Here's what I'm proposing, regardless of whether it comports with anyone's idea of naive realism or direct realism. There are many constituents of the world. Some are human, some are bees, some are flowers. None of them exist in an "external world" apart from anything else. None of them is an "external object" in that sense. — Ciceronianus

This is Stoic doctrine, and we know you're a Stoic. Okay.

There is no "thing" called a perception which exists somewhere inside of us.

But this I don't understand.
Are you referring to Stoic epistemology, epistemology according to Stoicism?

If I conceive a flower as X and you as Y, what is the truth value of the proposition "the flower is Y"? — Hanover

An odd question. The flower is X, or not; or it is Y, or not.

You might have meant to ask: 'if I conceive a flower as X and you as ~X, what is the truth value of the proposition "the flower is X"'

Sometimes folk are wrong about flowers.

One of us might be wrong. My money is on it being you.

I tend to believe a causative link between the thing and the experience. — Hanover

...but the claim was that flowers are is unknowable. So you can't know anything about such causal chains.

Always it comes back to this: you want to claim that we can talk about flowers but not flowers-in-themselves; and yet you insist in telling us about flowers-in-themselves.

There's a basic contradiction in claiming that there is something about which we cannot make claims.

Very well, what is the flower in and of itself? — Hanover

The more I think about that question, the more incoherent it seems. To be something is to instantiate some attribute or set of attributes, no? Attributes are cognized; so if knowing attributes is dependent on judgements derived from perception, is asking about attributes that are imperceptible in principle not incoherent?

So, if the flower is knowable, it can only be knowable from an analysis of all perspectives, recognizing that each of our perspectives is mediated by our peculiar filters. This is precisely how we all navigate the world by the way. Science requires we eliminate subjective bias. — Hanover

A much clearer approach to the same issue is to get rid of the subjective/objective dichotomy by talking about the stuff about which we agree or disagree.

So we tend to agree that the needle on the potentiometer points to the seven, but might disagree that vanilla is better than chocolate.

Incidentally, it's the confusion of agree/disagree with subjective /objective that leads to all that nonsense about intersubjectivity.

In any case, I won't need to consult you in order to determine that the poppies in the front yard are red and purple. So you are mistaken in thinking it can only be knowable from an analysis of all perspectives.

I asked you to sketch out how "appearances deceive us". I've never felt "deceived" by an appearance, I don't know what that would be like. — baker

If you look back, you will see that I was commenting on another's comment making a claim that science had 'discovered' that our senses were unreliable. I pointed out that though this might appear to be the case, by its own claim, the claim cannot be relied on. Just to be clear, because it seems important to you for some reason, I am arguing throughout for direct realism, and thus not in disagreement with you about not being deceived in general. I thought this was made clear by my previous repetition of that claim first as the other's quote and then as my ironic comment on the claim. Obviously, that wasn't as clear as I thought it was, but hopefully, this will make it clear enough.

Trite, I know, but there is this:

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism 760 / 931 (81.6%)
Other 86 / 931 (9.2%)
Accept or lean toward: skepticism 45 / 931 (4.8%)
Accept or lean toward: idealism 40 / 931 (4.3%)
— PhilPapers Survey — Banno

This isn't the survey result that applies to the questions within this thread. From the same survey:

See #21.

This is Stoic doctrine, and we know you're a Stoic. Okay.

There is no "thing" called a perception which exists somewhere inside of us.

But this I don't understand.
Are you referring to Stoic epistemology, epistemology according to Stoicism? — baker

No, there's nothing particularly Stoic about that (as far as I know, in any case).

That comment is more along the lines of Austin, or ordinary language philosophy. I think we can deceive ourselves when we start referring to a perception as if it's a kind of "thing." In particular in this case, as if it's something separate from an "external object" like a flower, and, it seems, something that varies from person to person or creature to creature encountering the "external object." I suppose it's the result of the dualism that induces us to think of ourselves as separate from the "external world." It's like referring to sense data as if it's a kind of thing, although as I understand it that kind of thing is a thing which separates us from the rest of the world.

See #21. — Hanover

Not without a magnifying glass.

This isn't the survey result that applies to the questions within this thread. — Hanover

The title of this thread: "The Strange Belief in an Unknowable "External World" (A Mere Lawyer's Take)"

The question I referred to: "External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?"

The question you referred to: "Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?"

So you think the thread about the external world is not about the external world.

One aspect of Direct Realism is that the external world exists independently of the mind. As you propose that there is no "external world", am I correct in thinking that your view is neither Naive Realism nor Direct Realism, but something else, such as Idealism, as Hanover suggests ? — RussellA

I don't think so, no. When I say there's no "external world" I'm simply saying there's a single world, and that we're a part of it, not apart from it. I think referring to an "external world" is confusing as it implies there's some world outside of us in which we don't participate, and perhaps even in which we don't exist, but simply observe.

I think when we refer to an "external world" which "exists independently of the mind" we've already accepted a dualism I reject. We assume the existence of a mind separate from the world. I don't think our minds are separate from the world; I think they're parts of the world just as we are (necessarily so, of course). So, the question "Is there an external world which exists independently of the mind?" seems to me to be...well, weird.

That comment is more along the lines of Austin, — Ciceronianus

You just like philosophers with the surname "Austin".

He is addressing the question whether all his experience might be a mere figment of his imagination, including his own hands. — Cuthbert

I think it's a question which shouldn't arise, frankly, and I assume it does only if one takes faux doubt of the kind which so famously was indulged in by Descartes seriously. Our every act, our very existence, establishes we don't seriously believe our hands are figments of our imagination.

If a "constituent" is a part, it is distinct from other parts, which logically demands that bees, flowers, and people are apart from each other. By "apart" I mean not a part of, which means it's separate from me, thus being external.

It is my experience that my perceptions cease upon my unconsciousness, yet it seems the object of my perception is unaffected by unconsciousness. Do you believe otherwise? When I sleep, does my bed cease to exist now that I no longer perceive it? — Hanover

There are humans and there are bees. I'm a human. I'm not a bee. So, if that is what you think makes a bee "external" to me, that's fine, but I think calling it "external" is inappropriate. I would simply say something like "There are bees in the world" much as I'd say "There are humans in the world" or "We're in (or are a part of) the world." If I'd even say such things. I don't think it would occur to me to do so.

And that may be the salient point. If we accept we're part of the universe along with everything else, how does the question whether there's an "external world" even arise? Obviously, we wouldn't think there was another world or universe. We wouldn't think our minds are independent from the rest of the universe. We wouldn't wonder whether the rest of the universe really exists, or if the rest of it would go away if we were asleep.

Nor, I think, would we wonder whether a flower is really a flower, or whether it's really something different from a flower--or think that what it truly is cannot be known.

You just like philosophers with the surname "Austin" — Banno

I like the two I know of, anyhow.

If we accept we're part of the universe along with everything else, how does the question whether there's an "external world" even arise? — Ciceronianus

"Uni" verse means one. It means everything that there is. That something is "external" could not mean external to the universe. If it did, the universe would only be part of what there is. This distinction you make is not one that needed to be made because no one argues otherwise.

That the blender is separate from the cupboard is separate from the coffee maker is entirely possible even if all the world is the kitchen.

When I say there are objects external to me, I don't mean external to the universe because that, well, wouldn't make a whole lotta sense.

Knowing this now, I say there is me, and then there are flowers and I have a perception of the flower. The question then is whether my perception represents the flower or is the flower. If the former, we're not direct realists. If the latter, we are. The latter makes no sense to me.

The question then is whether my perception represents the flower or is the flower. If the former, we're not direct realists. If the latter, we are. — Hanover

So to you direct realists think that the flower is the perception of the flower.

No wonder you are puzzled. perplexed.

So to you direct realists think that the flower is the perception of the flower. — Banno

It's easy to read that way if you're tacitly assuming a perception is an object that bears properties like a flower bears properties.

I suppose you are right. Hanover appears to be fixated on the picture that he is a homunculus looking out at a seperate, external world, and hence thinks all there are, are perceptions, and hence that perceptions are what has properties.

Knowing this now, I say there is me, and then there are flowers and I have a perception of the flower. The question then is whether my perception represents the flower or is the flower. If the former, we're not direct realists. If the latter, we are. The latter makes no sense to me. — Hanover

Words are multiplying unnecessarily here and causing you some confusion it seems. Your perception of the flower is neither a representation of the flower nor is it the flower. You perceive the flower, you don't perceive a representation of the flower. The flower is presented to your perception, is present in your perception, not represented by it. It is your thought or talk about the flower that represents the flower, if anything does.

It's easy to read that way if you're tacitly assuming a perception is an object that bears properties like a flower bears properties. — fdrake

In that view it is not that a perception is an object that bears properties like a flower bears properties, but that it is an object that bears properties instead of a flower that bears properties.

There seems to be some truth to this in the sense that some properties of the flower are only realized in being perceived. Nonetheless they are properties of the flower, not properties of the perception of the flower.

In that view it is not that a perception is an object that bears properties like a flower bears properties, but that it is an object that bears properties instead of a flower that bears properties. — Janus

Doesn't it depend on the representation relationship? I guess I don't really want to get into it in too much depth. Spelled out my view about perceptual intermediaries here.

I didn't find what you wrote there understandable without putting in considerable effort. My point was only that it is not the process of perception of an object that bears properties, but the object that is perceived. That some properties of objects (like colour for example) may be said to be perception-dependent does nothing to change this; that is, it is not my perception of a flower which is yellow, but the flower I perceive which is yellow.

:up:

Words are multiplying unnecessarily here and causing you some confusion it seems. Your perception of the flower is neither a representation of the flower nor is it the flower. You perceive the flower, you don't perceive a representation of the flower. The flower is presented to your perception, is present in your perception, not represented by it. It is your thought or talk about the flower that represents the flower, if anything does. — Janus

If my perception and the flower are the same thing, that's idealism. There is no external to speak of, so you can eliminate that word as well.

suppose you are right. Hanover appears to be fixated on the picture that he is a homunculus looking out at a seperate, external world, and hence thinks all there are, are perceptions, and hence that perceptions are what has properties. — Banno

No, objects have properties.

If my perception and the flower are the same thing, that's idealism. There is no external to speak of, so you can eliminate that word as well. — Hanover

Is idealism coherent? What about my perception of the flower, or the bees? Being different how can they all be the same flower?

Is idealism coherent? What about my perception of the flower, or the bees? Being different how can they all be the same flower — Janus

There's a flower in your head and you're asking about the bee in your head. Idealism is strange, but not incoherent.

There's a flower in your head and you're asking about the bee in your head. Idealism is strange, but not incoherent. — Hanover

As the old saying goes, there are no flowers in my head, but you can see where they've been, :wink: (Well actually you can't; you'll need to open the skull).

Idealism doesn't seem to provide any explanation as to how the flower I see can be the same flower you see, hence it doesn't cohere with everyday experience, which seems to show that we can both look at, smell, and touch particular flowers (among many other wonderful things which I won't mention here for the sake of brevity and decorum)..

The ol' Bishop Berkeley's God might do the trick, I suppose, if He was Himself a coherent entity, or I guess you could posit a universal or collective mind, but in my experience philosophical idealists never seem to want to go there.

Direct Realism is a philosophy of the mind based on the theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

Philosophers often use “Naïve Realism” as a synonym for “Direct Realism”, though sometimes Naive Realism is taken as a strong form of Direct Realism, more along the lines of Aristotle's approach.

In the context of the philosophy of the mind, the phrase "External World" is the view that in the world there are things or events that exist independently of the mind.

I don't think our minds are separate from the world; I think they're parts of the world just as we are — Ciceronianus

If the mind is part of the world, then in the world there is the mind and there is that which is outside the mind, ie, an "external world" - ie leading to the possibility of Naive Realism, Direct Realism or Indirect Realism.

So, the question "Is there an external world which exists independently of the mind?" seems to me to be...well, weird. — Ciceronianus

This would mean that there is no "external world" - ie, Idealism


These two viewpoints seem contradictory.

When I see a flower, I don't see a perception of a flower. I see a flower. Do you claim I see something else?