:up: A difference in degree, not in kind, even though the ramifications differ in kind.

I don't agree that the ""meaning" of "headache"" is learned entirely on account of public behavior, though. One could not learn the meaning of headache if one had never felt pain. — Janus

To me this is not so obvious, however initially plausible. If you assume that meaning is referent, then it's a tautology. But in the Wittgensteinian spirit, I'd say that knowing what a word means is just knowing how to use it appropriately.

If I go by what you say, then I can't ever know if you know what "headache" means. The only way I can get a sense of whether you have experienced pain is by noting whether you use the token "pain" appropriately.

But in the Wittgensteinian spirit, I'd say that knowing what a word means is just knowing how to use it appropriately.

If I go by what you say, then I can't ever know if you know what "headache" means. The only way I can get a sense of whether you have experienced pain is by noting whether you use the token "pain" appropriately. — hanaH

I agree knowing what a word means involves knowing how to use it appropriately; but I cannot see how that could be the whole story. If the person who has never experienced pain talks about pain, the whole conception she could have of pain that informs that talking would be derived from the kinds of behavior exhibited by those who say they are in pain.

And that would be an inadequate conception inasmuch as it does not include the input derived from having experienced pain. Understanding pain cannot be wholly to do with what you can know about another, because in all cases their behavior could be wholly faked, and the concept of pain is not the concept of any kind of behavior, simply because someone could be in pain and manifest no outward sign of it at all.

Here's my take on what you're wondering about:

The correct use of words is a matter of convention which may change over time. — Janus

Intriguing to say the least. An attitude reminscent of Bolyai and Lobachevsky, the two of whom discovered/invented non-Euclidean geometry.

However, philosophy, I reckon, is aimed at grasping reality which means the meaning of "definition" has to be so crafted as to make that possible. Lobachevsky and Bolyai kind of moves (playing around with the definition of "definition") would eventually lead to us losing touch with reality unless...that doesn't happen and we actually end up gaining a deeper insight on the issues herein mentioned.

Thinking, believing, understanding, pointing, excusing, deducing, etc., etc. All the various concepts and activities of our lives have different conditions (criteria) and possibilities than reference or correspondence (and embody different interests and judgments of our culture in different ways). This is the main point of the PI (that everything is meaningful in its own way). — Antony Nickles

:up: What's meaningless in one language game is meaningful in another? :chin:

Why would Wittgenstein then say some philosophical problems are psuedo-problems, not real but actually instances of "bewitchment by language"? By the way, none of the articles I read on Wittgenstein provide concrete examples of this happening in actuality.

It doesn't make sense!

You are restricting what you call philosophy to something analogous to a statement being true or false (essence as something singular and certain), when, for example, Austin has shown that there are statements that have the value of being true without the same criteria and mechanism as true/false (that some statements accomplish something (or fail to) in the saying of them). — Antony Nickles

See my reply to Janus above - we can perform a Bolyai-Lobachevsky move no doubt but then the question is, will that bring us closer to reality or take us further away from it?

Not clear what your point is there.

I think knowing what a word means is knowing how to use it appropriately; but I cannot see how that could be the whole story. — Janus

I hear you, but if the proposed referent of "pain" is uncheckable, then there's no reason to even assume that it's singular (or that you and I have the same referent in mind in this very conversation.)

The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red pain and another section another. — W

None of this has anything to do with what you can know about another because in all cases their behavior could be wholly faked, and the concept of pain is not the concept of any kind of behavior, simply because someone could be in pain and manifest no outward sign of it at all. — Janus

I agree that someone might sit quietly in pain and even hide their pain (out of pride, perhaps, or fear.) I don't think this exceptional situation cancels the concept's dependence on behavior in general though. An angry person can conceal their anger, but surely the concept anger is learned with the help of the punching and yelling of self and others and correlated tokens.("He got real mad and hit her in the face.")

Why would Wittgenstein then say some philosophical problems are psuedo-problems, not real but actually instances of "bewitchment by language"? By the way, none of the articles I read on Wittgenstein provide concrete examples of this happening in actuality. — TheMadFool

Because philosophers get stuck in a word that may be totally misleading, thus getting stuck when a way out is manifest just by switching to another vocabulary. By switching such words, one switches one's way of thinking about the problem.

Take the word "thinking". We use it all the time, but it can be seriously misleading. Even though we use it, we're not sure about what it means. But if one assumes one does know, then one is infecting your philosophy to such an extent that you'll be willing to entertain the notion that machines can "think." If we don't know what thinking is for a human being, why apply it to machines, which are even further removed from us by many facts about nature.

Actually even the word "knowledge" is problematic, to such an extent that we even say that justified true beliefs constitute knowledge. But this is highly problematic. One can have a justified true belief, but not have knowledge:

Imagine you watch the finals in the NBA and team A beats team B. You saw it and reached this conclusion. Unbeknownst to you, what you were watching was a replay of a previos game in which the same team wins (team A) against the same opponent (team B). In the actual finals team A does beat team B, but you were watching a replay, not the actual game. So you had justified true belief, but it wasn't knowledge.

Not clear what your point is there. — Janus

It's all got to do with how we define the word "definition".

My guesstimate is that if our aim is to understand reality, the definition of "definition" will have to be tailored to that end. That's the reason why we've defined "definition" as about essential features (essences).

However, just like Bolyai & Lobachevsky (mathematicians) ushered in the era of non-Euclidean geometry simply by tinkering with the parallel postulate, we could to alter the definition of "definition", make it about something other than essences or play around with its logical structure (e.g. replace AND with OR) and see what happens, let the chips fall where they may in a manner of speaking.

Maybe, just maybe, something amazing might happen as it did with non-Euclidean geometry (theory of relativity).

Why would Wittgenstein then say some philosophical problems are psuedo-problems, not real but actually instances of "bewitchment by language"? By the way, none of the articles I read on Wittgenstein provide concrete examples of this happening in actuality. — TheMadFool

This may help (from the Blue Book).

The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently, comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results. Very often the way the discussion of such a puzzle runs is this: First the question is asked "What is time?" This question makes it appear that what we want is a definition. We mistakenly think that a definition is what will remove the trouble (as in certain states of indigestion we feel a kind of hunger which cannot be removed by eating); The question is then answered by a wrong definition; say: "Time is the motion of the celestial bodies". The next step is to see that this definition is unsatisfactory. But this only means that we don't use the word "time" synonymously with "motion of the celestial bodies". However in saying that the first definition is wrong, we are now tempted to think that we must replace it by a different one, the correct one.

Compare with this the case of the definition of number. Here the explanation that a number is the same thing as a numeral satisfies that first craving for a definition. And it is very difficult not to ask: "Well, if it isn't the numeral, what is it?"

Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.

Will think about it :up: Thanks a ton.

For me the meaning of 'definition' is given by the uses and purposes of dictionaries. (Actually one of the meanings of 'definition' because the word is also used as an antonym to blurriness). Dictionaries catalogue common current usages (and sometimes past, obsolete usages for the sake of those who might be interested). So, I'm not seeing a problem here.

bring us closer to reality or take us further away from it? — TheMadFool

What does this mean? It's like saying bringing a fish in the ocean closer to water or taking it farther way. :roll:

:up:

Update

For me the meaning of definition is given by the uses and purposes of dictionaries. Dictionaries catalogue common current usages (and sometimes past, obsolete usages for the sake of those who might be interested). So, I'm not seeing a problem here. — Janus

I'll respond to you later. See my update post.

What does this mean? It's like saying bringing a fish in the ocean closer to water or taking it farther way. :roll: — 180 Proof

It simply means how accurate is our mental model of reality.

Good points!

I hear you, but if the proposed referent of "pain" is uncheckable, then there's no reason to even assume that it's singular (or that you and I have the same referent in mind in this very conversation.) — hanaH

OK, I think I see the key difference between what we've each been saying. I would say that for a word to refer it is not necessary to know that it refers to the very same thing for all of us. In ostensive reference of course differences will become obvious. So I would agree that reference is more determinate in the empirical context. But I don't think that a lesser possibility of determination annuals the idea. It is enough that I take myself, and others generally take me, to be referring to a pain, an emotion, or a desire all of which are things commonly understood by almost everyone, to justify saying that non-ostensive words refer. I think the alternative is too black and white.

I don't think this exceptional situation cancels the concept's dependence on behavior in general though. — hanaH

In the spirit of not wanting to indulge in black and white thinking, I am not seeking to deny that the concept is at all dependent on behavior, I just want to say it is not (in its fullness) wholly dependent on behavior, as I think I've already acknowledged and explained.

In the spirit of not wanting to indulge in back and white thinking, I am not seeking to deny that the concept is at all dependent on behavior, I just want to say it is not (in its fullness) wholly dependent on behavior, as I think I've already acknowledged and explained. — Janus

Fair enough. We can drop it for now. Good chat!

That's a function of our brains' perceptual cognitive & psychological biases (contra Kant et al) and not just, or even principally, the function of our semantics. Scientific, rather than "mental", models (i.e. theories) seem the best approximations of reality we have (or need). The Scientific Image accounts for our Manifest Image but not the other way around. And so to which does philosophy belong? Both, I think, but only in the gaps where the Scientific & Manifest overlap.

Update

Do not mistake the finger pointing at the moon for the moon. — Some Guy

Wittgenstein claims that how we use the finger, what we point to with it, decides what the finger is, its meaning as it were. True that but...it doesn't follow that the moon or anything else the finger points to is minus an essence.

This is the crucial realization in my humble opinion: Wittgenstein's thesis would only carry weight if, in the example above, the moon (referent) itself had no essence to it. That would be an astounding discovery. However, since he's only really talking about the finger (words/signs), :meh:

That's a function of our brains' perceptual cognitive & psychological biases and not just, or even principally, our a function of semantics. Scientific, rather than "mental", models (i.e. theories) seem the best approximations of reality we have (or need). The Scientific Image accounts for our Manifest Image but not the other way around. And so to which does philosophy belong? Both, I think, but only in the gaps where they overlap. — 180 Proof

:up: Thanks.

Likewise :smile:

Found this, and I think it adds to the thread:

Irreferentialism

It has been noted how, in relation to introspection, Wittgenstein resisted the tendency of philosophers to view people’s inner mental lives on the familiar model of material objects. This is of a piece with his more general criticism of philosophical theories, which he believed tended to impose an overly referential conception of meaning on the complexities of ordinary language. He proposed instead that the meaning of a word be thought of as its use, or its role in the various “language games” of which ordinary talk consists. Once this is done, one will see that there is no reason to suppose, for example, that talk of mental images must refer to peculiar objects in a mysterious mental realm. Rather, terms like thought, sensation, and understanding should be understood on the model of an expression like the average American family, which of course does not refer to any actual family but to a ratio. This general approach to mental terms might be called irreferentialism. It does not deny that many ordinary mental claims are true; it simply denies that the terms in them refer to any real objects, states, or processes. As Wittgenstein put the point in his Philosophische Untersuchungen (1953; Philosophical Investigations), “If I speak of a fiction, it is of a grammatical fiction.”

Of course, in the case of the average American family, it is quite easy to paraphrase away the appearance of reference to some actual family. But how are the apparent references to mental phenomena to be paraphrased away? What is the literal truth underlying the richly reified façon de parler of mental talk?

Although Wittgenstein resisted general accounts of the meanings of words, insisting that the task of the philosopher was simply to describe the ordinary ways in which words are used, he did think that “an inner process stands in need of an outward criterion”—by which he seemed to mean a behavioral criterion.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy-of-mind/Radical-behaviourism

To me this is not about something like "only particles and waves are real" but rather about the stuff that makes science and rationality possible: public stuff. FWIW, I think it's mostly a dead end to try to give some strict definition of "real" (and the other common master words.)

:up:

(You posted that quote before I finished corrected it.)

Once this is done, one will see that there is no reason to suppose, for example, that talk of mental images must refer to peculiar objects in a mysterious mental realm. Rather, terms like thought, sensation, and understanding should be understood on the model of an expression like the average American family, which of course does not refer to any actual family but to a ratio. This general approach to mental terms might be called irreferentialism. It does not deny that many ordinary mental claims are true; it simply denies that the terms in them refer to any real objects, states, or processes.

I wonder if (for instance) this would cover logical laws, scientific hypotheses, mathematics. Through which many discoveries have been made about real objects, events, processes, which would never have been discovered through ordinary discourse.

it is interesting that a lot of the time there is the picture that thought is alive until it is put into language, and then, having been cemented in an expression, it is thus dead. — Antony Nickles

'The letter kills, the spirit gives life'.

Scientific, rather than "mental", models (i.e. theories) seem the best approximations of reality we have (or need). The Scientific Image accounts for our Manifest Image but not the other way around. And so to which does philosophy belong? Both, I think, but only in the gaps where the Scientific & Manifest overlap. — 180 Proof

Well, arguably, what happened to all that essence and substance talk, was that it was transformed into the basis for modern science.
— Wayfarer

That's why, it seems, I instinctively used H2O, the chemical formula for water, in my post. It seems so natural to do so, as if that, the chemical composition of water, is its (water's) essence but...is it? I suppose it is - everything about water can be explained with how the molecule H2O would/does behave. I wonder if Wittgenstein had anything to say about science and what seems to be its focus on the thing-in-itself (the referent e.g. water) rather than the sign (the word "water"). Could we then say that to deal with the Wittgensteinian problem of language games we could switch our perspective to a scientific one? I'm shooting in the dark here so do bear with me. — TheMadFool

Update

1. Context vs Language game & Form of life.

That the meaning of words depend on context was well established way before Wittgenstein formulated his theory of language games & forms of life. Ergo, since Wittgenstein believed that his theory was brand new indicates context-sensitive meaning of words was/is not what a language game & form of life is about.

2. Language as social (private language).

Here too, everyone already knew language, being a form of communication, is social and so what does Wittgenstein's claim that language is social add to what we were aware of long before Wittgenstein was even born.

.

Actually even the word "knowledge" is problematic, to such an extent that we even say that justified true beliefs constitute knowledge. But this is highly problematic. One can have a justified true belief, but not have knowledge:

Imagine you watch the finals in the NBA and team A beats team B. You saw it and reached this conclusion. Unbeknownst to you, what you were watching was a replay of a previos game in which the same team wins (team A) against the same opponent (team B). In the actual finals team A does beat team B, but you were watching a replay, not the actual game. So you had justified true belief, but it wasn't knowledge. — Manuel

It's just another kind of Gettier problem, and I believe Gettier is just wrong about this. Believing one is justified, is not the same as being justified. It's the difference between a claim, especially probability claims, which always carry with them the chance that your claim is incorrect, and what we mean by justification. Just because my sensory experiences usually lead to correct conclusions, doesn't mean they always do. It's the difference between believing that X is a fact, and X actually being a fact. If I make a claim that X is knowledge based on a particular justification, and you later find out that your justification was unwarranted, then it doesn't fit the definition, viz., it wasn't justified. We may have a good ground for our conclusion, and that grounding gives us a warrant to believe the conclusion, but if later you find out that your grounding is unwarranted, then you don't have knowledge. You may have the right to claim it's knowledge, but that right is dependent on what reality actually is. However, this is a bit off topic.

Could we then say that to deal with the Wittgensteinian problem of language games we could switch our perspective to a scientific one? I'm shooting in the dark here so do bear with me. — TheMadFool

Ah, Fool buddy, you've shot yourself in the dark again. :smirk:

There is no "Wittgensteinian problem of language-games" that I can see. Besides, "a scientific one" would just comprise another language-game. You either find Witty's semantics useful for clarifying our discursive (bad) habits or you do not. I very much do.

The PI could have justifiably – more precisely – been titled "Philosophical Reminders". He isn't providing new knowledge, Fool; Witty is elucidating confused and inconsistent discursive practices – calling attention to how philosophers in particular myopicly misuse ordinary language to, what he thought, say what cannot be said rather than shutting up when and where silence articulates – shows – what words cannot.

What's meaningless in one language game is meaningful in another? — TheMadFool

How an apology is meaningful is different than how fairness is meaningful. They have different criteria, they matter to us in different ways, we judge them on standards that are of different structures. This is the "grammar" which is the expression of their "essence", what is essential to us about each thing.

Why would Wittgenstein then say some philosophical problems are psuedo-problems, not real but actually instances of "bewitchment by language"? — TheMadFool

Language allows for our bewitchment. A word (different than a sentence) has the possibility of having a direct visual referent, so we can say the "meaning" of "cat" is that thing right there. We are mesmerized by the idea of all of language working this way because of our desire for certainty, something fixed, universal, predictable, etc. We can define a single word without a context, so we picture all language without any, removed from their ordinary criteria, and then we are tempted to impose our criteria for certainty, etc.

Philosophy, as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us.

-Witt, Blue Book, from @hanaH

So Wittgenstein's philosophy is to fight our temptation to take the forms of language that express certainty and apply them universally as a theory of meaning.