Consciousness, Mathematics, Fundamental laws and properties

tom111

So I have some thoughts on consciousness. Lmk what you all think.

It seems that we can easily observe informational correlates of consciousness (such as integrated information theory), and from there construct mathematical theories to quantify the degree of consciousness within a system. However, these theories are descriptive, rather than prescriptive. In terms of the nature of qualia itself, and indeed why consciousness should be associated with say, systems displaying higher degrees of information integration, mathematics seems to fall short. We can conclude that consciousness arises in systems of higher informational integration, but why does it? And why are the qualia within the consciousness represented in the way they are?

It seems that there are two options from here. We either regard consciousness as a fundamental property (a property like charge for example in which we accept that there are no more fundamental descriptions of it; some things just exist the way they are without the need for further explanation) or we can try to come up with a more fundamental theory, that goes beyond surface-level descriptions of consciousness.

Let us suppose we go with the first option. So, I suppose that makes sense. We have consciousness as this extra “thing” associated with certain informational processes, just as we have this peculiar concept called “charge” associated with certain particles. Both charge and consciousness cannot be described on any deeper level, they simply exist because that’s the way things are. We can obviously come up with laws to describe the behaviour of charge, descriptive laws, but it reaches a point in which we cannot describe it any deeper. You can observe a phenomenon and rationalise its existence with a set of fundamental laws, then explain these laws with even more fundamental laws etc etc but eventually you’ll arrive at a point in which you cannot go any deeper. Reality isn’t built upon an infinite recursion of more and more fundamental laws and phenomena. Something at this base of this process is “fundamental”.

In a way, with consciousness or charge or something, this feels unsatisfying. We assume that not only does this fundamental property *just* exist, but it is coupled to all other properties via a seemingly arbitrary set of laws that also exist just because. We must be careful with labelling things as fundamental; we could view the whole “fundamental property” idea as we nowadays view “god of the gaps”; we feel as though something cannot be explained more fundamentally, so we label it fundamental. Of course, consciousness and charge could indeed genuine fundamental properties, but it is safer to assume that they are not, in case we wrongfully fall into this trap.

Which brings us to the second option. Perhaps there is a more fundamental theory to consciousness. The first question is, can consciousness be described mathematically on a more fundamental level than simply “this system has x amount of consciousness because it has y amount of this informational correlate”? Personally, I don’t think it can. Surely, mathematics cannot describe why the colour red is represented the way it is, or why an injection of serotonin into the brain has the subjective effect it does.

So overall this leaves us with two options, either consciousness as well as qualia are fundamental properties, or the laws of nature can not all be described mathematically.

Miller

Empiricism is dependent upon senses which are dependent upon consciousness. I don't see with my eyes I see with my brain, and I don't see with my brain I see with my consciousness, and what i see is qualia which is consciousness.

It's like looking at molecules under a microscope and trying to learn about the microscope from the way the molecules look. But with no basis of comparison from other microscopes or instruments or anything else. and no ability to ever see the microscope itself. Just seeing the molecules and trying to use them to know the microscope that has never been seen.

Complete self recursion is impossible, this is what causes the hard problem of consciousness, the illusion of free will, and the ego.

john27

↪tom111

I would agree that for some things, its almost simpler to view it in a non-deterministic setting.

SophistiCat

It seems that we can easily observe informational correlates of consciousness (such as integrated information theory), and from there construct mathematical theories to quantify the degree of consciousness within a system. — tom111

I don't know what mathematical models you are referring to, but it seems to me that it is unwarranted to jump to any metaphysical conclusions from the mere fact that some descriptive mathematical models of conscious systems don't give you certain features of consciousness.

T Clark

↪tom111

Discussions of consciousness here on the forum always break down because people are not clear about the meaning of the word. Are you talking about self-awareness or the ability to perceive "qualia," a word, by the way, I hate. I assume mice perceive qualia. I assume they are not self-aware. Or maybe you're talking about something else.

It seems that there are two options from here. — tom111

So overall this leaves us with two options, either consciousness as well as qualia are fundamental properties, or the laws of nature can not all be described mathematically. — tom111

There are certainly more than two options. The one that seems most useful to me is that consciousness is a property that emerges spontaneously from routine mental processes. Those mental process emerge spontaneously from nervous system behavior.

We can conclude that consciousness arises in systems of higher informational integration — tom111

I would say that consciousness is a system of higher informational integration.

apokrisis

It seems that there are two options from here. We either regard consciousness as a fundamental property (a property like charge for example in which we accept that there are no more fundamental descriptions of it; some things just exist the way they are without the need for further explanation) or we can try to come up with a more fundamental theory, that goes beyond surface-level descriptions of consciousness. — tom111

There are better options. Maybe it is structure that is fundamental and not properties. Properties may be better thought of as emergent features of systems of relations.

Physical reality is best described as mathematical patterns or structures of relations. Quantum theory, relativity, the standard model. The maths describes the causal structure of reality.

When it comes to consciousness, neuroscience is also seeking to find its mathematical model of its essential causal structure.

Both life and mind are themselves code-based modelling relations with reality. That is the kind of structure they are. Semiotic structures. Genes and neurons anchor the business of modelling the environment in terms of an organism's interests and purposes.

So consciousness just is - in a general metaphysical way - the brain modelling the world from an enactive or "selfish" point of view. Consciousness is what it is like to be in a modelling relationship with the world - a model of the world that has "me" in it as its centre.

That general semiotic modelling relationship is now being put on a solid mathematical foundation by Karl Friston and his Bayesian Brain approach. He now claims it to be a fourth branch of mechanics - Bayesian mechanics to add to classical, statistical and quantum mechanics.

See his talk here for details.

That still does not "explain" the redness of red, of course. But that is a different story. Scientific accounts generally don't explain reality in terms of qualities ... being that they deal in the mathematically quantifiable.

It is like being given a useful - measurable and calculable - explanation of magnetism and complaining that an account of its essential causal structure does not give you an understanding of the magneticness of magneticity.

Once you verbally reduce the world to singular qualities, you cut it away from all that is its counterfactual context. You abstract it from its structure of relations. And no wonder not much more can be said.

But even without going into the maths of Bayesian mechanics, or the metaphysics of code-based semiosis, it should be easy enough to see that the brain - in modelling its environment in terms of its embodied self-interest - ought to feel like something. Indeed, something just like being a model of the world as it is with "ourselves" living and acting in it.

How could such modelling not feel like something? (The question that brings the conversation back to the realm of questions which are framed counterfactually and thus allow you to say why zombies can't be actually zombies if they indeed are in a Bayesian modelling relation with the world, exactly like we are.)

AquaTomo

I don't know what mathematical models you are referring to, but it seems to me that it is unwarranted to jump to any metaphysical conclusions from the mere fact that some descriptive mathematical models of conscious systems don't give you certain features of consciousness.

180 Proof

Both life and mind are themselves code-based modelling relations with reality. That is the kind of structure they are. Semiotic structures. Genes and neurons anchor the business of modelling the environment in terms of an organism's interests and purposes. — apokrisis

:100:

So consciousness just is - in a general metaphysical way - the brain modelling the world from an enactive or "selfish" point of view. Consciousness is what it is like to be in a modelling relationship with the world - a model of the world that has "me" in it as its centre.

:up:

Miller

that consciousness is a property that emerges spontaneously from routine mental processes. Those mental process emerge spontaneously from nervous system behavior. — T Clark

The brain, mind, and consciousness are 3 completely different things.

180 Proof

The brain, mind, and consciousness are 3 completely different things. — Miller

"Different" but not unrelated: noun, verb, and preposition, respectively.

bert1

"Different" but not unrelated: noun, verb, and preposition, respectively. — 180 Proof

Eh? All three are nouns

bert1

it should be easy enough to see that the brain - in modelling its environment in terms of its embodied self-interest - ought to feel like something. — apokrisis

This is the crux of it. Why should it feel like something? Why can't the modelling happen in the dark?

180 Proof

↪bert1

This explains the idealist's penchant for reification fallacies.

bert1

↪180 Proof

It's grammar. I don't think you're actually saying what you mean. You might be making a perfectly good point, but you haven't made it clear.

T Clark

The brain, mind, and consciousness are 3 completely different things. — Miller

I'm with 180 Proof, at least as far as brain vs. mind.

"Different" but not unrelated: — 180 Proof

As I see it, brain is to mind as your TV set is to "Gilligan's Island." Not the same, but inseparable. As for consciousness - what we call "mind" is the set of mental processes. "Consciousness" is one of those processes.

180 Proof

As I see it, brain is to mind as your TV set is to "Gilligan's Island." Not the same, but inseparable. As for consciousness - what we call "mind" is the set of mental processes. "Consciousness" is one of those processes. — T Clark

I'll drink to that. :up:

↪bert1

I don't think you actually understand what I mean and blame my "lack of clarity" (so far you're the only one, bert) for your failure to understand me.

apokrisis

This is the crux of it. Why should it feel like something? Why can't the modelling happen in the dark? — bert1

Do you understand the Bayesian/semiotic approach to modelling well enough to justify such a doubt?

If not, your proclaimed doubt is “happening in the dark”.

T Clark

↪apokrisis

This is a really interesting post. It helped me reframe the subject in a new way I found helpful. I've always found your discussions of semiotics... provocative. By which I mean, I believe what you say but don't understand. I've been trying for the four years since I first read your ideas on the forum. I watched the first 10 minutes of the video you linked and quickly got lost. I'll keep trying.

When it comes to consciousness, neuroscience is also seeking to find its mathematical model of its essential causal structure.

Both life and mind are themselves code-based modelling relations with reality. That is the kind of structure they are. Semiotic structures. Genes and neurons anchor the business of modelling the environment in terms of an organism's interests and purposes.

So consciousness just is - in a general metaphysical way - the brain modelling the world from an enactive or "selfish" point of view. Consciousness is what it is like to be in a modelling relationship with the world - a model of the world that has "me" in it as its centre. — apokrisis

I like the relation of complex processes such as life and consciousness as models. That's the part of this discussion I find in tune with my way of seeing things but expanding them.

How could such modelling not feel like something? (The question that brings the conversation back to the realm of questions which are framed counterfactually and thus allow you to say why zombies can't be actually zombies if they indeed are in a Bayesian modelling relation with the world, exactly like we are.) — apokrisis

I like this especially for a couple of reasons. First - it's a great rhetorical response to the "science can't address qualia" argument. They say "How do you explain the experience of red?" You say "How could such modelling not feel like something?" It turns their argument back on them. Rhetorical ju jitsu. I don't know that it actually explains anything, but maybe it will knock them off their homo-centric high horse.

That's the second reason I like it. I'm comfortable that we don't need to postulate some extra layer of causation or emergence in order to explain "qualia." Whenever the subject comes up, I try to imagine how it would feel for sparks in neurons to turn into movies in my mind. You say "Of course it feels like something," makes me rethink the defensiveness I sometimes feel in that discussion.

Good post.

Enrique

How could such modelling not feel like something? — apokrisis

You're presuming that experiencing necessitates feeling, but no reason besides raw intuition and consensus to think it must. The uncertainty about what it is to experience merely shifts from "consciousness" to a supposed feature of consciousness, "feeling", without explaining anything.

The explanation has to come from substance being modeled, not mere structure of the model itself, regardless of how efficacious a model's predictive capabilities prove to be. I imagine Bayesian mechanics is, like quantum mechanics, approximate and subject to at least some uncertainty of interpretation, though it might include within its interpretive scope predictions that apply to neuroscience and physics simultaneously. Explanation only becomes exhaustive when the substances it describes are observed to completion, and mechanistic concepts alone never get us to that point.

bert1

Do you understand the Bayesian/semiotic approach to modelling well enough to justify such a doubt?

If not, your proclaimed doubt is “happening in the dark”. — apokrisis

I might take the trouble to look into it if I think it's worth it. I don't see any reason to. You haven't given a prima facie reason why the modelling must feel like something. You've asserted it and said the burden of proof is on the doubter, which is rhetorical nonsense.

bert1

I don't think you actually understand what I mean and blame my "lack of clarity" (so far you're the only one, bert) for your failure to understand me. — 180 Proof

I read the words you wrote. That should be enough no? What else do you want me to do?

apokrisis

You've asserted it and said the burden of proof is on the doubter, which is rhetorical nonsense. — bert1

You are doubting something before you have even understood what you claim to doubt. So until you can supply some grounds to substantiate your doubt….

apokrisis

You're presuming that experiencing necessitates feeling — Enrique

Huh?

Explanation only becomes exhaustive when the substances it describes are observed to completion, and mechanistic concepts alone never get us to that point. — Enrique

Did you not understand the part of my post where I argued from the position of a structuralist, as opposed to a substantialist, ontology?

It is the belief that mind is some kind of fundamental reified substance which is where folk go wrong. I start from the opposing belief that mind is a process - a structure of relations. So if mindfulness is substantial, it is in the proper Aristotelean sense, not the Cartesian dualist sense.

bert1

You are doubting something before you have even understood what you claim to doubt. So until you can supply some grounds to substantiate your doubt…. — apokrisis

Please say something that looks like you're making a case as to why the modelling must feel like something, why it can't happen in the dark. Use the word 'therefore' or something. You don't have to, I don't want to give you homework you don't want to do. I'm just saying what kind of thing would interest me enough to take a look. I'm genuinely interested in non-panpsychist theories of consciousness, but I don't have time to spend hours researching things that I suspect are totally irrelevant to the problem.

apokrisis

I like this especially for a couple of reasons. First - it's a great rhetorical response to the "science can't address qualia" argument. They say "How do you explain the experience of red?" You say "How could such modelling not feel like something?" It turns their argument back on them. Rhetorical ju jitsu. I don't know that it actually explains anything, but maybe it will knock them off their homo-centric high horse. — T Clark

I posted the Friston video to show that neuroscience can now claim to show that “modelling” is a physically generic fact of reality. It is not some arbitrary system of thought humans can chose to employ. It is like Darwinian selection or the Platonic solids - an inescapable state of physical organisation. A mathematical necessity.

Peirce got the ball rolling with his semiotic logic. He saw that “meaning creation” is just a mathematical necessity that organises human thought and also makes the Cosmos a rational place. There is a structure of relations that defines what constitutes “order” and so lifts existence out of chaos or vagueness.

Theoretical biology got to the same level of insight in defining life as a modelling relation - see Robert Rosen and his relational biology, Howard Pattee and his epistemic cut.

Now Friston is hitting neuroscience with the same story. With a lot of actual maths.

So it isn’t rhetorical to the degree there is genuine scientific advance being made. There is a new model of modelling which defines it as physically generic and mathematically necessary.

Now you can doubt or dispute this model of modelling. But first you have to show you understand the argument being made.

@bert1 simply declares he isn’t motivated enough to learn about it. I think we can dismiss “rebuttals” that take that form.

Whenever the subject comes up, I try to imagine how it would feel for sparks in neurons to turn into movies in my mind. You say "Of course it feels like something," makes me rethink the defensiveness I sometimes feel in that discussion. — T Clark

This idea that neural firing must somehow produce an experienced representation is just a hangover from Cartesian representationalism and the “naturalisation” of that ontology due to the great success of universal Turing machines as a 20th century technology.

But we wouldn’t say steam engines explain the mechanisms of life. So why would we say computer metaphors would have anything deep to say about the mechanisms of mind?

My point here is that both life and mind - as now clearly understood by the current science - have a very different (semiotic) logic about them.

What was the central problem for the Cartesian paradigm - how to connect the dualistic realms of the material and the mental - just isn’t a problem for the semiotic paradigm.

If there is still a problem, it is the general epistemic one that applies to the scientific method in general - the need to base causal accounts on counterfactuals. But that is, as I say a completely general epistemic issue, and not a specific ontological issue. It is not central to scientific inquiry. It just demarcates the ultimate limits of inquiry as a semiotic process itself. It defines truth as an asymptotic approach to a collective rational agreement - pragmatism, in a word.

apokrisis

I'm genuinely interested in non-panpsychist theories of consciousness, but I don't have time to spend hours researching things that I suspect are totally irrelevant to the problem. — bert1

This is bullshit. I posted Friston’s presentation. If you can’t muster the energy to consider what the world’s premier thinker on the subject has to say, then that’s on you.

Cartuna

I might take the trouble to look into it if I think it's worth it. I don't see any reason to. You haven't given a prima facie reason why the modelling must feel like something. You've asserted it and said the burden of proof is on the doubter, which is rhetorical nonsense. — bert1

:100:

It seems that there are two options from here. We either regard consciousness as a fundamental property (a property like charge for example in which we accept that there are no more fundamental descriptions of it; some things just exist the way they are without the need for further explanation) or we can try to come up with a more fundamental theory, that goes beyond surface-level descriptions of consciousness. — tom111

String theory sees charge as a vibrational mode of strings. It's this vibrational mode that gives the coupling strength to other strings. I don't agree with the string approach, but it goes to show charge can be described as emergent. The question of what charge is is shifted though to the question how a string can vibrate as vibration requires forces, and interactions, forces, are described by vibrating strings which obviously is not applicable to the vibrational motion of strings themselves.

Every description of consciousness is bound to touch the surface only. Of course there is a correspondence between description and experience. Seeing colors and hearing sounds have their neuronal counterparts. The visual cortex spatiotemporally differently organized than the auditory one. Eyes and ears give a different input and already in the embryonic stage your visual and auditory cortex are stimulated by retinal patterns in the developing eye or comparable patterns emerging from the developing ear, just to prepare you for the world you are thrown in. Likewise for pain, experiences for hot and cold, the feeling of itch on your back (which, when scratched, can give rise to spikes of itch on other body parts), thoughts and feelings, or whatever conscious experience.

The descriptions in terms of flowing patterns of spike potentials on the network of interconnected neuron cells and their relation to the physical world via the senses, offers no explanation for that what's the content of the patterns, i.e, the conscious experience. It offers no explanation why organisms with faces have a conscious experience, though it's hard to imagine how it could be else, i.e, people or animals doing their things without being conscious. You can consider all living creatures as dynamical complex structures with an unbroken bond to the past universe, but in doing so you leave out a component that constitutes that what's beneath the surface. Let's call it charge.

Miller

As I see it, brain is to mind as your TV set is to "Gilligan's Island." Not the same, but inseparable. As for consciousness - what we call "mind" is the set of mental processes. "Consciousness" is one of those processes. — T Clark

Baseless assumptions.

i could just say the opposite of both statements and it would be equally true

Miller

"Different" but not unrelated: — 180 Proof

Everything is related

Cartuna

This is bullshit. I posted Friston’s presentation. If you can’t muster the energy to consider what the world’s premier thinker on the subject has to say, then that’s on you. — apokrisis

Whatever he has to say, it can't explain consciousness. No matter how premier he thinks about it. All talk about dissipative structures evolving non-reversible into orderly structures, by means of night and day, is bound to leave out what's crucial for consciousness However you look at the problem, the materialistic approach won't work. The materialist might disagree though.

apokrisis

The materialist might disagree though. — Cartuna

Or more importantly, the “materialist” might in fact be a semiotician and systems thinker. And they might actually have a theory.

What have you got to offer beyond the usual doubts and assertions as your way to excuse an ignorance of where the science is at?

Consciousness, Mathematics, Fundamental laws and properties

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