Realism and an Ideal Theory

Marchesk

An ideal theory is one which meets all observational data and satisfies every theoretical constraint. A realist is said to be committed to the possibility that an ideal theory about the world could be entirely* wrong. This is because the world is supposed to be mind-independent for the realist, while theories are constructed by minds. Therefore, an ideal theory could still be false.

This is seen as an important criticism from anti-realists. If the world could be totally* different from a theory supported by all observation and theory, then what reason would there to maintain that there is such a world? It would be something utterly beyond our ability to know about it, even with a perfect theory.

The out for realists here is to reject the notion that an ideal theory could be fundamentally* wrong. This is because there need not be an isomorphic relationship between reality and the mind. Even though realists maintain that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes and linguistic practices, that does not necessitate that the mind is likewise independent of the world. Rather, it's most likely the case that the mind is fundamentally dependent on the world such that an ideal theory cannot be totally* wrong.

* It is still possible for an ideal theory to get some things wrong because those things don't appear to us nor show up in our models. We could have an ideal but incomplete picture of the world. The important point is that it could not be completely untrue, which would present problems for realism (how can one know about an unknowable reality?).

The crucial point is that mind is dependent on reality for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by reality.

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↪Marchesk

I think you're a little confused on the Realism vs Anti-Realism debate.

A Realist believes that it is possible, even if it is difficult, to obtain true depictions of reality.

The Anti-Realist argues that we are hidden behind a veil, which at the very least is held up by the apparent transcendentalism of reality, i.e. if it is impossible to access reality, then it is impossible to verify that what we have constructed is true.

Michael

↪darthbarracuda

You have it the wrong way round. Realism argues for verification-transcendent truths and anti-realism for verification-immanent truths. Check out Dummett's Realism.

The crucial point is that mind is dependent on reality for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by reality. — Marchesk

The same is true for the anti-realist. Anti-realism is not un-realism. An "ideal theory" is still constrained by reality; it's just that reality doesn't transcend the empirical.

Marchesk

↪Michael

What is the point in using the word "reality" in a metaphysical debate on realism to describe a position which is opposed to realism?

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↪Michael

Gotcha, my mistake.

Marchesk

A Realist believes that it is possible, even if it is difficult, to obtain true depictions of reality. — darthbarracuda

I think the fundamental position of a metaphysical realist is the existence of a mind-independent world, regardless of whether we can truly depict or not. That's what makes someone a realist. Given the OP, I would agree that it's necessarily possible to obtain a true depiction of reality, at least in part, since the mind is grounded by reality, but mind-independence of that world is what is key to the metaphysical position itself.

Michael

↪Marchesk

Because there's still a reality even if anti-realism is the case. The anti-realist doesn't deny that things are real; he just disagrees with the realist over what it means to be real.

Marchesk

↪Michael

But the anti-realist is denying that things are real, in the metaphysical or ontological sense, thus it's confusing to use that language. Ant-realists aren't realists, obvously, therefore they don't get to use the word "reality" for their position in a debate over metaphysical realism.

It would be the same if someone said that dreams were real and claimed the right to use dreamland as reality in a debate over realism.

Michael

But the anti-realist is denying that things are real, in the metaphysical or ontological sense, thus it's confusing to use that language. — Marchesk

No they're not. They're denying the realist's account of what it means to be real. Anti-realism is not un-realism. The argument is over the mind-independence/objectivity/verification-transcendence of reality, not over its existence. Mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent things are nonetheless real.

Marchesk

They're denying the realist's account of what it means to be real. — Michael

They're denying that there is a real world, only the world as it appears to us. This is a philosophical discussion, and as such, it's important to not misuse language.

Michael

They're denying that there is a real world, only the world as it appears to us. — Marchesk

They're saying that the world as it appears to us is the real world. They're denying that there's something else to the real world (e.g. mind-independence/objectivity/verification-transcendence).

Marchesk

Mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent things are nonetheless real. — Michael

Yeah, sure, dreams are real too, in that people do have dreams. But they're also not real, as in the things I dream about aren't part of the world. They didn't happen, except as a dream. Same with imagination. So we don't say that dreams or imagination are real. That's abusing language, even though it's true that people do imagine and dream.

Marchesk

↪Michael

They're saying that the world as it appears to us is the real world. — Michael

But that's abusing language in context of a discussion over metaphysical realism. The realist thinks the distinction between appearances and reality is important, because there is a real world beyond appearances. The anti-realist denies this.

Michael

Yeah, sure, dreams are real too, in that people do have dreams. But they're also not real, as in the things I dream about aren't part of the world. They didn't happen, except as a dream. Same with imagination. So we don't say that dreams or imagination are real. That's abusing language, even though it's true that people do imagine and dream. — Marchesk

But the anti-realist doesn't say that dream trees or imagined trees are real trees. The anti-realist says that the trees we see when awake are real, but aren't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent.

Marchesk

but aren't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent. — Michael

If they're not mind-independent, then why call them real?

Marchesk

Anti-realism is not un-realism. — Michael

It is anti-realism, which means opposed to realism. So it's really strange to want to hold on to the word "reality" in such a discussion.

Michael

If they're not mind-independent, then why call them real? — Marchesk

Because they are real.

The realist thinks the distinction between appearances and reality is important, because there is a real world beyond appearances. The anti-realist denies this.

Yes. The anti-realist says that the real world is what appears, not something else. The disagreement is over the separation of the real world and the empirical world.

It is anti-realism, which means opposed to realism. So it's really strange to want to hold on to the word "reality" in such a discussion.

To be an anti-realist is to be opposed to metaphysical realism. It's not to be opposed to the existence of reality.

Consider, the moral anti-realist doesn't say that morality isn't real; they say that morality isn't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent. Unless they're also a moral nihilist, there's nonetheless a real mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent morality.

Marchesk

Because they are real. — Michael

But they're not real, as in they're not mind-independent. Which is what real means in context of this discussion.

Yes. The anti-realist says that the real world is what appears, not something else. — Michael

If the real world is what appears, and the anti-realist isn't a naive realist, then the anti-realist is talking about appearances.

The disagreement is over the separation of the real world and the empirical world. — Michael

I'm not sure about that, since direct realists and scientific realists might disagree. The disagreement then would be over whether the empirical world is mind-independent.

To be an anti-realist is to be opposed to metaphysical realism. It's not to be opposed to the existence of reality. — Michael

But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence.

Michael

But they're not real, as in they're not mind-independent. Which is what real means in context of this discussion.

But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence. — Marchesk

"Real" doesn't mean "mind-independent". My dreams are real dreams but they're not mind-independent dreams.

If the real world is what appears, and the anti-realist isn't a naive realist, then the anti-realist is talking about appearances.

If the real world is what appears and if the anti-realist accepts that things appear then the anti-realist accepts that there's a real world.

I'm not sure about that, since direct realists and scientific realists might disagree. The disagreement then would be over whether the empirical world is mind-independent.

Sure. But regardless, the empirical world is the real world.

Marchesk

"Real" doesn't mean "mind-independent". My dreams are real dreams but they're not mind-independent dreams. — Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, realists mean mind-independence when talking about reality. Anti-realists mean something different if/when they wish to use the word "reality". Of course realists don't deny that dreams happen, but dreams have no ontological status independent of minds, and that's what matters for being real, to a realist.

The anti-realist position is that what appears to us when we're awake has the same ontological status of dreams, in that it's mind-dependent. The realist disagrees. So using the word "reality" for both is to employ different meanings.

Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, realists mean mind-independence when talking about reality. Anti-realists mean something different if/when they wish to use the word "reality". — Marchesk

If the realist wants "real" to mean "mind-independent" then he can. But that doesn't require the anti-realist to adopt this terminology. The anti-realist can continue to use "real" as one ordinarily does; to describe the things we see every day when awake.

Marchesk

The anti-realist can continue to use "real" as one ordinarily does; to describe the things we see everyday when awake. — Michael

And the discussion can become a never ending argument over what is meant by "real".

Michael

And the discussion can become a never ending argument over what is meant by "real". — Marchesk

Well, yes. That's the disagreement; over what it means for a tree to be real.

But let's go back to the first thing I quoted of you and replace the word "real" with "mind-independent", as that's what you claim to mean:

"The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."

Yes, that seems like an accurate description of realism.

Marchesk

Well, yes. That's the disagreement; over what it means for a tree to be real. — Michael

No, that's not the disagreement! The disagreement is over whether the tree can be mind-independent, and if so, if realists we warranted in maintaining such a position.

It's a metaphysical dispute, not a semantic one, although it seems to turn into a semantic one on these forums. And the reason is because someone wants to use the other side's terminology, but with different meaning, and then a big argument ensues over who has the right to use the terminology. Which completely derails the metaphysical dispute.

Michael

And the reason is because someone wants to use the other side's terminology, but with different meaning, and then a big argument ensues over who which side has the right to use the terminology.

The realist doesn't have ownership over the word "real". "Reality" isn't realist terminology. It's English terminology.

Marchesk

The realist doesn't have ownership over the word "real". "Reality" isn't realist terminology. It's English terminology. — Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, the realist does get ownership over the word "real', because they are espousing realism.

Even if they don't, it's not the anti-realists job to tell the realist that they can't employ "real" the way they do to put forth their position, which is what you did in your initial response to the OP. I was putting forth a realist rebuttal to criticism of realism by virtue of an ideal argument being potentially false, and you criticized my use of the word "reality".

Michael

But in context of metaphysical realism, the realist does get ownership over the word "real', because they are espousing realism. — Marchesk

"Realism" and "real" mean different things. The realist is free to tell us what "realism" means but not what "real " means. You might as well say that Ayn Rand can tell us what "objective" means because she argues for Objectivism.

Marchesk

"Realism" and "real" mean different things. The realist is free to tell us what "realism" means but not what "real " means. — Michael

The realist is certainly free to use "reality" to mean mind-independence, or verification transcendence, or whatever to mean that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes, and linguistic practices. The anti-realist might not wish to use the word "real" that way, but that's what the realist means, so it's bordering on absurd to argue over what the realist means when employing use of the word "reality".

Michael

The realist is certainly free to use "reality" to mean mind-independence, or verification transcendence, or whatever to mean that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes, linguistic practices. — Marchesk

As I said, you're free to use "reality" that way. But the anti-realist is free to use it another way because the realist doesn't have exclusive rights to how the words "real" and "reality" are used. Which is why, as I said in my first post, the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality.

The anti-realist might not wish to use the word "real" that way, but that's what the realist means, so it's bordering on absurd to argue over what the realist means when employing use of the word "reality".

I wasn't arguing over what the realist means when using the word "reality". What I said was that the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality.

The implication of what I said, then, is that your statement is ambiguous, and so you need to be more explicit with what you mean. I offered an explicit interpretation of your statement: "The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."

Marchesk

What I said was that the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality. — Michael

Okay fine, but that doesn't mean the same thing. Anyway, I was responding to one critique of realism, which is that and ideal theory could still be false for realists. And that's problematic.

Marchesk

"The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."

Yes, that seems like an accurate description of realism. — Michael

Right, but it's important because it means that our thoughts about the world can't be entirely different from the world, on a realist account. Which means that the world can't be entirely different, but not because it's mind-dependent, rather the opposite.

Realism and an Ideal Theory

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