A self-driving car can't feel pain. I assume you can. — RogueAI

I don't feel pain. I'm a zombie, remember? I merely process the data received from my nerve endings and make the appropriate facial expressions and such.

Some cars don't have damage sensors. They're still awfully primitive. Ones that do have the sensors process the data, which can be interpreted as pain or not depending on your choice to characterize it with such language or not, a choice which doesn't alter what's actually going on one way or the other. But I assert there is no evidence of any fundamental difference between myself and the car. Our mutual refusal to use the word pain to describe the respective systems isn't evidence of anything.

What's that like? — Marchesk

To what? There isn't anything to which it is like something. That's the thing I deny. There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me.

My brain hurts now. I'll admit to having difficulties with the p-zombie argument when it comes time for the zombies to talk about consciousness. — Marchesk

Yeah, that's the real problem here. If qualia are epiphenomenal, how can we talk about them?

Yeah, that's the real problem here. If qualia are epiphenomenal, how can we talk about them? — InPitzotl

:up:

To what? There isn't anything to which it is like something. That's the thing I deny. There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me. — noAxioms

So you don't feel pain?

There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me. — noAxioms

This phrase sounds suspicious. There's a me, but there's no I being me?

Also, there's definitely an "I" there. Something typed an entire grammatically correct, if not coherent, response in this thread with a unified theme conveying some particular form of skepticism to zombies.

I don't feel pain. I'm a zombie, remember? — noAxioms

Are you pretending for the thread, or do you actually think you're a p-zombie?

Thanks for all the feedback everyone. I actually appreciate it.

My brain hurts now. I'll admit to having difficulties with the p-zombie argument when it comes time for the zombies to talk about consciousness.
— Marchesk
Yeah, that's the real problem here. If qualia are epiphenomenal, how can we talk about them? — InPitzotl

Indeed, if one with qualia can talk about it, it isn't epiphenomenal. Those of us without the qualia might talk about it because we hear the rest of you talking about it and know no better.

Are you pretending for the thread, or do you actually think you're a p-zombie? — RogueAI

Well, not pretending anything. Chalmers claims a conscious experience that does not supervene logically on the physical. I don't have that since what I do isn't a logical contradiction like that. So I can only presume Chalmers (and the rest of you non-zombies) has a conscious experience that is fundamentally different than me just "receiving data that could be interpreted as pain", as it was put in T2. I might use the word pain, not because I (like the other zombies) am lying, but because we've been provided with no other vocabulary to describe it.

So you don't feel pain? — Marchesk

'Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it.

There's no 'I' (a thing with an identity say) that's being me.
— noAxioms
This phrase sounds suspicious. There's a me, but there's no I being me? — InPitzotl

This is a better question. The 'me' is like the robot, the thermostat', the automaton. These things, in common language, have a sort of legal identity, but not an identity which holds up to close scrutiny such as Parfit demonstrates. The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical. My 'me' doesn't appear to have that. It seems inconsistent that something with an identity can be paired with something without one. The bijunction between the two doesn't work without a series of premises which I find totally implausible.

Also, there's definitely an "I" there. Something typed an entire grammatically correct, if not coherent, response in this thread with a unified theme conveying some particular form of skepticism to zombies.

No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this.

The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical. — noAxioms

I cry foul here. Imagine a believer of the classical elements telling you that he just fetched a pail of water from the well. When you ask the guy what water is, he explains that it is the element that is cold and wet. Analogously, you object... there is no "water"; for "water" refers to an element that is cold and wet, and we don't have such things. The problem is, the guy did in fact fetch the stuff from the well. This I believe is your error.

Slightly more analytical, the guy has a bad theory of water. When asked to describe what water is, the guy would give you an intensional definition of water that is based on the bad theory. It's proper to correct the guy and to say that there is no such thing as he described in this case; however, the guy is also ostensively using the term... the stuff in the well is an example of what he means by water. His bad theory doesn't make the stuff in the well not exist. So the guy is in a sense wrong about what water is, but is not wrong to have the concept of water. The stuff the guy goes out to fetch from the well really is there.

You're objecting to an intensional definition of "I", which is simply based on a questionable theory of self... but you still have the extension to which "I" refers.

No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this. — noAxioms

I've no idea what you mean by legal me, but the ostensive I to which humans refer is not something a toaster has. I can't comment on the automaton... the term's too flexible.

'Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it. — noAxioms

How far does you skepticism go? Do you think there's a strong possibility you're the only mind in existence?

Pain' seems to be a word reserved to describe the experience of had by the experiencer of a human. It would be a lie to say that I feel pain, in the context of this topic, so lacking an experiencer, I cannot by definition feel pain any more than can a robot with damage sensors. Again, I may use the word in casual conversation (outside the context of this topic) not because I'm lying, but because I lack alternative vocabulary to describe what the pure physical automaton does, something which by your definition cannot feel pain since it lacks this experiencer of it. — noAxioms

I can't tell which position you're actually arguing for or against. I assume it's a reductio?

I any case, I'm confident you do feel pain, and trying to argue that you don't via some objective comparison or description doesn't change the fact that you do in fact feel pain.

Brain activity that triggers the vocalization of the expression "I am conscious." There's nothing special about those words. "I am conscious" is no more an indicator of consciousness than "one plus one equals two." They're just sounds that can result from mechanical operations. — Michael

This is exactly why a physicalist like Dennett, who thinks the idea of Zombies is incoherent, says that if they were possible, then we would all be zombies. Why would a zombie say it is conscious if it didn't think it was conscious? (Why would it say anything at all if it didn't think anything, for that matter?).

If the zombie can think it is conscious (which itself is an act of consciousness), and this thinking is the result of brain activity, then what reason could we have to think consciousnesses would not also be a result of brain activity?

It's hard to see where he's committing a fallacy. — Sam26

You would need to posit a programmer which is no part of Chalmer's ideas..

Slightly more analytical, the guy has a bad theory of water. When asked to describe what water is, the guy would give you an intensional definition of water that is based on the bad theory. It's proper to correct the guy and to say that there is no such thing as he described in this case; however, the guy is also ostensively using the term... the stuff in the well is an example of what he means by water. His bad theory doesn't make the stuff in the well not exist. So the guy is in a sense wrong about what water is, but is not wrong to have the concept of water. The stuff the guy goes out to fetch from the well really is there. — InPitzotl

An eliminativist about personal identity could hold the phlogiston as a counterexample. To be sure, the phlogiston, identity, water element have been posited not as idle fantasies, but in order to explain some manifest reality. But the preferred solution, at least in the case of the phlogiston, was not to come up with a better theory of the phlogiston, but to drop the stuff altogether as part of a better theory that accounts for the manifest reality of heat transfer.

An eliminativist about personal identity could hold the phlogiston as a counterexample. — SophistiCat

I am pretty sure you're at least one step behind, not ahead, of the post you just replied to.

But the preferred solution, at least in the case of the phlogiston, was not to come up with a better theory of the phlogiston, but to drop the stuff altogether as part of a better theory that accounts for the manifest reality of heat transfer. — SophistiCat

This is clumsily phrased. Phlogiston theory is a theory about combustion. It was replaced by oxidation theory, a better theory about combustion. We dropped the notion of phlogiston, but not the notion of combustion.

I am pretty sure you're at least one step behind, not ahead, of the post you just replied to. — InPitzotl

I am not sure how to take this. Is this just a generic putdown, or did you mean something more specific? What am I missing?

This is clumsily phrased. Phlogiston theory is a theory about combustion. It was replaced by oxidation theory, a better theory about combustion. We dropped the notion of phlogiston, but not the notion of combustion. — InPitzotl

Well, referring to the phlogiston theory as a theory of heat heat transfer was perhaps clumsy, but you have ignored the substance of my response in favor of capitalizing on this nitpick.

Why would a zombie say it is conscious if it didn't think it was conscious — Janus

The argument is just about conceivability. Your question shows you've gone beyond conceiving of the P-zombie to asking why it's like that.

That's all that's needed to drive the wedge in.

The "I" on the other hand refers to the experiencer of a conscious thing, something which gives it a true identity that doesn't supervene on the physical.
— noAxioms
I cry foul here. Imagine a believer of the classical elements telling you that he just fetched a pail of water from the well. When you ask the guy what water is, he explains that it is the element that is cold and wet. Analogously, you object... there is no "water"; for "water" refers to an element that is cold and wet, and we don't have such things. The problem is, the guy did in fact fetch the stuff from the well. This I believe is your error. — InPitzotl

This comment would perhaps at least make sense to me had it been attached to a comment of mine about pain and "data which could be interpreted as pain", but you've chosen to reference a comment about different kinds of identity for two very different things (a car and its driver say).
The only way I can parse it, it is the followers of Chalmers that are making the error you point out, where a human is privileged in being allowed to call something water/cold/wet, but anything else (a sump pump moving the stuff) doing the exact same thing is not allowed to use such privileged language (the pump moves a substance which could be interpreted as water). A mechanical device with damage sensors to which it reacts lacks the privilege to say it feels pain. I didn't make those privilege rules, so cry foul to the ones that make those rules. I decline to use the word because I don't consider myself to be in the privileged class.

Slightly more analytical, the guy has a bad theory of water. When asked to describe what water is, the guy would give you an intensional definition of water that is based on the bad theory. It's proper to correct the guy and to say that there is no such thing as he described in this case; however, the guy is also ostensively using the term... the stuff in the well is an example of what he means by water.

Bad analogy. In the case in question, nobody is ostensively using a term. You can't point to your subjective feeling of warmth and assert the toaster with thermostat doesn't feel anything analogous. Sure, it's a different mechanism, but not demonstrably fundamentally different.

So the guy is in a sense wrong about what water is, but is not wrong to have the concept of water.

No, wrong to have the concept of water since the term 'water' is not in fact being ostensively used. Perhaps not wrong, since there may be water in his well, but I detect none in mine and he cannot show me the water in his.

You're objecting to an intensional definition of "I".

I think so.

No, that's the legal 'me' doing that. Any toaster has one of those. Any automaton can type a similar response in a thread such as this.
— noAxioms
I've no idea what you mean by legal me

Legal identtiy: There is a rock placed at X, and you move it to a new location Y. Is it the same rock, or merely a different arrangement of matter in the universe with only language suggesting a binding between the prior arrangement and the later one? Is that toaster under your arm the same toaster as was stolen from me a moment ago, or a different one to which I have no claim? I shake a rope sending a wave down its length. Is the wave I created the same wave that reaches the other end despite not involving motion of a single bit of the original perturbed material? That's what I call legal identity, and has nothing to do specifically with life forms. It seems mostly language based, not based on anything physical, and it doesn't always work. A cell divides by mitosis. Which is the original cell? Language has no obvious answer and physics doesn't care.

but the ostensive I to which humans refer is not something a toaster has.

This seems to be an example of the privileged language mentioned above. What I see as the 'bad theory' asserts privileged status to humans, raising them above a mere physical arrangement of matter, and assigns language reserved only for objects with this privileged status. I'm denying the status, and thus sit in the group with the toaster, forbidden to use the sacred language. My son has one of those 'hey google' devices sitting on its table, and it might reply to a query with "I cannot find that song" or some such. But such usage seems to refer to the legal identity (something I don't deny) and not to "I, the experiencer of the device" which neither the toaster nor the physical arrangement of matter referred to as 'noAxioms'.

How far does you skepticism go? Do you think there's a strong possibility you're the only mind in existence? — RogueAI

I don't consider my position on this to be abnormally skeptical. I simply deny the non-physical experiencer, which is a fairly standard monist position. I differ from the mainstream position in that I'm willing for others to have the dual relationship (and hence all the talk about it), thus forcing me to use alternate terms to describe how I work. Most monists probably believe that every mind supervenes on the physical, not just some of them. My position explains why the zombies talk about pain when they don't actually 'feel' (privileged definition) it. They are not lying, merely drawing from the limited vocabulary available to them.

I any case, I'm confident you do feel pain, and trying to argue that you don't via some objective comparison or description doesn't change the fact that you do in fact feel pain. — Marchesk

Not if a mechanical device is forbidden from using the word. If a thermostat doesn't feel warmth, then neither do I. I admit to pain being a rare one, with few devices having sensors to provide it.

If the zombie can think it is conscious (which itself is an act of consciousness) , and this thinking is the result of brain activity, then why would consciousnesses not also be a result of brain activity? — Janus

:up:
Or not even necessarily brain activity, but any information-processing activity.

I am not sure how to take this. Is this just a generic putdown, or did you mean something more specific? What am I missing? — SophistiCat

It was not a put-down. I'm not just generically using braggart language here; you're literally one step behind. The water example is a response to the response you just gave, and it does not negate it. We did not discard the notion of water when we discarded classical elements, and there is a good reason we did not do so. That we discarded phlogiston on replacing it with a better theory, does not negate this good reason not to discard water when dropping classical element theory.

Well, referring to the phlogiston theory as a theory of heat heat transfer was perhaps clumsy, but you have ignored the substance of my response in favor of capitalizing on this nitpick. — SophistiCat

That's not quite the clumsiness I was referring to. "X is a bad theory of Y" is to be understood in the sense of X being an explanans and Y an explanandum. In this sense, phlogiston theory is not a theory of phlogiston because phlogiston is an explanans. The explanandum here is combustion; so phlogiston in this sense is a theory of combustion. When we got rid of phlogiston theory, we did get rid of phlogiston (explanans), but we did not get rid of combustion (explanandum).

We did not discard the notion of water when we discarded classical elements, and there is a good reason we did not do so. That we discarded phlogiston on replacing it with a better theory, does not negate this good reason not to discard water when dropping classical element theory. — InPitzotl

There is an infidelity in my phlogiston analogy in that "phlogiston" and "self" are not on the same level in terms of their pedigree and epistemic centrality. They are, however, on the same level in that both are theoretical entities that have played a role as explanans, and it is that which eliminativists attack. They do not deny that which gives rise to our habitual concept of "self"; rather they question the validity of the conceptualization.

Here I should disclose that I have been playing something of a devil's advocate, because I am not on board with the kind of eliminativism that blithely rejects concepts like "self" as merely illusory. Personal identity may be nothing over and above a psycho-social construct, a legal fiction, as @noAxioms might say, but it does exist at least qua construct, and as such it has very real consequences. And that is existence enough, as far as I am concerned. Where I am on board with eliminativism is in not granting habitual mental categories roles in science or metaphysics without first subjecting them to critical evaluation.

We don't know if consciousness if physical or nonphysical.

A p-zombie is a hypothesized being physically identical to a human but bereft of consciousness.

So, yes a p-zombie begs the question; after all it's defined in such a way that assumes consciousness nonphysical.

However, it can still be used in an argument like so:

1. If consciousness is nonphysical then p-zombies are possible

Ergo,

2. If p-zombies are impossible then consciousness is physical.

Bad analogy. In the case in question, nobody is ostensively using a term. — noAxioms

Of course they are. This is why they tend to say we have these properties, but these things over here, they don't. They are ostensively pointing to the properties, and they are formulating an incomplete theory in an attempt to explain the properties they are pointing to. And I even agree it's a bad theory about what they're ostensively including.

The only way I can parse it, it is the followers of Chalmers that are making the error you point out, where a human is privileged in being allowed to call something water/cold/wet, but anything else (a sump pump moving the stuff) doing the exact same thing is not allowed to use such privileged language (the pump moves a substance which could be interpreted as water). — noAxioms

The notion that either we have an immaterial driver in the driver's seat experiencing things or the toaster feels warmth sounds like a false dichotomy to me.

Is it the same rock, — noAxioms

Yes, it's the same rock...

or merely a different arrangement of matter in the universe — noAxioms

...and it's probably that too. Most of the toaster's mass is in gluons. They're constantly obliterating and reforming. And the next grand TOE may even do something more weird with the ontologies.

Nevertheless, if you had your name scratched onto the toaster when I stole it, it will tend to still be scratched on there unless I scratched it off.

Identity need not be fundamental; it can be "soft"... emergent, pragmatic versus universal by necessity, constructed from invariances, and the like.

You can't point to your subjective feeling of warmth and assert the toaster with thermostat doesn't feel anything analogous. Sure, it's a different mechanism, but not demonstrably fundamentally different. — noAxioms

Actually, yes, I can. The toaster reacts to warmth. "Legal me" reacts to warmth as well. But "legal me" also reacts to an increase in blood acidity.

But there's a difference between how I react to warmth and how I react to an increase in blood acidity. I can subjectively report on my feeling of warmth; I cannot subjectively report on my feeling of high blood acidity. Ostensively speaking, warmth is an example of something I subjectively feel; acidity is an example of something I react to but do not subjectively feel. There is no good reason for me to suspect that because the toaster reacts to warmth like I react to warmth, that it is subjectively feeling warmth like I subjectively feel warmth in contrast to how I do not subjectively feel blood acidity.

This seems to be an example of the privileged language mentioned above. What I see as the 'bad theory' asserts privileged status to humans, raising them above a mere physical arrangement of matter, and assigns language reserved only for objects with this privileged status. — noAxioms

Your sales pitch here is a dud. I can play Doom on this computer. I might could even play Doom on my Keurig. But I cannot play Doom on this bottle of allergy pills.

Different physical objects have different physical arrangements, and some arrangements have properties other arrangements don't have. We might could even say certain arrangements of physical objects have privileged status, raising them above other arrangements, and that we are justified in assigning language reserved for some classes of objects.

The "I" I accused you of having is simply a unit of theory of mind as it applies to the linguistic aspect of your posts. Humans can be thought of as objects susceptible to be described in terms of units of theory of mind, at least in the typical sense.

My son has one of those 'hey google' devices sitting on its table, and it might reply to a query with "I cannot find that song" or some such. — noAxioms

There are particular arrangements of physical matter that come in individual "toaster"-like bodies, which are embedded in their environments and must navigate them, and which regularly participate in conversations of various sorts with other entities. "Hey google" is not one of these things. But noAxioms is one of these things.

TOM can probably be extended to work in some version on "hey google", but it's distinct enough to reassess how we want to discuss its identity. An automaton of the right type might work better (SDC's are a bit out... the networked trend confuses the information-complex-to-body relation so requires the reassessment). You, OTOH, meet the requirements to apply theory of mind to as humans above the age of five regularly do.

But for some reason, instead of asking me what I mean by "I", or getting this plain reference to the notion that you as a unit consistently type out the same themed argument throughout single posts and across time, you keep going to this "experiencing the device" thing. I understand you're rejecting a bad theory of "I"; I too reject it. But I cannot play Doom on my bottle of allergy pills, and I cannot play debate-the-zombies with my toaster (at least yet).

The argument is just about conceivability. Your question shows you've gone beyond conceiving of the P-zombie to asking why it's like that.

That's all that's needed to drive the wedge in. — frank

Not really. I'm saying that the absurdity of the idea that the p(urported) zombies could say things about their experience, even though they have no experience, is the central point that establishes the inconceivability of such a being.

Not really. I'm saying that the absurdity of the idea that the p(urported) zombies could say things about their experience, even though they have no experience, is the central point that establishes the inconceivability of such a being. — Janus

A computer can't tell you it's conscious?

Only if someone conscious programs it to.

Only if someone conscious programs it to. — Janus

Why would that be a problem for the argument?

As I pointed out before the idea of a programmer is no part of Chalmer's philosophy. If you wanted to posit that there could be p-zombies among us, or we could even all be p-zombies, because we are living in a consciously programmed simulation, then that would not be incoherent, but just a silly idea we could have no reason to believe.

As I pointed out before the idea of a programmer is no part of Chalmer's philosophy. If you wanted to posit that there could be p-zombies among us, or we could even all be p-zombies, because we are living in a consciously programmed simulation, then that would not be incoherent, but just a silly idea we could have no reason to believe. — Janus

It's kind of blatantly obvious that you aren't familiar with Chalmers or philosophy of mind in general.

It's kind of blatantly obvious that you're resorting to ad hominem because you can't mount a decent rebuttal. If you think Chalmers invokes conscious programmers, then cite the relevant text. On the other hand if you think there is a plausible explanation, other than being deliberately programmed, for purported zombies to be speaking about experiences that they, by definition, do not have, then present it.

It's kind of blatantly obvious that you're resorting to ad hominem because you can't mount a decent rebuttal — Janus

Not an ad hominem. It's just a fact.

Just a fact! :rofl: You know nothing about me. As I thought; you can't come up with the goods. It's a little sad that you feel a need to resort to such tactics, Frank. what are you trying to defend?