However, something which has always been, in one form or another, does not have a beginning. Without a beginning, there would not be a first cause, only a continuously changing cause. — Present awareness
Call this first cause w. It's obvious that w too underwent a transformation from possible to actual. Hence, another cause is necessary that effected this. Reiterate this line of reasoning ad infinitum, ad nauseum and we're quickly face to face with another thorn in our side viz. infinity. — TheMadFool
A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.
— Philosophim
Okay, but that still does not answer the question. Does the atomic decay in time span 2 as opposed to the atomic decay in time span 1 have an explanation for its existence?
In order for that atom to decay, there must be a prior... the atom must exist. — InPitzotl
At the same time, there is no explanation for why it decayed versus did not decay; any explanation given for why it decayed in time span 2 would have to describe why it didn't decay in time span 1. — InPitzotl
↪Philosophim
To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat: — Manuel
↪Philosophim Meaning you can't contradict one metaphysical position with another one.
Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it...... — Pantagruel
For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation.You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. — Philosophim
No it doesn't.It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity. — Philosophim
(Edited, after having enough time to quickly scan your source a bit more): There are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. These theories would give up realism; they would e.g. in our card trick predict the probability as 1/4. Since there's at least one local theory consistent with BT, it cannot be said that BT replaces locality with action at a distance. It certainly doesn't in the BT-consistent local MWI, where no such replacement exists.Here are a few links to back my claims: — Philosophim
You still didn't answer the question I asked you.So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed — Philosophim
Aspects of quantum theory are definitely counter-intuitive, you could interpret them as being also illogical, in the same sense. — Pantagruel
For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation. — InPitzotl
It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't. — InPitzotl
Outdated; there are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. Instead of giving up locality, they give up realism. None of your quotes address this. Your quotes seem generically to treat QM via a Copenhagen view. — InPitzotl
To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.
But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration
If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time.
What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully.
The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct?
But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.
I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR.
That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. — Philosophim
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim
Sorry, you still don't get the question.If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions. — Philosophim
Excuse me? You just quoted me explaining why it doesn't. Incidentally, see also the edit.Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, — Philosophim
But you didn't understand it.I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. — Philosophim
MWI admits a local explanation that does not violate BT; your source explains why. Note that I'm specifically invoking a local interpretation of MWI, and your source specifically has a section on that very thing.(Recall that in Section 6, in order to apply Bell's definition of locality to the type of experiment considered in Section 5, we assumed that the outcomes A1 and A2 were functions of the local beables in regions 1 and 2, respectively.)'
...
However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.
...
I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. — Bob Ross
The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time. — Bob Ross
The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. — Bob Ross
To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation — Bob Ross
That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — InPitzotl
So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain? — InPitzotl
However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.
Okay, then causes are not logically necessary.Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. — Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me.In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results. — Philosophim
The question isn't about the number of alphas, it's about whether or not this particular thing is one.We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. — Philosophim
For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. The former has a burden the latter lacks.All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. — Philosophim
But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. If it's logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true.As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. — Philosophim
You mean MWI? It's not just MWI being referred to; it's a local interpretation of MWI. But again for re-emphasis, your question is misguided. Local interpretations of MWI need not be proven to challenge logical necessity; it suffices that local interpretations of MWI are logically possible. If it is logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true. (Not that I understand how challenging local interpretations helps you).But is BT provable epistemically? — Philosophim
Why would you think that? I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. Apparently that's where you got the impression, but I cannot see how you drew that connection.So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. — Philosophim
Okay, then causes are not logically necessary. — InPitzotl
In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.
— Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me. — InPitzotl
For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. — InPitzotl
To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible. — InPitzotl
But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. — InPitzotl
I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. — InPitzotl
Hmmm...The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. — Philosophim
Hmmm...It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. — Philosophim
Nope.If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. — Philosophim
Not really.If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. — Philosophim
The sequence S1={0.5, 0.25, 0.125, 0.0625, ...} is infinitely decreasing. But the entire sequence has a prior... 0. Also -1, -2, and so on. By contrast, the sequence S2={-1, -2, -3, -4, ...} is also infinitely decreasing. But this sequence has no prior. Both of these are logically possible. This might make your head asplode, but it's not something you can derive falsum from using logical operations.If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? — Philosophim
Actually, I can. Infinitely regressing sets can have priors; S1 does for example.You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. — Philosophim
Also possible; see S2. Infinitely regressing sets can have no priors. In this case, your question is basically asking what's smaller than the smallest negative number, which is a question that has a problem since there is no such thing as the smallest negative number.It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence." — Philosophim
BT isn't supposed to "contradict the conclusion". You're trying to argue that on every day, the ground is wet. BT is analogously a demonstration that maybe on some days the ground is dry. For your argument to hold, you basically have to show it can't possibly ever be dry. If I can see how it might possibly ever be dry, you haven't shown it can't possibly ever be dry.This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. — Philosophim
Let's assume that the ground is dry one single day, maybe in the far future. Now let's run through your argument... did you rule out my assumption? Can your argument derive falsum from my assumption that one single day in the far future it's dry? If not, you haven't demonstrated this assumption is a contradiction. And if you haven't done that, you haven't shown your conclusion is logically necessary.What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. — Philosophim
Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.
While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.
This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does.
Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)
I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning.
Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole.
Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn?
Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.
To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well.
It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!
Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!
So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. — Alkis Piskas
Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? — Alkis Piskas
if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. — Bob Ross
So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider) — jgill
1. The first cause has to be uncaused.
2. Only nothing has no cause. — TheMadFool
It cannot be caused, or uncaused
— Philosophim
:chin: — TheMadFool
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.