Yes, he makes the distinction between the ready to hand and the present to hand ( objectively present ). But he derives the present to hand from the ready to hand as an extreme modification of it. His discussion of the statement and subject-predicate logic shows how a thing which just ‘is’ is derived from the hermeneutic structure of concernful dealings, rather than use and value being attributes just added onto an objectively present thing. — Joshs
The world, the sky and the stars, on the other hand, have a mode of being which is not grounded in a process of reflected reasoning. Their existence is, in a stronger sense, revealed rather than "planned". — Heiko
What I am doing is pointing out the problems with an account the treats apples as a category. — Banno
An imaginary apple might not be an apple, but it is an imaginary apple. It enters into our conversations as an imaginary apple, and we can at least try to put parts of this conversation into a first-order predicate format — Banno
How so? — Srap Tasmaner
"There is something that is an apple and is imaginary" — Srap Tasmaner
"Category" being roughly the same as "predicate". — Banno
What I am doing is pointing out the problems with an account the treats apples as a category. — Banno
Philosophy is about clarifying concepts rather than making up a neat story. The examination of existence in the tradition of Frege, Russell, and so on, the one that lead to modern formal logic, is a strong contender for providing at least part of such an account. — Banno
it is apparent from an examination of the history of philosophy that clarification is the very bread and butter of philosophy. — Banno
But while you seem to think it is somehow to be done prior to philosophising — Banno
The OP asks the question "why is there something?" - does it provide an answer?
@Xtrix? Does your dialogue answer this?
What of the title question - "What is being"? For my money an account of how we use the word "being" goes a long way to answering this.
Some folk like answers, right or wrong. Other folk are comfortable saying that they don't know. — Banno
More commonly it is understood that a degree of clarity is eventually reached that allows a science to bud off from philosophy. — Banno
You suggest that clarification is an outgrowth of science. Rather, science is an outgrowth of clarification. — Banno
It was the clear understanding of momentum and force that permitted the development of physics — Banno
the clear understanding of atoms that led to chemistry — Banno
the clear understanding of speciation and evolution that led to biology — Banno
Clarification is not an ontology. — Banno
And analytic philosophy is not the same as philosophy of language. — Banno
Nor is there any restriction in looking at language. On the one hand, what is there that is outside of language? On the other, understanding language will show us what is outside of language. — Banno
"Being" is not central to philosophical concerns. — Banno
For what it’s worth, Grice says something like this too with his thing about “natural meaning” and “non-natural meaning”. He claims a kind of continuity between “clouds mean rain” and “‘clouds’ means clouds”. (Heidegger slips ‘signs’ and ‘symbols’ into that torturous discussion of phenomena and appearance, so we’re not far off.) — Srap Tasmaner
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