I provided an example that appears to demonstrate that one can have cause and effect without change.
You reply by just stipulating that 'effect' and 'change' mean the same. I mean, what's the point?
Again: change and 'effect' are not the same, for one can have cause and effect without any change, as Kant's example demonstrates.

And once more, even if that's false - and it isn't - it wouldn't be an answer to the question 'what is change?'

"What is cheese?" "Cheese is Fromage in French". That's not an answer to the question. What you've done is say "Cheese is Potage in French". That's is false, but even if it is was true, it would not be an answer to the question.

Question begging. — Bartricks

You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly.

And besides I did not definitively state that reality is not a sensation. That would indeed be begging the question. I said you haven’t proven it is.

You're one of those people who thinks that all valid arguments beg the question. Tedious. Learn to argue properly. — Bartricks

If I state that A resembles B. Then state that A resembles A and only A, without evidence, that must mean that I think B is A correct? That’s begging the question, when the conclusion is that B is A.

That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks

They could very well not be, which is why I don't find that argument convincing in the first place. And it doesn't seem clear to me that they have to resemble reality to be "of" reality. The binary code of this site doesn't resemble this site. Yet is very much the binary code "of" this site. Why should our sensations resemble reality to be "of" it?

What on earth are you on about? First, it is 'Berkeley' not 'Barkley' (it's pronounced Barkley, but spelt 'Berkeley'). — Bartricks

Cats and dogs? Barkley? Joke just went over your head.

Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

False. You argued that. Berkeley argued sensations resemble reality. You don't even understand your own argument....

I explained why it is a single mind. — Bartricks

No you haven't. You had terrible explanations for why you think your God is a single mind, but no explanation for why this is a single mind. You have to connect this mind with your idea of God, they're not necessarily the same.

As for the 'waht's the source of those' question - er, a mind. — Bartricks

And yes, sensations are 'of' sensations — Bartricks

I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress.

I said you haven’t proven it is. — khaled

The clarion call of the internet educated.

Why should our sensations resemble reality to be "of" it? — khaled

If the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations, then in what possible sense would our sensations be enabling us to perceive the world?

At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world.

False. You argued that. Berkeley argued sensations resemble reality. You don't even understand your own argument.... — khaled

Er, Berkeley made that argument. I am simply applying it to change. You clearly haven't read Berkeley. Or me.

You had terrible explanations for why you think your God is a single mind, but no explanation for why this is a single mind. You have to connect this mind with your idea of God, they're not necessarily the same. — khaled

I could give you any number of arguments in support of there being a single, unified reality that our sensations give us some awareness of, and it would make no difference, would it? If Bartricks makes an argument, it must be shit - yes? So why would I bother? I made one, but I am not going to bother making it again or adding others to it, when my interlocuter is so determined that I am wrong about everything. It's just boring.

when my interlocuter is so determined that I am wrong about everything. It's just boring. — Bartricks

Do you not see how this applies to both sides? I'm fine with having a less hostile and more productive conversation, but every time I try to do that you go back to ad homs as soon as you're cornered. If you want to try again sure.

A perfect example is how you choose to ignore valid critiques in favor of long winded responses to minor points. For instance, this goes unaddressed:

I didn't phrase the question right. A sensation is a sensation "of" something correct? You say my sensation is "of" another sensation. So what is this other sensation "of"? This leads to infinite regress. — khaled

If A is a sensation of B, and B is a sensation, then what is B a sensation of? If it's another sensation, that would lead to infinite regress. If it stops at one point "P is a sensation of X" and X is not a sensation, then why is A not simply a sensation of X? Why presume all the middlemen? (middleminds?)

I could give you any number of arguments in support of there being a single, unified reality that our sensations give us some awareness of, and it would make no difference, would it? — Bartricks

Correct because that's not what I'm asking you to prove. I agree there is a unified reality. I'm asking you to show this mind:

From this it follows that change itself is the sensation of a single mind. — Bartricks

Is the same one as God.

Or to show that it is a single my by some other means.

And this is another good example of your trolling. Purposeful misinterpretation. When has "single unified reality" ever been questioned in my responses? What made you think I was asking for a proof of its existence?

Berkeley argued that sensations resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

In your op:

I think so, thanks to a simple argument of George Berkeley’s. Sensations, argues Berkeley, give us insight into reality by resembling parts of it. — Bartricks

Next step: sensations can resemble sensations and nothing else. — Bartricks

Maybe Berkeley argued that sensations resembled sensations and nothing else as well, I haven't read much of his work so I wouldn't know. But since you said it without citation, I assumed it came from you.

If the external world bore no resemblance whatsoever to any of our sensations, then in what possible sense would our sensations be enabling us to perceive the world? — Bartricks

Who said anything about "enabling us to perceive" or whatever. You asked what sensations "of" the real world mean. The key word is "of"

That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, else our sensations will simply not qualify as being ‘of’ reality at all. — Bartricks

The answer: In the sense that the perceptions are caused by the external world. That makes them perceptions "of" the real world.

Just like the code of this site is "of" this site, despite bearing no resemblance to this site, because the cade causes the appearance of the site.

At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks

If the field is causing the perception of the mug and desk, then the perception of mug and desk are of the real world. That's a more productive definition.

Otherwise how DO you resolve this? This could indeed be the case. We could be living in a dream world. So requiring the perception to resemble the reality (phenomena to resemble the thing-in-itself) would lead to the conclusion that: Maybe our perceptions are of reality. There is no way to confirm from the perceptions whether or not they are of reality or of a dream world.

And resemblance seems like a terrible standard in other ways too. Mainly that it's vague. If in reality there is a red cat, but I see a blue cat, is my perception "of reality" or not? What about if I see a purple elephant? "resembles" has no clear meaning. The table and mug DO resemble the field in some ways. All 3 have a horizontal flat portion for example.

Change

1. Replacement change: From the little that I know of computer graphics, if you see a red triangle on screen and then it changes color to blue, what's actually happening is the red triangle is being erased (clear screen) and then a blue triangle is being drawn in the empty screen. In short, a new blue triangle is being swapped for the old red triangle.

2. Non-replacement change: You take a red triangle, made of metal bars, and you color it blue. The metal triangle remains same and its hue changes.

Can we actually tell the difference between replacement change and non-replacement change? Does it matter?

In simple terms, change is "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)
— Alkis Piskas
That is circular as well. For what does 'becomes different' mean if not 'changes'? — Bartricks

I don't think this is what a circular definition is.

"A circular definition is a definition that uses the term(s) being defined as a part of the definition or assumes a prior understanding of the term being defined." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_definition)

There are no common terms between "change" and "becomes different". Besides, they are of a totally different kind: One is a noun and the other is a verbal phrase.

I can now undestand why you are talking about "circles" here and "circles" there. You assume that the definition (meaning) of a word and the word itself are circular. Well, then all the definitions of words are circular!

Based on this finding and on the frequency of your usage of the word "circular", I believe that you have to re-examine / reform your description of your topic.

Put down your dictionary and start thinking.

If one wants to know what change is, it is no good just offering up some synonym for change.

Now, I offered an argument for the view than change itself is a sensation. Do you have anything to say about that case?

$\Delta \space Law$ = Everything changes.

If the $\Delta \space Law$ is true, it itself should change.

If the $\Delta \space Law$ changes, $C \space Law$ = Some things don't change.

$\Delta \space Law$ leads to a contradiction!

it is no good just offering up some synonym for change. — Bartricks

I didn't offer any synonym of "change". I described the essence of change. "Movement" just came naturally to me --without the presence of any dictionary-- as something that characterizes and is similar to change. Besides, I also mentioned two of Heraclitus great sayings that also show the nature of change.

I think I have covered the word and essence of "change" well enough for my contribution to your topic to be at least appreciated. Well, I had a good time, anyway! :smile:

what would you consider 'constant change' ?
Is it changing or is it constant?

You reply by just stipulating that 'effect' and 'change' mean the same. — Bartricks

That's not what I said, or meant. I merely pointed-out that "cause", "effect", and "change" are inextricably (logically) linked in our experience. If we notice a Change in something, we look for the Cause of that Effect. Change, or Difference, is a clue that something happened. So, curious humans instinctively want to know how or why that happened, and the answer is in the Causation. The Cause is not the Effect ; the Change is not the Cause ; and the Effect is not the Cause, but merely a sign of Causation. Cause & Effect are the "causal relata" of Change.

Change is news; it could be good or bad for us. No-change is not interesting. Change is a Transformation from before to after. "Exchange" is the Cause of that new Form. Change is not a physical thing, it's a rational inference from experience with Before and After. For humans, Difference is the essence of Meaning. No difference, no significance. Meaning is the Difference that makes a Difference to me. Even the "change" in your pocket, is implicitly the result of a Cause or Action that exchanges one form of currency (paper money) into a different form (metal money). "Change" can be a noun ( referring to an Effect) or a verb (referring to the Cause).

The original Big Bang Theory appeared to imply a Change from Nothing to Something. But people instinctively began to ask about the Cause of that existential Conversion. A Multiverse would merely beg the question ; just a never-ending series of Effects. Likewise, Inflation tries to answer the Change question, without mentioning the Ultimate Cause. That's because, a First & Final Cause would be a Creator from scratch.

Does your Acausal definition of "Change", not somehow imply a Cause/Effect relationship? Or, are you talking about transcendent Change? That's a horse of a different color. In the real world, you can't have physical or metaphorical Change (Effect) without a Cause, unless the Cause is Absential, in which case, the Cause is not apparent. :joke:

PS__I apologize for going on & on about such an academic question. But the answer to "what is change" is essential to my worldview.

The Metaphysics of Causation :
Absences: The main argument for transcendence is that absences can be involved in causal relations. Absences are said to be transcendent entities. They are nothings, non-occurrences, and hence are not in the world.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/

Power of Absence :
http://bothandblog4.enformationism.info/page17.html

However, that either doesn’t tell us what change in itself is - it just tells us when we typically recognize there to have been a change - or it is a circular and so tells us nothing. — Bartricks

I disagree, it tells us what change ontologically amounts to. So yes it does tell us what change is. Indeed there can be different properties at different times that no one recognises.
It is not circular because the term change is not included in the definition of change as having different properties at different times.

For it appeals to a change in temporal properties. When a thing goes from being present to being past, it has already changed – changed from being present to being past. — Bartricks

No it doesn’t. First of all, that definition of change makes no mention of predicates like “being present” and “being past“. Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense.

I suggest that we first detect change by way of sensation. For after all, it can seem to us that something has changed even when we cannot identify 'what' has changed. — Bartricks

This sounds like a categorical confusion between “sensations” as an ontological type (the sensation of "red" is neither true or false) with “seeming” which is an epistemological type (what seems to be red can be blue so the red-seeming can be true or false).

Typically anyway, we have the sensation of change and then notice what seems to have caused that sensation in us — Bartricks

And the cause of a sensation is a sensation? And if it’s not a sensation how do you get the idea that “sensations” are caused?

That is, there must be some resemblance between our sensations of reality and reality itself, — Bartricks

How do they resemble since reality is what is beyond sensation? On what ground one can support the idea of such resemblance, since he/she can not even verify such resemblance?

So what, then, is change in itself? — Bartricks

What is not still, changes. Thus, change is movement/motion. There is no overall Stillness, else naught would go on; therefore, something is ever changing.

It could be though that time is an illusion and the universe is one static entity, infinite in static time and space. The block universe contains non-entropic time only. Entropic time is just played out by matter inside.

Yes there is. I suspect that, like most people here, you don't know an argument from your elbow. Here is the argument:

1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks

I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. But if we find that there cannot be "a sensation" of change, and that it requires a number of sensations to perceive change, then your entire approach must be rejected.

I think that premise 1 here needs to be justified. If you can explain how change can be sensed by one sensation, rather than needing a number of sensations to be perceived, then we might have a solution to your question of what is change. — Metaphysician Undercover

We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases.

Possibilities are not good evidence. Note as well that I have argued that change and time are not equivalent, for any attempt to provide an analysis of change in terms of time would simply be circular (for a change in temporal properties is still a change). Furthermore, this thread is not about what exists, but about what change is. Whether change is real or not is a matter that must wait upon the correct analysis of change. To start out by assuming change is an illusion, is to have started out thinking one knows already what change is and then insisting that there is none. It is, then, to say the least, premature.

What is not still, changes. Thus, change is movement/motion. There is no overall Stillness, else naught would go on; therefore, something is ever changing. — PoeticUniverse

None of that follows. I provided an answer to the question I posed in the OP. Whether is works or not is the matter under discussion.

I disagree, it tells us what change ontologically amounts to. — neomac

What on earth does that mean? What work is the word 'ontologically' doing?

I explained why it is circular. If you say 'change is when an object has a property at one time that it doesn't have at anotehr' then you have appealed to another change - a change in temporal properties - in your analysis of change. So it is circular. It is really no different to saying "bread is a substance made of bread" when the question is "what is bread?"

No it doesn’t. First of all, that definition of change makes no mention of predicates like “being present” and “being past“. — neomac

What? If an object goes from being present to being past, it has changed, has it not? Changed from being present, to being past. So it is no analysis of change to say "an object has changed when it has a property at one time that it does not have at another", for that's no more or less than to say that an object has changed in one respect when it has changed in another - true, but not an analysis of change.

Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense. — neomac

Yes they are, and that would be irrelevant anyway, for you'd still be appealing to a change in your analysis of change.

A substantial answer to the question "what is change" must not make any mention of change or a synonym for change, otherwise it will be circular.

That's not necessarily a fault, incidentally - if we find we cannot analyze change without making mention of change or one of its cognates, then we have discovered that change is change and not another thing.
The point, though, is that my sensational analysis does not make mention of change and thus is substantial.

This sounds like a categorical confusion between “sensations” as an ontological type (the sensation of "red" is neither true or false) with “seeming” which is an epistemological type (what seems to be red can be blue so the red-seeming can be true or false). — neomac

You keep putting in extra words. What's a 'categorical' confusion as opposed to just a confusion?
Anyway, what you're doing is throwing mud at a wall and hoping some of it sticks. I have not said that sensations can be true or false, so why on earth do you think I am confused about the nature of sensations?

There are different sorts of sensation, and some of them are 'of' reality and thus are capable of being accurate or inaccurate. That's not true of all of them. A sensation of pain cannot be accurate or inaccurate. However, the impression that one is in pain can be. And similarly, my visual impression that there is a mug on my desk can be accurate or inaccurate.

The impression of change is like this - that is, it is capable of being accurate or inaccurate. It is accurate if there has been actual change, and not if not.

The point, though, is that the accuracy condition of a sensation is going to be another sensation. And thus, if change is something we have a sensation of, then change itself is a sensation.

Change is difference. "Keep the change". Becoming different. What is becoming? Turning different. What is different? The other. Change is relational.The play between. The transcendence. The evolving to new states in spacetime. Evolution. Propagation. Interaction. Increasing distances. What is increasing? Is it change? If the increase is not static, yes. Change is the derivative. Differentiating. The opposite of integrating, eliminating all changes into a whole. The second derivative is zero if there is no change in direction. Differentials are changes of variables. Infinitesimals. The mathematical symbol is the delta. The difference, again. Mathematically the change is a function. Differential equations describe changes of state. With boundary conditions. Change is irreversible. That is, it needs irreversibility as a background (not the same as time). Time is just an irreversible aspect of collections of particles. Without change, no progress. Progress is change. Different theories of change all contain an element of differences and their interplay. Differences don't exist on their own. They aquire identity because of each other.

If A is a sensation of B, and B is a sensation, then what is B a sensation of? If it's another sensation, that would lead to infinite regress. If it stops at one point "P is a sensation of X" and X is not a sensation, then why is A not simply a sensation of X? Why presume all the middlemen? (middleminds?) — khaled

I have not claimed that all sensations are 'of' things (indeed, the word 'of' is ambiguous anyway). Sensations - some of them - tell us about reality by resembling it. That is not a full account of how perception works - but it is, I think, an essential element of any plausible account of how it works and it is the only element that I need. For if that is correct, then change is a sensation.

That does not imply an infinite regress, for sensations do not 'essentially' tell us anything. It is our reason that tells us that our sensations (some of them - I am not going to keep putting in this qualification hereafter) are resembling an actual world. And as sensations can only resemble other sensations, then the reality they are resembling is itself a world of sensations. Those sensations - the one constitutive of reality - are not resembling anything.

Take a conscious act of imagination: when you imagine something (and are aware you're imagining it), the sensations constitutive of your imagining are not 'representing' anything to be the case. That is, one does not take them to be resembling something. They are not necessarily accurate (I say not necessarily, for one may be trying to imagine something real - in that case they could be judged for accuracy - but this is not a case in which one is trying to imagine something real, one is just engaging in pure imaginative activity). They just are what they are: sensations constitutive of an act of imagination.

If someone else's sensations were somehow tracking my imaginative activity, then that person's sensations could tell them about my imaginary world by means of resemblance. Their sensations would be 'of' my imaginative activity - and so be 'of' a subset of my sensations - but there would be no regress, for my sensations are not themselves 'telling me' about anything. Their sensations are 'of' mine, whereas mine are of nothing (by which I mean that mine are not 'of' other sensations - they are not doing representing work).

As already explained, movement makes reference to change. So to reduce change to movement is to go in a circle.

It is our reason that tells us that our sensations (some of them - I am not going to keep putting in this qualification hereafter) are resembling an actual world. — Bartricks

Sensations - some of them - tell us about reality by resembling it. — Bartricks

How did you come to this conclusion? How do you know this:

At the moment there appears - visually - to be a blue mug on my desk. If there is no desk or mug there in reality and I am actually stood in a field, then I am not seeing the field by means of the visual appearance of the mug and desk, for there is barely any resemblance between the field that is actually there and the mug and desk I am getting the impression of. A fortiori, if there was no resemblance at all between my sensations and the external world, I would not be perceiving the world at all but living in a dream world. — Bartricks

is not the case? Because it seems to me that defining sensations to be "of reality" iff they resemble something leads to us not knowing if our sensations are "of reality" or of some dream world. Just like how you can't be sure from the contents of a painting whether or not it represents a real landscape or something the author imagined.

I have not claimed that all sensations are 'of' things (indeed, the word 'of' is ambiguous anyway). — Bartricks

I took it as part of the definition. I wouldn't use the word "sensation" without it being of something. "Sensation of heat", "Sensation of cold" etc. I have never seen "sensation" used in vacuum without it being a sensation OF something, have you? I can't think of a sentence that uses "sensation" without it being a sensation of something.

I wouldn't call imagination a sensation for instance. The confusion may be due to us not using "sensation" in the same way.

As already explained, movement makes reference to change. So to reduce change to movement is to go in a circle. — Bartricks

The definition of change that I gave was: "An act or process through which something becomes different" (Oxford LEXICO)
There's no "movement" in it. Read well what other people write.

You are obsessed with "circles"! You see "circles" everywhere! Everything for you is a "circle".

OK, that's it for me.

We can get the impression a change has occurred, without being able to identify what, if anything, has changed. Thus there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change. For this would not be possible if, rather than having a sensation of change, we had instead to infer change from some kind of comparison between cases. — Bartricks

This really does not address the issue. Your claim that you can sense change through a single sensation without the requirement of comparing a number of sensations, is not justified by your assertion "that there seems to be a feeling or sensation of change".

Try looking at it this way. When we sense something, we can describe the feeling, as "a sensation", by distinguishing it from other sensations within the same category of type of sensation. So for example, in the category of taste, sweet can be distinguished from sour, in the category of hearing, loud from quiet, hard from soft in tactile sensation, red from green in vision, etc.. All these descriptions require a comparison

Now, what category of sensation would you put "change" into, such that we can consider it to be a type of sensation which can be apprehended and described without comparison to another sensation?

@Bartricks

> What on earth does that mean? What work is the word 'ontologically' doing?

The question “what is change?” may mean that one want to know under what ontological categories/terms change can be understood: e.g. men are substances, colours are properties, wars are events, number are abstract entities etc.
The notion of “change” you are clumsily referring to is a known as “Cambridge or russellian change”, within the analytic philosophical tradition. According to Russell there is no intrinsic state of change, but simply possessing different properties at different times. Since you are clumsily reporting it as if the term “change” was included in the definition to make it look circular, you think that the definition of russellian change is circular, which is not.



What? If an object goes from being present to being past, it has changed, has it not? Changed from being present, to being past.

It seems you are unfamiliar with the philosophical debate about the subject you are talking about. Russellian change can not be understood as a transition from being present to being past. Being present and being pas are predicates which may or may nor indicate properties in a strict ontological sense. Some believe that being present and being past can be reduced to predicates which do not refer to present nor past. In any case russellian change can be understood without reference to such predicates.



> Secondly, “being present” and “being past” may not be properties in strict sense. — neomacYes they are

Again, you seem unfamiliar with the ontological terminology. Properties in ontology are technical terms, and may presuppose a more or less strict usage. E.g. existence is not a property according to some, while it is a first order property to some others, or a second order property for some others. So one can claim that also predicates like “being present” and “being past”, as “being possible” and “being necessary” are not properties as much as existence is not a property. This needs to be argued of course. My point is simplu that yours is just a debatable assumption in ontology.


> You keep putting in extra words. What's a 'categorical' confusion as opposed to just a confusion?

"Categorical confusion" specifies the scope of your confusing as much as terminological confusion specifies that you are confusing terms and mnemonic confusion specifies that you are confusing memories. In this case you are confusing ontological with epistemological categories. “Sensation” as an ontological category is neither true nor false: red is a sensation, and as such it is neither true nor false. While if we take “red” in terms of what information it delivers of the world it may refer to, therefore - as a perceptual belief - then it can be true or false.



> There are different sorts of sensation, and some of them are 'of' reality and thus are capable of being accurate or inaccurate. That's not true of all of them. A sensation of pain cannot be accurate or inaccurate. However, the impression that one is in pain can be. And similarly, my visual impression that there is a mug on my desk can be accurate or inaccurate.

You believe that there are 2 types of sensations: sensations “of” reality and sensations which are not “of” anything. FYI, this does not correspond to the empiricist view where sensations do not refer. In philosophy “reference” recalls the debate over “intentionality”, and sensations are usually understood as devoid of intentionality . I’m claiming that such a distinction is a confusion. One and the same type of sensation can be understood in ontological terms or epistemological terms. In ontological terms, sensations do not “refer to“ , they are not “of” something. However if you understand them in epistemological terms, they can deliver information of something else, like a red sensation can accurately or inaccurately deliver information about the skin color of an apple. Also the sensation of “pain” can deliver information about our body and this information can be inaccurate (e.g. phantom limb pain). Aristotle, Hume, and Kant have different ideas about how sensations can deliver information about the world. None of them believes that sensations as such deliver such information. The intuitive reasons why one may want to not assume that there are sensations that refer to something as such are the following: 1. the same sensation can deliver information about 2 different objects: the external world and us (e.g. sensation of heat on our skin delivers information on the source of heat and our body part), and two completely different sensations can deliver information about one and the same object (e.g. we recognize the circular shape of an object by tactile and visual sensations ) 2. An accurate assessment about a sensation doesn’t depend on the accurate assessment about the sensation is referring to (e.g. I can see something red without understanding what is red).
The additional trouble with the notion of “sensation of change” is that sensations are actual: at time t1 you have a sensation of heat, and at time t2 you have a sensation of cold, now when would the sensation of change supposedly happen? If you say at t1, then t2 didn’t occur yet, so there was no change. While if you say at t2, then t1 doesn’t exist anymore so how can you detect the change?


> The point, though, is that the accuracy condition of a sensation is going to be another sensation. And thus, if change is something we have a sensation of, then change itself is a sensation.

As someone said: “it is an egregious mistake to confuse one's detection of something with the thing itself” so having an impression that something has changed may be understood as detection mechanism for establishing what is true, but truth conditions do not need to be understood as sensations (e.g. statements about the existence of aliens in the outer space can be true or false independently if we can ever prove it or not by direct or indirect observation, and related sensations). And “having an impression that something has changed” doesn’t necessarily amounts to “having a sensation of change” but it may simply express a weakly belief that change was detected even in the absence of any specific “sensation of change”.

Change can be defined by pointing at processes. By pointing at different parts of the process and comparing them. If the parts are the same, then no change has occured. Processes are defined to evolve in time. Time is connected with a cyclic process. It is the number times the cyclic process has repeated. Now this might sound circular. How can you define time on a base that needs time in the first place? If a process is defined as a situation evolving in time, how can we use a process in the definition of time?

The answer lies in irreversable and reversable processes. A reversable process is used in the definition to quantify the irreversable processes (or another reversible process). A pendulum is a cyclic reversible process (in the ideal case) and time is defined as the number of times (how appropriate!) the process has shown the same face. This definition of time is not applicable in defining the reversible process itself. You could
compare a reversable process with another reversible process, but what's the use? A sinusoidal, reversible process can be a function of time but that time is again based on another reversible periodic process.

There are few truly reversible processes. The reversable process time refers to is that of an ideal clock and a realization is difficult, if not impossible. Of course there are 60 billion watches with a strap to sell, and an atomic clock is kept in isolation to compare all other clocks to, but an ideal clock is impossible to construct and will always stay an idea. A real clock will always show failure of a constant period, no matter how closely approximated.

It's this ideal clock that serves as the background of theoretical processes, when theoretically described and which are measured by a theoretical observer. Like the distances this theoretical observer measures refer to an ideal unit of distance which can only be approximated in the real world, like a standarized meter kept at constant temperature or a defined as the distance that light travels in a standarized amount of time (which shows the connection between space and time), which only shows that the meter is not an exact realization of the ideal, since the clock that measures the time needed can never be ideal or reversible.

So for change we need different situations which are part of an irreversible process. The parts of a reversible process that repeat themselves are used to compare two situations that are separated in time. Reversible processes induces the notion of time. They exhibit the reversible cyclic behavior relative to which the evolution of irreversible processes (or other reversible processes) is measured.

Irreversible processes are the key to change. They induce the notion of reversible processes, which induce the notion of time to measure the rate with which parts of irreversible processes become different or indicate if processes are reversible. Now you might ask if parts becoming different doesn't beg the question. I think it's clear though. If you define becoming as distances between particles varying, there is no circularity.


If you reverse time, which is the same as reversing all momenta of all particles, the clock will just reverse it cyclic motion, and no difference with the forward clock will be seen, as the clock is based on a reversible cyclic motion. The numbers the clock is attached to though, will be decreasing instead of increasing (it always amazes me why the counting before a rocket's ignition is backwards, though time zero, as well as ground zero, are regarded special; as if it all starts with the ignition of the rocket). This is the solution to the question why time is not reversible. If you reverse time the numbers decrease, counting back to time zero. This implies though that there is a beginning at infinity, which is an impossibility. On top of that the boundary conditions would have to be finely tuned with infinite precision, but since infinity has no boundary, this can't be realized. Locally we can reverse time, but globally this is impossible.

If space, time, and charge are reversed, then according to the TPC theorem in physics, processes look the same, a strong indication that a mirror universe must be there.Around t=0 there obviously was no clock present. But we can look at that state as a clock going forward and backward around time zero.

To experience change we must have a memory of past parts of processes. You compare the perceived situation with a memorized one and change will appear naturally. Of course you can have a change of heart and think that no fundamental change has appeared, which can diverge you to different conceptions of change. Is there a change in general? A change that is valid for everyone? No, there isn't. One man's change is the other's static.

I don't see your point. You asked what evidence I have for a sensation of change. I provided some. I can have the impression there has been a change, even though I cannot say what has changed.

It is also not a belief, for I might not believe anything has changed.

So, there is a sensation of change. There is also a sensation of stability. That is, it can seem that nothing has changed (even when things have).

1. There is a sensation of change
2. A sensation can only resemble another sensation (and so if a sensation is 'of' something, then what it is of is itself a sensation)
3. Therefore, change is a sensation. — Bartricks

1. We can sense change, so there is a sensation of change.
2. Appears to be several English phrases arranged.
3. Change can be sensed; it doesn't follow that change is the mere sensing of an event.

Take an explosion. I can sense an explosion. Does it follow that only the "sense" of the explosion is what has transpired? Probably, not. I'd imagine there's plenty of empirical evidence corroborating the sensed event occured.