You believe that science is in support the view that we can't know the rest of the world? — Ciceronianus

What are you referring to by "the rest of the world"?

is eruditer than Hanover, in my humble opinion. The OP is a case in point. — Banno

You're both on a leaky raft at sea.

I think my major problem with metaphysical conceptions to "organize" being, is that it contains in and of itself small determinisms that result in conceptual designs which go on forever.

For example:

"I see a concept of a red apple".

Well to illustrate the "red apple", you then need to generalize what the concept entails. An apple, being the colour red.

But then whats the concept of an apple? Well... the concept of an apple comes from the subset concept fruits and...etc.

This idea of infinite definitions doesn't make an iota of sense to me in terms of the organization of being. It feels much more closer to an intelligent over-complication. It as well describes that at the end of the tunnel, we wouldn't know exactly what a chair is, because the concepts would never end, but this is (probably) not true. We DO know exactly what a chair is.

Another aspect which I don't find clear is that perception somehow perceives this self contained complication, rather than just the simple object.

yet state of the art science supports his view. — frank

All you have done is state this.

Back it up.

I suspect you are confusing two uses of "model". One is the model that is the subject of our cognition, the other is the implementation of our cognition. The first is used by those who talk about scientific methods and such, the second is used by cognitive scientists in setting out how the brain works.

And you are tedious. Make an argument.

"I see a concept of a red apple". — john27

The regress is avoidable by recognising the error of thinking that what you see is a concept-of-apple. It isn't, it's an apple.

What are you referring to by "the rest of the world"? — frank

What are you referring to by "science"?

the second is used by cognitive scientists in setting out how the brain works. — Banno

Cognitive scientists have not yet set out how the brain works. They have theories.

I suspect you're trying to step beyond science with philosophy.

If you made an argument, you'd be deep in a form of rationalism.

What are you referring to by "the rest of the world"?
— frank

What are you referring to by "science"? — Ciceronianus

Oh dear.

Yep.

Well, I'm sure metaphysics has its place somewhere in philosophy. Maybe just not in the description of being.

he question we're addressing is the probative value of evidence, which presupposes representations of "truth" whatever that may be, and which is the subject matter of this thread. That is, when I see something, of what probative value is my having seen the thing in terms of proving the thing exits? That is, does the evidence I possess prove the thing I assert, namely that the thing is as I say it is? It seems we need to know what the thing is if we seek to establish whether my claims about it are true. — Hanover

What we do every day, every moment, in interacting with the rest of the world provides no relevant evidence regarding the nature of the rest of the world?

If you made an argument, you'd be deep in a form of rationalism. — frank

Why?

Just what I was going to write in response to your question "what do you mean by the rest of the world?"

How about this, then. What do you claim is the subject matter of science, or the sciences, or scientific inquiry? Or, say, of geology?

I'm sure metaphysics has its place somewhere in philosophy. Maybe just not in the description of being. — john27

:wink:

Indeed, theorising about being will inevitably lead to circularity. In that sense all that can be said by ontology is that there is stuff to talk about.

Cut the passive-aggressive shite and present something cogent.

If you made an argument, you'd be deep in a form of rationalism.
— frank

Why? — Banno

Because of the broadness of the metaphysics you'd be engaging. If you want to back off of that and just do philosophy of language, you have to take a much less ambitious stance.

You couldn't, for instance, poo poo indirect realism, since it's so common to speak in those terms that they are presently the terminological framework of science.

Cut the passive-aggressive shite and present something cogent. — Banno

Honestly, it seems like you're the one who's being hostile. You're misunderstanding me if you think I am.

Hmm. What is it you think rationalism is? Because it is beyond me how you might take what has been said here to imply that Tully and I have been advocating Descartes, Spinoza or Leibniz.

I just don;t think you have been paying attention.

How about this, then. What do you claim is the subject matter of science, or the sciences, or scientific inquiry? Or, say, of geology? — Ciceronianus

This is something I've thought a lot about since discovering thar neuroscience is seriously engaging representational theories.

The short answer is that they don't really deal with the philosophical side effects of adopting indirect realism.

it seems like you're the one who's being hostile. — frank

You are adopting your usual passive-aggressive stance of objecting without providing any content. Yes, it pisses me off.

So I will go back to ignoring your posts.

Hmm. What is it you think rationalism is? Because it is beyond me how you might take what has been said here to imply that Tully and I have been advocating Descartes, Spinoza or Leibniz. — Banno

I said "a form of rationalism" and even specified what I meant by that. The discussion between us can be dropped. Thanks :up:

So i will go back to ignoring your posts. — Banno

Thanks.

The discussion between us — frank

So far as I can see, there was none.

So far as I can see, there was none. — Banno

Cool. Ciceroninus got to the interesting stuff without you. :blush:

One is a plane. the other is something like an interaction between you and the plane. — Banno

This means: we have 2 things: (1) planes and (2) perceptions of planes.

(1) is the plane.
(2) is the plane + my interaction with it.

Am I right so far?

If the plane is the object and the perception is the object + my interaction with it, and I only know what I perceive, and I don't know which part of my perception is the added part and which is the plane part, then I don't know what the plane is. I only know what my perception is.

The logic follows right?

The notion of a thing-in-itself. This is a nonsense. — Banno

Then why did you talk about it above? You identified it as #1. If #1 is actually the plane + my interaction with it, it's #2.

This means when we speak of planes, assuming we don't speak nonsense, we speak only of what we perceive, and we make no claim about the airplane because we don't know how closely our perception matches the airplane.

But, should we deny there is an airplane absent our perception (i.e when the tree falls in the woods where no one is there to see it, there is no tree) we are no longer realists. The noumenal anchors us in realism. That the thing in itself is unknowable doesn't mean it's meaningless or nonsense. It serves the purpose of rooting reality in the world, not just in our head.

The noumenal anchors us in realism. That the thing in itself is unknowable doesn't mean it's meaningless or nonsense. It serves the purpose of rooting reality in the world, not just in our head. — Hanover

That's how I see it too. It would be rather strange indeed if the things we saw, for some reason, looked as they do to us, absent us. That is, river and stones would like as they seem, absent us, with all the colours, textures and the like. Surely not the everyday concepts "river" and "stone" would be around though.

If we postulate things in themselves, then we can say there is something that exists absent us, which does not depend on mind.

This means: we have 2 things: (1) planes and (2) perceptions of planes. — Hanover

I think that risible. Shall we give your perception of the plane a proper name - "Fred" perhaps?

Better, surely, to think of the plane as an individual, and your seeing it as something you might do, rather than as an individual.

Am I right so far? — Hanover

No.

Better, surely, to think of the plane as an individual, and your seeing it as something you might do, rather than as an individual. — Banno

Perception is an activity, not a thing. But, this activity consists in the construction of phantom things in the mind. These phantoms look, smell, taste, feel, sound certain ways. Naive realism says that this is so because things really do look, smell, taste, feel, sound this way.

In truth, everything we actually know about things, we know indirectly, through inference. Everything we experience directly is in fact illusion, constructions of the mind. Illusion because the presentation of these experiences is as if they are of the world itself.

Perception is an activity, not a thing. But, this activity consists of the construction of phantom things in the mind. — hypericin

Sure. But here's an important thing... those "phantom things" are not what we see, taste and touch; they are what our seeing, tasting and touching, at least in part, consists in. They are not what we see, but part of our seeing; not what we touch, but part of our touching; not what we taste, but part of what you have called the activity of touching.

But here's an important thing... those "phantom things" are not what we see, taste and touch; they are what our seeing, tasting and touching, at least in part, consists in — Banno

I don't see a problem with that. It appears to be consistent with indirect realism, so inside the bounds of science. :up: