If you say "It is raining", i cannot interpret you as saying anything other than " Michael believes it is raining". — sime

You're talking about speech acts, not propositions. If we were simply interpreting speech acts then consider this dialogue:

Michael: "It's raining."
Andrew: "You're wrong."

We could interpret this as:

Michael: "I believe that it's raining."
Andrew: "I believe that it's not raining."

Which somewhat makes sense. However, the proposition "you're wrong" doesn't mean "I believe that it's not raining." We can use the proposition "you're wrong" in many different situations, including ones that have nothing to do with the rain. I'm concerned with the meaning of the proposition "you're wrong", not how to interpret it as a speech act in a specific situation like we've done above.

And when we just consider the meaning of the propositions, "it is raining" is a claim about the weather and is true if it is raining, whereas "Michael believes that it is raining" is a claim about my belief and is true if I believe as such. They are not the same thing. And "you're wrong" is a claim about the truth of something the other person has said, and is true if the other person asserted a falsehood.

If I believe that it's raining then I can't be wrong when I say "I believe that it's raining," but I can be wrong when I say "it's raining."

I'm concerned with the meaning of the proposition "you're wrong", not how to interpret it as a speech act in a specific situation like we've done above. — Michael

If you understand my point of view, then we might be talking apples and oranges with you playing the game of arguing within accepted philosophical convention and me under-mining it, but assuming we disagree i'll continue.

What I am questioning is the very existence of inter-subjective semantics for propositions, which in turn leads to questioning the distinction between ethical misconduct and epistemic errors. The notion of inter-subjective meaning is dubious at best, and rigor is improved by conditionalizing every utterance, including so-called propositions, with respect to the causes of the speaker's utterances including causes that are external to the speaker's mind or brain.

For instance, consider the published results of a scientific experiment. If the details of the experiment aren't reported, then the results cannot be interpreted and are gibberish. Why should utterances divorced from their speakers be treated differently? How can we arrive at the idea of an inter-subjectively meaningful and speaker-independent proposition? And if we can't, then why should we attribute epistemic errors to anyone, even in the case of ourselves?

Language is a social convention for coordinating human activity, and achieves this by correcting people who fail to speak in a socially accepted fashion. But how do we leap from the observation that a speaker has spoken the unethical utterance "The Earth is Flat", to the conclusion that the speaker has made an epistemic error? This isn't justified on any causal analysis of psycho-linguistics, unless "epistemic errors" are trivially defined by convention to refer to the unethical utterances concerned.

If you have justification that X is true, and if X is true, then you have ascertained that X is true. — Michael

So what I mean when I say 'I know x' is 'I believe x', 'I have justification for believing x' and 'x is an independent fact'?

What I mean when I say 'I believe x' is quite clear. What I mean when I say ' I have justification for believing x' is relatively clear.

What do I additionally mean by adding 'x is an independent fact'. That meaning is already covered by 'I believe x' and 'I have justification for believing x'.

If Jack said to you 'I believe x and I have good justification for believing x', then John said ''I believe x and I have good justification for believing x, and x is true', what is John communicating that Jack isn't?

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X". This is similar to the mistake that @sime made above regarding "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" – even if asserting the former implies an assertion of the latter, as propositions they mean different things.

That belief and knowledge are different is obvious when we consider it in the third-person: "John believes that Donald Trump won the 2020 election" is not equivalent to "John knows that Donald Trump won the 2020 election." John can believe that Donald Trump won even if he didn't, but he can't know that Donald Trump won if he didn't.

So perhaps this issue is best discussed in the third-person. According to the JTB definition of knowledge, John knows that X iff:

1) John believes that X is true,
2) John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3) X is true

It is important to understand (contrary to @sime's claim above), that we don't interpret this as:

1) John believes that X is true,
2) John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3) I believe that X is true/John believes that X is true

The third condition isn't that I believe that X is true, or even that John believes that X is true (that would be the first condition); it's just that X is true. An independent fact must obtain for us to have knowledge.

The next issue is that you seem to think that knowledge of X depends on first knowing that the third condition is satisfied, but that is not the case. Rather, knowledge of the third condition is entailed by the three conditions being satisfied (indeed; that's exactly the JTB definition).

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X" — Michael

If propositions are not speech acts, then where are they used? Do we mime them? Communicate them through the means of interpretive dance?

It is important to understand (contrary to sime's claim above), that we don't interpret this as:

1) John believes that X is true,
2) John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3) I believe that X is true/John believes that X is true — Michael

How do we not (apart from just never using the expression "John knows that X is true"). The only distinction between me saying "John believes x is true (but it isn't)" and "John knows x is true" is my belief about whether x is true.

you seem to think that knowledge of X depends on first knowing that the third condition is satisfied, but that is not the case. Rather, knowledge of the third condition is entailed by the three conditions being satisfied (indeed; that's exactly the JTB definition). — Michael

Then the entire human race is misusing the word 'knowledge' (as they're using it in cases where they merely believe x is true)...or...your definition is wrong. Which is more parsimonious an explanation?

If propositions are not speech acts, then where are they used? Do we mime them? Communicate them through the means of interpretive dance? — Isaac

You're completely missing the point.

Given the proposition "I believe that it is raining", what does the part in bold mean? It doesn't mean the same thing as the entire quoted proposition; "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean "I believe that I believe that it is raining."

The proposition "it is raining" is a proposition about the weather, and is true iff it is raining. The proposition "I believe that it is raining" is a proposition about my belief, and can be true even if it is not raining. And this is true even if the act of asserting "it is raining" implies that the speaker believes that it is raining.

This is what I mean when I say that speech acts are not the same as propositions.

How do we not (apart from just never using the expression "John knows that X is true"). The only distinction between me saying "John believes x is true (but it isn't)" and "John knows x is true" is my belief about whether x is true.

Then the entire human race is misusing the word 'knowledge' (as they're using it in case where they merely believe x is true)...or...your definition is wrong. Which is more parsimonious an explanation? — Isaac

I might say "John knows X" if I believe that X is true, but I wouldn't say "John knows X if I believe that X is true."

You're conflating the meaning of a proposition with one's reason for uttering it.

Given the proposition "I believe that it is raining", what does the part in bold mean? It doesn't mean the same thing as the entire quoted proposition; "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean "I believe that I believe that it is raining." — Michael

I think it does. I'm deflationary about truth. "It's raining" and "I believe it's raining" are just two ways of saying the same thing. In many contexts, the former might indicate a higher level of certainty.

The proposition "I believe that it is raining" is a proposition about my belief — Michael

So the conversation...

"Will I need an umbrella?",
"Yes, I believe it's raining".

...makes no sense to you? What does my belief have to do with whether you'll need an umbrella? What's relevant is that my belief is a belief about the world, the same world you inhabit, the one in which you'll need an umbrella if it's raining.

If I say "I believe it's raining" I'm not talking about my mind, I'm talking about the rain, but I'm willing to accept that there could be some niche contexts in which I might be talking about my mind. I don't see how that explains a supposed distinction between proportions and speech acts. They're just two different contexts in which "I believe it's raining" mean two slightly different things. they're still both speech acts.

I wouldn't say "John knows X if I believe that X is true." — Michael

Nor would I say "John knows X if X is true.". Both are just weird things to say.

As a simpler example:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

You want to interpret this as the claim that John is a bachelor iff:

1) I believe that John is a man, and
2) I believe that John is unmarried

The fact that I would only assert that John is a bachelor if I believe that he is an unmarried man doesn't mean that my belief has anything to do with whether or not John is a bachelor. Him being a bachelor has nothing to do with what I believe. And him knowing that it is raining has nothing to do with what I believe, for the exact same reason.

You want to interpret this as the claim that John is a bachelor iff:

1) I believe that John is a man, and
2) I believe that John is unmarried
— Michael

Not quite. I'd interpret the claim as...

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried

It's just about the correct use of the term 'Bachelor'

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried

It's just about the correct use of the term 'Bachelor' — Isaac

And that's categorically false. John might be a woman dressed as a man and lying about her marital status. The fact that the language community generally believe that John is a man and unmarried doesn't entail that John is, in fact, a bachelor.

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. There's no God of languages checking the 'truly' correct use.

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X". This is similar to the mistake that sime made above regarding "it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" – even if asserting the former implies an assertion of the latter, as propositions they mean different things.

That belief and knowledge are different is obvious when we consider it in the third-person: "John believes that Donald Trump won the 2020 election" is not equivalent to "John knows that Donald Trump won the 2020 election." John can believe that Donald Trump won even if he didn't, but he can't know that Donald Trump won if he didn't. — Michael

As we are both not john, we can both agree that John's beliefs doesn't equal the truth, but that doesn't give John the epistemic warrant to know that fact, because it lies outside of John's cognitive closure.

At most, John can parrot the sentence without any understanding of what reality is like outside of John's beliefs.

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. There's no God of languages checking the 'truly' correct use. — Isaac

Whether or not your use is felicitous does not depend on what you believe. You might only assert that someone is a bachelor if you believe that they are a bachelor, but you can mistake a woman for a man or incorrectly believe that they are unmarried. Your belief that John is a bachelor has no bearing on whether or not John is a bachelor. You can be wrong. John being a bachelor and you believing that John is a bachelor are two very different things, with very different truth conditions.

And you might only assert that it is raining if you believe that it is raining, but your belief that it is raining has no bearing on whether or not it is raining. You can be wrong. It raining and you believing that it is raining are two very different things, with very different truth conditions.

As we are both not john, we can both agree that John's beliefs doesn't equal the truth, but that doesn't give John the epistemic warrant to know that fact, because it lies outside of John's cognitive closure.

At most, John can parrot the sentence without any understanding of what reality is like outside of the John's beliefs. — sime

When I'm out in the rain getting wet, I certainly have an understanding of what reality is like outside my belief that it is raining; I have the actual, physical experience of the rain making me wet. The fact that it's raining coupled with the physical experience of the rain making me wet grants me the epistemic warrant to know that it's raining.

When I'm out in the rain getting wet, I certainly have an understanding of what reality is like outside my belief that it is raining; I have the actual, physical experience of the rain making me wet. The fact that it's raining coupled with the physical experience of the rain making me wet grants me the epistemic warrant to know that it's raining. — Michael

Suppose i assert "I know that it's raining because I am experiencing rain and that this fact coheres with everything else that i know". But suppose that unknown to me, the mods of this forum had drugged me into experiencing an hallucination, in such a fashion that I would never become aware of this fact at a later date.

In this situation, should a moderator judge my belief to be wrong, given that i am employing the word "know" in the same sense in which i always employ it?

In this situation, should a moderator judge my belief to be wrong, given that i am employing the word "know" in the same sense in which i always employ it? — sime

Yes, your belief is wrong because it isn’t raining.

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. — Isaac

Felicity here seems to be a matter of the spell you have cast, by speaking the word ‘bachelor’, coming off.

Yes, your belief is wrong because it isn’t raining. — Michael

But is my belief wrong from my perspective given that my use of "to know" hasn't changed, or only wrong from the mods perspective?

It’s wrong because it is a fact that it isn’t raining. Our perspectives are irrelevant.

Whether or not your use is felicitous does not depend on what you believe. — Michael

No. It depends on what the language community around me believes.

Your belief that John is a bachelor has no bearing on whether or not John is a bachelor. You can be wrong. John being a bachelor and you believing that John is a bachelor are two very different things, with very different truth conditions. — Michael

Agreed. I don't know how you've ended up thinking I don't believe I can be wrong.

I'm talking about what the expression "I know x" means. I'm claiming that it means something like "I believe x and most people in my language community would agree with me". I'm making this claim on the basis of the fact that this is how the expression is actually used.

You seem to be arguing that there's some special meaning of "I know x" which is not determined by the way it's used, but rather determined by some other criteria, but I've yet to get clear on what those criteria are.

Felicity here seems to be a matter of the spell you have cast, by speaking the word ‘bachelor’, coming off. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, and if everyone starts using 'bachelor' of John despite his obviously being a woman and married, then it's the meaning of the word 'bachelor that will have changed, not the truth of my statement.

It’s wrong because it is a fact that it isn’t raining. Our perspectives are irrelevant. — Michael

That's where we disagree then. If someone other than myself claims to 'know' something, I can't interpret their use of the word as making transcendental claims that from my perspective is beyond their cognitive closure.

Therefore if i was observing a brain in a vat, i would understand the brain's claims to knowledge to be correct from it's perspective, in spite of the fact that from my perspective it's claims are false. And if during the course of it's life it spontaneously started to believe that it was in a vat without being informed via miraculous intervention from my world, I would understand it's belief to be delusional.

A preliminary and tentative framework: knowledge is a something about a something. I know I have five toes on my left foot (FTLF) - the knowing and the FTLF two different things. How do I know I have FTLF? My best answer is correspondence of several ideas (about toes and five and left and feet) with an experience and my subsequent judgement as to the relation of both. Thus while the FTLF are objects of perception, and taken to be as they appear to me, the knowledge itself is nothing at all in itself but what in turn I take it to be as a matter of reflection and judgment. And nowhere did JTB come into any of this - unless the entire world and everything in it subsumed under JTB.

It seems to me, then, that knowledge is a genus and JTB a species thereof. And it may be that a special feature of JTB as knowledge is that it applies more to matters of art. For example, I know I have FTLF. My auto mechanic know how to fix cars. I know my auto mechanic can fix my car. So far no JTB. On the other hand, such "knowledge" that I may have that the trainer of my horse can actually train my horse may well be built from a belief that seems true and in seeming, justified.

And following these lines, it appears that JTB knowing may be a qualified kind of knowing, but in no case any ground of knowledge itself. And not least because knowledge is performative and JTB is not, but that requires performance to verify.

No. It depends on what the language community around me believes. — Isaac

No it doesn’t. The language community around you can incorrectly believe that I am not married when in fact I am and so incorrectly believe that I am a bachelor.

So even if you and the language community assert “Michael is a bachelor” if you/they believe that I am a bachelor, it doesn’t follow that “Michael is a bachelor” means “I/we believe that Michael is a bachelor” or that your/their assertion is true.

I am a bachelor iff I am an unmarried man, irrespective of what you/they or even I believe.

I'm talking about what the expression "I know x" means. I'm claiming that it means something like "I believe x and most people in my language community would agree with me". I'm making this claim on the basis of the fact that this is how the expression is actually used. — Isaac

I’ve said that this is best understood in the third-person. “John believes X” doesn’t mean “John knows X”. And also "John knows X" doesn't mean "John and I believe X."

Yes, and if everyone starts using 'bachelor' of John despite his obviously being a woman and married, then it's the meaning of the word 'bachelor that will have changed, not the truth of my statement. — Isaac

That's not how it works. When the entire language community claimed that the Sun revolved around the Earth, they didn't mean something else by "the Sun revolved around the Earth." They meant exactly what we mean now; they were just wrong. You misunderstand the meaning-as-use interpretation of language.

Yes, and if everyone starts using 'bachelor' of John despite his obviously being a woman and married, then it's the meaning of the word 'bachelor that will have changed, not the truth of my statement. — Isaac

Re-reading this properly (I skimmed earlier), I've noticed that you've specified "despite obviously being a woman and married." Now you're changing the argument.

Your original claim was this:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried

Which is false. The language community might believe that John is an unmarried man despite the fact that John is a married woman. According to the above, John is a bachelor despite being a married woman. Obviously that's wrong. The correct definition is the one I gave:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

The language community around you can incorrectly believe that I am not married when in fact I am and so incorrectly believe that I am a bachelor. — Michael

They can indeed. My claim wasn't about their correctness. My claim was about felicitous use.

The entire claim here has nothing to do with whether I or my entire community can or cannot be wrong about things.

The claim is about what "I know x" means.

"John knows X" doesn't mean "John and I believe X." — Michael

So far you've only asserted this, not argued for it. When people say "John knows x", they mean that John believes x and that they (and their community) would agree with him. It means that because that's the set of circumstances under which it's used (mostly).

If you're arguing that it 'really' means something else you need to present some criteria by which we're judging what expressions 'really' mean. Otherwise I might just say it 'really' means that John has a hat on, and you have no ground to tell me I'm wrong.

When the entire language community claimed that the Sun revolved around the Earth, they didn't mean something else by "the Sun revolved around the Earth." They meant exactly what we mean now; they were just wrong. — Michael

See above. The example was about felicitous use, not rightness or wrongness.

The correct definition is the one I gave:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried — Michael

If the entire language community uses the term 'bachelor' of a person, but you use 'wife's, how are you going to make yourself understood? What more is there to the definition of a word than it's felicitous use?

If the entire language community uses the term 'bachelor' of a person, but you use 'wife's, how are you going to make yourself understood? What more is there to the definition of a word than it's felicitous use? — Isaac

I don't understand what you're saying here. I am simply asserting the fact that John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. Whether or not John is a bachelor has nothing to do with what anyone believes about John's sex/gender or marital status; whether or not John is a bachelor depends on what the facts are. Do you disagree? Are you going to continue to say that John, who is in fact a married woman, is a bachelor iff the language community incorrectly believes that John is an unmarried man?

What you say makes no sense. We have evidence that the world is not a disc. We have images taken from space. We have satellites that orbit. We know what the actual shape of the world is thanks to instruments which have made this possible. It was not possible in ancient times, so the earth was mistakenly thought to be a flat disc.

The truth is not dependent on our knowing it. that way lies absurdity.