I don't think there is such a strong difference in kind between sentences and words. — Banno

Well I took this up above, but the idea that a sentence like "I know I am in pain" looks like it is meaningful in the abstract is because words can be defined (however partially, they can) and so we can imagine we understand what this sentence does. But a sentence is like an expression, which is meaningful by the criteria of a concept, as what I say can be judged to be a threat or an apology, or that only in an expression are we able to determine which use of a word applies.

I feel like a... — TheMadFool

... like a 'numerologist' yammering on about ZFC. — 180 Proof

:grin:

:ok: I defer to your better judgment!

:ok:

Also it is obvious to anyone with a pulse that...
— StreetlightX

:sweat: You guys are killing me. — Caldwell

Recruitment officer: We need soldiers!
Draftee: What's the qualification? A heartbeat?

Maybe the mistake I'm worried about is lumping together all religious speech; there are lots of different sorts of things one might say, that could count as religious, and some of them connect rather clearly to practice and some quite a bit less clearly. — Srap Tasmaner

That's fair. But I'd qualify this to say something like: "be good and you'll get to heaven" counts as an exhortation or something similar. That's the use to which it is put. But if you then go on to ask: "but where is heaven? What's it like?" - then you've disengaged from the 'rough ground'. So: one can 'make use' of religious language, and indeed, this is done all the time. But I wouldn't say it has any 'cognitive content'. Same goes for your own example which I think is exemplary: "Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead". Maybe it's got some value as a morality tale, but if you're then going to ask about the mechanics of resurrection and turn it into some philosophical or metaphysical debate, I'd tell you to pound sand.

Another way to put this is tautologically: if your religious discussion has some practical import ... then it has some practical import.

It seems weird to refer to language-games without reference to correctness, and it seems self-sealing. — Sam26

Language-games are more or less open-ended. The meaning of words can change. Whether or not a word is being used correctly is determined from within the game itself. This is not to say there is no correct or incorrect usage, but that correctness is a function of the game.

I can always say someone else's language-game isn't a language-game, because the word is not doing anything. — Sam26

Whether or not a word is doing something is determined from within the game itself.

I think there's some room for debate there, but let's say you're right about all of that. What I'm more interested in at the moment is this sort of claim:

You can't correctly be said to know you have an itch. — Banno

Does that mean it's incorrect to say I know I have a headache? "Incorrect" how? In the sense that it's false? Or does "I know I have a headache", despite appearances, have no truth-value?

There are all sorts of sentences that are still meaningful despite lacking a truth-value, but this isn't a question or a command or a recommendation, or any of those cases; it's a simple indicative sentence. For sentences like that, being meaningful and being truth-apt go hand-in-hand. So do we conclude that "I know I have a headache" is meaningless, or that it is some sort of exception?

The question is exactly this: is the use of a sentence in a language-game its meaning? (Whether this is what Wittgenstein claims, I'd leave aside for the moment.) If you show, to your satisfaction, that a given sentence is not a 'valid move in a language-game' --- and let's say "You don't demonstrate to your self that you have a pain - you just have a pain" does that --- then did you thereby show that the sentence is meaningless? Or that it lacks a truth-value? Or both?

What is the sense of "knowledge like that of an object"?... I believe that my pain can be known in the exact same sense that any other object can be known: perceived via the senses and explained rationally by the intellect. — Olivier5

We could say we "perceived via the senses"(empirically) and can explain pain "rationally" as neurons firing and tissue swelling and brain processes (this is me being sciency). But my pain is not explained or justified; we don't use reasons, but, at best, describe our pain, yet, in describing it, we are expressing it (even to ourselves, as in, becoming aware of it in that way) because it is ours, we have it. I don't even need to be (necessarily) aware of my pain nor say anything to me or you intellectually rational, because I can merely cry out; and now, substitute words. #244

For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression? — Witt, PI #245

With an object, we have the space (between us and it) to create the picture of a word and the thing it refers to. This kind of thing can be given qualities and must meet criteria like discrete, defined, perceivable, certain. And in this space I can have knowledge in the sense of what is true. This picture of an object is not how pain works; there is no pain that is true for me, there is no criteria to meet other than my awareness of it and my expression (description) of it to you. Now I can lie (to myself and you) and I can do a better or worse job of expressing my pain, but that will only matter to the extent of the context--doctor's appointment, request for sympathy, comparison to your pain, etc.--and not as knowledge, say, of Mars' atmosphere.

Does [You can't correctly be said to know you have an itch. @Banno] mean it's incorrect to say I know I have a headache? "Incorrect" how? In the sense that it's false? Or does "I know I have a headache", despite appearances, have no truth-value? — Srap Tasmaner

Earlier, here, I said:

In what context would we say "I know I have a headache."? Maybe when you've made it aware to me that you have a headache, then, when I see you a little while later and you have an ice pack on your knee, and I point to your head and shrug, saying "Don't you have a headache?", you might look at me (like I'm an idiot) and say "I know I have a headache." -- but this is in the sense of "Duh, I know", as in the use (grammatical category) of: I am aware. — Antony Nickles

The method Witt uses in imagining a context for an expression is to show that the sentence is meaningful, that there are ordinary criteria for judging such a use of I know (as that I am aware), in order to show (by contrast) that the criteria are just not what we want--as an answer to the skeptic that there is in fact something in me that is "me" (rather than pain just being mine), which the example of pain seems to provide with its intensity (apparent inability not to be known) and seeming certainty (that our knowledge is unshakable, rather than not certain at all). The need to "know" our pain in this way removes any context (and our human part in someone's pain) and imposes criteria like correctness and truth-value of the pain. For pain, we judge the expression not the pain, though I may judge the pain by the expression ("That's not quite it")--not having the words (quite yet), not paying attention, not fully aware of my repressed pain, being mistaken out of shock. Others' judgement is also not by the criteria of correctness or truth in correspondence, but it works in the ways that I can lie or be mistaken, and all you have is to accept my expression as a person in pain, or reject the expression (question me or dismiss me).

Does that mean it's incorrectto say I know I have a headache? "Incorrect" how? — Srap Tasmaner

Note my bolding.

It is correct that you have a headache, but incorrect to say you know you have a headache, because the justification for the claim, if there is any, is the headache itself.

Of course we can draw a distinction between infelicitous and incorrect uses. But this is not an infelicity; it is a misuse. One of the aspects of the language game of knowing stuff is being able to present a justification for appraisal. that aspect, that criteria for knowledge, had not been met. "I know I have and itch" doesn't achieve the status of being eligible for a truth value, to use your somewhat constipated term, becasue it is not grammatically a statement. It's not like "Paris is the capital of France"; Nor "Paris is the capital of Germany"; but more like "Paris is the capital of lemongrass".

Your point might be that it is not incorrect but rather a misfire, that you are taking correct and incorrect to imply merely true or false propositions. In which case we, and here we might include @Sam26, might agree that it would be better to say "misfire"; but we do talk of folk's grammar being incorrect, so that seems to me unnecessarily pedantic.

Can one claim to know one has a headache anyway? Again, of course. This was shown by @Isaac in a previous thread, but keep in mind that this use would be a distinct form of knowing, involving unconscious brain functions, and quite different to knowing one has a clean shirt.

Language-games are more or less open-ended...

Whether or not a word is doing something is determined from within the game itself. — Fooloso4

There's an unresolved tension here. Language games do reach out to other language games. It would be brave indeed to claim that any use is determinate.

It would be brave indeed to claim that any use is determinate. — Banno

I’m fairly sure I know what you mean by this: that it would be brave to claim that any meaning is determinate, or that we can be certain to understand any use of language. But isn’t that just what we do everyday? I think the bar is set too high here on knowledge/certainty; a philosophical use of these terms.

That is, to say that we can never be certain what someone means with their use of language, then I think you have gone too far or set too high a standard.

The language game of knowing that such-and-such involves being able to present a justification. That justification must be accessible to others.

Suppose I claim to know I have five dollars, but refuse to open my wallet in justification. It would be quite reasonable for you to doubt my claim.

In the case of a pain, were the only justification is the pain itself, it is simply not possible to provide the necessary evidence.

There is a difference between "I have five dollars" and "I know I have five dollars". That difference is not found between "I have a headache" and "I know I have a headache".

I suspect Olivier will simply deny this; but that just implies he has failed to engage with the argument.

I’m fairly sure I know what you mean by this: that it would be brave to claim that any meaning is determinate, or that we can be certain to understand any use of language. But isn’t that just what we do everyday? I think the bar is set too high here on knowledge/certainty; a philosophical use of these terms. — Luke

Meh. The bar, so far as it is set, is set by what works.

The counterpoint to the argument that language games are rules-based is found in Davidson's "A nice derangement of epitaphs".No set of conventions can explain all of language use; but moreover, even if it did, some wag would immediately break those conventions.

And I think this puts the lie to the notion that language games are rules-based. That one is following a rule is not dependent on one being able to state that rule, but is found in what one does.

Language games are family resemblances, and the thing about families is that they grow. That newborn second cousin with the red hair might have no genetic link to you, but still becomes a part of your family.

And I think this puts the lie to the notion that language games are rules-based. That one is following a rule is not dependent on one being able to state that rule, but is found in what one does. — Banno

How does it follow that language games are not rule based? Is it that there are no rules or that following the rules is found in what one does?

It would be brave indeed to claim that any use is determinate. — Banno

To determine whether or not a word is "doing something" in a particular game is not to claim a determinate use of the word.

following the rules is found in what one does? — Luke

That's what I said.

Then another word might have been more suitable. Perhaps "decide"? "Choose"?

That’s a funny way to answer a question. Okay, never mind.

Edit: in case you missed it, how can one follow the rules (in what one does) if there are no rules (if language games are not rules based). In other words, how can conventions be broken if there are no conventions?

The method Witt uses in imagining a context for an expression is to show that the sentence is meaningful, — Antony Nickles

Was it meaningless when originally said here a few pages back?

Suppose I claim to know I have five dollars, but refuse to open my wallet in justification. It would be quite reasonable for you to doubt my claim. — Banno

Looking in your wallet is how we would verify that you have $5; how would we verify that you knew that, that you weren't just guessing?

"I know I have and itch" doesn't achieve the status of being eligible for a truth value, to use your somewhat constipated term, becasue it is not grammatically a statement. It's not like "Paris is the capital of France"; Nor "Paris is the capital of Germany"; but more like "Paris is the capital of lemongrass". — Banno

If it's like the last one, then is it meaningless?

By the way, are you allowing that it can be true or false that I know Paris is the capital of France? How about, "I know I left my keys right here"? Or "I know I was thinking about something important a minute ago, but now I can't remember what it was"?

Not seeing a point to that post.

In the case of a pain, were the only justification is the pain itself, it is simply not possible to provide the necessary evidence. — Banno

I knew there was a more definitive criteria of the sense of knowledge I was trying to contrast with that of being aware for @Olivier5, but I couldn't come up with this, so thank you. I would add that the flip-side is that our impotence to prove our sensations to the other outside of our expression of them makes the other's rejection of our pain all the more isolating, which adds to the desire for a picture that ensures our ability to communicate who we are to someone else as if it were just a matter of simply describing some thing that is certain and complete (all that is required) to be known/justified in a way that defies rejection, ensures acceptance.

Yes.

The method Witt uses in imagining a context for an expression is to show that the sentence is meaningful,
— Antony Nickles

Was it meaningless when originally said here a few pages back? — Srap Tasmaner

The emphasis is being able to show a context; in this way we can see the implications of the expression, the way in which it works (it's grammar) and thus which sense of the concept, what use it is here. TMF's original sentence is meaningful because all the words can be, but there is, as yet, no context (despite its being a retort here) in which we can see which use of know this is and what the sentence tells us of the implications to the concept of sensations. To say the sentence is more/different than I have outlined is to have a different context/example or to be able to say there is something objectionable in my description, reasonably, with evidence (what else we say when we say that).

Meh.

Cheers. This might be what is missing - but that would be odd, since he seems to have read PI.

Imagine you tell a friend about a headache and she asks, "Did you know you had a headache at 3:00?

It isn't gibberish, but you'd still probably ask for clarification because it's such a weird question.

I think anytime people ask for clarification, they're trying to make an utterance useful. They're trying to find the missing context.

It's not like Wittgenstein had nothing to say about meaning, and he's widely read as endorsing a kind of functionalism: the meaning of a word, perhaps as well the meaning of a sentence, simply is the use one makes of it, or can make of it, as a move in a language-game.

Whether that paragraph represents Wittgenstein well, I'll pass on for now.

The question I am trying to raise is whether that view, LW's or not, is defensible.

If no one in this thread holds that view, I won't get anywhere unless someone plays devil's advocate, but I would be surprised, as most of the Wittgensteinian folks around here are only too happy to talk about 'moves in a language-game' and so forth. Maybe @Luke will take me up on it.

Hi Srap. I think W’s position would be that if it doesn’t make sense to doubt it (e.g having a pain), then it doesn’t make sense to say you know it, either.