I'm not convinced of that — Manuel

I fail to see how, if it’s a matter of definition, but so be it.

Just like you get intense in political stuff, — Manuel

I like to think I’m intense with everything I care about. :strong:

If stasis is equivalent to objectively present , enduring , subsisting , self-identical, inhering, then he is determining stasis as an inadequate way to think about existing. Becoming isnt at one pole and stasis at the other, and neither is becoming the sequential movement of things becoming present ( stasis) in time and then passing away. Rather , the becoming of time is a single unified occurrence that is future, present and having been in the same moment. There is no room for stasis or objective presence here. — Joshs

In that case there isn’t room for becoming, either.

Thinking of being as becoming is just as inadequate as thinking of being as constant presence.

I don’t see “becoming of time” meaning anything. Time— temporality— is, essentially, us. It’s dasein’s being as ecstatic openness. Things persist and change, sure, but first they’re here, they are.

Heidegger is not offering an interpretation himself, for example that being = time.
— Xtrix

He certainly is, if you are referring to the ontological understanding of the being of Dasein. — Joshs

The being of dasein is temporality, which interprets being. Not being in general.

I like to think I’m intense with everything I care about. :strong: — Xtrix

Oh no, you most certainly are. :sweat:

Just that there's more room in politics to get really upset at some people. It's a bit harder (though not impossible) to get pissed of at someone for not agreeing on a word, or if tree exists or not. I fall more into the latter category, especially with some rather niche topics.

In any case, thanks for the conversation. Great threads, as usual. :ok:

But within this context, we're talking about what's usually thought of as the most "universal" of concepts. — Xtrix

The distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘things’ is a fundamental ontological distinction. If you lose sight of that then what ontological distinctions are there? Why are ‘beings’ called beings and not things?

I don’t see “becoming of time” meaning anything. Time— temporality— is, essentially, us. It’s dasein’s being as ecstatic openness. Things persist and change, sure, but first they’re here, they are. — Xtrix

This sounds like the view of time Heidegger is critiquing, that events occur ‘in’ time , that things come into presence and ‘ occupy’ time and then disappear.

“What does it mean to be "in time"? This "being-in-time" is very familiar to us from the way it is represented in natural science. In natural science all processes of nature are calculated as processes which happen "in time." Everyday common sense also finds processes and things
enduring "in time," persisting and disappearing "in time." When we talk about "being-in-time," everything depends on the interpretation of this "in." In order to see this more clearly, we ask simply if the glass on the table in front of me is in time or not. In any case, the glass is already
present-at-hand and remains there even when I do not look at it. How long it has been there and how long it will remain are of no importance. If it is already present-at-hand and remains so in the future, then that means that it continues through a certain time and thus is "in" it. Any kind of continuation obviously has to do with time.”(Zollikon)

“Time is making present according to Aristotle, (the present at hand) and in so doing is a counting
of time as now, now, now. And thus time shows itself for the vulgar understanding as a succession of constantly
"objectively present" nows that pass away and arrive at the same time.”

Temporality for Heidegger isnt simply ‘us’ as ecstatic openness. It is what is happening to us NOW as a future ( a totality of relevance) which is in the process of having been. The structure of temporality is transition as unified occurrence. ‘We’ ‘are’ only as being changed.

“Temporalizing does not mean a "succession" of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein "occurs out of its future"."Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general." Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”(Heidegger 2010)

I should add that your reading is consistent with a number of Heidegger scholars, including Dreyfus. Mine is consonant with Derrida’s reading.

The distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘things’ is a fundamental ontological distinction. If you lose sight of that then what ontological distinctions are there? — Wayfarer

Past , present and future.

The being of dasein is temporality, which interprets being. Not being in general. — Xtrix

What’s the difference between being in general and the totality of being of dasein?

They’re temporal distinctions.

The distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘things’ is a fundamental ontological distinction. If you lose sight of that then what ontological distinctions are there? Why are ‘beings’ called beings and not things? — Wayfarer

Beings are things, yes. Rocks, trees, particles, love, music, toothpaste, apes, snakes, numbers...you get the point. The fundamental ontological distinction is between being and beings, not beings and things. Beings and things are interchangeable.

Beings are things, yes. Rocks, trees, particles, love, music, toothpaste, apes, snakes, numbers...you get the point. — Xtrix

I get the point, and I think it's mistaken. I don't know much about Heidegger, but I do know he speaks of 'the forgetfulness of being'. Maybe that could cast some light.

But, my argument is that we deploy the word 'being' with respect to beings such as ourselves, because it designates something which is absent in rocks, trees, and toothpaste. Not in apes, which are beings, albeit not rational, language-using beings. But the abandonment of the distinction between beings and things is characteristic of the dominant philosophical stance of modern culture, which has a monistic ontology comprising only one category of substance, namely, matter~energy. And that stance is called 'materialism'.

According to Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being, and thus Being as such, has been forgotten by ‘the tradition’ (roughly, Western philosophy from Plato onwards). Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power. In this way Being as such has been forgotten. — SEP Entry, Heidegger

That resonates with Buddhist philosophy - because of the attempt to 'objectify' Being as those various terms that are named in that passage (idea, substance, etc). By labelling 'Being' as some concept or putative 'entity' or 'thing', then the 'open' nature of being (is that what he means by 'clearing'?) is forgotten, because we think we've got it described. This is exactly the criticism that Buddha makes of the putative 'ātman'.

I don’t see “becoming of time” meaning anything. Time— temporality— is, essentially, us. It’s dasein’s being as ecstatic openness. Things persist and change, sure, but first they’re here, they are.
— Xtrix

This sounds like the view of time Heidegger is critiquing — Joshs

It's not a view of time. Persistence and becoming both presuppose being. They are also thought of in terms of the present-at-hand, as things that persist or change "in time," as I think you agree, and this itself rests on an interpretation of time which is also present-at-hand. When looked at phenomenologically, this doesn't appear to be dasein's state of being, for the most part. Dasein seems much more engaged with and coping with a world than seeing things as objects that persist or "become." This distinction is an old one, of course, but itself rests on a present-at-hand mode of being -- beginning with Plato's characterization of Parmenides and Heraclitus.

Temporality for Heidegger isnt simply ‘us’ as ecstatic openness. — Joshs

Dasein is ecstatic openness. Temporality is a unity of these ecstasies. That's what I gather. He's trying to re-interpret time and human beings as temporality and dasein, respectively, and in terms of ecstatic openness. The ecstatic refers to the ecstases of temporality, the openness to dasein's "disclosure," aletheia.

It is what is happening to us NOW as a future ( a totality of relevance) which is in the process of having been. — Joshs

It's odd that you use "now," which Heidegger explicitly says is the move Aristotle makes and which the tradition has taken ever since, when thinking about time: as a series of now-points.

‘We’ ‘are’ only as being changed. — Joshs

We are only as being temporal. He's not saying we're embodied change, he's saying we're embodied time/temporality. He is not equating temporality with change. How can we think or "know" change in the first place? We first have to "be" before we can even comprehend change.

I should add that your reading is consistent with a number of Heidegger scholars, including Dreyfus. Mine is consonant with Derrida’s reading. — Joshs

I can't say I've dived deep into Derrida, but from what I have read and heard I'm not terribly impressed. I could be wrong about that. I find Dreyfus far more honest and more careful. Most of my opinion comes from reading the texts several times, particularly Being and Being, Introduction to Metaphysics, Basic Problems, and an underrated 'book' called "Basic Questions of Philosophy," which is well worth the read. His interviews (available on YouTube) are also very helpful, I think, because he's forced to condense his material and give an overview. Many don't take these very seriously, but I don't know why -- they seem very consistent with the written work that I've encountered.

The being of dasein is temporality, which interprets being. Not being in general.
— Xtrix

What’s the difference between being in general and the totality of being of dasein? — Joshs

What do you mean by the totality of being of dasein? Remember the title: being and time. If dasein is essentially time, and is the entity that interprets being and questions being, then we begin to understand why in the West being was interpreted as "presence." But Heidegger doesn't himself offer an interpretation of being, only the human being.

But, my argument is that we deploy the word 'being' with respect to beings such as ourselves, because it designates something which is absent in rocks — Wayfarer

Yes, but this thread is about ontology, which is using "being" very differently than exclusively for sentient entities.

"Je souffre d'être."
~Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, 1657-1757

Yes, but this thread is about ontology, which is using "being" very differently than exclusively for sentient entities. — Xtrix

I don't think it provides the liberty to re-define the term according to your preference.

Says you who is the only person who ever tries to say thing 'being' = living entities despite having been told and shown multiple times that no one but you holds this position.

:sweat: Uh oh ...

The dude even regularly cites an essay I supplied to him to show him how completely off-base he is on this point and yet he still sticks to this fake meaning over and over again.

I'd honestly like to understand why the distinction between beings and things is considered controversial, and also why it is not considered. It's an honest question. I'm really not trying to pick a fight (although I understand that is the only type of interaction that you seem to take pleasure in.)

It is true that the term 'being' used as a noun, refers generally to living beings, and not to inanimate objects. I think it's legitimate to ask why this is the case, and what the implicit distinction is between these usages. I can't see why that question, of all questions, is not a legitimate question about the subject of 'ontology', when the subject itself is about 'the meaning of being'. I would have thought it the most basic question of ontology.

Xitrix has said that 'being' can be said of 'anything that exists' - the examples being 'Rocks, trees, particles, love, music, toothpaste, apes, snakes, numbers.' Isn't there an obvious problem here? Isn't there an in-principle difference between the kind of being that numbers represent, and the kind of being that rocks represent? And apes? They are beings of different kinds - not just different kinds of object or thing, but their natures have differences, don't they? Is it controversial to assert that rocks are not beings?

an essay I supplied to him — StreetlightX

That essay is 'The Problem of Being and the Greek Verb 'To Be''by Charles Kahn. I think it supports the point that I was seeking to make,with respect to the derivation of the word 'ontology'. My argument was that the meaning of 'being' and 'existence' were differentiated in the Greek in a sense which has been lost in subsequent usage as per the following:

That essay is 'The Problem of Being and the Greek Verb 'To Be''by Charles Kahn. I think it supports the point that I was seeking to make — Wayfarer

It absolutely does not. It rightly makes a distinction between being and existence, but it in no way goes on to situate 'being' on the side of living or sentient things or what have you. The rest of your post is special pleading, and is irrelevant. There is no 'obvious problem' to anyone who does not drag their own personal and unwarranted presuppositions into the study of ontology.

Why am I not surprised? Likewise, @Wayfarer also reflexively cites articles on and quotes speculations from the most tested and precise physical theory to date (re QFT or QM – apparently he's mislead by / fixated on the widely dismissed "Copenhagen interpretation") as "evidence" or "justifications" for his non/anti-physical worldview (i.e. idealism, subjectivism, supernaturalism) incorrigibly oblivious of (or shamelessly hypocritical about) the patent inconsistency of this. A dogmatically fact-free, religious mindset at work and on full display to spar (or preferably rodeo clown around) with. A notoriously widely, though shallowly, read fellow.

It rightly makes a distinction between being and existence — StreetlightX

that is the only distinction I wished to make, and up til now, there has been no acknowledgment that there is such a distinction to be made.

Love you too! :heart:

That is the only distinction I wished to make — Wayfarer

But, my argument is that we deploy the word 'being' with respect to beings such as ourselves, because it designates something which is absent in rocks, trees, and toothpaste. Not in apes, which are beings, albeit not rational, language-using beings. — Wayfarer

No it wasn't.

Rocks exist, but apes and humans are beings, and it's a significant distinction. That's all I wanted to say.

Rocks exist, but apes and humans are beings, and it's a significant distinction. — Wayfarer

Yeah this is your own little napkin distribution of the distinction that accords to nothing in philosophy. Please stop acting as though anyone but you sticks by it.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics Z:

"Now substance (=being) seems to belong most evidently to bodies. That is why we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, and each thing of this sort, as well as such things, whether all or some, as are parts of these or from which they are composed (for example, the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun)".

What you call a 'forgetting' is a 'Wayfarer projecting into history'.

What is Being?

(Let's keep things simple. :smile: )

A noun. Nothing more, and nothing less. It's not even an intelligible concept. An artifact of the English language: "To be, or not to be."

Talk about human-beings and animal-beings, living, or persisting, are a whole new ballgame.

(-ing! :chin: ) Do rocks be? or do rocks exist? Are rocks being? or are rocks existing?

"Now substance (=being) seems to belong most evidently to bodies. That is why we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, and each thing of this sort, as well as such things, whether all or some, as are parts of these or from which they are composed (for example, the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun)". — StreetlightX

'being’, as Aristotle tells us in Γ.2, is “said in many ways”. That is, the verb ‘to be’ (einai) has different senses, as do its cognates ‘being’ (on) and ‘entities’ (onta). So the universal science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single science of being when the very term ‘being’ is ambiguous? ...

Aristotle explains his point by means of some examples that he takes to be analogous to ‘being’. Consider the terms ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’. Neither of these has a single definition that applies uniformly to all cases: not every healthy (or medical) thing is healthy (medical) in the same sense of ‘healthy’ (‘medical’). There is a range of things that can be called ‘healthy’: people, diets, exercise, complexions, etc. Not all of these are healthy in the same sense. Exercise is healthy in the sense of being productive of health; a clear complexion is healthy in the sense of being symptomatic of health; a person is healthy in the sense of having good health.

But notice that these various senses have something in common: a reference to one central thing, health, which is actually possessed by only some of the things that are spoken of as ‘healthy’, namely, healthy organisms, and these are said to be healthy in the primary sense of the term. Other things are considered healthy only in so far as they are appropriately related to things that are healthy in this primary sense.

The situation is the same, Aristotle claims, with the term ‘being’. It, too, has a primary sense as well as related senses in which it applies to other things because they are appropriately related to things that are called ‘beings’ in the primary sense. The beings in the primary sense are substances; the beings in other senses are the qualities, quantities, etc., that belong to substances. An animal, e.g., a horse, is a being, and so is a color, e.g, white, a being. But a horse is a being in the primary sense—it is a substance—whereas the color white (a quality) is a being only because it qualifies some substance. An account of the being of anything that is, therefore, will ultimately have to make some reference to substance 1.

(Note also that the word that is given as 'substance' here, was in the original 'ouisia', which is nearer in meaning to 'being' than 'substance' in the usual sense of 'a material with uniform properties'. But the point remains that exploring the different modalities of the verb 'to be' is a fundamental concern of the Metaphysics.)

Occum's razer, at your service — Wheatley

You can't even spell it, much less explicate it.

Another snippet from Kahn:

Yes, I know all this quite well. Notably, there is not a single thing in what you quoted which makes being an exclusive domain of humans or apes or whathaveyou.

I know all this quite well. Notably, there is not a single thing in what you quoted which makes being an exclusive domain of humans or apes or whathaveyou. — StreetlightX

Well, go and chat with your dog, then, if you have one. He might know.

I'm sorry that your inability to substantiate your fabrications led you to this nothingburger line.

I apologise for the facetious comment above. In humans alone, the mind reaches the point of being able to consider such issues. That marks humans off from other sentient creatures. And I still think it's remarkable that this has to even be spelled out, let alone that it be a cause of such hostility.

" 'The world is my idea' — this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows,
though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness' ~ Schopenhauer.