I wonder why does each of have an 'I' as an aspect of consciousness, or self consciousness? Are human beings the only living beings with a sense of 'I'? — Jack Cummins

FWIW, here's my take on the self-concept, from the perspective of Enformationism theory. The Self is not a Real thing, in the sense of a ghost, but it is an Ideal concept. As such, it is as useful as your mental model of the Real World, which according to Kant is not the ding an sich. We can't ask animals if they have a sense of self, but like humans, they act as-if they do. :cool:


Self/Soul :
The brain can create the image of a fictional person (the Self) to represent its own perspective in dealings with other things and persons.
1. This imaginary Me is a low-resolution construct abstracted from the complex web of inter-relationships that actually form the human body, brain, mind, DNA, and social networks in the context of a vast universe.
2. In the Enformationism worldview, only G*D could know yourself objectively in complete detail as the mathematical definition of You. That formula is equivalent to your Self/Soul.
3. Because of the fanciful & magical connotations of the traditional definition for "Soul" (e.g. ghosts), Enformationism prefers the more practical term "Self".
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page18.html

Animal self consciousness :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_consciousness

Good questions. There are not surprisingly many views on this subject in philosophy. In modern times, Hume was among the first to present the issue in a skeptical
context.

“ For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception…. If any one, upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me.”

Some argue that ‘I’ is synonymous with self, and self is constructed as a new self in every new moment of experience. Others go even further in a relativist direction, claiming that the ‘we’ comes before the self , which is socially constructed. Others suggest that consciousness always implies self-consciousness, and self-consciousness rests on a self that is immutable and accompanies all experiences of the world as a feeling, the feeling of what it’s like to be the unique self that one is. All animals that can be said to be conscious are self-conscious.

For my part, I believe the self is a comparison between my past and my present. The ‘I’ is not a persisting identity but an ongoing self-similarity. But there are different sorts of selves in different contexts. The notion of self that implies a distinction between individuals will arise only in those contexts where an awareness of others is prominent. In other situations, this sense of self will not be present. Instead, a sedimented background of habits and goals will mark the ‘self’ that maintains itself as an ongoing style or theme.

I doubt it. There are other social primates, for instance, and I think that 'I' is largely emergent from social interaction. But we don't know. That may not be a sufficient condition for self-hood. My feeling is that we should move toward an assumption of sentience where that is consistent with observation, rather than assume the opposite and validate cruelty.

As for what 'I' is... spit and you'll hit a new definition, but mine is along the Kierkegaard-to-Kahneman trajectory. It's the brain talking to itself about its environment. I am not you, because you're in my environment.

It's the brain talking to itself about its environment. I am not you, because you're in my environment. — Kenosha Kid

Unless you happen to be schizophrenic, in which case the I and you inhabit the same ‘person’. In this case, agency or lack thereof may be a better articulation of the ‘I’ than self vs environment.

Unless you happen to be schizophrenic, in which case the I and you inhabit the same ‘person’. — Joshs

The brain talking to itself about itself and girl will it give itself a piece of itself's brain talking to itself about itself and girl will it give itself a piece of itself's brain talking to itself about itself and girl will it give itself a piece of itself's :cry:

Yes, the relationship between the construct of the self and the 'I' is not straightforward. It does seem to be an aspect of awareness arising in brain consciousness, but the 'I' is not simply the brain. The concept of I is probably used in different ways but the elusive sense of I is likely to have given rise to the idea of 'the ghost in the machine'.

I am not sure to what extent the idea of 'I' relates to self, ego consciousness, and it is likely that these constructs have changed so much in accordance with understanding of human beings. It is so bound up with the nature of identity, of connection to others and as cohesive sense of identity between past, present and future. As far as I know, most people retain the sense of being an 'I' in dreams too.

Definitely the sense of 'I' is partly learned within social environments. The whole distinction between the child and mother is recognised by psychologists as being central to ego integrity in development. 'I' and 'me' may be a bit different philosophically and psychologically because me may be as a point of reference while I is the starting point of subjectivity and sense of one 's own consciousness.

As for what 'I' is... spit and you'll hit a new definition, but mine is along the Kierkegaard-to-Kahneman trajectory. It's the brain talking to itself about its environment. I am not you, because you're in my environment. — Kenosha Kid

:up:

The term 'I' may be the point of subjectivity but it may not be identical to the self. — Jack Cummins

It's only a self-reflexive indexical for claiming – declaring – first person (possessive) singular, discursive agency.

In that sense, it may be an emergent state of a way of organising consciousness. However, in some ways, it seems odd that each of us a sense of oneness within rather scattered aspects. Of course, in states of dissociation people lose their cohesive identity but, in most cases, each of us develops a coherent autobiographical 'I'. Only in unusual circumstances, this may fragment in some ways.

I think it is only an artifact of grammar, that is, each one of us using (verbal & nonverbal) language for socially orientating oneself (re: semiotics). This social orienting recursively shapes "consciousness". I'd like to avoid psychologism here and suggest that embodied continuity of memories generates – confabulates – the illusion of self-"identity" and therefore the loss, or "dissociation", of self-"identity" indicates neuropathology (hindering or completely incapacitating grammar-usage) rather than some noogenic, spiritual, or metaphysical disturbance in "consciousness" (as if it were a "reified essence" e.g. Cartesian / Platonic object).

So, do you think that the continuity of memories, often formulated as 'identity', is illusory? Surely, this would almost be supportive of the idea that consciousness is an illusion. That is because 'I' and consciousness may even be identical with I being a way of reference to the stream of consciousness itself.

Yes, the relationship between the construct of the self and the 'I' is not straightforward. It does seem to be an aspect of awareness arising in brain consciousness, but the 'I' is not simply the brain. The concept of I is probably used in different ways but the elusive sense of I is likely to have given rise to the idea of 'the ghost in the machine'. — Jack Cummins

Apparently, you think of "I" as something different from the psychological Ego, or Self-Consciousness. I agree that the Self-image is not simply the physical brain. But it is an imaginary creation of the brain. That's why I place the Self under the categorical heading of Meta-Physical. But I don't view it as a Soul or Ghost that can run around outside the body-brain complex. The link below is a discussion of Terrence Deacon and Jeremy Sherman's notion of Causal Absence and human Agency to explain the sense of an immaterial Ghost in a biological Machine.. :smile:


The Ghost in the Organism :
So Sherman chose to expand upon the allied notions of "Selves" and "Aims" as meta-physical agents in physical reality.
http://bothandblog3.enformationism.info/page20.html

"Consciousness" is phenomenal awareness of mind. Mind(ing) tracks and resolves 'discontinuities' between memories & expections or expections & predictions in order to adaptively coordinate behavior with(in) social / natural environment(s). "Self-identity" is confabulated (via sub-cognitive operant conditioning of "theory of mind") from the embodied continuity of memories. "Consciousness", I surmise, is a more peripheral, higher level (emergent) process than the deeper, more core-like "self-identity" process in human cognition., and so I do not equate or conflate them (vide A. Damasio, T. Metzinger)

So, do you think that the continuity of memories, often formulated as 'identity', is illusory? — Jack Cummins

I don't know if is an illusion or not. Our condition is especially good at fusing experiences with accounts given about them. A thoroughly skeptical point of view does not start from a more objective point of view, free from this problem of singular perception. The view requires accepting our experience is outside of what is really going on.

And that seems unlikely. Why would such a condition be more possible than others?

'I' — Jack Cummins

It all depends on how you look at it.

The most well-known philosophy that rejects the reality of a self is Buddhism but do keep an eye on how Buddhists define the I in particular and everything else in general: in Gautama's view, ontology is pointless/meaningless if not eternal (the anicca-anatta duo). From such a perspective, true, there's no I for it ceases to be at death.

However, a less demanding or more relaxed definition of the self - one that allows for its dissolution when we perish - admits of the existence of an I albeit only as long as we draw breath.

This imaginary Me is a low-resolution construct abstracted from the complex web of inter-relationships — Gnomon

:up: Convenient fiction?

There's theory of mind too, which completes the picture: being able to model the subjective experiences, knowledge, situation of others, which is social behaviour that plays a part in me distinguishing I from You. Prior to that, the perceived distinction does seem blurred.

I'd like to avoid psychologism here and suggest that embodied continuity of memories generates – confabulates – the illusion of self-"identity" and therefore the loss, or "dissociation", of self-"identity" indicates neuropathology (hindering or completely incapacitating grammar-usage) — 180 Proof

:up:

Or actual memory impairment, e.g. can still narrate an autobiography but all the elements are missing/false.

Who am “I”.

....which reduces to nothing more than a metaphysical object querying itself.

I can say that, express it objectively, because “I” thought it up.

Not much point in asking about that for which the answer is contained in the question.

A brain does not perceive itself to be a brain. This is due to it lacking internal sensory inputs (re: medial neglect ... e.g. viewed only from one end, a spring coil seems merely a circle). In other words, brain functioning is transparent to its own functioning. Thus, throughout its life a brain tells itself (and other brains) stories in the form of answers to the question "Who am I?" updated episodically from lived experience. In fact, "you" are – no more a brain than a video game avatar is a player – just a shadow dancing on a cave (skull) wall.

Plato's cave of skulls. I like! And yeah, a correction (already correct in Kierkegaard):

It's the brain's conversation with itself about its environment. — Kenosha Kid

A brain does not perceive itself to be a brain. — 180 Proof

The single most important line in your post. A brain fails to recognize itself even when all the evidence points to that simple truth: I/self = brain.

Why do you suppose this happens?

It's kinda like mirrored-self misidentification, not an exact match but good enough for government work if you know what I mean.

It is a delusion nonetheless.

Why do you suppose this happens? — TheMadFool

If you'd read "the single most important line" in my post you wouldn't need to ask.

I/self = brain.

:roll:

What's wrong?

I am that which thinks, the brain is that which thinks. Thus, I am the brain!

That means if I'm unable to, or if I'm unwilling to, accept the argument above, either I'm suffering from a delusion or there's a good reason why I reject the argument.

Which is it? Please elaborate. Thanks.

I am that which thinks, the brain is that which thinks. Thus, I am the brain! — TheMadFool

Hasty generalizations (at least).

Please elaborate.

:point:

Hasty generalizations (at least). — 180 Proof

Where? I haven't made any generalizations unless you mean to imply that there are some among us who have a nonphysical self, something other than our trusty wetware.

:up: Convenient fiction? — TheMadFool

Yes. Without that fictional Self, we would not know where we fit into the story of Life. We are the stars of our own show, playing in the Cartesian Theater. :smile:

A brain does not perceive itself to be a brain. — 180 Proof

That's true. A brain doesn't have internal sense organs to make a physical sense of itself (neuronal pattern). But it does have a mind, to create a self-image, which is our meta-physical sense of self. Douglas Hofstadter refers to that internal feedback as a "strange loop". :cool:


I Am a Strange Loop :
Strange Loop says that each of us is a point of view, and one's perspective – indeed our most intimate subjectivity – can exist in other substrates, outside of the brain. No, Hofstadter hasn't gone mystical, religious, or superstitious; but he has pushed the boundaries of science by thinking poetically.
Book by Douglas Hofstadter
https://philosophynow.org/issues/78/I_Am_A_Strange_Loop_by_Douglas_Hofstadter

A strange loop is a cyclic structure that goes through several levels in a hierarchical system. It arises when, by moving only upwards or downwards through the system, one finds oneself back where one started. Strange loops may involve self-reference and paradox.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strange_loop

Hofstadter's idea of the 'strange loop' as a means of self reference in consciousness is fascinating. So, thanks for sharing that as part of the nature of how consciousness of the 'I' comes into being for human beings.

That's true. A brain doesn't have internal sense organs to make a physical sense of itself (neuronal pattern). — Gnomon

But it can sense other brains by taking looking at them from the outside in other people. Or taking them out of bodies and touching them. Working brains can even touch themselves, and look at themselves in the mirror. What they can't make sense of is the conscious experiences it gives to it's possessor. Sstrange loops won't help to explain the perception of the I. If you consider the I to be the body the brain is in, a certain level of self representation is needed to be aware of the I. If you consider the brain as part of the I and materialisticly only, which it undetachable is, but only insofar the inside of matter is concerned, strange loops become apparent. The notion of the brain being structured dynamical material is bound to give rise to such loops, as the material brain can contain structures simulating other structures but never the structure that does the simulating. Such loops though don't have any impact on the perception of the I or consciousness.