There's two issues. The first is about language and refers your second question.

Are you going to continue to say that John, who is in fact a married woman, is a bachelor iff the language community incorrectly believes that John is an unmarried man? — Michael

To whom are you going to say it? In what context? Your entire language community, every single speaker believes John is a bachelor. So to whom are you going to use a sentence in which you use the term "John is a wife"?

The second is about what it means for something to be treated as being the case.

John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. Whether or not John is a bachelor has nothing to do with what anyone believes about John's sex/gender or marital status; whether or not John is a bachelor depends on what the facts are. — Michael

To say 'x is a y' is to say something about what it is to be an y (at the least that x is one of the sorts of thing a y is). But what it is to be a y is determined by the community for whom a y is a thing. A y is not a thing outside of a community for whom it is a relevant aspect of their life.

So John is not a bachelor by virtue of properties of John alone. He's a bachelor by virtue of a relationship between properties of John and the role of those properties in the community for whom 'John', 'bachelor', 'wife', 'married', and 'man' mean anything at all.

Your entire language community, every single speaker believes John is a bachelor. So to whom are you going to use a sentence in which you use the term "John is a wife"? — Isaac

The language community. They all (incorrectly) believe that John is a bachelor. I correct them to inform them that John is in fact a married woman. They thank me for correcting them. That's what Copernicus did when he corrected everyone's false claim that the Sun orbited the Earth.

To say 'x is a y' is to say something about what it is to be an y (at the least that x is one of the sorts of thing a y is). But what it is to be a y is determined by the community for whom a y is a thing. A y is not a thing outside of a community for whom it is a relevant aspect of their life.

So John is not a bachelor by virtue of properties of John alone. He's a bachelor by virtue of a relationship between properties of John and the role of those properties in the community for whom 'John', 'bachelor', 'wife', 'married', and 'man' mean anything at all. — Isaac

None of this changes the fact that John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. This is contrary to your earlier claim that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is a man and the language community believes that John is unmarried. The language community can be mistaken about John's sex/gender and marital status, just as they were once mistaken about the orbit of the Earth and the Sun, and their mistake doesn't make John a bachelor.

So a belief that's well justified is 'true'?

Then what purpose does 'true' serve in 'Justified True Belief', that is not satisfied by 'Justified Belief'? — Isaac

It depends on what you mean by "justified". If no false belief is ever really justified, even though we may think it is, then knowledge could indeed be defined as justified belief, because it would already be taken for granted that any justification must be based on the truth.

But truths are also contextual, so there are contexts in which we can know that our beliefs are justified. Like the 'it is raining' example; I know it is raining if I see the rain falling and wetting the streets, the buildings, trees, cars, people's umbrellas and so on. I am justified in believing it is raining because i see that it is raining, so I can say I know it is raining.

The 'bartender/ fake id' example brought up a salient point about justification. because of the existence of fake ids a bartender could never be epistemically, as opposed to legally, justified in believing a person is 18 on the basis of an id.

So, following from this, the Gettier cases demonstrate problems of being able to determine what constitutes justification, not a problem with the definition of knowledge as justified true belief.

So for example, in some imaginable context we could even question the justification of believing it is raining; it could be a simulation, an elaborate trick, an hallucination or whatever. This is the path to radical skepticism. We could also be skeptical as to whether there really is any truth apart from our beliefs; but even this would assume that there is a truth about whether there is any truth apart from our beliefs; so the definition, based on our common understanding of knowledge that it is JTB remains untouched, regardless of whether we think we can ever be said to know anything at all.

They all (incorrectly) believe that John is a bachelor. I correct them to inform them that John is in fact a married woman. They thank me for correcting them. — Michael

At which point it's no longer true that your entire language community believes John is a bachelor.

This is contrary to your earlier claim that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is a man and the language community believes that John is unmarried. — Michael

You asked about the interpretation of a claim and I answered...

I'd interpret the claim as...

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

As I've said, quite a few times now, I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case, only about what claims that something is the case mean, claims such as "John knows x".

At which point it's no longer true that your entire language community believes John is a bachelor. — Isaac

As I've said, quite a few times now, I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case, only about what claims that something is the case mean, claims such as "John knows x". — Isaac

But there's a problem here. Imagine Joe is part of this community and is one of the persons that have been corrected; and he was corrected today. Yesterday, Joe may very well have said, "I know John is a bachelor". You're paying heed to the fact that today, John changes his mind; he will now say: "I know John is not a bachelor". But what you're missing is that today, Joe will not say: "I knew John was a bachelor yesterday, but I was wrong", because that statement is a contradiction. The reason that statement is a contradiction is because Joe recognizes that "to know x" requires x to actually be the case. If "to know x" only required x to be believed, there would be no problem with Joe saying "I knew John was a bachelor yesterday, but I was wrong."

But we don't talk that way, not in English. Once Joe learns that it's not the case that Joe is a bachelor, he instantly revises his past claims to know Joe was one. (This analysis requires the thing being discussed to not change, but, that applies here, and it makes the point).

At which point it's no longer true that your entire language community believes John is a bachelor. — Isaac

So? It is still a fact that, prior to me correcting them, John is not a bachelor even though the language community believes that John is an unmarried man.

I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case — Isaac

Yes you are. You said:

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. — Isaac

This is false. John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried. John being a bachelor has nothing to do with whether or not you "felicitously" use the term bachelor. You've even accepted that "felicitous" use can be wrong.

As I've said, quite a few times now, I'm not making any claims at all about what's actually the case, only about what claims that something is the case mean, claims such as "John knows x". — Isaac

And in doing so you continue to conflate the implication of speech acts with the meaning of propositions. If you and I both assert that it is raining then there are two speech acts that share a proposition. Your speech act may imply that you believe that it is raining, and my speech act may imply that I believe that it is raining, but the shared proposition isn't "Michael believes that it is raining" (which is true iff I believe that it is raining) or "Issac believes that it is raining" (which is true iff you believe that it is raining) but is "it is raining" (which is true iff it is raining).

So despite your continued assertion, the emphasized part of "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as "I believe that it is raining." There's no infinite recursion going on here. The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather, i.e. what's (allegedly) the case, and isn't simply a statement that one has a belief (about what, exactly?).

Joe will not say: "I knew John was a bachelor yesterday, but I was wrong", because that statement is a contradiction. The reason that statement is a contradiction is because Joe recognizes that "to know x" requires x to actually be the case. If "to know x" only required x to be believed, there would be no problem with Joe saying "I knew John was a bachelor yesterday, but I was wrong." — InPitzotl

An expression like "it's raining" can be used without the prefix " I think...", or "I believe", because it's part of the language game of making claims that it's taken as given. In the past one can reflect on the comparison between what one believed at the time and what one believes now, so a need for some prefix is required to distinguish which it is one means to claim.

Either that or this ludicrous situation where a word refers to something we can't ever ascertain... The former sounds simpler to me, but to each their own...

We are quite capable of asserting things that we don't believe. For example; Issac's surname is "Smith". This assertion says nothing about what I believe. It just says something about Issac's surname, and is true if his surname is Smith and false if it isn't.

In fact, as someone who takes part in a weekly quiz, I often assert things that I don't believe. We call these guesses. And, of course, such assertions are about what is the case.

John is not a bachelor even though the language community believes that John is an unmarried man. — Michael

That's the matter in question, so asserting it isn't an argument in favour of it.

You said:

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. — Isaac


This is false. — Michael

I was referring to the meaning of the word 'bachelor'. It has no meaning beyond that which it is felicitously used for.

Your speech act may imply that you believe that it is raining, and my speech act may imply that I believe that it is raining, but the shared proposition isn't "Michael believes that it is raining" (which is true iff I believe that it is raining) or "Issac believes that it is raining" (which is true iff you believe that it is raining) but is "it is raining" (which is true iff it is raining).

So despite your continued assertion, the emphasized part of "I believe that it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as "I believe that it is raining." There's no infinite recursion going on here. The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather, — Michael

All of this is just re-asserting the position you started out with. Why is it the case that...?

We are quite capable of asserting things that we don't believe. — Michael

Of course. The same sentence means different things in different contexts. Sometimes "I know x!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that x!"

I was referring to the meaning of the word 'bachelor'. It has no meaning beyond that which it is felicitously used for. — Isaac

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John.

And in the same vein, there's a difference between saying "things that are known are true and justified because the language community uses the term 'known' to refer to things they believe to be true and justified" and saying "X is known because the language community believes that X is true and justified."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about X.

Of course. The same sentence means different things in different contexts. Sometimes "I know x!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that x!" — Isaac

What does "x" mean in this context?

To make it simpler, let's say that sometimes "I know that it is raining!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that it is raining!" and that sometimes it means "I believe that it is raining."

What do the emphasized parts mean? Do all three emphasized parts mean the same thing?

An expression like "it's raining" can be used without the prefix " I think...", or "I believe", because it's part of the language game of making claims that it's taken as given — Isaac

You're confusing what you can infer from a claim with what a claim means. It does not entail that if you can infer y from a statement x that x means y. The statement "it's raining" is talking about what's happening outside. The statement "I believe it's raining" is talking about my belief. The addition/removal of "I believe" from these statements changes the meaning.

In the past one can reflect on the comparison between what one believed at the time and what one believes now, so a need for some prefix is required to distinguish which it is one means to claim. — Isaac

You're way too focused on beliefs. The statement "it's raining" is talking about what's happening outside. The gold standard for whether or not it's raining is baked into the intentionality of the claim; since the claim is describing what's happening outside, you verify it by looking outside. By contrast, "Joe believes John is a bachelor" is talking about what Joe believes of John. The gold standard for whether or not Joe believes John is a bachelor is to ask Joe.

Now, if I looked outside and saw that it was raining, that certainly should inform my belief that it's raining. But the statement "it's raining" isn't about what I believe; it's about what's happening outside. It's about what you would see if you look outside, not what I would say if you ask me. So yes, I use the outside world to inform my beliefs (i.e., my beliefs are informed by the actual state of affairs, best I can ascertain). But no, my beliefs are not the authority of what is true; the (described) actual state of affairs is. That's the entire reason we use justification.

Either that or this ludicrous situation where a word refers to something we can't ever ascertain... — Isaac

I don't see what's stopping us from looking out windows.

Doesn't this all get resolved if it's acknowledged that on occasion knowledge is wrong because humans make mistakes. I think knowledge can be improved; which means it must be imperfect. So, it's justified true belief, and occasionally a mistake.

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John. — Michael

I said there is nothing more to the 'meaning' of bachelor than it's felicitous use and you respond by saying the language community can be wrong about things. I don't see how the two are linked at all, you'll have to connect them up for me.

And in the same vein, there's a difference between saying "things that are known are true and justified because the language community uses the term 'known' to refer to things they believe to be true and justified" and saying "X is known because the language community believes that X is true and justified."

Not following this at all, they seem to be on two different topics. How does this relate to what it means to say "I know X"?
— Michael

What does "x" mean in this context?

To make it simpler, let's say that sometimes "I know that it is raining!" means "shut up, stop reminding me that it is raining!" and that sometimes it means "I believe that it is raining."

What do the emphasized parts mean? Do all three emphasized parts mean the same thing? — Michael

Parts of a sentence don't have independent meanings, that's why we construct sentences, otherwise what does "that it" mean in all those sentences, what does "up" mean in the second...

You're confusing what you can infer from a claim with what a claim means. — InPitzotl

No, I'm arguing that what we can infer from a claim and what it means are intrinsically linked. The argument is to say that if they meant different things, then from where would a claim derive its 'meaning' if not from that which a language community can infer from its use?

You're way too focused on beliefs. — InPitzotl

Too focused for what? For you? For Philosophy? For my mental health? I definitely am focused on beliefs, I make a career out of it, but too focused? Hell, my wife might agree given the breadth of dinner table conversation, but I'm not sue I understand what you could mean by it here.

It's about what you would see if you look outside — InPitzotl

How can it be? If I say "It's raining" when it isn't then what you would see when you look outside is {a lack of rain} so the expression "it's raining" is about {a lack of rain}? It doesn't seem to be.

I don't see what's stopping us from looking out windows. — InPitzotl

So once we've looked out of the window it definitely is raining? Ascertained to be an independent fact. If, rather, it turns out to be someone with a hose standing on the roof, then what? Is it post hoc relegated to a belief again? Do we have to go back in time and change what everything was about?

Ultimately, what Gettier overlooks is the perspectival nature of belief and knowledge, namely the fact that the intentional object of a judgement cannot transcend the information available to the judgement. So it makes no sense for an external evaluator to interpret a person's belief as referring to what only the external evaluator knows. And if the person himself evaluates his past beliefs as being false on light of new information, isn't this case the same as the previous fallacy with the person's future self playing the role of the external evaluator?

Moreover, if beliefs are interpreted as having immanently accessible referents as opposed to transcendentally unavailable referents, we end up with an opposite problem; how is it possible to have false beliefs?

In my opinion, the conclusion to the above is that beliefs cannot be properties of a mind.

I said there is nothing more to the 'meaning' of bachelor than it's felicitous use and you respond by saying the language community can be wrong about things. I don't see how the two are linked at all, you'll have to connect them up for me. — Isaac

You previously claimed that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is an unmarried man. That's false. The language community can be wrong about John.

It is not the case that John is a bachelor iff the language community believes that John is an unmarried man.

It is the case that John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man.

Parts of a sentence don't have independent meanings — Isaac

Yes they do. The "it is raining" part of "I believe that it is raining" has a meaning, and that meaning is different to the "it is not raining" part of "I believe that it is not raining," and both meanings are different to the "Paris is the capital city of France" part of "I believe that Paris is the capital city of France."

When I believe that it is raining, what do I believe? That it is raining. When I believe that Paris is the capital city of France, what do I believe? That Paris is the capital city of France. Beliefs have propositional content, and that propositional content can be (and is) asserted as a proposition.

The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather. It asserts something about what is actually the case. It is true iff water is falling from the clouds and false otherwise. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not you believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not the language community believes that it is raining. And the same principle applies to "John is a bachelor," "the Sun orbits the Earth," and "X is true."

Doesn't this all get resolved if it's acknowledged that on occasion knowledge is wrong because humans make mistakes. — Cheshire

We thought we knew X but we were wrong. We didn't know X because not X.

You previously claimed that John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man. — Michael

No I didn't. As I clarified in my previous post...

You said:

There's nothing more to John being a bachelor than my felicitously using the term 'bachelor'. — Isaac


This is false. — Michael


I was referring to the meaning of the word 'bachelor'. It has no meaning beyond that which it is felicitously used for. — Isaac

A 'bachelor' is not a thing outside of language community declaring it to be a thing - felicitous use of the term 'bachelor', that's all I'm saying there.

Yes they do. The "it is raining" part of "I believe that it is raining" has a meaning, and that meaning is different to the "it is not raining" part of "I believe that it is not raining," and both meanings are different to the "Paris is the capital city of France" part of "I believe that Paris is the capital city of France."

When I believe that it is raining, what do I believe? That it is raining. When I believe that Paris is the capital city of France, what do I believe? That Paris is the capital city of France. Beliefs have propositional content, and that propositional content can be (and is) asserted as a proposition.

The proposition "it is raining" refers to the weather. It asserts something about what is actually the case. It is true iff water is falling from the clouds and false otherwise. It has nothing to do with whether or not I believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not you believe that it is raining and nothing to do with whether or not the language community believes that it is raining. And the same principle applies to "John is a bachelor," "the Sun orbits the Earth," and "X is true." — Michael

Because...?

No, I'm arguing that what we can infer from a claim and what it means are intrinsically linked. The argument is to say that if they meant different things, then from where would a claim derive its 'meaning' if not from that which a language community can infer from its use? — Isaac

Your argument appears to contain the hidden and false premise that "it's raining" is used to convey to someone that the speaker believes that it's raining. The phrase "it's raining" does not require anyone to believe it beforehand to analyze its meaning or truth value. It may or may not be the case that someone believes it's raining; whether they do or don't is completely irrelevant to whether it is the case or not that it's raining (for this particular claim). What "it's raining" is used to convey is a weather condition.

Too focused for what? — Isaac

You're too focused on beliefs to analyze this properly; by which I mean you're being tunnel visioned. The fact that you've set up a scenario where the speaker believes it's raining simply reflects your bias to make the statement about beliefs. You didn't conclude that someone believes that it's raining from the statement "it's raining"; you concluded it from the fact that a person uttered that statement, and even then that is a fallible inference.

We could equally well consider this in the context of a quiz, something like:

Which of the following is true at your location right now?
(1) It's snowing
(2) It's raining
(3) None of the above

In this case, it would be erroneous to infer that the producer of the quiz believes that it's raining. This does not prevent us from analyzing the meaning of (2) or judging its truth value.

It's about what you would see if you look outside — InPitzotl

How can it be? If (A) I say "It's raining" when (B) it isn't then (C) what you would see when you look outside is (D) {a lack of rain} so (E) the expression "it's raining" is about {a lack of rain}? — Isaac

Actually, yes. The problem appears to be that you're misinterpreting what I mean by saying that (A) is about what's going on outside. You appear to surmise that this means that (A) is true; but that's incorrect. What it suggests is that what's going on outside is the test of A's truth.

For comparison, consider when (F) what I would taste when I sip from this soda can is (G) {ginger ale}. That (F) results in (G) does not say anything about whether (A) is true or not; (F) does not test (A). By contrast, (C) resulting in (D) does say something about whether (A) is true or not; this is simply the "not" case (which is equivalent to saying that (B) "it isn't [raining]" is true).

So once we've looked out of the window it definitely is raining? — Isaac

It no more follows that (A) being about what's going on outside means that once we've looked outside it is definitely raining than it follows that a person uttering A means that they definitely believe A.

What would you surmise option 2 in the quiz above is about?

Ascertained to be an independent fact. — Isaac

Let me fix that for you: "Ascertained its veracity".

If, rather, it turns out to be someone with a hose standing on the roof, then what? — Isaac

Then it's not raining. Unless it is. Regardless, the test of this would be to look outside. Again, it doesn't matter if this is your biased cherry picked scenario where the utterer of the statement believes it's raining, or if it is multiple choice option 2 on the quiz above. The statement is about the same thing either way.

No I didn't. — Isaac

Yes you did. Here:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

This is false. In fact, John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried.

Because...? — Isaac

Because what? I am simply informing you of how language works. When I assert that I believe that it is raining, there is something that my belief is about. And what is it about? That it is raining. The "it is raining" in "I believe that it is raining" is a proposition that has a meaning, and that meaning is a reference to something that is the case (the weather).

I suspect "I believe X" causes grammatical disagreements and confusion due to the fact that it can be used to mean ​"X is more likely true than false" and higher-order propositions, such as " the sentence "X" is true", not to mention it's use case in relativizing knowledge in relation to perspective ("I know X to be true, so let's agree to disagree").

As demonstrated in these use cases, first order and higher-order belief predicates must be eliminated via slightly different strategies in order to arrive at the equivalence of "I believe X" and "X is true", and in cases of doubt "X has intermediate truth value".

What "it's raining" is used to convey is a weather condition. — InPitzotl

How can an expression convey a weather condition? Weather conditions are made of atmospheric molecules? You seem on the one hand to want to talk in the abstract, but then on analysis assume those abstracts are concrete.

The fact that you've set up a scenario where the speaker believes it's raining simply reflects your bias to make the statement about beliefs. You didn't conclude that someone believes that it's raining from the statement "it's raining"; you concluded it from the fact that a person uttered that statement, and even then that is a fallible inference. — InPitzotl

"it's raining" is a speech act, or a written act, or a question-in-a-quiz act, but whatever, it is an act of human beings in a culture, it is not a work of nature, not a law of physics. It's 'used' to do whatever it's used to do, not one god-given purpose. Most of the time, it's used to get the listener to believe it's raining (by which I mean have a tendency to act as if it's raining - put a coat on, carry an umbrella, write a poem about it...). If you want there to be a 'meaning' to it other than the use it's put to, you'll need to decide how we're going to determine what that 'meaning' is. I'm not sure that 'it's what I say it is', is quite good enough.

(C) resulting in (D) does say something about whether (A) is true or not — InPitzotl

How?

So once we've looked out of the window it definitely is raining? — Isaac

It no more follows that (A) being about what's going on outside means that once we've looked outside it is definitely raining than it follows that a person uttering A means that they definitely believe A. — InPitzotl

You said

I don't see what's stopping us from looking out windows. — InPitzotl

in response to my reductio of "I know..." requiring the subject to be 'true'. If we look outside we don't get to find out if "it's raining" is true do we? We just gain more justification for our belief that it's raining. At no point do we find out that 'it's raining' is true, so add in '...is true' to the meaning of 'I know...' makes it impossible for anyone to use the term correctly. That just seems silly.

What would you surmise option 2 in the quiz above is about? — InPitzotl

Option (2) isn't about anything. It's part of a whole expression-act which is about the language game of quizzes.

Ascertained to be an independent fact. — Isaac

Let me fix that for you: "Ascertained its veracity". — InPitzotl

But we haven't ascertained its veracity, you admit yourself, we could still be wrong. We've gathered more justifications for believing it, but in JTB, we already have justifications and beliefs, the question is how to add the T.

Then it's not raining. Unless it is. Regardless, the test of this would be to look outside. — InPitzotl

What? You've just agreed that by looking outside we might not determine if 'it's raining' is true and then said that regardless the test of it's truth is to look outside?

No I didn't. — Isaac


Yes you did. Here:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac — Michael

This is now the third time I've pointed out the context of that partial quote. If you don't understand, you can just ask, but please don't keep disingenuously quoting parts of what I say to make some kind of 'gotcha', it's not a level of discussion I'm interested in. I said.

I'd interpret the claim as...

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

I am simply informing you of how language works. — Michael

So how did you learn how language works but I didn't? Did I miss something? Why are we in a situation where what you claim is just 'the way it is', but what I claim is subject to critique? Are you really so narcissistic as to think that the way things seem to you must be just exactly the way things are and people who see things differently must simply be ill-informed, awaiting your enlightenment?

This is now the third time I've pointed out the context of that partial quote. If you don't understand, you can just ask, but please don't keep disingenuously quoting parts of what I say to make some kind of 'gotcha', it's not a level of discussion I'm interested in. — Isaac

Look at the entire context:

As a simpler example:

John is a bachelor iff:

1) John is a man, and
2) John is unmarried

You want to interpret this as the claim that John is a bachelor iff:

1) I believe that John is a man, and
2) I believe that John is unmarried — Michael

I'd interpret the claim as...

John is a bachelor iff:

1) My language community generally believe that John is a man, and
2) My language community generally believe believe that John is unmarried — Isaac

So you are interpreting the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried". This is wrong, and why I said what I said here:

There's a difference between saying "a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men" and saying "John is a bachelor because the language community believes that John is an unmarried man."

The former is true, the latter is not. The language community can be wrong about John. — Michael

So we have two claims:

1) a bachelor is an unmarried man because the language community uses the term 'bachelor' to refer to people they believe to be unmarried men.

2) John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man.

Using 1), you interpret 2) as:

3) John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is an unmarried man.

This is an invalid interpretation. And that's because this is true:

4) The language community incorrectly believes that John is an an unmarried man.

You accept that the language community can be wrong; that they can believe that John is a bachelor when in fact John is not. Given that, 2) is true and 3) is false, 3) is a misinterpretation of 2).

So you are interpreting the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried". — Michael

No I'm interpreting the claim "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the claim "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried"

Claims are one type of speech act. There is no single 'meaning' of the sentence. It means whatever use it is put to in the speech act in which it is uttered.

A claim to any factual knowledge (as a type of speech act), is generally of the form 'I believe x and most people in my community sufficiently expert in x would agree'

Even if you're the only person in the world who believes x, it's still the same claim. To use your Copernicus example. "I know the earth goes around the sun" is that Copernicus believes the earth goes round the sun and anyone sufficiently expert (ie, once he's educated them) would agree.

The alternative is to accept a situation where I believe x for reasons {a, b, c, and d} but that I also believe everyone, when taught reasons {a, b, c, and d} will still not believe x. That's tantamount to private rules, it makes no sense.

No I'm interpreting the claim "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the claim "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried" — Isaac

Which is wrong as I have repeatedly explained.

1) John is a bachelor iff John is an unmarried man
2) John is a married woman
3) The language community generally believes that John is an unmarried man

Given that the above are true, the following is false:

4) John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is an unmarried man

Therefore, 1) and 4) do not mean the same thing.

So you are interpreting the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is a man and unmarried". — Michael

No I'm interpreting the claim "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" as the claim "John is a bachelor iff the language community general believe that John is a man and unmarried" — Isaac

You are drawing a distinction between a sentence and a claim. What is the distinction? Is the distinction such that the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is a man and unmarried," and that the sentence "it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "I believe that it is raining"?

If so then we can finally go back to the original claim:

John knows that X iff:

1. John believes that X is true,
2. John is justified in believing that X is true, and
3. X is true

These are to be understood as sentences, not as claims. So no misinterpreting 3) as "I believe that X is true" or "John believes that X is true" or "the language community generally believes that X is true."

Incidentally, this distinction you seem to be making between sentences and claims seems to be the same distinction I made earlier between propositions and speech acts that you initially denied:

As a speech act asserting that one knows X may be equivalent to asserting that one believes X, but as propositions "I believe X" is not equivalent to "I know X" — Michael

If propositions are not speech acts, then where are they used? Do we mime them? Communicate them through the means of interpretive dance? — Isaac

We may be using slightly different terminology but it seems we got there in the end.

Given that the above are true, the following is false:

4) John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is an unmarried man — Michael

Yep.

Therefore, 1) and 4) do not mean the same thing. — Michael

Agreed. You seem to be assuming that if two speech act mean the same thing on one context, they must mean the same thing in every context. The first claim at (1) is in the context where you believe John is a married woman (claim (2)), but the speech act at (4) is not in that context, so it's not surprising that they have different meanings

What you're missing (of my interpretation) is that there's no such thing as an independent fact that john is a married woman, someone must believe John is a woman. That John is a married woman is (and only is) someone's belief, so (2) and (3) are just direct contradictions, in this context.

You are drawing a distinction between a sentence and a claim. What is the distinction? — Michael

A sentence is a collection of words, a claim is a speech act. Only the latter has a meaning.

Is the distinction such that the sentence "John is a bachelor iff John is a man and John is unmarried" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "John is a bachelor iff the language community generally believes that John is a man and unmarried," and that the sentence "it is raining" doesn't mean the same thing as the sentence "I believe that it is raining"? — Michael

Sentences do not have meanings, only speech acts have meanings, sentences are just collections of words. The closest I'd be willing to go toward your model is to say that sentences have collections of meanings depending on the speech acts they are used in - for example "it's raining" (the sentence) has a fairly circumscribed set of meanings (circumscribed by the culture using it). It's not going to be used to greet a stranger, or annul a marriage, it's going to be used mainly in the context of the various behaviours we have around rain. But I doubt that's close enough for what you want to claim.

Incidentally, this distinction you seem to be making between sentences and claims seems to be the same distinction I made earlier between propositions and speech acts that you initially denied: — Michael

No. I can define a sentence other than a speech act (a collection of words arranged according to rules of grammar). I don't know what a proposition would be unless it was a speech act. If you're now saying that a proposition is more like a sentence (a collection of words arranged according to rules of grammar), then I'm happy with that distinction. Propositions wouldn't have any meaning though.

What you're missing (of my interpretation) is that there's no such thing as an independent fact that john is a married woman, someone must believe John is a woman. That John is a married woman is (and only is) someone's belief, so (2) and (3) are just direct contradictions, in this context. — Isaac

Right, so your entire argument rests on some form of extreme anti-realist metaphysics that denies that beliefs can be false or that there are belief-independent facts. I'm not willing to argue metaphysics here. This discussion is regarding a) what the JTB definition of knowledge entails and b) whether or not Gettier cases show the JTB definition of knowledge to be inadequate. For the sake of this discussion we must take some form of realism for granted.

We thought we knew X but we were wrong. We didn't know X because not X. — Michael

Right, I'm suggesting a present tense where we don't assume to know the future. We think we know X but we may be wrong. We may be wrong because we can't know all future observations which involve X. I understand the difference in the words intent and the imperfect state of people knowing things.

Gettier's demonstrations show JTB isn't precisely exclusive for every bit of information one can imagine. Considering the set JTB had to tackle it did a pretty good job and still is a good jumping off point. Personally, I think 'belief' seems a bit unnecessary. I could write something down that is knowledge. I could parish and it could remain. Would that information cease to be knowledge?