Yes, he makes the distinction between the ready to hand and the present to hand ( objectively present ). But he derives the present to hand from the ready to hand as an extreme modification of it. His discussion of the statement and subject-predicate logic shows how a thing which just ‘is’ is derived from the hermeneutic structure of concernful dealings, rather than use and value being attributes just added onto an objectively present thing. — Joshs

For a hammer this might be true. There is not too much to doubt about the meaning, purpose or function of a hammer, because it is just a human-invented tool. The world, the sky and the stars, on the other hand, have a mode of being which is not grounded in a process of reflected reasoning. Their existence is, in a stronger sense, revealed rather than "planned".

The world, the sky and the stars, on the other hand, have a mode of being which is not grounded in a process of reflected reasoning. Their existence is, in a stronger sense, revealed rather than "planned". — Heiko

Not for Heidegger. He has a very particular understanding of ‘world’ that is neither planned nor just ‘revealed’ , and not a product of reflective reasoning. World for Heidegger is projected out from a pragmatic background

Not for Heidegger. He has a very particular understanding of ‘world’ that is neither planned nor just ‘revealed’ , and not a product of reflective reasoning. World for Heidegger is projected out from a pragmatic background — Joshs

And the stars?

And the stars? — Heiko

I am sorry. The point, again, is that the being of mere tools made for a purpose, is not what seems worth a lengthy discussion. A hammer is a tool to put nails into walls.

A couple of points in reply.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts rather than making up a neat story. The examination of existence in the tradition of Frege, Russell, and so on, the one that lead to modern formal logic, is a strong contender for providing at least part of such an account.

An imaginary apple might not be an apple, but it is an imaginary apple. It enters into our conversations as an imaginary apple, and we can at least try to put parts of this conversation into a first-order predicate format, extending and developing the conversation as we go, with the usual problems of the intensional context. So we might discuss whether the imaginary apple was imagined to be red, or green, and play with the applicability of predication in the context.

Further, as Austin pointed out, being imagined might better be contrasted with being real than with existing. An imaginary apple is not a real apple, but it is, as already noted, an imaginary apple, and hence we do make use of the already contentious "is". The question is "What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that exists?", and not "What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that is imagined?".

And this is a large part of the clarification that is needed. "Exists" is surrounded by a host of related, but slightly distinct terms - real, actual, substantial, physical, corporeal, true - all with different nuance. In addition each can be contrasted with their negations. being real can mean not being imagined, not being a fake or forgery, not being genuine; what being real is depends very much on the context. A look at the more naive posts here will reveal plays on such ambiguity.

The question "What is the difference between a sweet, juicy, red apple and a sweet, juicy red apple that exists?" is not answered by an imagined apple, but by an apple that is not even imagined. The question seeks to show that an apple that does not exist cannot enter into the conversation, at least in any ordinary way - it might enter in the way the little man does in Antigonish.

And frankly it seems to me that much of the discussion here is an extended version of Antigonish. I suspect Wittgenstein might agree. The discussion of time is particularly pertinent here, perhaps taking the place of the stairs.

You said my way of approaching the question treats the being of the apple as a category, analogous to ‘green’ or ‘sweet’, and you quickly find there’s nothing much to say about ‘being’ as a category. That's quite unfair. What I am doing is pointing out the problems with an account the treats existence as a category. I have been quite explicit in saying that existenceis not a predicate, preferring this more accurate term over the archaic one. So your characterisation is exactly wrong.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts rather than making up a neat story. — Banno

Isn’t that what stories do?

Isn’t that what stories do? — Joshs

Not always.

What I am doing is pointing out the problems with an account the treats apples as a category. — Banno

How so?

An imaginary apple might not be an apple, but it is an imaginary apple. It enters into our conversations as an imaginary apple, and we can at least try to put parts of this conversation into a first-order predicate format — Banno

But not by by saying something like "There is something that is an apple and is imaginary", surely.

How so? — Srap Tasmaner

"Category" being roughly the same as "predicate".

"There is something that is an apple and is imaginary" — Srap Tasmaner

One would presumably take care to remain inside the intensional scope, sure; and then face the difficulties of that context. But not something I am interested in pursuing.

"Category" being roughly the same as "predicate". — Banno

As you like. What problems were you pointing out with the predicate "__ is an apple"?

What? Where?

What I am doing is pointing out the problems with an account the treats apples as a category. — Banno

How so?

ah - I mistyped. Fixed. My apologies.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts — Banno

Says who? Pretty strange to reduce philosophy to this. Try thinking outside the analytic tradition.

Says who? — Xtrix

Me.

I'm sorry, that should have said "good philosophy is about clarifying concepts".

Carry on.

Yes, let's reduce philosophy to "clarifying" terms. Amazing how science and academia has influenced how philosophy is thought about these days.

What a pity.

Philosophy is about clarifying concepts rather than making up a neat story. The examination of existence in the tradition of Frege, Russell, and so on, the one that lead to modern formal logic, is a strong contender for providing at least part of such an account. — Banno

Well, that’s the thing. Whatever Being is, it’s not a Fregean concept, so philosophy done this way can — by choice, mind you — have nothing at all to say about Being.

I suppose in mischaracterizing your position as taking the being-as-category approach, what I was really trying to get at is this: if the analytic approach — Frege, Russell, Quine — yields nothing, are we just done? Is there nothing to do unless it’s done this way?

You might think that. I think it a great improvement, for the reasons already given. It's not new; indeed it is central to Elenchus, and your own first principle specifies the need for such clarity. But while you seem to think it is somehow to be done prior to philosophising, it is apparent from an examination of the history of philosophy that clarification is its very bread and butter.

it is apparent from an examination of the history of philosophy that clarification is the very bread and butter of philosophy. — Banno

If this is true , then one can be justified in saying no more than this about the accomplishments of science. Newtonian physics did no more than clarify Aristotelian physics, Relativity and quantum theory did no more than clarify Newtonian physics, Darwinian biology did no more than clarify fixed-species doctrines, Chomskian linguistics did no more than clarify behavioral models of language acquisition.

What is it we want?

The OP asks the question "why is there something?" - does it provide an answer?

@Xtrix? Does your dialogue answer this?

What of the title question - "What is being"? For my money an account of how we use the word "being" goes a long way to answering this.

Some folk like answers, right or wrong. Other folk are comfortable saying that they don't know.

If you like. Newton's laws set up the notions of force and momentum with sufficient clarity that whole Fields of enquiry followed.

More commonly it is understood that a degree of clarity is eventually reached that allows a science to bud off from philosophy.

But while you seem to think it is somehow to be done prior to philosophising — Banno

No, in my view philosophy is a kind of thinking, which is a human activity. It does indeed consist of questions, but they are not limited to "clarifying" words -- a belief which is an outgrowth of science and mathematics. Because they've been successful in many ways, this has come to dominate what constitutes "philosophy." You see it as an improvement, but it's simply another ontology. A powerful one, no doubt -- but restricts "philosophy" to the narrow questions of logic and language. But the philosophy of language isn't philosophy. I think we need to grow out of that and return, as you mentioned, to the Greeks. You see Socrates as being interested mostly in "clarification," I see him as simply one who was willing to question.

The question of questions, of course, is the one in this thread.

The OP asks the question "why is there something?" - does it provide an answer?

@Xtrix? Does your dialogue answer this?

What of the title question - "What is being"? For my money an account of how we use the word "being" goes a long way to answering this.

Some folk like answers, right or wrong. Other folk are comfortable saying that they don't know. — Banno

I'm comfortable saying I don't know, which is why I give no answers. Looking at the word "being" itself -- its grammar and etymology -- is fine, but doesn't tell us everything. An understanding of history, of culture, of values, of the religious and political context of the Greeks, etc., are all necessary as well to round out a picture.

Whatever "this" is that's happening and which we're all a part of, is worth questioning indeed -- and the interesting part, in my view, is that we're all already living the answer.

More commonly it is understood that a degree of clarity is eventually reached that allows a science to bud off from philosophy. — Banno

Right, and that's mostly mathematics. Physics being the best example. In other sciences, there are explanatory theories and technical notions defined within this context. All well and good. But philosophy is not the philosophy of mathematics, or the philosophy of science, or the philosophy of language. It's just a mistake to believe it is.

Thanks for these replies. I find them puzzling.

You suggest that clarification is an outgrowth of science. Rather, science is an outgrowth of clarification. It was the clear understanding of momentum and force that permitted the development of physics, the clear understanding of atoms that led to chemistry, the clear understanding of speciation and evolution that led to biology. Clarification is not an ontology.

And analytic philosophy is not the same as philosophy of language.

Nor is there any restriction in looking at language. On the one hand, what is there that is outside of language? On the other, understanding language will show us what is outside of language.

"Being" is not central to philosophical concerns. If you doubt this, take a look through your favourite dictionary or encyclopaedia of philosophy. "Being" is a topic pretty much restricted to one branch of European philosophy from last century.

Contrast this with "existence". Go on, do a search.

You suggest that clarification is an outgrowth of science. Rather, science is an outgrowth of clarification. — Banno

I agree science is an outgrowth of philosophy, but if philosophy is clarification to begin with, then should we conclude that everything is a science? What "degree" do we reach which determines something as a science? Which is to say, what do we mean by "clarification"? When is a question or word clarified, and how do we decide?

It was the clear understanding of momentum and force that permitted the development of physics — Banno

If by "clear understanding" you mean mathematically formulated, sure.

the clear understanding of atoms that led to chemistry — Banno

Chemistry existed far before atomic theory.

the clear understanding of speciation and evolution that led to biology — Banno

Biology has existed long before Darwin's theory as well, as you know.

Did Chomsky's "clear understanding of UG" lead to linguistics?

Clarification is not an ontology. — Banno

What do you mean by this emphasis, that clarification is ontology itself?

And analytic philosophy is not the same as philosophy of language. — Banno

I never said it was.

Nor is there any restriction in looking at language. On the one hand, what is there that is outside of language? On the other, understanding language will show us what is outside of language. — Banno

Well first we have to ask: what is language? Is language everything? No, I wouldn't say that. I'd say it's something worth studying, and an important part of what it means to be human. But I would say yes, there are things outside of language: experience, thought, desire...but also being (the very fact that we "are"). Language is a kind of being.

I would say that's restricted, yes. Unless we define language as being itself, which would be rather odd.

"Being" is not central to philosophical concerns. — Banno

True, the question has largely been forgotten. But it constitutes the object of philosophy. Whenever we think, we think in terms of beings. To ask "what is being?" is, in the end, the question of philosophy. It busies itself with many other subjects, no doubt.

It'd be helpful perhaps to talk more about consciousness, thought, and language to flush out what I mean. Invoking Descartes and Kant is helpful, I think, as this underlies most of the last few hundred years, including the linguistic turn.

"Being and thinking." This is the dichotomy within which we're mostly stuck, in our western culture. "Thought," in this case, being viewed as logic and language. The human being is defined as an animal with reason, with language -- and whose essence lies in a knowing-relation to things. Hence we get minds and bodies, the inner and outer world, subjects contemplating objects, consciousness and its contents, etc.

This leads right into the analytic tradition. Frege, Moore, Russell, Quine, Kripke, Chomsky, etc. I'm not putting this down, really -- it's still very much a part of a long and powerful tradition. But we should recognize its historical development.

"What is being" is one question among several of philosophical concern. Add "what is knowledge?", "What is beauty?", "What am I?"... and a few others. Each has at one time or another been claimed to be the prime, defining question in philosophy. My favourite amongst these is "What ought I do?".

But I think this an impoverished way to discuss philosophy. Better to look at what philosophers do. Few philosophers restrict themselves to one of these questions, after all.

For what it’s worth, Grice says something like this too with his thing about “natural meaning” and “non-natural meaning”. He claims a kind of continuity between “clouds mean rain” and “‘clouds’ means clouds”. (Heidegger slips ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ into that torturous discussion of phenomena and appearance, so we’re not far off.) — Srap Tasmaner

I haven't read Grice, is his work worth exploring? Off the top of the head the general difference I see between signs and symbols is that signs are pre-linguistic (mostly?) and non-arbitrary, while symbols are linguistic, or at least dependent on language, and arbitrary.