Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage” — khaled
Even if they would want you to? Ok. Now why should we think so? You want to convince others if this so how would you go about doing that? — khaled
But you’re going back to the standard definition of utopia, not the example I gave. Let’s call it world X then. It’s a world where you can remove all suffering at the snap of a finger. But you will suffer all the same if you refuse to snap your finger. And there is no way of escaping easily (euthanasia). Would it be fine to have kids in world X? — khaled
It DOES fit what you’re saying. It’s an example where the condition for something being wrong is satisfied yet you don’t think the thing is wrong. Showing that the conditions you set out for making something wrong are insufficient. — khaled
No. I deny that life can be characterized as a series of negative experiences as you imply. — khaled
Perhaps.. but I can also argue that who needs gifts prior to being born? No one. And this goes to that asymmetry you hate. Positives aren't needed for any one. What's important is the baggage is given to no one, this is good (from the assumption that an agent exists in the first place not the meta tree falls in the woods perspective). — schopenhauer1
To me there is just something about creating unnecessary suffering that is wrong, full stop. — schopenhauer1
What do you think? Does it hold up to my philosophy? — schopenhauer1
That they cannot do. But they can snap their fingers and leave any suffering they may be experiencing and thus, no one has ever complained. Call that what you will, utopia or not. Now what? — khaled
It seems to me in this world that they can sufficiently change the game without dire consequences. In effect, they can sufficiently "escape", so barring other information, this seems permissible. — schopenhauer1
If the utopia involves strife, this too is wrong to impose. — schopenhauer1
Snapping of fingers is equivalent now to what we do here.. It's all moved up a level. It's really the whole "At least you're not living in X" argument rehashed.. See, you're not starving in the third world, thus life must not be that bad.. Old school comparison switcheroo psychologically. Nothing new here to see. — schopenhauer1
no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good". — khaled
Suspend these laws and cover up traffic lights and signs. Whoever dies while the traffic light was red (but the driver couldn't see it) is the person who would benefit form traffic laws. — khaled
But in the case of birth, not having a child that would suffer benefits no one. It's not even a matter of "we can't tell who it benefits" no it literally benefits no one. So how is it "good".
"Good" in the asymmetry is defined as "good for someone" in each quadrant except the one causing the asymmetry. There, it is defined as a "better state of affairs than the alternative". That's why the asymmetry makes no sense. And why I never believed it even as an AN. — khaled
So your problem seems to not be purely with how long the imposition lasts or how badly it can go, since both of those variables are the same in the real world and in world X. So those two variables are insufficient, as here is an example where they make something that seems fine to you wrong. So you tell me, what difference between the real world and world X makes having kids in world X fine but having kids in the real world wrong? — khaled
It does, but you said it's not wrong to impose. If I had to guess, it's because said strife is very easy to escape (snap of a finger). That seems to be the variable you're missing. It's not just about duration and amount of suffering, but how easy it is to escape said suffering. — khaled
The "at least you're not living in X" argument is used to tell you to quit complaining. I am not saying something like that. I'm giving an example to illustrate that you care about more than just whether or not the suffering is unnecessary or how long it's imposed for.
And is "snapping fingers is equivalent to what we do here" supposed to indicate that it's wrong to have kids under those circumstances?
I keep telling you, that by these examples I'm not trying to say "This imposition is fine so having kids is fine". So could you stop interpreting it that way? It's getting tiring repeating that "No, I am not implying that this imposition is fine therefore having kids is fine" every time. — khaled
All you need is an agent who knows that preventing harm is good. The person who would benefit need not exist, just someone. — schopenhauer1
But yet notice we don’t need to actually make this bad scenario happen to know someone would be harmed, and we have prevented that someone from the harm. — schopenhauer1
It simply falls to the axiom that prevented bad is always good, where prevented good is only relatively bad. — schopenhauer1
I don't think it's fine. — schopenhauer1
Not this world though, so I don't see where that would lead us except to confirm, "Yep that world is not this world". — schopenhauer1
Are you trying to ask what it would take to be permissible? — schopenhauer1
As I said previously with hedonic treadmill.. If in this world, a challenge to us is like the relative challenge of snapping fingers to them, it's the same thing. Can it be judged as too much by someone? If so, why? All of a sudden it becomes more like our world. — schopenhauer1
Inescapable without dire consequences, unnecessary to impose for that person who will be the recipient of negatives, set of challenges, judgement of negatives in the first place, that only humans are really capable of through linguistic self-reflective abilities. — schopenhauer1
In the case of not having kids, we know that we benefitted no one. We have prevented harm from no one. — khaled
Where are these extreme measures? — schopenhauer1
I didn't say bring about enlightenment, simply prevent harm. — schopenhauer1
So, sure maybe putting you in crutches makes you feel enlightened down the line, doesn't mean I should put you in crutches. — schopenhauer1
My ethics is based on the dignity of the person being harmed. In one case you already exist.. It's too late. — schopenhauer1
In the other, you are creating wholesale, harm onto someone else, unnecessarily. — schopenhauer1
Is it your position that parents have wronged their children? That's a simple yes or no question.
If the answer is 'yes', how do you square that with our moral intuitions? — Srap Tasmaner
My point is that bringing about enlightenment does prevent harm (the enlightened person will no doubt experience less harm since he’s enlightened, no?), yet you’re unwilling to cause harm (by putting him in crutches) to bring about this reduction of harm (enlightenment). Yet with AN you’re willing to cause harm in order to prevent future potential harm. I think you said something to the effect that the harm you cause someone in order to prevent a greater harm is a necessary harm. Since you make a moral distinction between these two events, I’m asking you why. Not being a crass utilitarian isn’t an answer. It still doesn’t explain what specifically about these two cases warrants them to be approached differently. — Pinprick
Again, AN isn't there to point blame at people, just recognize what is going on and to prevent the harms onto a future person. — schopenhauer1
That's okay, cause that sociopath's doing bad X is prevented. Not being able to pursue bad x is not a grounds to allow bad x. — schopenhauer1
So, then it’s justifiable to harm someone (sociopath/potential parent), even cause greater harm to that person, if it prevents that person from unnecessarily harming others (sociopath’s victims/children)? Is that right? I feel like I have to be missing something, because if that’s the case then you are justified in physically intervening in order to prevent childbirth, which essentially justifies eugenics. It also means the same for other scenarios; preventing a doctor from giving a vaccine, the use of lethal force for petty crimes like shoplifting, etc. But maybe that is what you mean? As long as you’re preventing someone from harming someone else your actions, regardless of severity, are justified. — Pinprick
Be calm! I entreat you to hear me before you give vent to your hatred on my devoted head. Have I not suffered enough, that you seek to increase my misery? Life, although it may only be an accumulation of anguish, is dear to me, and I will defend it. — Wretch/Fiend/The Demon/Thing (Frankenstein)
But why make Frankenstein go through it in the first place? Careless and didn’t think it through. — schopenhauer1
Oh right, I didn’t think I had to bring up the idea of consent and ameliorating greater harms with lesser harms but doing that now. — schopenhauer1
EVEN if you found out the sadness of the sociopath is actually greater than the pain he would pursue (he's not a complete monster let's say), then he should not pursue it. — schopenhauer1
As for consent, I don’t suppose you’ve obtained consent from the people you try to persuade/prevent from having children. IOW’s you’re not concerned about the harm your success at convincing others to not procreate may cause. So you must not think potentially causing harm to others without consent is wrong. — Pinprick
However, your justification for AN is that it potentially causes unnecessary harm without consent, therefore it should be prevented, but attempting to prevent it also potentially causes unnecessary harm should you succeed in your attempts to convert others to AN. This is where you contradict yourself. — Pinprick
Except it is a specific claim that you should not have children, isn't it? That to do so would be wrong, would be blameworthy. Benatar does not just say, "If and only if you have children, they will be harmed," which is surely true, but also, "Therefore you should not have children." — Srap Tasmaner
Yes. And you think so too for the Utopia example and surprise parties. Neither are needed impositions. The disagreement here is about the size of the “baggage” — khaled
We disagree as to happiness-making and virtue-making being moral. — schopenhauer1
I think one can judge how much of a prick or asshole or miserly someone is for not bringing happiness maybe.. but that's a character judgement.. value but not obligation. — schopenhauer1
The decision to have a child can be a costly decision. So are there any reasons to believe that economic considerations play a role in deciding to have children?
The figure below shows the relationship between fertility (more specifically, the total fertility rate) and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (measured in 2010 U.S. dollars) across countries in 2000. The total fertility rate is the expected number of births a woman would have over the course of her life.
The decreasing relationship between the two variables demonstrates the connection between fertility choices and economic considerations. In general, poor countries tend to have higher levels of fertility than rich countries.
In particular, women tend to give birth to no fewer than three children in countries where GDP per capita is below $1,000 per year. In countries where GDP per capita is above $10,000 per year, women tend to give birth to no more than two children.
This decreasing relationship between fertility and income is well known to economists and demographers alike. In addition, it holds true over time: Rich countries, such as the U.S., have experienced a remarkable decline in their fertility rate as they became rich. Also, the relationship holds at the individual level, as rich families tend to have fewer children than poor families.
Why is fertility so much higher in poor countries? There are several possible reasons:
Time is relatively cheap in poor countries, so spending time away from work to take care of a child is not as costly as in a rich country. If this effect is strong enough, it can (and probably does) offset the fact that it is difficult to afford a child on a low income.
A child may require more education to be successful in a rich country. Thus, a child may be more costly there, so families may opt to have fewer, more educated children.
Infant mortality can play a role. More births might be needed to achieve a desired number of surviving children when infant mortality is high, as it tends to be in poor countries.
Children can take care of their parents when they are old. However, this is not necessary in rich countries with a well-developed social security system and functioning financial markets. — The Link Between Fertility And Income
If I am causing someone to be affected for a lifetime of harm, then lets talk.. — schopenhauer1
They can walk away, ignore, go away. I am not forcing it on anyone. — schopenhauer1
"Converting" doesn't harm them if they are doing it voluntarily..Obviously they agree with the argument even if it causes them sadness. — schopenhauer1
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