You say it's a fundamental metaphysical question, then go on to show how it's not. What you describe is the use of God as a metaphor for "he absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences." Albert Einstein, an atheist, said that God does not play dice. Although I am not a theist, one of the texts that means the most to me this the American Declaration of Independence "All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator... — T Clark

Good examples of a metaphorical use of the God concept. As an atheist myself, I agree that this is a possible and often effective use of the concept.

My only disagreement is with your characterisation of my position in your first sentence. I didn't use the term 'fundamental'; instead I said that God (or gods) is a classic question in metaphysics, i.e. a question which has been traditionally seen as an important issue for metaphysicians of old, the "classics".

There's no reason someone can't use one metaphysical approach in the morning and another in the afternoon, depending on usefulness for a particular application. I have quite a few floating around in my mind right now. Now, I'm following (more or less) the rules of reason. Later I might want to follow the rules of intuition or poetry. One of the greatest strengths of human intelligence is the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking. Light is both a particle and a wave - far out man. — T Clark

Well, I have to admit that both Collingwood and my own life experience vouch for this but I still feel unsatisfied with a lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks. For me there still is a need for a meta-framework binding different methodological frameworks together, if only to tell which framework(s) are best used when. Even if that need might never be totally satisfied, we (I for one) crave for coherence.

Hence for instance the search for a unified theory between Relativity and QM.

My only disagreement is with your characterisation of my position in your first sentence. I didn't use the term 'fundamental'; instead I said that God (or gods) is a classic question in metaphysics, — Olivier5

Yes, I pulled the old switcheroo. I started out with "classical" as you did. Then I switched it to "fundamental" because that supported my rhetorical position better. I'm a bad boy.

I'm a bad boy. — T Clark

:grin: Let he who never sinned report you first.

I added a bit to my response BTW.

I still feel unsatisfied with a lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks. — Olivier5

The willingness to accept the "lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks" is exactly "the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking" I was talking about. Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. I guess some would call it intellectually lazy, but it's not.

Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. — T Clark

By definition, removing a constraint is liberating, but note that adding a constraint helps in focusing. The idea of Collingwood is that certain metaphysical constraints are fruitful, they bear interesting fruits in terms of knowledge by focussing our attention on certain types of explanations and excluding others.

For instance, a modern historian cannot decently believe or write that Zeus literally helped Heracles, or that Moses parted the Red Sea. Such mythological explanations or descriptions of events are ruled out by the naturalistic presupposition that gods do not intervene in history directly via miracles. Now, a mystical historian could say: "I find that believing in an interventionist God is sometimes liberating."

Would he be right?

If he means by that "The direct, literal intervention of Christ explains the victory of X over Y at battle Z better than any other explanation", or even if he means something like "The direct, literal intervention of Christ is as fair as any other explanation for the victory of X over Y at battle Z", I vouch he is wrong, at least in the context of modern historical research. For a sermon maybe ok...

If the mystical historian means something like: "Many people at the time and in the centuries that followed until now, especially many Christians, interpreted the victory of X over Y at battle Z as resulting from X's conversion to Christ, and we need to keep this framework of faith in mind when we read such and such historical sources", then he may be right.

The idea of Collingwood is that certain metaphysical constraints are fruitful, — Olivier5

Yes, but to me, the more interesting thing is that they are unavoidable and we need to try to be aware of what we are using and the influence it has on our thinking.

For instance, a modern historian cannot decently believe or write that Zeus literally helped Heracles, or that Moses parted the Red Sea. Such mythological explanations or descriptions of events are ruled out by the naturalistic presupposition that gods do not intervene in history directly via miracles. — Olivier5

As I noted, for me, theistic religion's place in metaphysics is ambiguous. My solution? Don't worry about it.

Now, a mystical historian could say: "I find that believing in an interventionist God is sometimes liberating."

Would he be right? — Olivier5

I see it from the other side. To be constrained limits your ability to understand. That's why, in an ideal world, we would pick, take responsibility for, our own constraints. That's not how it usually works, even for such profoundly insightful intellects as you and me. Your historian is responsible for his own metaphysics. It is in our best interests to be aware of them when we are reading his works.

Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. — T Clark

Is that not making the struggle to understand risk free?

The Collingwood method of not framing assumptions as true or false is helpful toward a taxonomic orientation of various concepts and points of view but it doesn't give itself problems it cannot solve.

Is that not an 'absolute' assumption of some kind? Is that saying all problems are only results of some set of ideas being adopted and are not verifiable beyond the expression of them?

Is that not making the struggle to understand risk free? — Paine

Good question, although I think it comes from the wrong direction. The goal is not be be correct, it's to provide answers that will work in the real world. Collingwood's metaphysics makes us, or at least gives us the ability to be, responsible for our own assumptions. It's then our job to pick assumptions that make sense in the world in which we live.

The Collingwood method of not framing assumptions as true or false is helpful toward a taxonomic orientation of various concepts and points of view but it doesn't give itself problems it cannot solve. — Paine

First of all, it's not all assumptions, presuppositions, but only absolute presuppositions that Collingwood's view applies to. As I said, the goal is not to just solve problems, but to solve them in a way that works.

Is that not an 'absolute' assumption of some kind? — Paine

If you're asking whether Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics is a metaphysical position, the answer is "yes."

The goal is not be be correct, it's to provide answers that will work in the real world. — T Clark

I propose the goal is to understand the world and ourselves in it. Being correct (or not) is an attribute of a proposition or a set of them. Understanding is finding out what is 'real' and wanting to understand more because of that experience. Being satisfied that a relativity separates absolute assumptions is a kind of cessation of desire. It is to say there is no ultimate coherence in this 'real' world and it is foolish to seek it out.

It is in that sense of the love in the word philosophy that I meant to have no problems. The eunuch does not sport pesky erections.

I propose the goal is to understand the world and ourselves in it. — Paine

The world and ourselves in it are functions of the metaphysical system we choose. First pick the system, then you get to see the world.

Understanding is finding out what is 'real' and wanting to understand more because of that experience. — Paine

Again, "real" is a function of the metaphysical system you choose.

It is to say there is no ultimate coherence in this 'real' world and it is foolish to seek it out. — Paine

No, it is to say that the ultimate coherence of the world is dependent on me and the choices I make and the values I hold.

So, you agree with Protagoras: 'Man is the measure of all things.'
That view captures a certain kind of immediacy in our experience but exemplifies the lack of desire I was referring to. According to Protagoras, any further efforts to understand beyond those parameters is make-work or wankery.

If you're asking whether Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics is a metaphysical position, the answer is "yes." — T Clark

So, what is its central tenet?

So, what is its central tenet? — Janus

In his own words:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or groups of persons, on this or that occasion or groups of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking.

Man is the measure of all things. — Paine

Wherever our ideas and technology go, we ourselves live at human scale. All human value resides at human scale. For us, the world is inseparable from human value.

The only tools we have to conceptualize reality are human language and mathematics. Humans cannot understand or use anything that hasn't been translated into humanese.

That view captures a certain kind of immediacy in our experience but exemplifies the lack of desire I was referring to. — Paine

Lack of desire for what?

According to Protagoras, any further efforts to understand beyond those parameters is make-work or wankery. — Paine

I never said I agreed with Protagoras, you did.

To my mind that does not read as a metaphysical statement at all, but as a methodological or historiographical statement.

The other point is that traditional metaphysics does not consist merely in "absolute presuppositions" whatever they might be, but in explicated systems. Sure you might say there are irreducible or groundless presuppositions or axioms that are the foundations of metaphysical systems, but that is also true of all empirical inquiries, ethics and aesthetics and even of the arts and crafts. I see those basic assumptions or axioms as being methodological, not metaphysical (excepting of course the grounding assumptions of metaphysics itself).

To my mind that does not read as a metaphysical statement at all, but as a methodological or historiographical statement. — Janus

Seems metaphysical to Collingwood and me. No reason we have to agree.

I see those basic assumptions or axioms as being methodological, not metaphysical. — Janus

As I said, it looks like "metaphysics" means something different to you than it does to me. That's no surprise. No one ever agrees as to what the word actually means. It comes down to this - Collingwood's understanding of metaphysics is what I'm interested in. It's an important part of my understanding of how the world works and how we understand it.

Again, no reason we have to agree.

Lack of desire for what? — T Clark

To understand the universe as it is, both with us and without us.

I never said I agreed with Protagoras, you did. — T Clark

Yes, it is only my description.

There seem to be, broadly, two conventional definitions of metaphysics: the "traditional" and the "modern".

1. The Word ‘Metaphysics’ and the Concept of Metaphysics

2. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “Old” Metaphysics

2.1 Being As Such, First Causes, Unchanging Things
2.2 Categories of Being and Universals
2.3 Substance

3. The Problems of Metaphysics: the “New” Metaphysics

3.1 Modality
3.2 Space and Time
3.3 Persistence and Constitution
3.4 Causation, Freedom and Determinism
3.5 The Mental and Physical

Above are headings in the SEP article on metaphysics.

It seems as if Collingwood is ignoring the world (the concern of metaphysics) and focusing instead on intended meaning.

Anyone can use the term "metaphysics" however they wish, but it is unusual.

:up:

To understand the universe as it is, both with us and without us. — Paine

The universe as is isn't anything. You have to have a point of view to see from, a center to stand on. That's metaphysics.

Anyone can use the term "metaphysics" however they wish, but it is unusual. — Manuel

As I've said many times, "metaphysics" means different things to different people. You can say it means anything you want it to. So can I.

As far as I can tell, Collingwood's description of metaphysics is respected and still referenced 80 years later. Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention?

There seem to be, broadly, two conventional definitions of metaphysics: the "traditional" and the "modern". — Janus

I don't think I get your point.

As far as I can tell, Collingwood's description of metaphysics is respected and still referenced 80 years later. Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention? — T Clark

Collingwood is not generally considered to be a central figure in the historical evolution of metaphysical thought.

I don't think I get your point. — T Clark

That doesn't tell me anything unless you point to what you are not getting.

Collingwood is not generally considered to be a central figure in the historical evolution of metaphysical thought. — Janus

And so...

And so Collingwood doesn't really count as a metaphysician, whatever else you might think he counts as. At most he counts as a kind of historian or historiographer of metaphysical thought, which as I have already pointed out, is not the same thing as a metaphysician.

My response was directed to what might be wanted beyond acceptance to any particular account of our limitations, however those things may be described. To notice that quality is not a claim upon what should be counted as possible or not. It is not leverage to object to your idea that the universe is a product of perception.

Nonetheless, I am pretty sure the universe is something with me and without me.

Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention? — T Clark

As I see it, it focuses on a rather narrow area of the world - important, no doubt - that of "absolute presuppositions".

Other traditions, say, pragmatism, process philosophy, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, continental philosophy, etc., continue to see metaphysics as dealing with the nature of the world.

There are exceptions such as the logical positivists or Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics and some of the language philosophy folks who either took metaphysics to be empty or in need of replacement.

So in this sense it's unusual, focusing on meanings (presuppositions). But it's not wrong or bad or anything like that.

And so Collingwood doesn't really count as a metaphysician, — Janus

Janus: Collingwood is not a metaphysician.
T Clark: Why not?
Janus: Because he's wrong.
T Clark: Why is he wrong?
Janus: Because he's not a metaphysician.