FWIW, here's my take on the self-concept, from the perspective of Enformationism theory. The Self is not a Real thing, in the sense of a ghost, but it is an Ideal concept. As such, it is as useful as your mental model of the Real World, which according to Kant is not the ding an sich. We can't ask animals if they have a sense of self, but like humans, they act as-if they do. :cool:I wonder why does each of have an 'I' as an aspect of consciousness, or self consciousness? Are human beings the only living beings with a sense of 'I'? — Jack Cummins
It's the brain talking to itself about its environment. I am not you, because you're in my environment. — Kenosha Kid
Unless you happen to be schizophrenic, in which case the I and you inhabit the same ‘person’. — Joshs
:up:As for what 'I' is... spit and you'll hit a new definition, but mine is along the Kierkegaard-to-Kahneman trajectory. It's the brain talking to itself about its environment. I am not you, because you're in my environment. — Kenosha Kid
It's only a self-reflexive indexical for claiming – declaring – first person (possessive) singular, discursive agency.The term 'I' may be the point of subjectivity but it may not be identical to the self. — Jack Cummins
Apparently, you think of "I" as something different from the psychological Ego, or Self-Consciousness. I agree that the Self-image is not simply the physical brain. But it is an imaginary creation of the brain. That's why I place the Self under the categorical heading of Meta-Physical. But I don't view it as a Soul or Ghost that can run around outside the body-brain complex. The link below is a discussion of Terrence Deacon and Jeremy Sherman's notion of Causal Absence and human Agency to explain the sense of an immaterial Ghost in a biological Machine.. :smile:Yes, the relationship between the construct of the self and the 'I' is not straightforward. It does seem to be an aspect of awareness arising in brain consciousness, but the 'I' is not simply the brain. The concept of I is probably used in different ways but the elusive sense of I is likely to have given rise to the idea of 'the ghost in the machine'. — Jack Cummins
So, do you think that the continuity of memories, often formulated as 'identity', is illusory? — Jack Cummins
'I' — Jack Cummins
This imaginary Me is a low-resolution construct abstracted from the complex web of inter-relationships — Gnomon
I'd like to avoid psychologism here and suggest that embodied continuity of memories generates – confabulates – the illusion of self-"identity" and therefore the loss, or "dissociation", of self-"identity" indicates neuropathology (hindering or completely incapacitating grammar-usage) — 180 Proof
It's the brain's conversation with itself about its environment. — Kenosha Kid
A brain does not perceive itself to be a brain. — 180 Proof
If you'd read "the single most important line" in my post you wouldn't need to ask.Why do you suppose this happens? — TheMadFool
:roll:I/self = brain.
Hasty generalizations (at least).I am that which thinks, the brain is that which thinks. Thus, I am the brain! — TheMadFool
:point:Please elaborate.
Hasty generalizations (at least). — 180 Proof
Yes. Without that fictional Self, we would not know where we fit into the story of Life. We are the stars of our own show, playing in the Cartesian Theater. :smile::up: Convenient fiction? — TheMadFool
That's true. A brain doesn't have internal sense organs to make a physical sense of itself (neuronal pattern). But it does have a mind, to create a self-image, which is our meta-physical sense of self. Douglas Hofstadter refers to that internal feedback as a "strange loop". :cool:A brain does not perceive itself to be a brain. — 180 Proof
That's true. A brain doesn't have internal sense organs to make a physical sense of itself (neuronal pattern). — Gnomon
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.