You don't agree that in an extensional, referentially transparent context, all fiction is false? — bongo fury

Why not set up a extensional, referentially transparent domain that is Tolkien's world?

Language games take place in space, two. — Banno

Any evidence-quotes from the later Wittgenstein for the idea that a language game is ‘in’ space? I don’t think you’ll find him describing space in this way, as a picture frame. This a question for Antony.

placing space somehow independent of time would also be problematic - they have been together since Einstein. — Banno

I was going to mention Einstein. In the case of modern physics , it is true that space-time are inseparable , but that doesn’t resolve the issue of the relation between space and time , or the priority of one over the other, from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

the thesis is that underlying these various Western interpretations is a fundamentally Greek one: constant presence, ousia.
— Xtrix

...and why should we fall back to this anachronistic greek interpretation when we have better ones in our formal logic? — Banno

Because formal logic depends on the notion of the self-identical object.

“A true object in the sense of logic is an object which is absolutely identical "with itself," that is, which is, absolutely identically, what it is; or, to express it in another way: an object is through its determinations, its quiddities [Weisheiten], its predicates, and it is identical if these quiddities are identical as belonging to it or when their belonging absolutely excludes their not belonging.”(Husserl, Crisis of European Sciences)

Because formal logic depends on the notion of the self-identical object. — Joshs

So you are suggesting to ditch the positive identity and fall back to identity as difference? How could this look for "Dasein"?

Here's an odd exchange:

why should we fall back to this anachronistic greek interpretation when we have better ones in our formal logic?
— Banno

Because formal logic depends on the notion of the self-identical object. — Joshs

Not only is this not an answer, it's not even on the same topic; but also, a=a is an extension of first-order calculus; and certainly not something it is dependent on.

The conclusion is, again, that there is nothing to be learned in this thread.

Why not set up an extensional, referentially transparent domain that is Tolkien's world? — Banno

Because fiction isn't meant to be read as fact.

Not only is this not an answer, it's not even on the same topic; but also, a=a is an extension of first-order calculus; and certainly not something it is dependent on. — Banno

Why isn’t it an answer? What does first order calculus depend on? A=A is a relation between A and A. But what presupposition lies behind the invocation of ‘a’? What does A have to consist of at minimum in order for it to play a role in a=a? We obviously have to assume that it is present in front of us as an entity of some sort. Doesn’t first order calculus assume this? Isn’t first order calculus a syntax, and doesn’t a syntax need something to operate on?

Sure. But we can use logic in fiction.

Bongo, if you have a point to make, please go ahead and make it.

Why isn’t it an answer? — Joshs

Ok, I will grant that it is an answer. But it is an answer that is both irrelevant and wrong. So it's not a good answer.

Why are philosophers experts on clarifying concepts?

The conclusion is, again, that there is nothing to be learned in this thread. — Banno

I've learned that it is possible to fill 23 pages about one not very interesting word. I'm not sure it makes philosophy look particularly effective or useful but I had a good time reading some of it. It just leaves me with a simple question: What the fuck is being? :gasp:

Ok, I will grant that it is an answer. But it is an answer that is both irrelevant and wrong. So it's not a good answer. — Banno

It may be wrong , but why don’t you do me the courtesy of answering my questions?

What does first order calculus depend on? A=A is a relation between A and A. But what presupposition lies behind the invocation of ‘a’? What does A have to consist of at minimum in order for it to play a role in a=a? We obviously have to assume that it is present in front of us as an entity of some sort. Doesn’t first order calculus assume this? Isn’t first order calculus a syntax, and doesn’t a syntax need something to operate on? — Joshs

What does first order calculus depend on? — Joshs

It does not depend on a=a.

And I have previously, several times, mentioned the domain of discourse. And yes, it is taken as granted in some first-order formal systems.

It is not what logic is based on.

Quine, remember.

What the fuck is being? — Tom Storm

Here are two answers.

In the first, it is what is taken as granted in our conversation. In formal logic, it's the things named by the constants a, b, c... In a natural language it's the stuff to which we give proper names. It's what is sometimes called the domain of discourse.

The second is that it is to have an attribute or property. In formal logic this is done with an existential quantifier: ∃(x)f(x) - there is something that is f. In a natural language this is done with a predicate: something is on the mat.

Now there are those who claim there is more, but what that "more" is remains obscure.

I've learned that it is possible to fill 23 pages about one not very interesting word. — Tom Storm

Yeah. Might be time to leave this thread. Nothing to see here.

It is not what logic is based on. — Banno

There is no way around the fact that logic and any variety of mathematics cannot begin without first assuming a ‘present’ object ( which includes empty symbols). We can’t get anywhere in inquiring into the basis of a present object in these conversations because that is such an irreducible , a priori notion for you that any alternatives appear wrongheaded or incoherent from your vantage. So that leaves out of consideration the phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty, Husserl , Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein.

Thank you. I don't quite get what this more might be either.

There is no way around the fact that logic and any variety of mathematics cannot begin without first assuming a ‘present’ object — Joshs

Sure, but that's not what is represented in a=a.

And we agreed earlier, in answer to Srap's question, that your account says nothing more.

Thank you. I don't quite get what this more might be either. — Tom Storm

It wouldnt be more, it would be less. That is, the ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ presume too much about the minimal condition for ‘presencing’.

that's not what is represented in a=a. — Banno

Tell me what is represented in a=a.

It's a definition of "=".


Last chance.

But here's something curious: Free Logic.

This is a branch of first order logic that does not assume that singular terms denote anything.

How cool. Finding this might even be enough to justify having spent so much time on this otherwise unhelpful thread.

Last chance. — Banno

Are these discussions a competition for you?

Take a look at the two paragraphs below by Husserl. The first describes sensations as we identify them objectively, as enduring, stopping and starting , speeding up or slowing down, like his example of a perceived tone. It doesn’t explicitly describe mathematical or logical symbols, but it shows how such objective sensations act as a model for symbolic objects.

Now look at the second paragraph. It describes what we really, originally perceive in a stretch of time. In actuality , there are no enduring tones or colors or shapes, just a flow which is changing so constantly that nothing ever doubles back , remains , extends, endures. How do we derive the objects in the first paragraph from this flow of the second paragraph? We discern similarities and regularities in the flow, and from these likenesses we ‘imagine’ identities such as a ‘tone’ or color or shape.
My question to you is, is it possible to generate the ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ of logical and mathematical symbolization fromthe moment to moment changes of the second paragraph? Keep in mind that, consistent with the dynamics of the second paragraph, recalling an instance from memory changes it , so ‘a’ is no longer ‘a’ when we refer back to it.

This is what I mean when I say that we derive the symbolic basis of logic and math from a temporal process that is more originary.

“Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures -that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into change.

Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession, and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change", and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.”(Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness)

Are these discussions a competition for you? — Joshs

No, more a game.

In this game, I ask a question and others quote holy writ. It's not that much fun.

what is taken as granted in our conversation — Banno

That's not a terrible place to start, although you might have said in our lives rather than our conversations.

I think the question is, can you give an account of what "taking as granted" is? How does it work? How is it possible?

Logic, by design, has nothing to say here: existence and truth are taken as primitives, and are *prior* to logical operations. (Originally Frege included "judgment" as well.) You can continue to add on formalisms like model theory, but to specify a domain of discourse, you'll need a "membership" primitive as well. (You'll also need membership to treat predicates extensionally.)

Logic, like math, gets along fine without defining its primitives -- that's rather the point -- but that's not to say we do not in fact bring to logic and to math an understanding, some kind of understanding from somewhere, of the meaning of those primitives, or that there's no reason to give them some thought.

It wouldnt be more, it would be less. That is, the ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’ presume too much about the minimal condition for ‘presencing’. — Joshs

Epoché?

Epoché? — Tom Storm

Yes, a thoroughgoing reduction leads us to this simpler beginning.

I think the question is, can you give an account of what "taking as granted" is? How does it work? How is it possible? — Srap Tasmaner

I've mentioned that the account given in the first hundred or so items in Philosophical Investigations provides a fine account. To that we might add Anscombe's, and Searle's, accounts of Intentionality. But none of this is to say that the account is complete.

But moreover, little in this thread seems to help.

If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration. — Joshs

To me this seems like a mere thought experiment. The totally of sensations always provides for a reference of duration. The body itself generates difference all the time - think of circulating blood or breath. It is not only external objects one would focus on that generates change. It is not even sensations that come clearly to mind as such if you think of the feelings of rest or unrest.for example.

Two persons blu a baloon, this is his, and this ballon is from another person, you pup the ballons, where air goes???

Wittgenstein and Heidegger are, in part anyway, barking up related trees: what it means to be in an interpreted and interpretable world. (Anscombe and Searle, I can't speak to.) And Wittgenstein's story is precisely that classical logic lacks the resources needed for such an account. (He tried.)