I cannot give you a thorough justification of anything. — Manuel

Well, then I don't have much reason to believe your statement and neither do you.

That's surely JTB and knowledge for that time. We would not call it knowledge today. — Manuel

Why in the world would that be JTB? It's not true and it's not justified. Just because someone believes their beliefs to be true and justified doesn't make it so.

But what about our beliefs now? They could be rendered false in a few decades. So we would have no knowledge. — Manuel

Yep.

If something is fact, then there could be no alternative fact.
If there are multiple facts then which one is true?

Pragmatic use of a fact is therefore take it or leave it, use it or don't use it depending on whether that fact is useful or not rather true or false, because a fact already is true.

Well, then I don't have much reason to believe your statement and neither do you. — Artemis

If that's how you take it, fine.

Why in the world would that be JTB? It's not true and it's not justified. Just because someone believes their beliefs to be true and justified doesn't make it so. — Artemis

Really?!?

You're born in the middle of a tribe, you see this vast ocean of things in the sky. You have no access to telescopes, books or anything else. It surely seems like the Earth is the center of the universe. It surely looks as if stars are diamonds in the sky. It's not unreasonable at all to believe this at that time. It would have been knowledge for them, I don't see why not.

If you don't have any recourse for better data, I don't see why you wouldn't have beliefs you take to be true. What's the alternative? Have no beliefs? That's just not possible.

Yep — Artemis

That makes no sense at all.

It would have been knowledge for them, I don't see why not. — Manuel

Because it isn't true. The earth is not actually the center of the universe and nothing they believe would make it so.

Not even Gettier challenged the idea that knowledge has to at least be objectively true!

Replying to both:

If you don't have any recourse for better data, I don't see why you wouldn't have beliefs you take to be true. What's the alternative? Have no beliefs? That's just not possible. — Manuel

and

That makes no sense at all. — Manuel

Sure it does. Once you realize that belief is not the same as knowledge. Belief is just one of the three components of knowledge. It is necessary but not sufficient.

Also, I find it interesting that you seem to be doing a 180 here from your statements in another thread:

Subjective experiences are not evidential, not admissible in the Court of Mikey as evidence; the only evidence which is admissible is objective in nature, and perceptible by those other than the claimant.
— Michael Zwingli

I agree.

Many people do not. You hear people speaking of "my truth" or "it's true to me" all the time. Yeah, such statements aren't suitable for logic, given the context. But people will continue to use it as evidence. — Manuel

So which is it? Do you agree or disagree that truth is relative?

Because it isn't true. The earth is not actually the center of the universe and nothing they believe would make it so. — Artemis

We can say that now. Back then they could not. It was the best theory they had for the time and not an unreasonable one at that, to me anyway. What would you expect them to say, "I believe the Earth is the center of the universe, but it is not true."

Sure it does. Once you realize that belief is not the same as knowledge. Belief is just one of the three components of knowledge. It is necessary but not sufficient. — Artemis

I am saying that people who studied alchemy, for whatever purposes, do have knowledge. They are knowledgeable about alchemy. Sure, alchemy is not true of the of the mind-indpendent world, but I wouldn't say that someone who is knowledgeable of alchemy only has beliefs. That sounds too religious-y for me.

Likewise, a reader can know a lot about 1984 by Orwell. But this of course does not mean that 1984 happened mind-independelty.

So which is it? Do you agree or disagree that truth is relative? — Artemis

That's a tough one. Initially I'd say that science aims at mind-independent knowledge, not dependent on our opinions or tastes. At the same time, science is dependent on human beings, who discovered it. So an element of subjectivity remains.

If a person claims to use personal experience as an argument for a truth claim about the world, I wouldn't accept it. But I cannot deny to such people that the experience they had is not true, if they limit it to experience alone, I don't have a problem.

Truths about the world are relative in a very different sense than personal truths.

We can say that now. Back then they could not. It was the best theory they had for the time and not an unreasonable one at that, to me anyway. What would you expect them to say, "I believe the Earth is the center of the universe, but it is not true." — Manuel

Their beliefs about the world back then may have been reasonable enough for the time, but since they weren't true, they weren't knowledge. A person can believe to know something and be wrong. Just because you believe one of your beliefs is knowledge doesn't mean it is knowledge.

THUS you embrace fallibalism: I believe that I know certain things, but I also acknowledge that I might be wrong. In fact, I don't know about which of my knowledge claims I am wrong, or to which degree, but I'm pretty certain lots of the things I believe to know are not true and therefore not knowledge.

You were right to suggest we must believe things to even function. And as such, I am stuck believing things that I can be reasonably certain will be disproven someway somehow someday. But it's still NOT knowledge.

If a person claims to use personal experience as an argument for a truth claim about the world, I wouldn't accept it. But I cannot deny to such people that the experience they had is not true, if they limit it to experience alone, I don't have a problem.

Truths about the world are relative in a very different sense than personal truths. — Manuel

Well, we seem to agree mostly here.
Exactly: it IS true that a person has such and such experiences. But a person's experiences have no bearing on the reality of things. If someone took LSD and told you they saw a pink, invisible unicorn in your house, you can BOTH acknowledge that they TRULY had this mental experience AND that there is no actual pink, invisible unicorn. They do know that they had an experience of a pink, invisible unicorn. They do not know that there IS a pink, invisible unicorn.

In short: it's the literal difference between something just being a belief and knowledge. This is literally WHY the definition includes a) justified and b)true. Knowledge is a KIND of belief, but not all beliefs are knowledge.

I don't see what is gained by insisting that knowledge must be thought of as so and so. The way I see it if that if we continue insisting on these criteria, we face the prospects of saying "We never had any knowledge of anything ever", because the details will change.

If you want to think of knowledge in this way, because it's useful to you, then by all means keep using it.

I agree with you on fallibalism.

If someone took LSD and told you they saw a pink, invisible unicorn in your house, you can BOTH acknowledge that they TRULY had this mental experience AND that there is no actual pink, invisible unicorn. — Artemis

As stated, no problems here, I agree. Well said. :up:

They do know that they had an experience of a pink, invisible unicorn. They do not know that there IS a pink, invisible unicorn. — Artemis

I think it is more helpful to keep the distinction between mind-independent and mind-depedent reality instead of knowledge. The way you phrase it sounds weird to me.

Yeah, there is a difference between belief and knowledge. Belief is rather English specific, it has strong religious connotations.

I don't see what is gained by insisting that knowledge must be thought of as so and so. The way I see it if that if we continue insisting on these criteria, we face the prospects of saying "We never had any knowledge of anything ever", because the details will change — Manuel

Well, by being clear and precise we get closer to actual truth and actual knowledge, for starters. Why do we define anything? So that we can put together coherent thoughts, build upon those thoughts, and share them with others. If I say cat and I mean panda and we're trying to have a conversation about pet keeping, you're a)going to get pretty confused really fast and b) the conversation is not going to go anywhere useful... up until the point of course we recognize our verbal misunderstanding, chuckle a bit about how silly we sounded, and THEN continue talking with a shared vocabulary.

And yeah, lots of what we think we know is going to be proven outright wrong or tweaked along the way someday. You seem... more uncomfortable with that notion than you seem to have an actual reasons to dispute it? But discomfort isn't a good reason to discount something.

I think it is more helpful to keep the distinction between mind-independent and mind-depedent instead of knowledge — Manuel

Why? Seems to me those are merely adjectives to describe knowledge.

Belief is rather English specific, it has strong religious connotations. — Manuel

In academic philosophy we don't use it with religious connotations.

As for other languages... well, I'm only bilingual and can't speak for the vast majority out there, but german shares the difference between "Glaube" and "Wissen." But more to the point, if other languages lack the specific ideas of "belief" versus "knowledge," then that alone doesn't change the validity of our definitions thereof. That is, after all, why languages borrow from another: to fill gaps and needs in their own language. English-speaking philosophy loves borrowing "Dasein" and "Weltanschauung" for example, and german philosophy likes "ecocriticism" and other english neologisms (german has a rich history in philosophy, so they didn't borrow much until more recently).

If you want to think of knowledge in this way, because it's useful to you, then by all means keep using it. — Manuel

Ah, the retreat back to relativism. "You do you" etc. But the slippery slope you mentioned earlier lies precisely IN relativism. Relativism inexorably leads down to nobody being able to make any truth claims or claims at all without getting themselves endlessly riddled in self-contradictions.

the conversation is not going to go anywhere useful... up until the point of course we recognize our verbal misunderstanding, chuckle a bit about how silly we sounded, and THEN continue talking with a shared vocabulary. — Artemis

We can talk about cats and not pandas, no problem.

And yeah, lots of what we think we know is going to be proven outright wrong or tweaked along the way someday. You seem... more uncomfortable with that notion than you seem to have an actual reasons to dispute it? But discomfort isn't a good reason to discount something. — Artemis

I don't want to have a truth claim to what knowledge is such that if a person disagrees with my definition, I'll then say that they don't have any knowledge, when it is not clear what counts as knowledge or not. You seem to hold that knowledge is true by virtue of its relation to the world as well as it being JTB.

The first is what science seeks to do, always subject to revision, the second is more fruitfully thought of, for me, as claims about mind-dependce vs mind-independence.

I want to say that novelists, historians and philosophers can be very knowledgeable, as they are, without arbitrarily limiting the use of the word "knowledge" to mean, what exists absent us.

That does not mean that some people do not have more knowledge than others, they often do, or that what one counts as knowledge is on shaky grounds as truth claims, this happens frequently.

then that alone doesn't change the validity of our definitions thereof. That is, after all, why languages borrow from another: to fill gaps and needs in their own language. — Artemis

Sure, quite true.

I only know Spanish, besides English, and belief in Spanish is "creencia", almost always used for religious arguments. As far as I'm aware, it's very similar in French too.

I take this to suggest that our use of the word "belief" is an English peculiarity, which might not be the best word to discuss this issues. We could use "ideas" or "thoughts" instead and avoid religious connotations.

Ah, the retreat back to relativism. "You do you" etc. But the slippery slope you mentioned earlier lies precisely IN relativism. Relativism inexorably leads down to nobody being able to make any truth claims or claims at all without getting themselves endlessly riddled in self-contradictions. — Artemis

I very much dislike, and have said so numerous times here almost all French Postmodernists, I think calling Rorty a pragmatist is an insult to Peirce, James and Dewey.

I believe in science, though very much dislike scienticsm.

The "you do you" is meant as a suggestion of practicality, as we don't appear to be convincing each other, though we agree in some areas, such as in fallibalism and illusions.

When does a fact establish itself as knowledge? More precisely, if knowledge is Justified-True-Belief, then how do facts fit into such a conceptual scheme for or of knowledge? — Shawn

Wittgenstein looks at belief in the Philosophical Investigations. He lands on the claim that belief operates like a hypothesis: "I believe it's going to rain". The other sense of belief is a strong feeling, like emphatic confidence: "I really believe in our chances for a win today." I think the way that belief is used in philosophy is like an opinion, which, structurally, appears to be individual: "In my opinion, ..." but also, restricted to certain topics: politics, moral moments, art. We do not have facts in these areas, nor is our opinion capable of being a fact, however justified. That does not mean that there aren't things like authority, expertise, norms, expectations, judgement, criticism, conceptual structure, etc. It's just that an opinion on these subjects will never become a fact.

Cavell says in The Claim of Reason that the thing that gives a fact its "factness", its certainty, its universality, its repeatability, its completeness of application, is not its justification nor its correspondence to the world, but the method of science. I'm not heavily-studied in philosophy of science, but there is science done well, and done poorly, as well as "soft" sciences (like economics) which, although they involve math, do not offer repeatable conclusions. This lack of reference is why we can be wrong about facts, why our world must only be a paradigm (Kuhn) though a fact is a fact nevertheless (until it is not).

I want to say that novelists, historians and philosophers can be very knowledgeable, as they are, without arbitrarily limiting the use of the word "knowledge" to mean, what exists absent us. — Manuel

First of all, philosophers spend a great deal of time trying to get their vocabulary right. I don't even understand how you (as someone who seems to have spent some time in academia) would come to dismiss the need for a clear and precise vocabulary in philosophy. Doesn't mean you can't revise the vocabulary, but you absolutely must be clear about what you're saying.

Additionally, an idea or a thought is not the same as a belief. You don't believe all the thoughts and ideas you have. Belief is a kind of thought or idea, namely one you think is true.

You can't both agree that we should be clear whether we are speaking of cats or pandas AND dismiss the need to be clear what we mean by "knowledge" or any other term in philosophy.

Second of all, JTB doesn't limit knowledge to mean what exists absent us. Knowledge is a particular kind of belief. Therefore it is very much something which can only exist in the mind. But it is a belief that is only then properly labeled as knowledge when and if it corresponds with the world "absent us" as you say.

I gotta admit, I'm becoming disappointed with this conversation. Based on the academic background you've suggested in your posts and profile, I'm not sure why there's this confusion about such really basic distinctions. I'd be curious to see a breakdown of your schooling, the courses you took, versus the kind of courses required in American and German colleges.

There is knowledge and then the order of knowledge as presupposed by mind. Otherwise, how do minds relate to knowledge, and how is knowledge, what it is?

Minds route data from facts through the order of knowledge which leaves a perfect or imperfect signature of each fact.

What's your knowledge of ice? You would then say what signature you have for ice; concise or not.

The signatory is mind, who scribes data through in order around its presupposed knowledge-cast, different things produce different signatures by taking different routes.

First of all, philosophers spend a great deal of time trying to get their vocabulary right. I don't even understand how you (as someone who seems to have spent some time in academia) would come to dismiss the need for a clear and precise vocabulary in philosophy. Doesn't mean you can't revise the vocabulary, but you absolutely must be clear about what you're saying. — Artemis

I actually disagree with you, no surprise. If these terms are so well defined, why the heck do people argue about them all the time? Do you see physicists arguing about what energy means or what inertia means?

Additionally, an idea or a thought is not the same as a belief. You don't believe all the thoughts and ideas you have. Belief is a kind of thought or idea, namely one you think is true.

You can't both agree that we should be clear whether we are speaking of cats or pandas AND dismiss the need to be clear what we mean by "knowledge" or any other term in philosophy. — Artemis

I didn't say that an idea or though is the same as belief, I said it could be substituted for the term idea or thought. Then we can ask are all my thoughts justified? No. Are my ideas correctly representing the external world? Probably not.

If that's what you say belief is, fine.

I think it's pretty evident that there's a difference between cats, pandas and knowledge.



My thesis was on Galen Strawson and Noam Chomsky and to a lesser extent Tallis. Though I also know a bit about Haack and Schopenhauer.

By focusing on Strawson and Chomsky, I'm already disagreeing with a good portion of how philosophers use certain terms, "reference", "materialism", "representation", etc. That's part of what makes it interesting to me.

I don't have an obligation to entertain you, if you don't find my answers satisfying, that's your problem, not mine.

I don't find your arguments persuasive on this topic.

Go ahead and define these terms as you wish. I've had plenty of interesting conversations here with all kinds of people. But it's not going to please or be instructive to everybody, that's par for the course.

If these terms are so well defined, why the heck do people argue about them all the time? Do you see physicists arguing about what energy means or what inertia means? — Manuel

First of all: yes, even physicists and other scientists argue about terminology.
Second of all: Why? because ideas are expressed through terms and most philosophers are aware that we must get the vocabulary right in order to get the ideas right... otherwise they wouldn't bother arguing about them.

I didn't say that an idea or though is the same as belief, I said it could be substituted for the term idea or thought. — Manuel

All you're saying here is that we can substitute the word panda for cat even though they're not the same.

I don't have an obligation to entertain you, if you don't find my answers satisfying, that's your problem, not mine.

I don't find your arguments persuasive on this topic.

Go ahead and define these terms as you wish. I've had plenty of interesting conversations here with all kinds of people. But it's not going to please or be instructive to everybody, that's par for the course — Manuel

I'm not actually trying to be dismissive or negative, though of course criticism almost invariably comes across as such. Instead, I'm just stating a fact: if you don't understand the terms, then of course you can't be persuaded by the argument, because you can't understand the argument without understanding the terms. That's --oh the irony!-- both the impediment to you understanding me as well as the core issue I'm trying to explain. C'est la vie.

Oh well. You can lead a horse to water, as they say... someday, when you've wrapped your head around the basics, let me know! Then I'd be interested to see if you have some better arguments for your critiques of JTB.

Well, all things are atomic, even the brain, so facts are atom-fold; the mind is capable of scanning atomic objects.

facts are true — Banno

Arghhh! You simply will not stop making this mistake! The referents of the terms "fact' and "true" are different. That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true. 2+2=4, and, while she loved you, she really did love you - maybe not so much now.

Facts are always historical, as such accepted as factual, and accepted as such, usable in crafting things deemed on the basis of the facts to be true.

And we concede many times over that ignorant misuse of the two terms while it can lead to confusion, is not necessarily fatal to understanding. But no excuse for you!

First of all: yes, even physicists and other scientists argue about terminology.
Second of all: Why? because ideas are expressed through terms and most philosophers are aware that we must get the vocabulary right in order to get the ideas right... otherwise they wouldn't bother arguing about them. — Artemis

The physicist is not interested in the definition, they are interested in the phenomena. Most physicists I know don't spend time worrying about the definition of energy or gravity.

Words give you an approximation on what experience informs you of, but it's not mathematics.

I'm not actually trying to be dismissive or negative, though of course criticism almost invariably comes across as such. Instead, I'm just stating a fact: if you don't understand the terms, then of course you can't be persuaded by the argument, because you can't understand the argument without understanding the terms. That's --oh the irony!-- both the impediment to you understanding me as well as the core issue I'm trying to explain. C'est la vie.

Oh well. You can lead a horse to water, as they say... someday, when you've wrapped your head around the basics, let me know! Then I'd be interested to see if you have some better arguments for your critiques of JTB. — Artemis

You're insisting that the terms you use are the ones that are de facto true or should be evident. By that standard, using your own words I could say that:

if you don't understand the terms, then of course you can't be persuaded by the argument, because you can't understand the argument without understanding the terms. — Artemis

So knowledge is whatever you say it is and since I don't agree that that's knowledge, then we can't have a conversation, therefore you are correct.

That's a tautology.

We won't profit anymore here. But thanks for the conversation.

So knowledge is whatever you say it is and since I don't agree that that's knowledge, then we can't have a conversation, therefore you are correct.

That's a tautology. — Manuel

I can't help myself: that's not an example of a tautology. It's an example of begging the question.

:up:

That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true. — tim wood

Rubbish. It is at present true that the cat is sitting on my guitar amp. It won't be in a minute or two.

There are no false facts. If you think there are, all you gotta do is show one.

Hence, all facts are true.

He got off the amp.

The spuds went in, but took a while to sprout. One last frost knocked 'em back a bit, but they are nearly ready for a bit of bandicooting.

Actually, Tim, I re-wrote the first line of the Wiki article on Fact to correct the same error you make, only a few days ago. SO I'm asking for a bit of help.

It seems that the novel use you propose is on the rise.

Do you have some background that might support your view? Where did you derive it from? If it is becoming a common error I'd like to examine it in the Wiki article.

Here,

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.187414/page/n153/mode/2up

Should be p. 145, paragraph starting, "This is not to suggest that the positivists were wrong to insist...," and following as far as you care to read.

My fires on this lit in the distant past, either undergraduate philosophy or an unusual jr. high English class; this reference making them burn a little hotter and brighter.

You want I should point to the multiple examples, in everything from the OED down, that support what I have set out? Look them up for yourself.

You are taking a use that is specific to certain methodologies of science and seeking to aplly it generally. The paragraph you cite says as much.

For the rest of us, that twice two is four is a fact.

Well, just for you, it's tomāto. Question, then likely I'll have done: do you aver that true and fact mean the same thing and are interchangeable?

Even my Shorter OED lists five differing uses for "Fact".

But I'm concerned for you, if you think "That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true".

Even my Shorter OED lists five differing uses for "Fact". — Banno

Alternate spelling perfect or pluperfect?

But I'm concerned for you, if you think "That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true". — Banno

I give up; what am I missing? In what respect is something that is true, not true?

But I'm concerned for you, if you think "That which is true, in respect of being true, is always universally and necessarily true".
— Banno
I give up; what am I missing? In what respect is something that is true, not true? — tim wood

You see, that just looks to be a perversely obtuse reply.

There are truths that are neither necessary nor universal. Like that the cat is now siting on the table next to the keyboard.

Truth is a simple thing. Stop overthinking it.