It seems that we can easily observe informational correlates of consciousness (such as integrated information theory), and from there construct mathematical theories to quantify the degree of consciousness within a system. — tom111
It seems that there are two options from here. — tom111
So overall this leaves us with two options, either consciousness as well as qualia are fundamental properties, or the laws of nature can not all be described mathematically. — tom111
We can conclude that consciousness arises in systems of higher informational integration — tom111
It seems that there are two options from here. We either regard consciousness as a fundamental property (a property like charge for example in which we accept that there are no more fundamental descriptions of it; some things just exist the way they are without the need for further explanation) or we can try to come up with a more fundamental theory, that goes beyond surface-level descriptions of consciousness. — tom111
:100:Both life and mind are themselves code-based modelling relations with reality. That is the kind of structure they are. Semiotic structures. Genes and neurons anchor the business of modelling the environment in terms of an organism's interests and purposes. — apokrisis
:up:So consciousness just is - in a general metaphysical way - the brain modelling the world from an enactive or "selfish" point of view. Consciousness is what it is like to be in a modelling relationship with the world - a model of the world that has "me" in it as its centre.
The brain, mind, and consciousness are 3 completely different things. — Miller
"Different" but not unrelated: — 180 Proof
I'll drink to that. :up:As I see it, brain is to mind as your TV set is to "Gilligan's Island." Not the same, but inseparable. As for consciousness - what we call "mind" is the set of mental processes. "Consciousness" is one of those processes. — T Clark
When it comes to consciousness, neuroscience is also seeking to find its mathematical model of its essential causal structure.
Both life and mind are themselves code-based modelling relations with reality. That is the kind of structure they are. Semiotic structures. Genes and neurons anchor the business of modelling the environment in terms of an organism's interests and purposes.
So consciousness just is - in a general metaphysical way - the brain modelling the world from an enactive or "selfish" point of view. Consciousness is what it is like to be in a modelling relationship with the world - a model of the world that has "me" in it as its centre. — apokrisis
How could such modelling not feel like something? (The question that brings the conversation back to the realm of questions which are framed counterfactually and thus allow you to say why zombies can't be actually zombies if they indeed are in a Bayesian modelling relation with the world, exactly like we are.) — apokrisis
How could such modelling not feel like something? — apokrisis
Do you understand the Bayesian/semiotic approach to modelling well enough to justify such a doubt?
If not, your proclaimed doubt is “happening in the dark”. — apokrisis
You're presuming that experiencing necessitates feeling — Enrique
Explanation only becomes exhaustive when the substances it describes are observed to completion, and mechanistic concepts alone never get us to that point. — Enrique
You are doubting something before you have even understood what you claim to doubt. So until you can supply some grounds to substantiate your doubt…. — apokrisis
I like this especially for a couple of reasons. First - it's a great rhetorical response to the "science can't address qualia" argument. They say "How do you explain the experience of red?" You say "How could such modelling not feel like something?" It turns their argument back on them. Rhetorical ju jitsu. I don't know that it actually explains anything, but maybe it will knock them off their homo-centric high horse. — T Clark
Whenever the subject comes up, I try to imagine how it would feel for sparks in neurons to turn into movies in my mind. You say "Of course it feels like something," makes me rethink the defensiveness I sometimes feel in that discussion. — T Clark
I'm genuinely interested in non-panpsychist theories of consciousness, but I don't have time to spend hours researching things that I suspect are totally irrelevant to the problem. — bert1
I might take the trouble to look into it if I think it's worth it. I don't see any reason to. You haven't given a prima facie reason why the modelling must feel like something. You've asserted it and said the burden of proof is on the doubter, which is rhetorical nonsense. — bert1
It seems that there are two options from here. We either regard consciousness as a fundamental property (a property like charge for example in which we accept that there are no more fundamental descriptions of it; some things just exist the way they are without the need for further explanation) or we can try to come up with a more fundamental theory, that goes beyond surface-level descriptions of consciousness. — tom111
As I see it, brain is to mind as your TV set is to "Gilligan's Island." Not the same, but inseparable. As for consciousness - what we call "mind" is the set of mental processes. "Consciousness" is one of those processes. — T Clark
This is bullshit. I posted Friston’s presentation. If you can’t muster the energy to consider what the world’s premier thinker on the subject has to say, then that’s on you. — apokrisis
The materialist might disagree though. — Cartuna
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