However, something which has always been, in one form or another, does not have a beginning. Without a beginning, there would not be a first cause, only a continuously changing cause. — Present awareness

"First cause" does not designate a beginning, it designates the first state of causality chain. If it is the case that everything has always existed, the reason for that, is evidenced by the fact that it has always existed. There is no prior reason why something has always existed correct?

Call this first cause w. It's obvious that w too underwent a transformation from possible to actual. Hence, another cause is necessary that effected this. Reiterate this line of reasoning ad infinitum, ad nauseum and we're quickly face to face with another thorn in our side viz. infinity. — TheMadFool

That's what the OP does. I examine the idea of a universe with infinite regress, and finite regress. In examining the idea of an infinite regress of causality, I find it cannot escape the question of, "Why is there an infinite regress of causality opposed to a finite regression of causality?" The answer is, "It simply is". Thus, even an infinite regress of explanations still has a first cause for its existence.

Also, this is not a theist argument. It seems to be making people think the argument is trying to argue something that it is not. If anything, this is a hard counter to theistic arguments.

To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat:

Meaning you can't disprove one metaphysical position with another one.

Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it......

A first cause has no prior explanation for its existence. If you posit that there are known entities that have no prior explanation for your existence, you're not countering the OP, you are affirming its logical necessity with its existence in reality.
— Philosophim

Okay, but that still does not answer the question. Does the atomic decay in time span 2 as opposed to the atomic decay in time span 1 have an explanation for its existence?

In order for that atom to decay, there must be a prior... the atom must exist. — InPitzotl

Ok, I see what you're asking now. Lets address your reasoning.

At the same time, there is no explanation for why it decayed versus did not decay; any explanation given for why it decayed in time span 2 would have to describe why it didn't decay in time span 1. — InPitzotl

You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. It posits that one explanation cannot be addition of a hidden variable. But that's it. It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.

Here are a few links to back my claims:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Controversy_and_common_misunderstandings
From this link here is a deeper link about Bells Take on his own theorem.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#The_EPR_argument_for_pre-existing_values

I will quote a few points of the article for guidance.

"Whatever the historical explanation for the misunderstanding might be, it turns out that the general understanding within the physics community regarding Bell's theorem was that it established the impossibility of "hidden variables" (or, for those a little better informed, of "local hidden variables") and the role of the EPR argument (i.e., the fact that the non-locality problem arises anyway if we regard quantum theory as complete) was missed entirely. Moreover, many authors took Bell's theorem to be a proof that, with regard to the EPR argument, Einstein was wrong and Bohr was right. While it is indeed true that Bell's theorem shows that Einstein was wrong, in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

"Already at the time Bell wrote this, there was a tendency for critics to miss the crucial role of the EPR argument here. The conclusion is not just that some special class of local theories (namely, those which explain the measurement outcomes in terms of pre-existing values) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory (which is what follows from Bell's inequality theorem alone), but that local theories as such (whether deterministic or not, whether positing hidden variables or not, etc.) are incompatible with the predictions of quantum theory. This confusion has persisted in more recent decades, so perhaps it is worth emphasizing the point by (again) quoting from Bell's pointed footnote from the same 1980 paper quoted just above: "My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

And what is the EPR?

"In a celebrated 1935 paper11, however, Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen pointed out that, in situations involving specially-prepared pairs of particles, this orthodox principle conflicted with locality. Unfortunately, the role of locality in the discussion is often misunderstood — or missed entirely. One thus often hears that the EPR paper is essentially just an expression of (in particular) Einstein's philosophical discontent with quantum theory. This is quite wrong: what the paper actually contains is an argument showing that, if non-local influences are forbidden, and if certain quantum theoretical predictions are correct, then the measurements (whose outcomes are correlated) must be revealing pre-existing values. It is on this basis — in particular, on the assumption of locality — that EPR claimed to have established the "incompleteness" of orthodox quantum theory (which denies the existence of any such pre-existing values)."

To sum this all up, the EPR assumed locality and hidden variables. BT pointed out that locality and hidden variables were not compatible in regards to quantum entanglement and spins. To bring the relevant quotes out of the above quotes:

" in that the assumption of the EPR argument (locality) turned out to be incorrect, it is not at all true that Bell's theorem shows that the EPR argument itself is not valid. In fact the EPR argument is correct and plays a crucial role in establishing that its main assumption is wrong."

and:

""My own first paper on this subject ... starts with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it begins with deterministic hidden variables." "

So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed, or that there aren't potentially other variables we don't know about. His claim was to show that locality could not work while there were hidden variables. This is not the destruction of cause and effect, or spooky science with out comes that have no possible explanation.

↪Philosophim

To be fair, we proceeded to have a discussion and I think we reached a kind of agreement. Which I'm forgetting now. :sweat: — Manuel

Ha ha! All good!

↪Philosophim Meaning you can't contradict one metaphysical position with another one.

Of course, the scientific method itself is fundamentally a methodology which doesn't necessarily have metaphysical implications. ie. Science openly admits its status as provisional and approximate. Science is consistent with material reductionism, but it doesn't imply it...... — Pantagruel

Metaphysical is such a broad term, I don't use it. If you mean science is a model that attempts to propose solutions that are not contradicted by reality, I'm all for it. Same with logic. If reality contradicts logic, then its not really logic right?

Well, logic is a function of human reason. Aspects of quantum theory are definitely counter-intuitive, you could interpret them as being also illogical, in the same sense.

You are incorrect here. BT does not posit that there is no explanation. — Philosophim

For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation.

It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity. — Philosophim

No it doesn't.

Here are a few links to back my claims: — Philosophim

(Edited, after having enough time to quickly scan your source a bit more): There are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. These theories would give up realism; they would e.g. in our card trick predict the probability as 1/4. Since there's at least one local theory consistent with BT, it cannot be said that BT replaces locality with action at a distance. It certainly doesn't in the BT-consistent local MWI, where no such replacement exists.

This is actually mentioned in your source; in fact, there's an entire section on it specifically: "Many-worlds and relational interpretations of quantum theory". I'm not sure why you're trying to engage with this, seeing as how twice you said you didn't want to debate this.

So again, BT is not claiming that cause and effect is destroyed — Philosophim

You still didn't answer the question I asked you.

Aspects of quantum theory are definitely counter-intuitive, you could interpret them as being also illogical, in the same sense. — Pantagruel

Being counter intuitive does not mean they aren't logical.

For the third time in a row, I'm reminding you that you are not meeting the burden of logical necessity. BT is logically consistent with the premise that there is no explanation. — InPitzotl

If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. The second is logically proven at the conclusion of the argument. If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions.

It replaces it with the idea of action at a distance, like gravity.
— Philosophim
No it doesn't. — InPitzotl

Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, I'm not going to continue explaining why it does.

Outdated; there are local theories of MWI that do not violate BT. Instead of giving up locality, they give up realism. None of your quotes address this. Your quotes seem generically to treat QM via a Copenhagen view. — InPitzotl

I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. If you have a different version of the theory you would like to propose, feel free. But I am not incorrect of my assessment of Bell's original theory.

To point out about countering realism, another citation from the links:

One currently popular account of Bell's theorem has it showing that "local realism" is incompatible with the quantum predictions, so that one has to choose between abandoning locality or abandoning realism. Those who talk about "local realism" rarely explain what they mean by "realism". (Is "realism" related to "hidden variables" of some sort? What exactly is meant by "hidden variables"? Is "realism" related to determinism?) And when they do, it often becomes clear that the "realism" under consideration isn't among the actual assumptions of Bell's theorem, so that abandoning that kind of realism isn't a viable strategy for saving locality.

Finally, if it appears that I am, incorrect in my assessment of Bell's Theorem, you don't think Bell's original theory doesn't apply anymore. So either way, Bell's original theory is not a viable critique against the OP.

Hello @Philosophim,
First of all, I would like to thank you for such a splendid, thought-provoking conversation! Moreover, I also think that we are narrowing down to the roots of the OP.

Upon further reflection, I have realized something that I believe to be of great importance that I overlooked this whole time and, quite frankly, I think is the source of a lot of the confusion in the other responses to your OP (or at least the ones I briefly read over). You see, I’ve noticed a general pattern amongst the other responses (although I do not mean to overgeneralize their counter arguments), namely that they were all addressing the issues with the use of causality in the argument (whether that be a counter-argument directed towards causality and effect being the two sides of the same coin, quantum physics producing seemingly truly random effects, or that causality is strictly a priori). To be honest with you, I think that some of these counter-arguments were perfectly valid, yet didn’t pose any threat to the true essence of your OP. The only reason I am able to state that previous sentence without contradiction is because there is a fundamental distinction (that I overlooked this whole time) between causality and explanation. First and foremost, causality (cause and effect) are two sides of the same coin: we semantically (and intuitively) label event, A, a cause if it seemed to be in direct correlation to event, B (with chronological precedence); However, event A is actually an effect, not a true cause, that was “caused” by a previous event, C, that produced A which, in turn, produced B (both A and B are effects). You could do this infinitely. For example, after initiating a chain of dominoes (one falling by the previous domino’s fall), we intuitively consider the “cause” of any particular domino falling as the previous domino—but actually, in fact, the whole chain of dominoes are simply effects sparked by, for instance, me flicking the first domino. So in a sense, the first domino is not only the “first cause”, but actually the “only cause”: this is also wrong. As you already can probably anticipate, if I “zoom out further”, so to speak, I would realize that the first domino was an effect of me flicking it and, therefore, is not a cause either. Doing this ad infitum demonstrates that we have no examples of any actual causes: just effects which we label a “cause” within a relative scope to bring meaning to the world around us (i.e. the first domino, with the scope of dominoes, is the cause of the chain of dominoes falling, but not in an absolute sense). This directly entails that we have no experiences of any sort of true cause, which means we have no reasonable grounds to induce anything (as induction requires experiences). I think a lot of people were quarreling with you on this (although I may be mistaken) and I think that it is perfectly valid, but let me repeat: it poses no threat to the true essence of your OP. As you are already well aware, even if it is an infinite chain of effects with no causes, we are still stuck in the same dilemma that your OP addresses: the actual infinite of effects would be the self-explained “first cause”. Now here’s the issue I would like to propose to you that would resolve this conflict (even in the case of the quantum arguments): your OP is directed NOT at causation, but explanation. In other words, you can’t logically utilize causation to induce a “first cause” (because you have no experiences of a “cause”, just a chain of effects and induction requires experiences as we previously discussed—therefore your “first cause” would be the only example of a cause we would have), but you can logically (in terms of your argument) induce a “first explanation”. You see, explanations are not restricted to causation whatsoever! Sure, we can’t actually, in an absolute sense, determine that this particular domino caused all the others to fall, but we do know that each event (each effect in the continuum of effects) has a sufficient reason (yay we are back at the PSR!). That leads me to my other point: PSR doesn’t require causation nor does it directly utilize it! Rather, it uses explanations. This is why I think, and agree with you, that pointing out that particular aspects of the quantum realm have no causes doesn’t affect your OP because you aren’t arguing (I would say) for a “first cause”, you are arguing for a “first explanation”. Therefore, the “first explanation” would be those quantum aspects that have no previous causes—notice that you would no longer be claiming that those quantum aspects are a cause, but rather, an explanation that is its own explanation. In other words, I think that your reliance on causation (although useful in an everyday sense) manifests most of the counter arguments I have read and the refurbishing of “first cause” to “first explanation” would suffice in resolving this conflict.

Last thing I will state about the previous statements is that, I think that the refurbishing of your OP into an explanatory (rather than causal) argument accurately shifts (thereby strengthening) your argument into what I would consider the true essence of it: PSR, left to its own, causes absurdities which you attempt to resolve by means of claiming that somewhere along the line of explanations (not necessarily causes) there must be a “first explanation”, which is, therefore, outside of the scope, so to speak, of PSR.

Now what I have stated hitherto doesn’t address our conversation too much because I was inadvertently thinking of your argument in terms of explanation and not causation (although I just realized that I was conflating the two terms). So now I will start addressing some of your points directed towards me, but I wanted to propose that refurbishment of your OP: its obviously up to you whether you refurbish it or not (just food for thought).

To this, I would translate and state, "Just because we can create a system of infinite numbers in our mind, it does not mean there actually exists an infinite amount of numbers in reality. If this is what you are implying, then yes, we are in complete agreement.

That isn’t quite what I meant, although I would agree with your statement. I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. In other words, any n run through the function P(n), is a number within space/time fabric. To use causation to assert, for instance, that any given location some 5000 billion light years away is operating under the concept of causation (that we would expect causation to occur there as well) is induction extended beyond experience (which I agree with you on that), but what I was trying to say is that anticipating (via induction) causality 5000 billion light years away is analogous to mathematical induction. However, mathematical induction is dis-analogous to causation past space/time fabric: it would be, on the contrary, analogous to considering “numbers” in a P(n) function that exist sans space/time. I would consider both extensions of P(n) and causality past space/time fabric to be over-extensions of induction for the aforementioned reasons. However, with that said, I think that a “first explanation” would not be affected by my critique here because explanations (PSR) could possibly exist sans space/time (potentially).

But isn't the idea of something being outside of space and time an induction that cannot be confirmed by experience? If so, in your case it shouldn't be a consideration

Yes, this is my whole point! To say it is “outside of space and time” is to make a contradictio in adjectio! The question itself is flawed, because “outside” linguistically refers to a spatial framework! Same goes for asking “what came before space and time”, as “before” linguistically refers to a temporal framework! That is why I would posit a very well known refurbishment to the question: “what is sans space and time?”. Now I still have problems with it (as I don’t think one can completely linguistically detach from space and time), but the use of sans is much better!

If I compare the two theories, that there may be situations that do not have space or time, versus the reality of space and time that is also logically confirmed, I'm going to take the more viable induction that uses space and time.

I am not quite following what you mean by this. The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time.

What I show is if you take the idea that everything must have a prior cause for its existence, it cannot withstand its own logical conclusion when examined fully.

I agree. As I previously stated above: causality is really just a bunch of effects (or randomness in terms of quantum mechanics)(and it simply doesn’t make sense sans space and time). I think you are fundamentally arguing (and correct if I am wrong) for a “first explanation” (in terms of a solution to the problem of the derivation of PSR, not necessarily causation).

The principle of sufficient reason in other words, has a glaring flaw, and logically, cannot be true. The POSR is an induction as well correct?

I would agree (mostly). PSR does have a glaring flaw (two actually: it’s infinite derivation makes no sense and it doesn’t require of itself a sufficient reason—it is an axiomatic metaphysical principle). I would say it can be true in a relative sense, but not true in an absolute sense (because, for me, explanations collapse when extended into an absolute sense). PSR is meaningful (and I think you would agree with me on this) in a relative sense but completely useless in an absolute sense. The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. I think it makes equally as little sense to say that PSR can be fixed, so to speak, by allowing an explanation, somewhere down the line, to explain itself (that isn’t really PSR, although you are more than in your own rights to redefine it that way if you so choose). Although, yes, your definition of PSR is correct, there is no explanatory power (and thereby no true reasons derived therefrom) by saying something explained itself.

But can you point to a situation in reality in which there is literally no space between anything? At this point, that is and induction, but not observed reality. In all cases in which we have observed reality, we have found space between objects, and also in between the smaller objects we discover. So for my case, I believe it is much more reasonable to conclude that there is "nothing" between things. This is not an affirmation that I am correct. I am just trying to point out my induction is not less reasonable then the idea that "nothingness" doesn't exist.

Although I don’t entirely understand why you think there’s “nothing” between things (and I would be genuinely interested as to know why), but I do agree with you in the sense that people aren’t giving your OP enough credit: but I think that is partially (nay, primarily) due to the use of causation in your OP instead of explanation (which I think you could easily swap the terminology out and your argument—as I understood it—wouldn’t change, it would only eliminate a lot of the confusion). Anyways, I am curious as to what you think of my refurbishment proposal (hopefully I explained it adequately enough).

I do not believe anyone else has grasped the argument to your extent, nor provided such detailed and insightful criticism such as yourself. I think we are reaching a conclusion with the points I made about the POSR.

To be honest with you, in hind-sight, I think that I understood it better than the rest simply because I have unintentionally thinking in terms of explanations and not distinguishing it from causation. That’s why I think your argument is much stronger in terms of explanation and not causation.


To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation (and I look forward to your response)! I think that our fundamental difference is that I consider the derivation of explanations (aka PSR) to be an explanatory-collapse regardless of which derived concept one derives it back to (but you definitely go me thinking about first explanations for sure!).
Bob

If my premises are all correct, I am meeting the burden of logical necessity. Either everything has a prior explanation, or there are things that do not have a prior explanation. — Philosophim

That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:

1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — Philosophim

If BT allows that there are things that have no prior explanation, then that is consistent with the OP, and its conclusions. — Philosophim

Sorry, you still don't get the question.

217Pb will decay in about 20 seconds to 217Bi. For said 217Bi to be made, you need a prior of 217Pb. But 217Bi may or may not result from 217Pb in any given 20 second life span.

So a decay product 217Bi does have a prior (217Pb, which will also emit a Beta particle). So it can be explained as having a prior cause (217Pb). And also, it does not have an explanation ("why did the 217Pb decay into 217Bi during this 20 second span and not the one before it?" has no answer).

So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain?

You keep saying this doesn't disprove causality, but that's not the question. I want to know what causality even means here. You suddenly jump from causality to explanations, and I have to admit, that change in wording is the very first thing I notice. Are you talking about first causes, or explainability? From the OP it sure sounds like you're talking about first causes. But if you want to talk about explainability, how do your premises then handle partial explainability?

Maybe part of the problem is that you are imagining that I'm arguing 217Bi is a first cause, and you're saying, aha! I have those things in my theory. Let me dissuade you of that notion. Your proposal is that things are either first causes or parts of causal chains. I propose that 217Bi is both a first cause and part of a causal chain (whatever that means; it's just a dialectic position). So why am I wrong? That is what I'm asking you when I ask you which it is.

Yes it does. If you are not going to explain why it doesn't, — Philosophim

Excuse me? You just quoted me explaining why it doesn't. Incidentally, see also the edit.

I quoted a reference to Bell himself, because that is the theory you cited. — Philosophim

But you didn't understand it.

So read it from your own source:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Many-worlds_and_relational_interpretations_of_quantum_theory

(Recall that in Section 6, in order to apply Bell's definition of locality to the type of experiment considered in Section 5, we assumed that the outcomes A1 and A2 were functions of the local beables in regions 1 and 2, respectively.)'
...
However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.
...

MWI admits a local explanation that does not violate BT; your source explains why. Note that I'm specifically invoking a local interpretation of MWI, and your source specifically has a section on that very thing.

You absolutely nailed the "reassessment". So why have I been using causality and not explanations? Because I run into another problem. What is an explanation? You understand what an explanation is clearly, but how do I define it? How do I put it into a definition that everyone can agree with? If I claim something is an explanation, then it seems like I'm really talking about "knowledge". And at that point, this becomes an exploration into epistemology that few would accept.

Despite people trying to reject cause and effect, and despite their counterpoints not actually challenging the OP, but missing the mark (as you clearly noted), cause and effect are something fairly stable that people can understand, that is essentially an explanation. Why is this thing the way it is? Because of these things being the way they are. Why does this effect occur? Because this cause occurs.

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

My label of a "first explanation" as a "first cause", is not inaccurate. It is simply a more complex translation than I would like, because it serves the purpose of being simple to understand, difficult to counter, and stable. A first explanation is the first in a chain of explanations. A first cause is the first in a chain of causes. That which has no prior explanation for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality. That which has no prior cause for its existence, can be explained by its existence in reality.

If I had a better means of language that could preserve what was needed for the argument, and not diverge into the tempest of epistemology, I would. But you are right. It is not ideal, and perhaps it would have been better to use the term "explanation", then explain what an explanation is through cause and effect. So thank you, your point is well taken!

I was implying that the function P(n) only operates within a space/time fabric. It does not attempt to induce any “numbers” outside of that framework: that is why it isn’t an inductive over-extension. — Bob Ross

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

The dilemma I was trying to put forth is that one cannot fundamentally utilize a “before” or “outside” when contemplating something sans space/time fabric. The same issue is true, I would say, of causality (it doesn’t extend past space and time) and if causality did, then it would be a different causality altogether (which existed in a space and time framework sans our space and time framework)! I don’t think we really have any good evidence to conclude anything beyond space and time. — Bob Ross

True. This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does. Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning. That being said, refinement is NOT my best quality as a philosopher. If the argument would be served using other syntax, you again may be correct. Feel free to use such terms until we run into a place where there is more than semantic difference.

The difference, fundamentally, between me and you (I would say) is the fact that, for the very same reason you are abandoning PSR, I would abandon an arbitrary stopping of PSR somewhere along the line of derivation. — Bob Ross

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole. I can understand how you think it is arbitrary, but that is where the conclusion in the OP comes in. If I cannot comprehend of a situation where there is no first explanation, (understanding this can be backed in an underlying manner by cause and effect) is it unreasonable to conclude the alternative, that there must inevitably be a first explanation?

Like we have both concluded, neither can be confirmed by experience. So we are arguing between two inductions. To liken the argument to something more common, let us propose someone states the reason why it rains is a magical unicorn. Since it cannot be confirmed by experience, we must think about it logically. The problem is, no one has seen any evidence of a magical unicorn, and within the proposal, there is still the question of what caused the magical unicorn to be. It doesn't really answer the ultimate question, and there is no evidence it exists. Would it be more logical to drop the unicorn entirely, even though the rain remains unexplained, or to keep it? In exploring reality, it may be that a unicorn in fact DOES exist. But that still doesn't answer the question of what caused the unicorn, and I still think most of us feel it is unreasonable to believe in the unicorn when we lack evidence that it exists.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn? This is where a hierarchy of induction is needed. At this point, I am inclined to state the proposal of there being no first cause is the unicorn. But because we have no meaningful way to conclude which inductions are stronger than others, I have no means to back this opinion, besides opinion. This is where the knowledge paper I wrote comes in. In it, I break down a hierarchy of inductions as the end. Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well. It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

To rap this up, I wanted to, again, thank you for such a wonderful conversation — Bob Ross

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

That's not your stated premise. This is your stated premise:
1. Either all things have a prior cause for their existence, or there is at least one first cause of existence from which a chain of events follows. — InPitzotl

Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. Bob Ross and I had a fantastic discussion on this. In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.

So the question I ask you, yet again, is which is it? Is 217Bi an alpha? Or a result of a causal chain? — InPitzotl

We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. To know that specifically, we have to prove it. Lets assume that BT is correct as a theory. As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. This is very different from stating, "We don't yet have an explanation for its results". I've also mentioned how difficult it is to confirm that we have actually found an alpha. You can't just find something you don't understand, throw your hands in the air and say it has to be an alpha. That's no better than ascribing God as the cause for rain.

However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation.

Alright, so we are citing a popular off branch of BT. But is BT provable epistemically? No. Its just a theory that could be cool, as there's no evidence that multi-verse theory exists. Now what IS interesting, is if my theory is true, multiverse theory has another leg to stand on, as there doesn't seem to be a reason why a multiverse couldn't happen, opposed to it just being guess work.

So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. It is not, and I even claim its ridiculously difficult to do so, and for some alphas, might be impossible. The point is that even though we haven't discovered or realized alphas, at least one must exist following the chain of prior causality.

To mention again, Bob Ross and I came to a satisfactory conclusion. I would give it a read if you want to understand the theory and the conclusions I agreed with him on.

Yes, and a cause is an explanation for an effect. — Philosophim

Okay, then causes are not logically necessary.

In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results. — Philosophim

I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me.

We don't know. Remember, I'm not claiming the existence of any one alpha. All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. — Philosophim

The question isn't about the number of alphas, it's about whether or not this particular thing is one.

All I'm claiming is that it is necessary that there be at least one. — Philosophim

For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. The former has a burden the latter lacks.

As I noted earlier, BT does not claim that there cannot be any explanation for its results. — Philosophim

But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. If it's logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true.

But is BT provable epistemically? — Philosophim

You mean MWI? It's not just MWI being referred to; it's a local interpretation of MWI. But again for re-emphasis, your question is misguided. Local interpretations of MWI need not be proven to challenge logical necessity; it suffices that local interpretations of MWI are logically possible. If it is logically possible X is false, it cannot be logically necessary X is true. (Not that I understand how challenging local interpretations helps you).

Let me back up. To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible.

So I think the confusion you have with the OP is you think its trying to posit a specific first cause. — Philosophim

Why would you think that? I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. Apparently that's where you got the impression, but I cannot see how you drew that connection.

Okay, then causes are not logically necessary. — InPitzotl

The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. It is either the case that there are things that have no prior cause for their existence, or things that have prior cause for their existence. This is an assumption. If you can show that the assumption is incorrect, then the conclusion is not logically necessary.

If you can provide an alternative, that there is something which does not have a prior cause, and is something which has no prior cause for its existence, then the assumption is false. The BT argument only applies to the first premise, not the conclusion. I do not see you presenting a viably third option with the BT argument as I've noted prior.

In the end, I think Bob Ross successfully countered the notion that the argument is logically necessary. I would read our discussion to see the results.
— Philosophim
I'm not quite sure I have to read it... it seems apparent to me. — InPitzotl

Well of course it does to you, otherwise we wouldn't be going back and forth. But Bob really nailed the essence of the argument, and I think you'll really get to understand the conclusion. I feel like I've been explaining the OP to you for a while, and either you don't quite understand it, or I don't quite understand your criticism. Maybe you're right, but I'm just not seeing it. Its not that I'm stubborn, I clearly say Bob nailed it. If you read it, you might see another view point, and tie it into your own argument so that I might see it better.

For the fourth time, you are (or at least were) claiming that it is logically necessary that there be at least one. That's vastly different than claiming that it is merely necessary. — InPitzotl

To me, "logically possible" means that if you assume something to be true, you do not get a contradiction. "Logically necessary" means that if you assume something to be false, you do get a contradiction (e.g., it contradicts the argument for it being logically necessary). Logical possibility doesn't mean something is the case; it could be wrong, but still be logically consistent. So you don't need to test if something is true to demonstrate it's logically possible. — InPitzotl

Ok. If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence."

This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. If there is something in BT that is discovered to have no prior reason for its existence, we have the logical necessity becoming a reality. Here we have the existence of something which has no prior cause for its existence, an alpha.

But for re-emphasis, regarding the claim that it is logically necessary, BT demonstrates how it is logically possible that there cannot be any explanation for the results. — InPitzotl

Again, this does not counter my conclusion.

I don't understand how you get from my asking you a question about whether a 217Bi atom (as a decay product of 217Pb) is or isn't an alpha to my confusing you as saying there's only one specific alpha. — InPitzotl

What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. That has nothing to do with the OP. If you believe the rate of decay we have calculated from an atom has no prior cause, you agree with my OP. I'm not here to decide whether BT theories are correct, or make any assertions as to what specifically is confirmed in existence as an alpha. That is out of the wheelhouse of the discussion. I'm here to show the conclusion to the OP is correct.

The premises of the OP are not logically necessary. — Philosophim

Hmmm...
1. ¬□P

It is the conclusion that is logically necessary if the premises are true. — Philosophim

Hmmm...
2. ( P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒□C

That doesn't work. ( P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒C works, and ( □P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒□C works, but not ( P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒□C.

Imagine it this way. Let's say "a world" is a day. Let's say, it's necessarily true that IF it rains on some day, THEN the ground will wet that day:
□(P⇒C)
(P is "it rains", C is "ground is wet"; "a day" is our model of "a world").

So it rained last Wednesday. We can then say that the ground was wet last Wednesday:
( P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒C
...but we cannot say that because it rained last Wednesday, and □(P⇒C), that the ground is necessarily wet:
( P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒□C
...it doesn't have to be, for example, wet today just because it rained last Wednesday.

Now if it rained every day (it necessarily rains), then the ground would be necessarily wet:
( □P ∧ □(P⇒C))⇒□C

...but it doesn't follow that the ground is necessarily wet just because on some day it rained and it's wet.

If we look at the conclusion of the OP, it fits logical necessity under your definition. — Philosophim

Nope.

If I assume everything has a prior cause for its existence, I run into a contradiction. — Philosophim

Not really.

If infinite regress exists, what caused there to be infinite regressive causality in existence? — Philosophim

The sequence S1={0.5, 0.25, 0.125, 0.0625, ...} is infinitely decreasing. But the entire sequence has a prior... 0. Also -1, -2, and so on. By contrast, the sequence S2={-1, -2, -3, -4, ...} is also infinitely decreasing. But this sequence has no prior. Both of these are logically possible. This might make your head asplode, but it's not something you can derive falsum from using logical operations.

Just because you can ask your question doesn't mean it need have an answer; or that if it has no answer there must be a contradiction. Questions can be the problem too. Here:

You can't say, "Something else", because the question continues. — Philosophim

Actually, I can. Infinitely regressing sets can have priors; S1 does for example.

It only ends with, "It must not have a prior cause for its existence." — Philosophim

Also possible; see S2. Infinitely regressing sets can have no priors. In this case, your question is basically asking what's smaller than the smallest negative number, which is a question that has a problem since there is no such thing as the smallest negative number.

This is why I also keep saying BT does not contradict the conclusion. — Philosophim

BT isn't supposed to "contradict the conclusion". You're trying to argue that on every day, the ground is wet. BT is analogously a demonstration that maybe on some days the ground is dry. For your argument to hold, you basically have to show it can't possibly ever be dry. If I can see how it might possibly ever be dry, you haven't shown it can't possibly ever be dry.

What I'm saying is I don't see any evidence of it being something which has no prior explanation for its being. — Philosophim

Let's assume that the ground is dry one single day, maybe in the far future. Now let's run through your argument... did you rule out my assumption? Can your argument derive falsum from my assumption that one single day in the far future it's dry? If not, you haven't demonstrated this assumption is a contradiction. And if you haven't done that, you haven't shown your conclusion is logically necessary.

I am back after some pondering on the subject ...

First, we must select a "world", a "universe" to work on the premise "A first cause is logically necessary": the physical universe (nature) or the non-physical universe (a "personal" universe existing in our minds), Yes, the second one is usually neglected, but it exists; it's another kind of "universe" : E.g. a thought can produce another thought, a logical statement can produce another one, etc. All these are non-physical, since they exist in our minds. But since this second universe needs be well and clearly define before working on it, and this is not something easy, I will restrict the application of the premise on the physical universe, the material world. For now, at least.

So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. (This might be argued, but I can't see how!) So, there must exist a cause for that thing to occur, to exist. This, apparently can go back to infinity, right? So, the question is "Can such an infinity of cause and effect relationships exist?" If yes, the premise is of course refuted and we don't have to speak about it anymore!
But anyway, the impossibility of such an infinity is more logical, isn't it? So let's accept this.

Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? A non-physical entity that is not itself created, but which always existed and is the first cause of everything --physical and non-physical. Right? This leads us to concepts like God, Supreme Being, Universal Consciousness, etc. I believe that it does not matter how we name it, since one way or another we don't --and most probably, we cannot-- know how it works! :smile:

This is as far as I can personally reason on the subject. So, I will look for and present excerpts on the subject from standard references and known philosophers of the past.

1) "First cause, in philosophy, the self-created being (i.e., God) to which every chain of causes must ultimately go back.
(https://www.britannica.com/topic/first-cause)

2) "First Cause is term introduced by Aristotle and used in philosophy and theology. Aristotle noted that things in nature are caused and that these causes in nature exist in a chain, stretching backward."
"There must be a First Cause because such causal chains cannot be infinite in length."
"Aristotle referred to the First Cause also as the "Prime Mover" that is a deity of "pure form" without any potentiality"
(https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/First_Cause)

3) "The 'first cause argument' is an argument for the existence of God associated with St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)."
"The first cause argument is based around cause and effect. The idea is that everything that exists has something that caused it, there is nothing in our world that came from nothing."
"Aquinas argued that our world works in the same way. Someone or something must have caused the world to exist. The cause is God, the effect is the world."
"Aquinas stated that this cause (which is outside our world) is the first cause - that is, the one that started everything."
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zv2fgwx/revision/2)

I can see your logic and I agree with your conclusion that there has to be a first cause. I read a bit through the other arguments and saw that your point is that infinite causality requires still an explanation of why it is. The answer that "It simply is" reveals that there is a "Law" or "Rule" which regulates reality such that infinite causality is the case. In my own journey, I discovered that all sequences of causation and change are eventually caused either by laws/rules/instructions of reality which dictates how change must happen, and these objects don't have an actual cause to them. Even in the case of an infinite causality, there is a higher law which regulates that infinite causality or sequence to such degree. This higher law might be your first cause.

Hello @Philosophim,

Is a cause and effect always an explanation? Is an explanation always a cause and effect?
The first question seems true, but the second leaves doubts. I believe an explanation can be translated into a cause and effect, though it may not be the simplest, clearest, or most direct way of communicating that explanation. But, there is a stable defined means of communicating that explanation.

I see your dilemma now, and, therefore, exactly why you are utilizing causality instead of explanation. Although I think that utilizing it in terms of explanations would "open more doors", so to speak, in your OP, I understand that it may introduce a new level of (possibly) unnecessary complexity and, so, I respect you decision to refrain from semantic refurbishment.

While I do agree there are formula's that assume space and time, many formula's do not. For example, a formula may extend for infinity, but infinity may not exist. An electron is considered to have zero mass for many formula's, though the reality is that it does have mass once you use formula's that have a meaningful digit small enough for them to matter at that scale. That being said, your criticism would apply to them as well, and you are correct.

I apologize, I think I misunderstood what you were previously saying. As I understand it now, you seem to be pointing out (quite correctly) that potential infinities may not truly exist (and actual infinities). There is a limit to how many numbers I can fathom within my time constrained lifetime and, therefore, I can't possibly verify that all numbers (within no bounds) actually work for P(n) (and some may not even represent actual quantities in the universe). Even if I continually mentally incremented a number (any number, no matter how big) for my entire life, non-stop, from here onward, I would, nevertheless, never be able to verify them all. With respect to that I agree with you! However, I think there is a fundamental difference between utilizing a P(n) function that is induced to work for an actual or potential infinite, and attempting to utilize it beyond space and time. For example, for me, all that mathematical induction means (in terms of meaningfulness for the subject) is that any number I can fathom in my lifetime is reasonably induced to work in P(n) . But, more importantly, I would never attempt to (somehow) extend it past space and time and infer that some quantity (let's just say X) that exists (somehow) beyond space/time will give reliable results when past through P(n). In other words, any use of P(n) (although technically it could be relating to numbers that don't have any true quantifiable existences in reality) is a use of P(n) specifically tailored for this space/time rabric that I wouldn't say can be reasonably extended past thereof. Anyways, I think you understand what I am trying to say so I will leave it at that.

This to me, a first cause is something outside of space and time. There is no space or time which forces a first cause to exist, it simply does.

I understand your point here, but think this is exactly why using the term "explanation", contrary to "causation", helps your argument, because I don't think explanation in terms of causation can occur "outside" of space and time. However, I do understand what you mean by "outside", I think that we both don't know what that truly means in terms of the context of "outside of space and time" and I think that is my main point here--that, I would say, neither of us can truly separate our thinking beyond space/time in terms of causation (and that's why I would argue that there is no meaningful usage of "cause" and "effect" "outside" of space and time). But, again, I see where you are coming from and I get that our terminology is quite limited with respect to your OP.

Once it exists, it is within the realm of space and time. But prior to that? I cannot say. Perhaps there is something beyond space and time which creates that first cause. But it is meaningless to speak on it. And if something outside of space and time could create something within space and time? The question would still exist, "What caused THAT?" :)

I think this exposes exactly my issue with your OP, which is that your OP seems to require the use of causality beyond space and time to make its case, but yet then it concedes that any causality past space/time is meaningless to discuss (which I would agree with). You see, I could then argue that space/time is eternal (although I'm not actually trying to argue that), which I would say your OP would be the claim that the fact that it is eternal is the "first cause". But the fact that it is eternal is not a cause (I agree with you that this is epistemological in nature), it is beyond causation (because it is beyond space/time, it is metaphysical in a sense--this fact doesn't "cause" any "effect", it, by definition, explains itself): it is an explanation completely beyond causation (and, therefore, I would argue that, even though it is a complicated topic, explanation and causation are not synonymous). Now, as you pointed out, the explanation could end up being Causation (note the captial C), which would be meaningless for us to discuss because that Causation would be "outside" of our causation (which is restrained to space/time). You see, if you agree with me in that, for all intents and purposes, Causation doesn't exist (in terms that we can't discuss it), then your causal argument gets cut off at space/time, but your explanatory argument proceeds just fine! In other words, although I get where you are coming from on this, there seems (to me) to be a necessary distinction between explanations and causations. The fact that an actual infinite goes on forever is not explained by that very fact being its own cause but, rather, it lies in the fact that, somehow, it, by definition, explains the necessity of it continuing on forever (which could be a result of Causation or something entirely else, but necessarily not causation).

I understand your specific use of "sans" time and space within language, and respect it. I think its largely semantics at this point, and we're essentially saying the same underlying meaning.

I agree with you here: it is semantics and that's why I don't quarrel with people over the usages because, quite frankly, we both are talking about the same thing. However, I think that the fact that we can't truly discuss these matters properly, which (I would say) is directly due to the fact that we can't separate from certain fundamental aspects of our existence, is incredibly telling that we may (but not necessarily are) over-extending our logic into Logic. Personally, the fact that we can't quite accurately pose the question makes me wonder what authority we truly have to ask it in the first place! That's why I do my best to try to conceive of a proper way of semantically putting it, because, in this case, I don't see how I can truly answer the question if I can't even truly verify whether my question is valid or not.

Here again I think we have a semantics difference. I don't believe I'm abandoning the PSR, I'm refining it to fix a hole.

That makes sense, I recant my previous statement that you are abandoning it! As you noted thereafter, I do still think it is an arbitrary fix.

Is the proposal that there can be no first explanation the unicorn, or the proposal that there must be a first explanation the unicorn?

Although I understand what you are portraying here, I am going to have to disagree with you here in favor of your own OP! You see, your OP is quite strong in the sense of your question here, because to take the position that there can be no first explanation (and, therefore, that the contrary is the unicorn) is to concede the OP! This is because it is paradoxical: the fact that there is not first explanation is, in itself, the first explanation. I think this is exactly why I would argue our logic breaks down (which leads me to describe it as explanatory-collapsibility). You see, there is another option here: although the framework in which we live our lives compells us to make this distinction (that either there is no first explanation or there is one) it doesn't apply if we were to claim that our framework doesn't persist to the level at which we are posing the distinction! I think that whatever kind of framework may exist past space and time is most definitely some sort of framwork completely separate from our own and that is my explanation for why all of these questions we could posit (that seem like binary questions) will inevitably collapse on themselves! In other words, to take the position that there is no first explanation, inevitably collapses into the position that there is one. And to take the position that there is a first explanation, is to presume that there is a possibility that there isn't one, which collapses on itself because, again, if there isn't one then it will, in turn, collapse again into the position that there is a first explanation and, you guessed it, that collapses yet again into the idea that there is an alterative (this infinitely collapses, but, wait, we could then extend your OP to pose that these infinite collapses is the first explanation--which I think you see where I am going with this).

Because despite my best efforts at using cause and effect to represent an explanation, it always boils down to epistemology in the end.

I 100% agree. However, I respect your efforts to keep it comprehensible (by using terms pertaining to causation).

To your point, I believe practically every criticism you mentioned has merit, and you have successfully defended your view point logically within the framework of thought that we have. On the flip side, I believe I have also defended my line of reasoning as well.

I think you did a marvelous job at arguing your position! I also think that your OP has much merit!

It is the fact that both of our conclusions necessarily rely on inductions about the nature of reality, and that we have no means within our framework of concluding if one induction is more viable than the other, that we can both make our choices without contradiction. And, if I cannot argue beyond an appeal that my induction is more viable than the opposite induction, I cannot argue that a first cause is logically necessary. If we had a viable framework which allowed us to logically determine which inductions are more reasonable to hold, perhaps my claim of logical necessity would be true. But without that framework, I cannot claim it. Well done!

I agree! However, (although I may be mistaken here), I am starting to think that you may be misunderstanding I position slightly (as in very slightly): if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. Therefore, I think it isn't useful to attempt to uncover some logical reasoning behind it (in terms of causal derivation) but, rather, I would argue that whatever overlying metaphysics necessitates our representations is, in part, completely unobtainable by human reason. If I could reasonably (without producing an explanatory-collapse) extend causal derivation beyond space/time, then I would, at the very least, accept it as just as valid as mathematical induction, but I don't think it is possible to do so. Hopefully that made sense.

Agreed! It is a joy to discuss with someone who puts the theory through its paces! I hope my response was adequate to your points and critique. You are a fantastic philosopher, and I looked forward to every response you made. Thank you as well!

Your responses were more than adequate! I hope I am not reiterating myself on some of my points I am making in this post, but i still think they are relevant to the discussion. You are also a fantastic philosopher!

Bob

From a mathematical POV there are unusual dynamical systems that describe a sequence of forward causal steps extending back in time that account for an incident, F, that has occurred at a specific moment in time in the near past, and for which there is a first cause; but the accuracy of that process in producing F improves as that first cause is initiated earlier and earlier in an unbounded trip into the past.

So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider)

If anyone is interested, I will briefly sketch out this scenario. Otherwise, ignore and continue with philosophical conversations.

Its been years since I've read logic, but that's a good approach. Lets make sure we're setting up the premises fairly.

A = !∃X -> Y
An alpha is when there does not exist some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

C = ∃X -> Y
A cause is where there exists some prior cause, X, for an examined state, Y.

Onto the premises!

Q (For Question) = Y -> (A or C)
(I'm going to use "or" and "and" because I don't want to copy and paste the symbols repeatedly. :D)
The first premise is the question. For a state of existence, there exists a first cause, or a prior cause for its existence.

Y -> (!∃X -> Y) OR (∃X -> Y)
Translates to
Y -> (!∃X or ∃X) -> Y
Translates to
Y <-> (!∃X or ∃X)
All Y's lead to some prior explanation, or lead to no prior explanation. There is some prior explanation lead to Y, or there is not some prior explanation that leads to Y.

Lets start with our second premise:

For all Q's about Y states, the answer is a cause.
(Translating C)
(∀(Q) = ∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))

Now lets see what we can conclude.

∃Y= (∀Y <-> ∀(∃X))
First, this is a state, which then has a question. This is looking awkward, so lets change it to a set.

∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ X )
For the set of all Q's, there exists some prior cause. But, because the set it itself a Y, we have a situation in which there is something outside of a set, that should be in the set.

y = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> x ∈ Q )
So what if we said that the set of all Y's also includes the set itself? Because if there exists a y outside of the set, then there exists an x outside of the set. This would be called a Universal set. However, Russel's paradox shows this is impossible. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_set#Russell's_paradox So we can't do that.

But if that is the case, then all this leaves us with a Y outside the set of all Y's. Which means there is a question outside of the set. But if there is a question outside of the set, then our set is contradicted.

But if we instead state:

A = ∀Q( y ∈ Y <-> (x ∈ Q or (!x ∈ Q))
There does not exist any Q's outside of the set with an answer that does not lead to a contradiction. If the answer is A, then there is no Y or X outside of the set that leads to Russel's paradox.

Feel free to check my logic, I'm pretty rusty on it, and not sure if this is the best representation. Great discussion so far!

So, let's start by assuming that (something cannot be the cause of itself. — Alkis Piskas

Agreed.

Now, if the infinity of cause and effect is impossible, there must be a "first cause" from which all starts, right? However, since we said that nothing can be the cause of itself in the physical universe, that cause must necessarily be non-physical, right? — Alkis Piskas

Not quite. Physical or non-physical, that would be a prior cause. If you posit a non-physical cause, its still a cause right? Which means the same question applies to it. What caused the non-physical state which caused the physical state?

The real answer is, "There is no prior cause." Meaning nothing created it, and it is not the cause of itself. It simply exists, because it does. So if a non-physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being. If a physical thing had no prior cause, it would be by its virtue of being.

The problem with positing a God as "The" solution, is it doesn't logically follow. A God does not escape the problem of the first cause, nor offers a solution. If there is a first cause, then it has no prior reason for its existence, and no rules or limitations of why it should, or should not exist. Meaning the first cause could be the big bang, or particles just entering into existence at any time. Is a God also probable? Yes. But that's only one out of an incredible number of other options.

To prove one or many first causes is a monumental task that might be impossible. If anything, we would need to work our way backwards through causality and hope we arrive at conclusive proof at a start. If a person is going to prove a God is a first cause, they will need to do it separately from the conclusion that there is a first cause. The necessity of a first cause does not necessitate that a first cause be God.

Well stated again Bob. I agreed with your points, and wanted to also specifically point to this one.

if you think that I am arguing that there is no first explanation and, thereby, that there being a first explanation is the unicorn, then I would say that that is not my position. I am arguing that both of those propositions collapse on one another (in terms of explanations) and that is why, although I don't think I have elaborated much further beyond this criticism, I would conclude that no matter how one contemplates it, it will inevitably collapse. — Bob Ross

Yes, even though you or I may personally agree with the OP to an extent, without a better framework of epistemology, it collapses into a messy paradox. Like you stated about logic being extended to Logic, I feel the OP extends to the limit of what we can know by today's standards, and finds itself in a strange situation when we are faced with the limits of the unknown.

At this point, I would be repeating myself if I mentioned anymore. What a fantastically thorough examination! If you are interested in continuing a discussion of epistemology, here is the link I spoke about earlier. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I do not intend this to pressure you, it is only if you enjoyed the conversation, and would like more like this on another topic. It is one of my older works, and it is broken into four parts of about 20 pages total, so I understand if that is a bit much to take on. If you do read it, I recommend reading it all at once however. In the past people stop after the first part, and ask questions that are all answered in the later parts. The payoff for it is I can viably establish not only an epistemology that crosses cultures and contexts, but contains a means of establishing a hierarchy of inductions, something that I think the study of epistemology lacks.

And if it doesn't interest you, not a worry at all. I am grateful for the great conversation here, and hope to see you again in other conversations on the boards!

So, there is a “first cause” (not necessarily unique) for an F, but that first cause has no set position in an infinite span of past time and is only completely reliable in a limiting sense. (this has nothing to do with a “point in time at negative infinity” that set theorists might consider) — jgill

I believe what you are talking about are limits like in calculus? Or are you talking about the limits of precision? For example, .1 becomes .11, becomes .111, etc?

1. The first cause has to be uncaused.

2. Only nothing has no cause.

Ergo,

3. The first cause is nothing.

4. Nothing can't cause anything

Ergo,

5. The notion of a first cause makes zero sense.

1. The first cause has to be uncaused.

2. Only nothing has no cause. — TheMadFool

Can you prove that nothing has no cause though?

Nothing isn't anything. It cannot be caused, or uncaused. It is the absence of both cause and effect. Nothingness is outside of causality. The only thing that can be uncaused, is something that exists.

It cannot be caused, or uncaused — Philosophim

:chin:

It cannot be caused, or uncaused
— Philosophim

:chin: — TheMadFool

Was the use of "it" the source of confusion? Nothingness cannot be caused or uncaused, because nothingness is not a thing. If its not an effect, it cannot be caused correct?