, canonical, essential right or wrong to these differing descriptions. — Banno

To be clear, I have the usual intuitive sense that I know what it's like to 'feel pain.' My point is that this is way too fuzzy to serve as the foundation of a theory of knowledge. — hanaH

Why do you need a foundation?

don't think that Wittgenstein dismisses the inner sensation, but some people do think this is the case.
— Sam26

It seems to me that the inner sensation is useless. It doesn't matter if we all have different beetles in our boxes or if some of us have no beetles. — hanaH

It's just the introduction of skepticism. Skepticism never rules out anything. It's just doubt.

I think you have the wrong idea about where I'm coming from.

I think you have the wrong idea about where I'm coming from. — hanaH

Could you explain why?

Could you explain why? — frank

Sure. I'm not trying to play the skeptic, nor am I trying to found some theory of knowledge. You might say I'm emphasizing the behaviorist streak in Wittgenstein.

According to methodological behaviorism, reference to mental states, such as an animal’s beliefs or desires, adds nothing to what psychology can and should understand about the sources of behavior. Mental states are private entities which, given the necessary publicity of science, do not form proper objects of empirical study.
...
Analytical or logical behaviorism is a theory within philosophy about the meaning or semantics of mental terms or concepts. It says that the very idea of a mental state or condition is the idea of a behavioral disposition or family of behavioral tendencies, evident in how a person behaves in one situation rather than another. When we attribute a belief, for example, to someone, we are not saying that he or she is in a particular internal state or condition. Instead, we are characterizing the person in terms of what he or she might do in particular situations or environmental interactions. Analytical behaviorism may be found in the work of Gilbert Ryle (1900–76) and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–51) (if perhaps not without controversy in interpretation, in Wittgenstein’s case).

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/behaviorism/

IMO, people do think in terms of internal states, though I think it's better to translate this into dispositions...if and when we care about being rational and scientific, etc.

Sure. I'm not trying to play the skeptic, nor am I trying to found some theory of knowledge. You might say I'm emphasizing the behaviorist streak in Wittgenstein. — hanaH

Correct me, but wouldn't Wittgenstein advise that we don't have a vantage point on ourselves necessary to diagnose behaviorism?

Mental states are private entities which, given the necessary publicity of science, do not form proper objects of empirical study. — hanaH

They aren't private in the sense used in the PLA, yet they remain subjective.

IMO, people do think in terms of internal states, though I think it's better to translate this into dispositions...if and when we care about being rational and scientific, etc. — hanaH

It's probably better to think in terms of subjectivity when we care about morality.

It is a description of the sensation, although not an complete one. — Fooloso4

Earlier in the discussion, I said:

I think Wittgenstein's point is that having a pain (or other sensation) is not something that one can come to know or to learn of, and so it does not constitute knowledge. In order for it to be (learned) knowledge, one would need to be able to guess or speculate whether one was in pain and then be able to confirm or disconfirm it. — Luke

This summarises the kernel of his On Certainty-style argument that can be found at PI 246, for example.

Along the same lines, in their exegesis of PI 290, Baker and Hacker state:

One says ‘I am in pain’ without justification. Whereas I identify the pain of another by reference to behavioural criteria (including his verbal behaviour), I do not identify my sensation by criteria, nor does a ‘private’ sample warrant my utterance. Indeed I do not identify my sensation (for there is here no possibility of any misidentification). — Baker and Hacker

They go on to explain that descriptions of physical objects are the terminus of that kind of language game, whereas verbal expressions of pain are the start of their kind of language game. We can be misled into thinking that these "descriptions" are on equal footing. As they say:

We take ‘I have a pain’ to be a description of the speaker’s state of mind, and so conceive this language‐game to begin with the sensation, which is observed, identified, ascribed to a subject (I) to whom one refers in the description which is the terminus of the language‐game. For when I describe my room, e.g. ‘The sofa‐table has a K’ang‐Hsi vase on it’, I observe the items in the room, identify them, satisfy myself that I know how things are, and refer to them in the description I give. But these language‐games are altogether different. I do not observe my sensations, nor do I identify them. There is no question of my knowing or not knowing how things are with me here. The first‐person pronoun thus used is not a referring expression, and in an avowal such as ‘I have a pain’ I do not ascribe an experience to a person to whom I refer (cf. Exg. §§404 – 10). An avowal of pain is not a description of one’s state of mind, nor is it a description of one’s pain. — Baker and Hacker

As Wittgenstein himself says at PI 290:

290. It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of criteria; it is, rather, that I use the same expression. But it is not as if the language-game ends with this; it begins with it. But doesn’t it begin with the sensation — which I describe? — Perhaps this word “describe” tricks us here. I say “I describe my state of mind” and “I describe my room”. One needs to call to mind the differences between the language-games. — LW

Correct me, but wouldn't Wittgenstein advise that we don't have a vantage point on ourselves necessary to diagnose behaviorism? — frank

I don't think I understand you here. In case it helps,

Why would anyone be a behaviorist?

The first reason is epistemic or evidential. Warrant or evidence for saying, at least in the third person case, that an animal or person is in a certain mental state, for example, possesses a certain belief, is grounded in behavior, understood as observable behavior. Moreover, the conceptual space or step between the claim that behavior warrants the attribution of belief and the claim that believing consists in behavior itself is a short and in some ways appealing step. If we look, for example, at how people are taught to use mental concepts and terms—terms like “believe”, “desire”, and so on—conditions of use appear inseparably connected with behavioral tendencies in certain circumstances. If mental state attribution bears a special connection with behavior, it is tempting to say that mentality just consists in behavioral tendencies.

That's one way to grok "meaning is use." This is not intended to exhaust the use of the phrase.

Correct me, but wouldn't Wittgenstein advise that we don't have a vantage point on ourselves necessary to diagnose behaviorism?
— frank

I don't think I understand you here. , — hanaH

Behaviorism is built on certain hinges that we don't verify.

The first reason is epistemic or evidential. Warrant or evidence for saying, at least in the third person case, that an animal or person is in a certain mental state

What I want you to do is turn the above around on the world you see around you. You have no warrant for saying you're not a brain in a vat.

In all the most significant ways, skepticism about mental states is the same as skepticism about external states.

And the answer to either is exactly the same.

Why? — Banno

This is how we decide conclusively whether two temporally separated instances of what appears to be the very same thing, actually are two instances of the very same thing, rather than two different but identical things, by referring to a spatial-temporal continuity. Think of what Wittgenstein says of the chair at 253. How would you determine conclusively that the chair in front of you is the same chair as was there yesterday, rather than another chair which is exactly the same? You'd look to determine the spatial-temporal continuity of the chair between yesterday and today. Hence spatial-temporal positioning is the principal criterion of identity.

As I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no "principal criterion of identity". — Banno

Wittgenstein presents us with the pieces of a puzzle, that is his way of writing the Philosophical Investigations. You, and "pretty much everyone else", are inclined to say that he presents us with a puzzle which cannot be solved. I am inclined to look for the resolution.

You, and "pretty much everyone else", are inclined to say that he presents us with a puzzle which cannot be solved. I am inclined to look for the resolution. — Metaphysician Undercover

He presented the solution, but you didn't notice and have gone off on your own.

This is how we decide conclusively whether two temporally separated instances of what appears to be the very same thing, actually are two instances of the very same thing, rather than two different but identical things, by referring to a spatial-temporal continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

tTat's just not what is being claimed. And this is the very point I made here:

...this is oddly matched against a form of essentialism, where there is a determinate meaning for each and every word... — Banno

You are convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings, in this case arguing that identity has something to do with location. But this is the very ting that has been dismissed in the argument you so tortuously mis-comprehend.

What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, we just decide to use words to treat them one way or the other, depending on what we need to do.

I really do not know how to put this any clearer.

Behaviorism is built on certain hinges that we don't verify. — frank

Sure. I'd say that (roughy) we reason from uncontroversial statements toward more controversial statements.

"The rat pushed the lever." This is something that anyone in the room could agree or disagree with, or so we typically think. A philosopher could muck even this up, but we can't afford to humor the radical skeptic all the time. ("How do we know it's the same rat from instant to instant? Maybe a different but extremely similar rat is teleported into the place of the rat of the previous instant?")

Economy is central here. What can we afford to doubt? What's the cost of the claimed difference? And so on.

What I want you to do is turn the above around on the world you see around you. You have no warrant for saying you're not a brain in a vat. — frank

It would be a difference that makes no difference. The vat theory just slaps a different token on the whole of experience without changing its internal structure. It's all mind. It's all matter. It's all a dream. These are information-poor statements. When does a child learn that physical objects exist? When the goo is slapped out of his newborn lungs or when he reads a history of philosophy? Or?

In all the most significant ways, skepticism about mental states is the same as skepticism about external states. — frank

If external just means public, then I don't see why this would be true.

What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, we just decide to use words to treat them one way or the other, depending on what we need to do. — Banno

:up:

Behaviorism is built on certain hinges that we don't verify.
— frank

Sure. I'd say that (roughy) we reason from uncontroversial statements toward more controversial statements. — hanaH

You missed the link to Wittgenstein there.

But yes. It's uncontroversial that people have mental states. The cost of your doubt is morality.

If you're happy with that, well, that's unfortunate for you.

But yes. It's uncontroversial that people have mental states. The cost of your doubt is morality. — frank

I think you are still misreading me. It's not about denying or affirming mental states. It's about cutting out an explanatory middle man, an appendix that serves no purpose, at least in a stricter, philosophical context. We can all still talk about our feelings and sensations when we are off the clock, but there's a reason that a psychologist or philosopher might want to minimize their dependence on entities that are private by definition (invisible to science and rationality by definition.)

It's about cutting out an explanatory middle man, an appendix that serves no purpose, at least in a stricter, philosophical context — hanaH

Mental states are central to morality. That's the heart, not the appendix.

but there's a reason that a psychologist or philosopher might want to minimize their dependence on entities that are private by definition (invisible to science and rationality by definition.) — hanaH

Scientists call it first-person data. It's certainly not invisible and not private as that word is used in the PLA.

But I'm repeating myself now. Probably a good time to thank you for the discussion and wish you well.

Adios
:up:

tTat's just not what is being claimed. — Banno

Well I know it's not what's being claimed, that's obvious. I didn't say it was being claimed, those words are my means of explanation.

You are convinced of something along the lines of words having determinate, identifiable or statable meanings, in this case arguing that identity has something to do with location. But this is the very ting that has been dismissed in the argument you so tortuously mis-comprehend. — Banno

I really don't know where you get this idea from. You do not seem to ever be capable of reading what I write because you have some preconceived notion of what I am "convinced of". That's probably the real reason you do not like to reply, because you cannot understand what I say, as what I say is always inconsistent with what you think I am convinced of..

Notice, that what I said is that spatial-temporal positioning is a type of description, therefore it does not provide for a true sense of "naming". That's why I said "in the end, such a naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible, because the principal criterion of identity is a thing's spatial-temporal positioning". I had already said that spatial-temporal position is a description, and therefore it cannot be the basis for a true "naming".

So you replied with "I, and pretty much everyone else, read this section, we see that what Wittgenstein has shown is that there can be no 'principal criterion of identity"'. But he really hasn't shown anything about any criterion of identity at this section. He has simply shown exactly what I said, "naming will prove to be nonsensical, or impossible". And as I explained (in my own words), this is because any attempt to name is reduced to a description. as the result of any application of a criterion of identity, which is a requirement for naming.

It's not the case that there cannot be a criterion of identity, what's the case, is that whatever criterion of identity we choose, it will not give us what Wittgenstein requires for a true naming.

What Wittgenstein shows is that words do not have such fixed meanings. — Banno

This is obvious, it's everywhere in the text..

We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing, — Banno

Yes we do decide this, quite commonly actually. It's an important legal matter of ownership and possession, for instance. If someone steals my possessions, and I see you with some things which appear to be exactly the same as mine, I might accuse you of theft. .We need to determine conclusively whether the things are or are not mine.

And, if that does not convince you, we could look at the methods of scientific experimentation, and the need to determine whether the object observed at a later time is the same object which was observed at an earlier time.

I really do not know how to put this any clearer, but you are being very foolish to claim that "We do not decide conclusively if two temporally separated instances are or are not the very same thing,"

Scientists call it first-person data. It's certainly not invisible and not private as that word is used in the PLA. — frank

Ask yourself what that can really mean. Public speech may report experiences using mentalistic language, but these reports themselves are strings of public tokens (or perhaps digital sound files.)
I can do science about how mentalistic language is used.

But Spock doing a mindmeld does not currently compute.

EDIT:
First I looked into first-person data, confirming what I expected it to be. Then I discovered someone who seems to make the same point as above.

First-person data have been both condemned and hailed because of their alleged privacy. Critics argue that science must be based on public evidence: since first-person data are private, they should be banned from science. Apologists reply that first-person data are necessary for understanding the mind: since first-person data are private, scientists must be allowed to use private evidence. I argue that both views rest on a false premise. In psychology and neuroscience, the subjects issuing first-person reports and other sources of first-person data play the epistemic role of a (self-) measuring instrument. Data from measuring instruments are public and can be validated by public methods. Therefore, first-person data are as public as other scientific data: their use in science is legitimate, in accordance with standard scientific methodology.

https://philpapers.org/rec/PICFD

This point is so obvious that it's strange to see it made. The thirst for hidden entities is so great that it's hard work to look at (public) surfaces?

But I'm repeating myself now. Probably a good time to thank you for the discussion and wish you well.

Adios
:up: — frank

Till next time.
:flower:

I should have known better than to engage. Enjoy the view up the garden path.

Now, can you see that "common or conventional usage", though it may dictate what is correct and incorrect, it does not necessarily indicate what is true and what is false. In other words, common usage might have us saying something which is false, because it is conventional, and therefore correct, though it is not true. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are you introducing truth and falsity?

241. “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their language that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life. — LW

If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Correctly call what existence? Are you questioning the existence and use of nouns?

If “X exists” amounts to no more than “X” has a meaning — then it is not a sentence which treats of X, but a sentence about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word “X”. — PI 58

So, let's look at what you call "the existence of a 'type'". If the "type" is produced by, or it's existence is dependent on, common, conventional, or correct usage, with complete disregard for truth or falsity, how can we correctly call this "existence"? Such a "type" is something purely imaginary, and it is incorrect to say that imaginary things have existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Whose imagination does common usage exist in? If all types are imaginary, then all nouns in the English language are imaginary. But in that case, I could not call you an imbecile.

Simply put, we commonly talk about nonexistent things. — Metaphysician Undercover

We also commonly talk about existent things. What's your point?

If the type-token distinction is merely classificatory, then all tokens would simply be types, because classification just produces types. — Metaphysician Undercover

So the type-token distinction, and classification more generally, is impossible? It's clearly not.

Come on Luke, 258, where "S" is proposed as the name of a sensation, is where he shows that there really is a problem with names referring to sensations.. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you said:

Reread 244 please. He distinctly says, there doesn't "seem" to be any problem here. Then he goes on to explain how there really is a problem with names referring to sensations.. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the problem with naming sensations is found at 258, then why tell me to re-read 244?

You might simply say, a "type" is a thing whose existence is created by common or conventional usage, but conventional usage is insufficient to support "existence". Talking about Santa Clause does not give that named thing existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Who claimed that it did?

So I'll reiterate, the problem is not with the reality of a private language, there is no problem here. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a very big problem here.

...All stated in a public language.
— Luke

Obviously you misunderstand. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nothing is more obvious than your misunderstanding of the private language argument.