I'm not convinced of that — Manuel
Just like you get intense in political stuff, — Manuel
If stasis is equivalent to objectively present , enduring , subsisting , self-identical, inhering, then he is determining stasis as an inadequate way to think about existing. Becoming isnt at one pole and stasis at the other, and neither is becoming the sequential movement of things becoming present ( stasis) in time and then passing away. Rather , the becoming of time is a single unified occurrence that is future, present and having been in the same moment. There is no room for stasis or objective presence here. — Joshs
I like to think I’m intense with everything I care about. :strong: — Xtrix
But within this context, we're talking about what's usually thought of as the most "universal" of concepts. — Xtrix
I don’t see “becoming of time” meaning anything. Time— temporality— is, essentially, us. It’s dasein’s being as ecstatic openness. Things persist and change, sure, but first they’re here, they are. — Xtrix
The distinction between ‘beings’ and ‘things’ is a fundamental ontological distinction. If you lose sight of that then what ontological distinctions are there? Why are ‘beings’ called beings and not things? — Wayfarer
Beings are things, yes. Rocks, trees, particles, love, music, toothpaste, apes, snakes, numbers...you get the point. — Xtrix
According to Heidegger, the question of the meaning of Being, and thus Being as such, has been forgotten by ‘the tradition’ (roughly, Western philosophy from Plato onwards). Heidegger means by this that the history of Western thought has failed to heed the ontological difference, and so has articulated Being precisely as a kind of ultimate being, as evidenced by a series of namings of Being, for example as idea, energeia, substance, monad or will to power. In this way Being as such has been forgotten. — SEP Entry, Heidegger
I don’t see “becoming of time” meaning anything. Time— temporality— is, essentially, us. It’s dasein’s being as ecstatic openness. Things persist and change, sure, but first they’re here, they are.
— Xtrix
This sounds like the view of time Heidegger is critiquing — Joshs
Temporality for Heidegger isnt simply ‘us’ as ecstatic openness. — Joshs
It is what is happening to us NOW as a future ( a totality of relevance) which is in the process of having been. — Joshs
‘We’ ‘are’ only as being changed. — Joshs
I should add that your reading is consistent with a number of Heidegger scholars, including Dreyfus. Mine is consonant with Derrida’s reading. — Joshs
The being of dasein is temporality, which interprets being. Not being in general.
— Xtrix
What’s the difference between being in general and the totality of being of dasein? — Joshs
That essay is 'The Problem of Being and the Greek Verb 'To Be''by Charles Kahn. I think it supports the point that I was seeking to make,with respect to the derivation of the word 'ontology'. My argument was that the meaning of 'being' and 'existence' were differentiated in the Greek in a sense which has been lost in subsequent usage as per the following:an essay I supplied to him — StreetlightX
That essay is 'The Problem of Being and the Greek Verb 'To Be''by Charles Kahn. I think it supports the point that I was seeking to make — Wayfarer
It rightly makes a distinction between being and existence — StreetlightX
That is the only distinction I wished to make — Wayfarer
But, my argument is that we deploy the word 'being' with respect to beings such as ourselves, because it designates something which is absent in rocks, trees, and toothpaste. Not in apes, which are beings, albeit not rational, language-using beings. — Wayfarer
Rocks exist, but apes and humans are beings, and it's a significant distinction. — Wayfarer
"Now substance (=being) seems to belong most evidently to bodies. That is why we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, and each thing of this sort, as well as such things, whether all or some, as are parts of these or from which they are composed (for example, the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun)". — StreetlightX
'being’, as Aristotle tells us in Γ.2, is “said in many ways”. That is, the verb ‘to be’ (einai) has different senses, as do its cognates ‘being’ (on) and ‘entities’ (onta). So the universal science of being qua being appears to founder on an equivocation: how can there be a single science of being when the very term ‘being’ is ambiguous? ...
Aristotle explains his point by means of some examples that he takes to be analogous to ‘being’. Consider the terms ‘healthy’ and ‘medical’. Neither of these has a single definition that applies uniformly to all cases: not every healthy (or medical) thing is healthy (medical) in the same sense of ‘healthy’ (‘medical’). There is a range of things that can be called ‘healthy’: people, diets, exercise, complexions, etc. Not all of these are healthy in the same sense. Exercise is healthy in the sense of being productive of health; a clear complexion is healthy in the sense of being symptomatic of health; a person is healthy in the sense of having good health.
But notice that these various senses have something in common: a reference to one central thing, health, which is actually possessed by only some of the things that are spoken of as ‘healthy’, namely, healthy organisms, and these are said to be healthy in the primary sense of the term. Other things are considered healthy only in so far as they are appropriately related to things that are healthy in this primary sense.
The situation is the same, Aristotle claims, with the term ‘being’. It, too, has a primary sense as well as related senses in which it applies to other things because they are appropriately related to things that are called ‘beings’ in the primary sense. The beings in the primary sense are substances; the beings in other senses are the qualities, quantities, etc., that belong to substances. An animal, e.g., a horse, is a being, and so is a color, e.g, white, a being. But a horse is a being in the primary sense—it is a substance—whereas the color white (a quality) is a being only because it qualifies some substance. An account of the being of anything that is, therefore, will ultimately have to make some reference to substance 1.
Occum's razer, at your service — Wheatley
I know all this quite well. Notably, there is not a single thing in what you quoted which makes being an exclusive domain of humans or apes or whathaveyou. — StreetlightX
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