They. Exhaust. The. Possibilities. — Bartricks

No no no. Sure if a mind were to exist and were to be subject to time, it would have to be either past, present, or future. But what is the proof that minds are all subject to time in the first place?

But I believe there are none. If a proposition is true, it is not also false. — Bartricks

What makes you sure?

What if, God has actually made it so that propositions can be true and false at the same time, and tricked us into thinking that if a proposition is true it is not false?

You have no evidence that what she tells you is reality, because she told you the laws of reason, so you cannot use those laws to argue that she's not lying, they're precisely what's under suspicion.

To the first bit: burden of proof is on you. Explain how time can exist and a mind can exist yet that mind not exist either in the present, past or future.

To the second bit, I am so sure because my reason, like the reason of most others, tells me that no true proposition is also false. As with Aristotle, it tells me that a true proposition 'cannot' also be false, much as john McEnroe used to say you cannot be serious!?!". Of course, McEnroe did not mean that it is metaphysically impossible for the umpire to be serious. And likewise, when Reason tells us that a true proposition 'cannot' also be false, she is not saying that it is metaphysically impossible for it also to be false, but expressing the strength of her feeling on the matter.

To the first bit: burden of proof is on you. — Bartricks

No it isn't. I'm not definitively saying that a mind can exist outside of time. You're the one that's definitively saying it can't. The one pushing a position has to prove their premises. I don't care if a mind can exist outside of time or not because I find your formulation of mind idiotic in the first place, so I don't care to investigate.

I am so sure because my reason, like the reason of most others, tells me that no true proposition is also false. — Bartricks

Why do you trust your reason? Why is reason trustworthy?

Normally these would be very stupid questions, but your definition of reason is unlike most. Reason, to you, is a mind, a person, who tells you the rules of thought. Why do you trust them?

They're capable of contradictions, they can make it so that a proposition is true and false at the same time, and NOT tell you that they have done so. So why do you trust that they haven't done so?

Ah yes, the old 'the one who asserts something has the burden of proof'thing - the mantra of the youtube educated.
As you have asserted that the one who asserts something has the burden of proof, will you discharge that burden in respect of that assertion please. Do that before we move on

Reply to the rest of the comment you coward.

As you have asserted that the one who asserts something has the burden of proof, will you discharge that burden in respect of that assertion please. — Bartricks

You're right, I can't.

Now why do I have the burden of proof? What's your standard by which you determine that I have it? If "the one that pushes a position has burden of proof" isn't what you're using, what are you using?

So do you now accept that the youtube mantra is false?

Yes. Now reply to the rest of the comment. And state what standard you propose for determining burden of proof.

I don't believe you. I believe you thought it was true.

You have the burden of proof. Why? Because one has the burden of proof when what one is claiming is contrary to the appearances.

Now, once more, describe to me how a mind and time can exist, yet the mind not be present, future or past. That is to say, generate that appearance. You are unable to, yes? Thus, I am right and you are wrong. If time exists - and it appears to and thus we are justified in believing it to - then all minds that exist are subject to it, including God's. Got it?

Because one has the burden of proof when what one is claiming is contrary to the appearances. — Bartricks

Well the point is, it doesn't appear to me that minds must all be in present, future or past. Because the existence of minds as you describe them appears to me to be clearly contrary to reality.

What is your policy when following one appearance leads to a conclusion that clearly appears to be false? Like, for example, it being true that the rape victim deserved what happened to them (which you think is true, yes?) being a consequence of you reasoning from what appears to be true. What do you do then?

Now, once more, describe to me how a mind and time can exist, yet the mind not be present, future or past. That is to say, generate that appearance. — Bartricks

A disembodied head looking at a timeline of events, while not itself being at any one time.

Now, do you plan to address this:

I am so sure because my reason, like the reason of most others, tells me that no true proposition is also false.
— Bartricks

Why do you trust your reason? Why is reason trustworthy?

Normally these would be very stupid questions, but your definition of reason is unlike most. Reason, to you, is a mind, a person, who tells you the rules of thought. Why do you trust them?

They're capable of contradictions, they can make it so that a proposition is true and false at the same time, and NOT tell you that they have done so. So why do you trust that they haven't done so? — khaled

You have asked what, by your own admission, is a stupid question - why is reason trustworthy?
Why did you do that? We all have stupid thoughts. The key is to keep them in your mind and not blurt them out. That's the value of recognizing they're stupid, stupid.
Anyway, either you think there's a reason to think reason is not trustworthy- in which case you trust her about that at least (which is irrational as of all the things an untrustworthy person might say, they are unlikely to tell you they are not trustworthy!) - or you think there is no reason not to trust reason,in which case you trust her.

Note too, that I trusted reason 'before' I came to the conclusion she was a mind, for that was how I arrived at it: I listened and trusted what I was told.

Squirm squirm squirm. Take a tree then. Describe to me how a tree and time can exist, yet the tree not be present, future or past.

Oh, and your silly attemp failed, for I could only picture a head existing at a time, not one existing but at no time.

by your own admission, is a stupid question — Bartricks

False. I said that normally it'd be stupid but your definitions make it important.

Anyway, either you think there's a reason to think reason is not trustworthy- in which case you trust her about that at least (which is irrational as of all the things an untrustworthy person might say, they are unlikely to tell you they are not trustworthy!) - or you think there is no reason not to trust reason,in which case you trust her. — Bartricks

No. I think your formulation makes it so that there is no reason to trust or distrust. I'm not definitively saying she is lying, you are saying she is definitively not lying, and I'm pointing out that your framework does not allow you to make that case.

Why can't you just address a comment in its entirety?

What is your policy when following one appearance leads to a conclusion that clearly appears to be false? Like, for example, it being true that the rape victim deserved what happened to them (which you think is true, yes?) being a consequence of you reasoning from what appears to be true. What do you do then? — khaled

And add to that, what do you do when people don't see the same appearances.

Describe to me how a tree and time can exist, yet the tree not be present, future or past. — Bartricks

What would this accomplish? Even if I couldn't, what would that prove?

No, regardless of what one ends up concluding Reason is, it is stupid to ask "why trust Reason?"
It's intrinsically stupid, for the reasons I outlined - reasons, of course, that the stupid can't recognize.
This is the well known problem with the stupid. Those who ask stupid questions are the least able to recognize why those questions are stupid. Indeed, a stupid person asking a stupid question will only really be satisfied when they receive a suitably stupid answer.
I'll give it a go then. Why should you trust Reason? Because she's pretty, that's why. Happy?

Because she's pretty, that's why. — Bartricks

Really? What does she look like?

Now, for the rest? What happens when appearances contradict, like by having "The rape victim deserved it" come out as a conclusion? What happens when people have different appearances? What's the point of the tree?

Incidentally, i don't think Reason doesn't lie; I have never said that. The point is that one default trusts Reason; that's compatible with finding some of what she says to be dubious.
Note too that you asked me why I think the law of non-contradiction is true. To which my answer was that my reason and virtualy everyone else's represents it to be. Which is damn good evidence, yes?

So, Reason is to be default trusted - indeed, trying to default distrust Reason is a rationally self undermining task.

And the law of non contradiction is true, beyond any reasonable doubt.

Now address the OP and stop driving the discussion into the sands of broader issues in epistemology.

Those who ask stupid questions are the least able to recognize why those questions are stupid. Indeed, a stupid person asking a stupid question will only really be satisfied when they receive a suitably stupid answer. — Bartricks

No question is stupid, only answer can be stupid.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_such_thing_as_a_stupid_question

Loads of questions are stupid, including 'why trust reason?'
I explained why. But again, someone who thinks there are no stupid questions is someone ill equipped to be able to understand the stupidity of the many stupid questions that there are.

i don't think Reason doesn't lie; I have never said that. The point is that one default trusts Reason — Bartricks

Ah, that makes more sense. That's certainly more agreeable. The way you defended her trustworthiness made it seem like you believe she never lies.

Now address the OP and stop driving the discussion into the stands of broader issues in epistemology. — Bartricks

Well I did. I asked you to prove why all minds are subjects of time. You asked me to make the appearance of a mind that's not in time. I did so. Now we're pending your proof.

And broader issues in epistemology tend to come in a lot in any argument. You rely a lot on appearances so you must have some consistent way of sorting through what to do when appearances contradict, either your own with each other, or your own with others'.

For instance, you came to the conclusion that a rape victim deserves to be raped (because God wouldn't allow someone innocent to suffer unnecessarily so they must have not been innocent/they deserved it), which I dare say is very contrary to appearances, by logically following the consequences of different appearances. But instead of doubting your conclusion, you decided that indeed, rape victims deserve to be raped. Why that decision?

And it is very clear that much of what appears true to you doesn't appear to be true to a majority of people but at the same time you frequently make points about how some statements appear true to a majority by referring to expert opinion and whatnot. How do you decide when to trust what appears to you to be the case, and when to revise your position in light of what appears to other people?

I'm going to sleep now. Nice chat bart.

That's just you being crude. Once again, let's go through the process. You asked me a question. You asked me how I knew that the law of non-contradiction was true. I explained, citing widespread corroborative rational appearances. You then asked why I trusted reason - which note, was not something I had said. I had not said the I think everything reason says is true....therefore. Nevertheless,i kindly went on to explain why we are default justified in trusting rational appearances and thus can safely conclude that the law of non-contradiction is true.
What you need to do - and this will be difficult - is resist the temptation to think my thoughts with your mental vocabulary. It isn't up to the job.

Oh, andi explained how your head example didn't work. To imagine the head existing and time existing I had to imagine the head existing in time.

Why are you talking about rape victims deserving to be raped? That's not my view (it's your interpretation of my view, not my actual view, which is subtler than you could possibly handle and involves deserving to live in ignorance in a dangerous world with dangerous people), and even if it was, why mention it here? Focus on time.

Ok last one, it's 2 am here.

You then asked why I trusted reason - which note, was not something I had said. I had not said the I think everything reason says is true. — Bartricks

Then we should be in agreement! I was arguing against this position which you deny supporting, what's the issue?

we are default justified in trusting rational appearances and thus can safely conclude that the law of non-contradiction is true. — Bartricks

But I always thought so (note, this is a very different claim from the one I was arguing against which is that everything reason says is true). I thought you had said that we should always trust reason. I was mistaken in that regard and admitted so:

Ah, that makes more sense. That's certainly more agreeable. The way you defended her trustworthiness made it seem like you believe she never lies. — khaled

You tell me to:

stop driving the discussion into the stands of broader issues in epistemology. — Bartricks

But here you are still dwelling on a point about broader issues in epistemology, when I had already returned to our discussion of the OP here:

I asked you to prove why all minds are subjects of time. You asked me to make the appearance of a mind that's not in time. I did so. Now we're pending your proof. — khaled

Is this characterization inaccurate somehow?

What am I being crude about exactly? I don't understand what you want me to address.

Now, on the topic of broader issues in epistemology:

broader issues in epistemology tend to come in a lot in any argument. You rely a lot on appearances so you must have some consistent way of sorting through what to do when appearances contradict, either your own with each other, or your own with others'.

For instance, you came to the conclusion that a rape victim deserves to be raped (because God wouldn't allow someone innocent to suffer unnecessarily so they must have not been innocent/they deserved it), which I dare say is very contrary to appearances, by logically following the consequences of different appearances. But instead of doubting your conclusion, you decided that indeed, rape victims deserve to be raped. Why that decision?

And it is very clear that much of what appears true to you doesn't appear to be true to a majority of people but at the same time you frequently make points about how some statements appear true to a majority by referring to expert opinion and whatnot. How do you decide when to trust what appears to you to be the case, and when to revise your position in light of what appears to other people? — khaled

Or do you want to get back to the significance of a tree out of time? Up to you, but I bet these "broader discussions in epistemology" will come up sooner or later so I'd address them now.

The view that everything Reason says is true is not a view I have ever expressed. It's not one I hold. It's a view you hear in your head when I say something much subtler. You keep trying to paint a Leonardo with a paintroller. Sheesh.

And I explained why your example failed. You might as well have said 'imagine that time exists and a mind exists, but the mind doesn't exist in the present or the future or the past. Done. Over to you".

As to these broader issues - you'd bring them up no matter what the topic. This thread is about time. I have appealed to rational representations. All arguments do. All philosophical cases for anything do. It's not an eccentricity on my part. My view about the nature of reason is certainly eccentric (though demonstrably true). But to keep asking me to defend it when what I M appealing to is the content of reason and not Reason's nature is just derailing.

But if God created time, then time was not needed for that initial act of creation. We can conclude, then, that there can be creation without time, for otherwise time itself could not have been created. — Bartricks

I'm a late-comer to this thread, and haven't read much of the subsequent discussion following the OP. But I may have something to add, relevant to the quote above. I don't have any direct knowledge of the Creator of our temporal world -- it could have been a tower-of-turtles in a time-bound Multiverse, for all I know. But I think it's more reasonable that the creator of Space-Time & Matter-Energy was independent of such limitations. In other words, whatever caused the hypothetical initial Singularity to explode into space-time must have existed in some sense prior to Space-Time.

So, it seems that the Creator (which I label ambiguously as "G*D") could only have existed as Eternal-Potential, instead of Temporal-Actual. Admittedly, Aristotelian "Potential" does not exist in any physical empirical sense. You can't examine it under a microscope. But as a metaphysical theoretical Platonic "Ideal", it encompasses unlimited infinite Possibilities. In the Real world, only lawful things are possible, By that, I mean, Natural Laws are the boundaries of Nature. In which case, only something not subject to those laws --- not natural ; unbounded --- could create the laws themselves : The Lawmaker.

Therefore, I conclude that the Singularity, and its subsequent Big Bang blowup, was not a physical thing --- subject to limits & laws --- but a program (design ; plan) for world creation, existing as an ethereal idea in the timeless Mind of G*D. And that is what I would call "creation without time". Real world Space-Time --- an ideal mathematical model --- exists only in the presence of Matter-Energy --- the physical elements of the real world. Hence, the Eternal Cause of our Temporal World cannot be Real ; so must be Ideal : existing only in unbound Potential. That is the assumption of PanEnDeism. :cool:



"Turtles all the way down" is an expression of the problem of infinite regress.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down

Aristotelian Potential :
In philosophy, potentiality and actuality[1] are a pair of closely connected principles which Aristotle used to analyze motion, causality, ethics, and physiology in his Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and De Anima. . . . The concept of potentiality, in this context, generally refers to any "possibility" that a thing can be said to have . . . Actuality, in contrast to potentiality, is the motion, change or activity that represents an exercise or fulfillment of a possibility, when a possibility becomes real in the fullest sense
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Potentiality_and_actuality

Platonic idealism usually refers to Plato's theory of forms or doctrine of ideas. It holds that only ideas encapsulate the true and essential nature of things, in a way that the physical form cannot.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic_idealism

Panendeism is an ontological position that explores the interrelationship between God (The Cosmic Mind) and the known attributes of the universe. Combining aspects of Panentheism and Deism, Panendeism proposes an idea of God that both embodies the universe and is transcendent of its observable physical properties. https://panendeism.org/faq-and-questions/
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page16.html

I really should stop

The view that everything Reason says is true is not a view I have ever expressed. It's not one I hold. — Bartricks

And I apologize for misinterpreting you, for the third time. You won Bart! You actually have an idea that makes sense! Good job! Now, here is your homework.

1- Getting back to the OP:

I asked you to prove why all minds are subjects of time. You asked me to make the appearance of a mind that's not in time. I did so. Now we're pending your proof. — khaled

And what is the significance of your question about a tree out of time?

But since you apparently don’t want to get back to the OP:

2- What do you do when appearances lead to apparently false conclusions, like rape victims deserving it:

you came to the conclusion that a rape victim deserves to be raped (because God wouldn't allow someone innocent to suffer unnecessarily so they must have not been innocent/they deserved it), which I dare say is very contrary to appearances, by logically following the consequences of different appearances. But instead of doubting your conclusion, you decided that indeed, rape victims deserve to be raped. Why that decision? — khaled

3- What do you do when what appears to you is different from what appears to others:

And it is very clear that much of what appears true to you doesn't appear to be true to a majority of people but at the same time you frequently make points about how some statements appear true to a majority by referring to expert opinion and whatnot. How do you decide when to trust what appears to you to be the case, and when to revise your position in light of what appears to other people? — khaled

Have fun!

I mentioned the tree merely because you seemed to think it was something about minds specifically- and more, my immaterialist conception of them - that was doing the work. No. If time exists, then the things that exist - trees, minds, whatever - exist in time. For they are all either present, future or past.

Now, you don't seem able to focus and can't resist wider epistemological issues not directly relevant to the question. But I am nice, so I will say something about them.

First, I do not believe all rape victims deserve to be raped. I believe that we all deserve to be exposed to the risks of harm that living in ignorance in this world exposes us to. That's different. Why? If you buy a lottery ticket, then you deserve to have a chance of winning. That does not mean that if you win, you deserved to win,or that if you lose, you deserved to lose. The bad things that happen to us are like that. We deserved to be exposed to the risk of them. But it does not follow that the particular harms that befall us were individually deserved. Importantly as well,our job is to treat others as if they are innocent.

That's my view, a view arrived at by rational reflection - a view that simply follows from the fact God exists and the fact that God would not suffer innocent people to live in ignorance in a dangerous world like this one.

It is not, then, contrary to any rational appearances, or at least not when one realizes that we ourselves are to view others as innocent. It simply conflicts with a widespread assumption - namely that we are born innocent and that the world is consequently an unjust place.

But anyway, if or when appearances conflict, then our faculty of reason appears to be unreliable on that matter, yes?

• All theorems of propositional calculus are necessary theorems of modal logic.
• The Law of Noncontradiction is a theorem of propositional calculus.
• Therefore the Law of noncontradiction is a necessary theorem of modal logic.
• If the Law of Noncontradiction is a necessary theorem, then it is not contingent.
• The law of noncontradiction is not contingent.

No true proposition is also false. I think that's true. I just don't think it is necessarily true. Telling me over and over that most philosophers think it is necessarily true is beside the point. I know. But this philosopher thinks it is just true.
You have previously insisted that my position commits me to affirming an actual contradiction. Yet you have been unable to show this. All you can do is huff and puff and insist, but you can't show it. Show it. And do so using premises I will accept - that is premises that do not presuppose that some truths are necessary. .

No true proposition is also false. I think that's true. I just don't think it is necessarily true. — Bartricks

Understood.

Telling me over and over that most philosophers think it is necessarily true is beside the point. I know. But this philosopher thinks it is just true. — Bartricks

I'm not just telling you, I am demonstrating it:

• All theorems of propositional calculus are necessary theorems of modal logic.
• The Law of Noncontradiction is a theorem of propositional calculus.
• Therefore the Law of noncontradiction is a necessary theorem of modal logic.
• If the Law of Noncontradiction is a necessary theorem, then it is not contingent.
• The law of noncontradiction is not contingent.

So, where does this argument go wrong? Want me to do it for you?

You have previously insisted that my position commits me to affirming an actual contradiction. Yet you have been unable to show this. — Bartricks

The contradiction is in your claim that the LNC is true in all possible situations but not necessarily true. You will have to explain this by digging yourself a deeper hole, and claiming that ☐p is not the same as ~⬦~p.

Show it. And do so using premises I will accept - that is premises that do not presuppose that some truths are necessary. . — Bartricks

Geach: "...as barren as a victory by an incessant demand that your adversary should prove his premises or define his terms."]

My bolding, to emphasis the similarity to your posts. — Banno

All theorems of propositional calculus are necessary theorems of modal logic.
The Law of Noncontradiction is a theorem of propositional calculus.
Therefore the Law of noncontradiction is a necessary theorem of modal logic.
If the Law of Noncontradiction is a necessary theorem, then it is not contingent.
The law of noncontradiction is not contingent. — Banno

It's question begging (and has other faults beside).

You need to show that my claim - that no true proposition is also false - generates a contradiction, due to the fact I have omitted any mention of necessity. Remember: I do not think that any true proposition is also false. And remember that I do not think that is necessarily true, just contingently true. Now, once more, without just assuming that it is necessarily true - which would obviously be question begging - show how I am committed to affirming a contradiction. Without squiggles and squoggles.

The contradiction is in your claim that the LNC is true in all possible situations but not necessarily true. — Banno

I don't claim that the law of non-contradiction is true in all possible situations! Christ. You literally just said you understood. You don't. I think it is contingently true, not necessarily true.

And stop - stop - squiggling and squoggling. I haven't the faintest idea what they mean. Box wiggle triangle. It's mental.

Tell me, @Bartricks, what would convince you that your argument is wrong?