Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage” — khaled

Perhaps.. but I can also argue that who needs gifts prior to being born? No one. And this goes to that asymmetry you hate. Positives aren't needed for any one. What's important is the baggage is given to no one, this is good (from the assumption that an agent exists in the first place not the meta tree falls in the woods perspective).

Even if they would want you to? Ok. Now why should we think so? You want to convince others if this so how would you go about doing that? — khaled

Get them to at least question why they would want to start all the negatives of life onto a person and really make them understand what those negatives do and can entail. Why should anything be more important than not making someone unnecessarily suffer? How it hat moral? To me there is just something about creating unnecessary suffering that is wrong, full stop. As you know, at some point it just stops at certain axioms that you try to make an emotional appeal for understanding. In ethics, unlike experimental sciences, you can't go much further, nor can you EXPECT it to go further.

But you’re going back to the standard definition of utopia, not the example I gave. Let’s call it world X then. It’s a world where you can remove all suffering at the snap of a finger. But you will suffer all the same if you refuse to snap your finger. And there is no way of escaping easily (euthanasia). Would it be fine to have kids in world X? — khaled

What do you think? Does it hold up to my philosophy? I can't say since I don't have full understanding of all this world entails. I know this world.

It DOES fit what you’re saying. It’s an example where the condition for something being wrong is satisfied yet you don’t think the thing is wrong. Showing that the conditions you set out for making something wrong are insufficient. — khaled

If the utopia involves strife, this too is wrong to impose. Do people ever experience strife? Can anyone judge it as not great? How so? then it's just hedonic treadmill hyper version of this world.. Snapping of fingers is equivalent now to what we do here.. It's all moved up a level. It's really the whole "At least you're not living in X" argument rehashed.. See, you're not starving in the third world, thus life must not be that bad.. Old school comparison switcheroo psychologically. Nothing new here to see.

No. I deny that life can be characterized as a series of negative experiences as you imply. — khaled

Not contiguous, interspersed, though there systemically speaking it's an overall thing too but that's a more in depth thing that would require its own topic.

If I'm robbed at gunpoint and pistol-whipped, I feel wronged by the guy that did it but I don't feel wronged by my parents. My parents will sympathize and wish that hadn't happened, they'll feel all sorts of things about the guy who did it, and they may even feel some anger at the police or policymakers for 'allowing this sort of thing to happen', and so might I, but they won't feel guilty for having brought me into the world and no one, including me, will expect them to. So it is for any harm done to me by another.

If I skid off the road during a rainstorm and end up in the hospital, I won't feel wronged by anyone, unless some of my injuries turn out to be related to deceptive safety claims by the maker of the car, that sort of thing, and certainly my parents won't feel guilty because I had a car accident and no one, including me, will expect them to. So it is for all accidents and 'acts of God'.

Is it your position that parents have wronged their children? That's a simple yes or no question.

If the answer is 'yes', how do you square that with our moral intuitions?

Perhaps.. but I can also argue that who needs gifts prior to being born? No one. And this goes to that asymmetry you hate. Positives aren't needed for any one. What's important is the baggage is given to no one, this is good (from the assumption that an agent exists in the first place not the meta tree falls in the woods perspective). — schopenhauer1

But you can't argue this in world X. And yes, I hate the asymmetry, because it makes no sense. The meaning of "good" and "bad" is not consistent in each quadrant. If you define them consistently you won't get an asymmetry.

"If you don't have a kid, and they would've like life, that's not bad because no one exists to suffer" if applied consistently would lead to: "If you don't have a kid, and they would've hated life, that's not good because no one exists whose suffering we mitigated"

The "traffic laws are good even though we can't point to who they benefit" that I keep hearing is bullshit. We can in fact tell who benefits from traffic laws. Suspend these laws and cover up traffic lights and signs. Whoever dies while the traffic light was red (but the driver couldn't see it) is the person who would benefit form traffic laws.

But in the case of birth, not having a child that would suffer benefits no one. It's not even a matter of "we can't tell who it benefits" no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good".

"Good" in the asymmetry is defined as "good for someone" in each quadrant except the one causing the asymmetry. There, it is defined as a "better state of affairs than the alternative". That's why the asymmetry makes no sense. And why I never believed it even as an AN.

To me there is just something about creating unnecessary suffering that is wrong, full stop. — schopenhauer1

Doesn't seem like it. Counterexample: World X. Or even surprise parties. If you are ever at a surprise party and you feel awkward in a conversation, that's unnecessary suffering right there. Your friends could've just not held the party. And yet you think it's fine to hold surprise parties most of the time.

What do you think? Does it hold up to my philosophy? — schopenhauer1

It shouldn't. It fits the conditions that make something wrong for you. It is lifelong and there is a lot of suffering that you try to mitigate. But you think it's fine to have children in those conditions:

That they cannot do. But they can snap their fingers and leave any suffering they may be experiencing and thus, no one has ever complained. Call that what you will, utopia or not. Now what? — khaled

It seems to me in this world that they can sufficiently change the game without dire consequences. In effect, they can sufficiently "escape", so barring other information, this seems permissible. — schopenhauer1

So your problem seems to not be purely with how long the imposition lasts or how badly it can go, since both of those variables are the same in the real world and in world X. So those two variables are insufficient, as here is an example where they make something that seems fine to you wrong. So you tell me, what difference between the real world and world X makes having kids in world X fine but having kids in the real world wrong?

If the utopia involves strife, this too is wrong to impose. — schopenhauer1

It does, but you said it's not wrong to impose. If I had to guess, it's because said strife is very easy to escape (snap of a finger). That seems to be the variable you're missing. It's not just about duration and amount of suffering, but how easy it is to escape said suffering.

Snapping of fingers is equivalent now to what we do here.. It's all moved up a level. It's really the whole "At least you're not living in X" argument rehashed.. See, you're not starving in the third world, thus life must not be that bad.. Old school comparison switcheroo psychologically. Nothing new here to see. — schopenhauer1

The "at least you're not living in X" argument is used to tell you to quit complaining. I am not saying something like that. I'm giving an example to illustrate that you care about more than just whether or not the suffering is unnecessary or how long it's imposed for.

And is "snapping fingers is equivalent to what we do here" supposed to indicate that it's wrong to have kids under those circumstances?

I keep telling you, that by these examples I'm not trying to say "This imposition is fine so having kids is fine". So could you stop interpreting it that way? It's getting tiring repeating that "No, I am not implying that this imposition is fine therefore having kids is fine" every time.

no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good". — khaled

You’re falling for the tree falls in the woods idea. All you need is an agent who knows that preventing harm is good. The person who would benefit need not exist, just someone. If no one exists, ethics itself obviously ceases to matter anyways so is a moot point.

Suspend these laws and cover up traffic lights and signs. Whoever dies while the traffic light was red (but the driver couldn't see it) is the person who would benefit form traffic laws. — khaled

But yet notice we don’t need to actually make this bad scenario happen to know someone would be harmed, and we have prevented that someone from the harm.

But in the case of birth, not having a child that would suffer benefits no one. It's not even a matter of "we can't tell who it benefits" no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good".

"Good" in the asymmetry is defined as "good for someone" in each quadrant except the one causing the asymmetry. There, it is defined as a "better state of affairs than the alternative". That's why the asymmetry makes no sense. And why I never believed it even as an AN. — khaled

It simply falls to the axiom that prevented bad is always good, where prevented good is only relatively bad. The weight is there from the beginning with intuitions about the goodness of prevented bads and the neutrality of prevented goods. HOWEVER, there DOES have to be an agent to recognize this. If you don't believe this to begin with, then it is correct that the asymmetry will not follow.

So your problem seems to not be purely with how long the imposition lasts or how badly it can go, since both of those variables are the same in the real world and in world X. So those two variables are insufficient, as here is an example where they make something that seems fine to you wrong. So you tell me, what difference between the real world and world X makes having kids in world X fine but having kids in the real world wrong? — khaled

I don't think it's fine. Read last post again about treadmill.

It does, but you said it's not wrong to impose. If I had to guess, it's because said strife is very easy to escape (snap of a finger). That seems to be the variable you're missing. It's not just about duration and amount of suffering, but how easy it is to escape said suffering. — khaled

I mean, yes but the challenges and escape are part of it. If snapping fingers becomes the sticking point, we got a problem. If literally no one has a problem snapping their fingers, then perhaps it's permissible. Not this world though, so I don't see where that would lead us except to confirm, "Yep that world is not this world".

The "at least you're not living in X" argument is used to tell you to quit complaining. I am not saying something like that. I'm giving an example to illustrate that you care about more than just whether or not the suffering is unnecessary or how long it's imposed for.

And is "snapping fingers is equivalent to what we do here" supposed to indicate that it's wrong to have kids under those circumstances?

I keep telling you, that by these examples I'm not trying to say "This imposition is fine so having kids is fine". So could you stop interpreting it that way? It's getting tiring repeating that "No, I am not implying that this imposition is fine therefore having kids is fine" every time. — khaled

Only if snapping fingers becomes the new threshold. As I said previously with hedonic treadmill.. If in this world, a challenge to us is like the relative challenge of snapping fingers to them, it's the same thing. Can it be judged as too much by someone? If so, why? All of a sudden it becomes more like our world.

So in other words, if all that happens is new problems coalesce around snapping fingers, the "set of challenges" of this world just gets repeated as a "set of challenges" in that world. However, if in some absolute sense, all negative feelings, experience, judgement went away towards snapping of fingers, then it would be permissible, but at that point we are no longer at the realm of the current human condition. It would be more like being on autopilot, where negatives don't even exist.

Are you trying to ask what it would take to be permissible? Or are you asking why it isn't currently right/just now? I think I gave a pretty good list.. Inescapable without dire consequences, unnecessary to start the conditions for negatives for that person who will be the recipient of negatives, set of challenges, judgement of negatives in the first place, that only humans are really capable of through linguistic self-reflective abilities. All of this is overlooking the dignity of the person to "get an agenda done" for that person. Wrong in my estimate.

All you need is an agent who knows that preventing harm is good. The person who would benefit need not exist, just someone. — schopenhauer1

By this formulation: That same agent knows that preventing pleasure is bad. Therefore "If you don't have a kid, and they would've like life, that's bad" would follow. Still no asymmetry. It's Good/Bad vs Good/Bad. And that's what happens when you apply one formulation consistently.

But yet notice we don’t need to actually make this bad scenario happen to know someone would be harmed, and we have prevented that someone from the harm. — schopenhauer1

In the case of traffic laws, yes. In the case of not having kids, we know that we benefitted no one. We have prevented harm from no one. If you want to say we prevented the "future harm" of someone, and that's good, then by the same token, we prevented the "future pleasure" of someone and that's bad. Again no asymmetry.

It simply falls to the axiom that prevented bad is always good, where prevented good is only relatively bad. — schopenhauer1

But by this axiom we should never do anything to anyone. Anything we do has a chance of harming, and a chance of benefiting. If we do it: It can be good or bad depending on which there was more of (harm or benefit). If we don't do it, it can be good (if we prevented harm) or neutral (if we prevented benefit).

By this axiom the asymmetry exists when doing literally anything that involves other people and so we should not do such actions. Even you posting here falls under this. It would make every act wrong. It's a shit axiom that no one believes no offense.

I don't think it's fine. — schopenhauer1

So having children in a world where they can only experience pleasure because they snap away any suffering is wrong? If you want to bite that bullet sure.

Not this world though, so I don't see where that would lead us except to confirm, "Yep that world is not this world". — schopenhauer1

It would lead us to recognizing that the ease by which you can escape suffering is also an important variable. But if you will deny having kids under these conditions is wrong then not much can be said. At that point it just seems like a reductio ad absurdum of your position. Especially since you were fine with it at first.

Are you trying to ask what it would take to be permissible? — schopenhauer1

This.

As I said previously with hedonic treadmill.. If in this world, a challenge to us is like the relative challenge of snapping fingers to them, it's the same thing. Can it be judged as too much by someone? If so, why? All of a sudden it becomes more like our world. — schopenhauer1

That is the point. I didn't think anyone would say it's wrong to have kids under those conditions but if it is, kudos, you have an internally consistent system! Not that that's saying much, even Nazism is internally consistent.

Now that you have said consistent system what's left is to explain why everyone should abide by it. Why should everyone think this:

Inescapable without dire consequences, unnecessary to impose for that person who will be the recipient of negatives, set of challenges, judgement of negatives in the first place, that only humans are really capable of through linguistic self-reflective abilities. — schopenhauer1

Is wrong? Sure if you asked someone if they agree that impositions described as above are wrong, they'll probably say yes, but that's cheap. It's again like saying "Are you in favor of exposing children to risks of sexual abuse". No one would say yes to that. That doesn't make sending kids to school wrong. The above quote seems to me to be as accurate a depiction of life as "exposing children to risks of sexual abuse" is an accurate depiction of schooling.

In the case of not having kids, we know that we benefitted no one. We have prevented harm from no one. — khaled

Wearing my 'moral sentiments' hat, I would add that doing good for another or preventing harm to them gives rise to a feeling that you have done good. If a stack of boxes is about to fall over on someone and you help them shore those boxes up, they feel relief and gratitude toward you for your help; I think Adam Smith would say you imaginatively share in their feelings and that's why you feel that your action was positive and moral.

I think, in general, this sort of thing reinforces the reciprocity of our moral duties and expectations. We help them in part because they would have helped us, or because they should even if they're not the sort of person who would. You also set an example by your behavior, and demonstrate what virtuous behavior is.

In the case of children, there are long-standing customs of filial piety; it's one of the central virtues and duties of Confucianism, and the ancient Hebrews even claimed it as a commandment from God. It is the complement of the duty of parents to care for their children, and the virtue of being a good parent.

Antinatalism cannot, by definition, include this sort of reciprocity. Your duty is to no one; the good you do is for no one. They cannot learn from your example to become more virtuous.

Where are these extreme measures? — schopenhauer1

I’m just meaning AN is considered to be excessive (or extreme) by most people.

I didn't say bring about enlightenment, simply prevent harm. — schopenhauer1

I was referring to this comment…

So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches. — schopenhauer1

My point is that bringing about enlightenment does prevent harm (the enlightened person will no doubt experience less harm since he’s enlightened, no?), yet you’re unwilling to cause harm (by putting him in crutches) to bring about this reduction of harm (enlightenment). Yet with AN you’re willing to cause harm in order to prevent future potential harm. I think you said something to the effect that the harm you cause someone in order to prevent a greater harm is a necessary harm. Since you make a moral distinction between these two events, I’m asking you why. Not being a crass utilitarian isn’t an answer. It still doesn’t explain what specifically about these two cases warrants them to be approached differently.

My ethics is based on the dignity of the person being harmed. In one case you already exist.. It's too late. — schopenhauer1

But it’s not too late. You can prevent harm by putting him in crutches and thereby bringing about his enlightenment.

In the other, you are creating wholesale, harm onto someone else, unnecessarily. — schopenhauer1

What are you referring to here? I’m not talking about the harm caused by procreating, if that’s what you’re referring to.

Is it your position that parents have wronged their children? That's a simple yes or no question.

If the answer is 'yes', how do you square that with our moral intuitions? — Srap Tasmaner

I don't focus on blame. Let's say you've been eating meat your whole life and then you become vegan. Should you focus on what you did prior? What you say is more about blame, and I think that's not really the aim of AN. But to answer your question more directly, many sensitive existentialist types, don't necessarily blame their parents, but life itself, the circumstances by which the negatives ensue. This is why there is existential literature going back to ancient empires. I don't think we learn how to blame things by intuition as much as habit. We usually look for the most immediate cause. Again, AN isn't there to point blame at people, just recognize what is going on and to prevent the harms onto a future person.

My point is that bringing about enlightenment does prevent harm (the enlightened person will no doubt experience less harm since he’s enlightened, no?), yet you’re unwilling to cause harm (by putting him in crutches) to bring about this reduction of harm (enlightenment). Yet with AN you’re willing to cause harm in order to prevent future potential harm. I think you said something to the effect that the harm you cause someone in order to prevent a greater harm is a necessary harm. Since you make a moral distinction between these two events, I’m asking you why. Not being a crass utilitarian isn’t an answer. It still doesn’t explain what specifically about these two cases warrants them to be approached differently. — Pinprick

Let's take an extreme example of what your logic is saying. There is a sociopath that is really messed up. And that sociopath feels tremendous loss at not pursuing his preference for bad stuff. He is depressed, his whole life is affected negatively. He can't sleep at night, he cries a lot. That's okay, cause that sociopath's doing bad X is prevented. Not being able to pursue bad x is not a grounds to allow bad x. This is what I mean by crass utilitarianism. Besides the fact that these sufferings are not equivalent. EVEN if you found out the sadness of the sociopath is actually greater than the pain he would pursue (he's not a complete monster let's say), then he should not pursue it. That is ridiculous and not right.

So what is the key here? It's being done to other people. The sociopath can be masochistic as he wants (though I would advise he get help), but not as sadistic as he wants.

Now granted, this is an extreme and not like the scenario in a crucial way that the sociopath is intending violence. However, I don't see a material difference in knowing that bad will happen to someone else, but pursuing it anyways because it makes you happy, even if one hopes the bad is not too great, or perhaps simply tries to ignore all the possibilities for bad that will incur. Ignoring known bads, discounting unknown bads, is not a great response to, "Sure I will allow this to happen to that other person".

Again, AN isn't there to point blame at people, just recognize what is going on and to prevent the harms onto a future person. — schopenhauer1

Except it is a specific claim that you should not have children, isn't it? That to do so would be wrong, would be blameworthy. Benatar does not just say, "If and only if you have children, they will be harmed," which is surely true, but also, "Therefore you should not have children."

That's okay, cause that sociopath's doing bad X is prevented. Not being able to pursue bad x is not a grounds to allow bad x. — schopenhauer1

So, then it’s justifiable to harm someone (sociopath/potential parent), even cause greater harm to that person, if it prevents that person from unnecessarily harming others (sociopath’s victims/children)? Is that right? I feel like I have to be missing something, because if that’s the case then you are justified in physically intervening in order to prevent childbirth, which essentially justifies eugenics. It also means the same for other scenarios; preventing a doctor from giving a vaccine, the use of lethal force for petty crimes like shoplifting, etc. But maybe that is what you mean? As long as you’re preventing someone from harming someone else your actions, regardless of severity, are justified.

So, then it’s justifiable to harm someone (sociopath/potential parent), even cause greater harm to that person, if it prevents that person from unnecessarily harming others (sociopath’s victims/children)? Is that right? I feel like I have to be missing something, because if that’s the case then you are justified in physically intervening in order to prevent childbirth, which essentially justifies eugenics. It also means the same for other scenarios; preventing a doctor from giving a vaccine, the use of lethal force for petty crimes like shoplifting, etc. But maybe that is what you mean? As long as you’re preventing someone from harming someone else your actions, regardless of severity, are justified. — Pinprick

Oh right, I didn’t think I had to bring up the idea of consent and ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms but doing that now.

Also, why is it we can even have this debate of suffering or life in the first place. A straetegy for antiAN is to pretend that there isn’t even a debate to be had. Yet here it is proven as I type. How it that we can even question what is going on? We are not like other animals in that sense. But this very conversation belies a constant evaluation and struggle of justifications. We need reasons and those reasons are never justified with simply. “Well we tend to think this way”. We change our minds, find different reasons, etc. Simply using circular reasoning of “its right because we do this” doesn’t fit in this open system of ours.

Be calm! I entreat you to hear me before you give vent to your hatred on my devoted head. Have I not suffered enough, that you seek to increase my misery? Life, although it may only be an accumulation of anguish, is dear to me, and I will defend it. — Wretch/Fiend/The Demon/Thing (Frankenstein)

But why make Frankenstein go through it in the first place? Careless and didn’t think it through.

But why make Frankenstein go through it in the first place? Careless and didn’t think it through. — schopenhauer1

Frankenstein was, in some sense, a natalist - he was, at the end of the day, father to the "wretch" and it (the "wretch") was the culmination of his life-long passion to give life.

Plus, the "wretch", despite the abject misery of his condition, wished to live on.

This is the paradox: Life is misery but people still want to live. Absurdism: our desire for meaning in a meaningless universe.

Oh right, I didn’t think I had to bring up the idea of consent and ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms but doing that now. — schopenhauer1

Man, you try really hard to avoid giving direct yes/no answers. We’ve already discussed greater/lesser harm.

EVEN if you found out the sadness of the sociopath is actually greater than the pain he would pursue (he's not a complete monster let's say), then he should not pursue it. — schopenhauer1

Although, you do keep trying to divert the questions away from your own actions and onto parents/sociopaths. So all I can do is assume. Therefore, I interpreted this to also mean that “Even if the harm I cause someone is greater than the harm they would have caused, if my actions prevent them from committing harm, I should act.”

As for consent, I don’t suppose you’ve obtained consent from the people you try to persuade/prevent from having children. IOW’s you’re not concerned about the harm your success at convincing others to not procreate may cause. So you must not think potentially causing harm to others without consent is wrong. However, your justification for AN is that it potentially causes unnecessary harm without consent, therefore it should be prevented, but attempting to prevent it also potentially causes unnecessary harm should you succeed in your attempts to convert others to AN. This is where you contradict yourself.

As for consent, I don’t suppose you’ve obtained consent from the people you try to persuade/prevent from having children. IOW’s you’re not concerned about the harm your success at convincing others to not procreate may cause. So you must not think potentially causing harm to others without consent is wrong. — Pinprick

If I am causing someone to be affected for a lifetime of harm, then lets talk.. But making an argument that might harm someone because they don't like it is trivial. They can walk away, ignore, go away. I am not forcing it on anyone. Get that??

However, your justification for AN is that it potentially causes unnecessary harm without consent, therefore it should be prevented, but attempting to prevent it also potentially causes unnecessary harm should you succeed in your attempts to convert others to AN. This is where you contradict yourself. — Pinprick

"Converting" doesn't harm them if they are doing it voluntarily..Obviously they agree with the argument even if it causes them sadness. So you are creating a classic straw man or red herring.

Except it is a specific claim that you should not have children, isn't it? That to do so would be wrong, would be blameworthy. Benatar does not just say, "If and only if you have children, they will be harmed," which is surely true, but also, "Therefore you should not have children." — Srap Tasmaner

It's not about blame. It's simply about what counts morally. Does giving happiness or the chance to be virtuous to someone else count as moral? I don't think so. I think it is neutral or non moral. It's something one can pursue, but not something one is obligated to pursue.. Not causing harm UNNECESSARILY, and not causing challenges to overcome only to be escaped by death or starvation and all the contingent harms (like oh let's say a lifetime's worth of harms which de facto comes from being born) is in the realm of morality. It doesn't matter who caused what.

Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage” — khaled

If one is committed to not causing unnecessary and inescapable harms and impositions...

We disagree as to happiness-making and virtue-making being moral. I think it is something to pursue if you want, but is non-moral. One is not obligated to give happiness or virtue, but one is obligated to not cause unnecessary, inescapable, harm/impositions/challenges.
I think one can judge how much of a prick or asshole or miserly someone is for not bringing happiness maybe.. but that's a character judgement.. value but not obligation.

We disagree as to happiness-making and virtue-making being moral. — schopenhauer1

“Happiness making” and prevention of harm is indistinguishable in my experience. It’s a conclusion I came to recently, though I haven’t explored its consequences fully. Anything that can be phrased as happiness making can also be phrased as harm prevention and anything that can be framed as happiness “removing” can be framed as harming. If so the distinction makes no sense. I’m sure you said a similar thing before but I can’t find the quote since I’m on mobile.

For instance, say A sent B a new computer as a gift. Note that B is not suffering on account of having a bad PC. You hear of this transaction and decide to destroy the PC. Have you harmed B? Have you done anything wrong to B?

All you did was prevent happiness making, but since that doesn’t factor into morality, surely you haven’t done anything wrong to the happiness recipient right?

Or simply: How do you distinguish the two. Can you come up with a definition for when an act is making happiness as opposed to preventing harm?

I think one can judge how much of a prick or asshole or miserly someone is for not bringing happiness maybe.. but that's a character judgement.. value but not obligation. — schopenhauer1

If you can save someone’s life by making a very inconsequential sacrifice are you obligated to?

@schopenhauer1

The decision to have a child can be a costly decision. So are there any reasons to believe that economic considerations play a role in deciding to have children?

The figure below shows the relationship between fertility (more specifically, the total fertility rate) and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (measured in 2010 U.S. dollars) across countries in 2000. The total fertility rate is the expected number of births a woman would have over the course of her life.

The decreasing relationship between the two variables demonstrates the connection between fertility choices and economic considerations. In general, poor countries tend to have higher levels of fertility than rich countries.

In particular, women tend to give birth to no fewer than three children in countries where GDP per capita is below $1,000 per year. In countries where GDP per capita is above $10,000 per year, women tend to give birth to no more than two children.

This decreasing relationship between fertility and income is well known to economists and demographers alike. In addition, it holds true over time: Rich countries, such as the U.S., have experienced a remarkable decline in their fertility rate as they became rich. Also, the relationship holds at the individual level, as rich families tend to have fewer children than poor families.

Why is fertility so much higher in poor countries? There are several possible reasons:

Time is relatively cheap in poor countries, so spending time away from work to take care of a child is not as costly as in a rich country. If this effect is strong enough, it can (and probably does) offset the fact that it is difficult to afford a child on a low income.


A child may require more education to be successful in a rich country. Thus, a child may be more costly there, so families may opt to have fewer, more educated children.


Infant mortality can play a role. More births might be needed to achieve a desired number of surviving children when infant mortality is high, as it tends to be in poor countries.

Children can take care of their parents when they are old. However, this is not necessary in rich countries with a well-developed social security system and functioning financial markets. — The Link Between Fertility And Income

A paradox, if you ask me? It's as if the more miserable one is (low income) the more children one wants and, on the flip side, happier (high income) you are, the smaller your family size.

There is such a thing as a happy Sisyphus. It takes balls to get there.

There is such a thing as a happy Sisyphus. It takes balls to get there. — frank

Really? I'd love to know who are those people.

Really? I'd love to know who are those people. — baker

There are probably some nearby.

I mean, it's one thing if they condemn you (or anyone) for 1000 years to push a damn boulder up the mountain. Then I can sort of understand being happy once you get the boulder to the top, because you defied the gods for that day.

But if the punishment is eternal, I cannot imagine a situation in which someone could be happy, even if Camus supposes this to be the case.

If I am causing someone to be affected for a lifetime of harm, then lets talk.. — schopenhauer1

It’s possible that you may be. Do you think the pain of not having a child will simply go away? Besides, the amount of harm caused is irrelevant, according to you.

They can walk away, ignore, go away. I am not forcing it on anyone. — schopenhauer1

This is exactly like the argument that we’re not forcing someone to live because they can always just kill themselves. You’re still creating the conditions of their suffering.

"Converting" doesn't harm them if they are doing it voluntarily..Obviously they agree with the argument even if it causes them sadness. — schopenhauer1

If it causes sadness, then it’s harmful. Being sad is a form of suffering, right? And it isn’t like one can’t voluntarily suffer.

There are probably some nearby. — frank

Too bad these happy sisyphuses refuse to share their secret to success!

But if the punishment is eternal, I cannot imagine a situation in which someone could be happy, even if Camus supposes this to be the case. — Manuel

And he made plans to get baptized into the Roman Catholic Church. So much for his integrity.

@frank @Manuel

(Sorry, technical problems, the edit button doesn't work from my phone.)

Being able to calmly endure all kinds of hardship is the holy grail for many people.

Those who seem to be succeeding at it do so by relying on distractions, and not because they had found a way to master hardship. Their success" depends