You say it's a fundamental metaphysical question, then go on to show how it's not. What you describe is the use of God as a metaphor for "he absolute presupposition that quantitative differences are all there really is 'out there', i.e. that qualitative differences are not fundamental but rather the expression of mere quantitative differences." Albert Einstein, an atheist, said that God does not play dice. Although I am not a theist, one of the texts that means the most to me this the American Declaration of Independence "All men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator... — T Clark
There's no reason someone can't use one metaphysical approach in the morning and another in the afternoon, depending on usefulness for a particular application. I have quite a few floating around in my mind right now. Now, I'm following (more or less) the rules of reason. Later I might want to follow the rules of intuition or poetry. One of the greatest strengths of human intelligence is the ability to hold two seemingly conflicting ideas in our minds at once and yet keep on thinking. Light is both a particle and a wave - far out man. — T Clark
My only disagreement is with your characterisation of my position in your first sentence. I didn't use the term 'fundamental'; instead I said that God (or gods) is a classic question in metaphysics, — Olivier5
I still feel unsatisfied with a lack of conceptual coherence between frameworks. — Olivier5
Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. — T Clark
The idea of Collingwood is that certain metaphysical constraints are fruitful, — Olivier5
For instance, a modern historian cannot decently believe or write that Zeus literally helped Heracles, or that Moses parted the Red Sea. Such mythological explanations or descriptions of events are ruled out by the naturalistic presupposition that gods do not intervene in history directly via miracles. — Olivier5
Now, a mystical historian could say: "I find that believing in an interventionist God is sometimes liberating."
Would he be right? — Olivier5
Rejecting the need for a "meta-framework" is intellectually liberating. — T Clark
Is that not making the struggle to understand risk free? — Paine
The Collingwood method of not framing assumptions as true or false is helpful toward a taxonomic orientation of various concepts and points of view but it doesn't give itself problems it cannot solve. — Paine
Is that not an 'absolute' assumption of some kind? — Paine
The goal is not be be correct, it's to provide answers that will work in the real world. — T Clark
I propose the goal is to understand the world and ourselves in it. — Paine
Understanding is finding out what is 'real' and wanting to understand more because of that experience. — Paine
It is to say there is no ultimate coherence in this 'real' world and it is foolish to seek it out. — Paine
Man is the measure of all things. — Paine
That view captures a certain kind of immediacy in our experience but exemplifies the lack of desire I was referring to. — Paine
According to Protagoras, any further efforts to understand beyond those parameters is make-work or wankery. — Paine
To my mind that does not read as a metaphysical statement at all, but as a methodological or historiographical statement. — Janus
I see those basic assumptions or axioms as being methodological, not metaphysical. — Janus
Anyone can use the term "metaphysics" however they wish, but it is unusual. — Manuel
As far as I can tell, Collingwood's description of metaphysics is respected and still referenced 80 years later. Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention? — T Clark
Yet, you call it "unusual." Can you support your contention? — T Clark
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