An essence is that quality/property necessary for a thing to be that thing. If an essence is absent, then a thing stops being that thing, we're talking about something else entirely. A wolf forebear is an essence of a dog. — TheMadFool

This actually catches some of what is important that Witt is pointing out, particularly that the grammar of a thing (the way it works, or not) expresses what makes a thing that thing. But to term it as a quality/property is to put "essence" into the framework of an object. For one thing, since there are a number of criteria for judging whether a thing is a thing, that would mean there would be multiple "essences", which would defeat the unexamined reason that we need to create it: to be "necessary", in other words, to be determinate, to be decisive--to create certainty in our relation to the thing. As well, in saying "essence" there is a tendency to imagine one generalized picture for what an essence is, how it works; when the criteria for an apology and of a table are not only categorically differentiating, but the criteria for which can be structured completely differently, such as that moral responsibility does not work as a function of knowledge.

To take a fact about a thing as the essence of it is to miss that our criteria for determining a thing are made up of what matters to us about something, what interests us, what makes up why we judge it the way we do. The impersonalization of a scientific categorization is fixed and certain but is not what matters to us in most cases. We could argue that the essence of a dog is loyalty, unconditional love--that the essence of a dog is that it is our best friend. A definition is set by us (if not just a list of examples), as a criteria can be when it is a standard, such as measuring (these are not the criteria Witt find illuminating). A dog is defined as: ____, and pick whatever fact you'd like. It is necessarily a mammal, does that tell us why it is important to us?

Wittgenstein is right in saying words lack an essence but words and definitions are two entirely different things. — TheMadFool

The point is that words can be defined individually, independently; that is possible to define words. This ability to put together these definitions is what makes us feel we can understand a sentence without a context, without it having been first said. To say that our definitions capture what is essential, means that it is us who strips away the ordinary criteria for judging, identifying, a seeing how a thing works. And we do this in order to have control and presage our communications rather than be responsible for them.

Words are not symbols.

moral responsibility does not work as a function of knowledge. — Antony Nickles

And we do this in order to have control and presage our communications rather than be responsible for them. — Antony Nickles

Interesting! :up:

How right you are! Essences do seem to have a subjective side to it. How would, for example, an alien define a dog, in terms of its essence. There's a worldview hidden behind the scenes that determines, to some but a substantial degree, how we see the world and that, to my reckoning, will have an impact on what we consider as critical to what, say, a dog is. Isn't this why Wittgenstein said, "if a lion could talk, we would not understand him."

As for science, it seems to or, at the very least attempts to, zero in on the fundamental nature of, how shall I put it?, stuff i.e. when science (say) states that water is $H_2O$ it means to convey that - the molecular permutation thus described - is the true nature of water. Something's off but I can't quite my finger on it at the moment.

A question for due consideration is whether Wittgenstein thought that language games were incommensurable. — Banno

I don't think there is a yes or no answer to this question. Some language-games are commensurable, and others are not. It seems clear that Wittgenstein thought that using the language-game of science to judge religious language-games is incommensurable. However, there would have to be something in common with the language-games of both to be able to have a conversation, i.e., there has to be some overlap. If the religious person, for e.g., is using the word know the way you're using it, as say, an objective justification, then both language-games are commensurate. However, if they're using the word know as a subjective justification, then it would seem to be incommensurate. It would be like one person playing chess, and the other is playing checkers.

There is no standard by which we could judge all language-games, there are just the games themselves. Each game has it's own rules, but there is a certain amount of overlap. There are rules that apply to all language-games, and there are rules that apply only to the language-game being played. There is no asking, "Which language-game is better?" It depends on what you're trying to do, or how you're using the concepts within the game. This doesn't mean that it's all relative, you can't just do what you want and expect to mean something with your words. There are norms of use, but you have to be careful just how far you extend that norm, just as with any concept.

Looking again at the matter of rule-following, and its importance in determining how a word is used, and how use is related to meaning. This must be seen the idea that meaning somehow arises in the mind, as an idea, or some other mind-dependent phenomena. The tendency is to give too much credit to one’s own mind as the determining factor in meaning. Although the mind is crucial, meaning is not a function of one’s own mind, rather, it is a function of many minds working in conjunction with one another. Many minds being the correlate to a group of language users, and how the practices of language users determines meaning. Its these practices that show the rules of the language-game. Just as the movement of the pieces in chess, show or demonstrate the implementation of the rules of the game.

What needs to be emphasized over and over, is the idea that meaning is an outward manifestation of language as a “form of life.” Forms of life have to do with “customs (uses, institutions),” namely, those things Wittgenstein cited in PI 23 (giving orders, reporting an event, play-acting, telling a joke, speculating, testing a hypothesis, etc.). The focus should be on what is happening in language from us as individuals. This change of focus, helps us to see the nature of meaning, i.e., it changes the focus from what is happening in my mind, to what is happening as the group functions in social settings (going from the internal to the external).

What is problematic is that since language is an activity of the mind, in the sense that it is me who is speaking, one wants to overemphasize the importance of the “me” or “I” in terms of meaning. However, it is not the “me” or “I,” it is the interaction of each of us with others, viz., the other language users. It is this interaction, that gives us a regularity, or a norm of use.

Another confusion that seems to raise its ugly head, is, my intention, what was, or is my intent as I use the words, i.e., some think that intent drives meaning, or has a significant role in meaning. However, this is also a misunderstanding. Our intentions have nothing to do with meaning. We learn the meanings in social settings, and use what we’ve learned to convey our intentions.

The Similarities Between Words & Logic

Wittgenstein claimed that people use words correctly even when they don't know their definitions; the classic example being the word "game".

Likewise, people were using logic, quite well in fact, even before logic became a subject of formal study and its rules were explicitly worked out.

Wriggle finger — Cratylus

To provide some context:

The Heraclitean philosopher Cratylus refused to discuss anything and would merely wriggle his finger, claiming that communication is impossible since meanings are constantly changing. — Wikipedia

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". Having different homes, therefore different meanings, ought to indicate to us that they are distinct words, despite having the same outward appearance. Therefore we ought to apprehend these words which appear to be the same, yet have different homes, as different words.

If we adopt this position, we have a new problem, which is the necessary boundary between a word with one home, and a word which appears to be the same word, yet has a different home, so is really a different word. Since both instances appear to be the same word, yet we conclude logically that they are not the same word, having different homes, we need other principles to distinguish them. It's kind of like they are identical twins. How we might distinguish the words is through context, the word's home, the two distinct games which are home to each, respectively. This means we must identify the game itself, and that's where the difficulty lies.

The various games of a language overlap, they share rules at some points and diverge at other points. And so a further problem develops. If the two distinct words, which appear to be the same, go by the same rule in two games, but different rules in another game, then why can't we say that they are actually "the same word" in those two games, and a different word in the third game. But if we adhere to the principle, a different game constitutes a different word, we must disallow this idea because the two games are distinct, constituting different homes, even though what is said of the two words, "appears to be the same" takes on an even stronger meaning.

What follows though, is that we lose all principles to distinguish one game from another, until we reach the point of "each particular instance of use must be viewed as a different game". Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word.

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". — Metaphysician Undercover

You should think of a word like a tool, as Wittgenstein said. Each use of a tool can be compared to each use of a word (each use being differentiated by a context or language-game). Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. It's the same tool or word used in a different way, with a different function or sense depending on the language-game. The idea that it's a paradox or possibly a contradiction is just not the case.

The idea that it's a paradox or possibly a contradiction is just not the case. — Sam26

Indeed.

And this is another example of @Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so.

The problem is not at all dissimilar to that which renders him unable to acknowledge instantaneous velocity because he fixates on velocity being over time. The slight change in word use leaves him floundering.

Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? — Sam26

Yes, I might say that the same object used in two different ways, is two different tools, like in the case of a multitool, and I'll explain further below. But what I was discussing is a word's "home". You referred to a word having a "home" in a particular language game. But if the word has a place in a number of different language games, like a tool has a number of different uses, how would we determine which language game, or use, is the "home" of that word, or which use is the "home" of the tool?

If it turns out that the word has a number of different "homes", wouldn't we have to say that these are actually different words? Homonyms are considered to be distinct words aren't they? Likewise, if a tool is defined by its use, then the same object could be two different tools, depending on how the object is used. Suppose a "saw" is what cuts wood, and a "knife" is what cuts meat. Then the same object could be both a saw and a knife, two different tools, depending on how it is used. And a multitool is a lot of different tools.

In case you're not following, here's a couple examples. I think most people would agree that "right", when it means correct, is a different word from "right" when it refers to one side of a person's body. But in the case of "see" they would say it is the same word whether it refers to seeing with the eyes, or seeing with the mind.

Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. — Sam26

I'm not making a pun, so don't consider this as silly. Homonyms are understood to be distinct words.

His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

I don't see how "family resemblance shows that this need not be so". Obviously "family resemblance" implies having something in common. So how can the argument for family resemblance show that the uses need not have something in common?

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

OK, so I'll ask you the question Banno. How would you distinguish between homonyms (in the case of two different words with the same sound and spelling), and one word having two different meanings? To take your analogy of "family resemblances", why would we say in the case of homonyms, "those two words are just like identical twins", but in other cases, "that's the same person"

Obviously "family resemblance" implies having something in common. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it doesn't. That's what you missed.

:gasp:

Care to explain yourself?

Sure. I wrote much of the Wiki article on the topic. Read that.

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Family_resemblance&oldid=144270623

"Family resemblance" implies that they have family in common, just like Wittgenstein says: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres". Therefore there is something in common, it's just in a way other than one might think. It's the overlapping which they have in common. So what you describe as "games held certain similarities and relations with each other", is what they have in common, these relations, like a family consists of relations. And we call this, what they have in common, "family".

That's actually the conclusion of my post above. Why don't you ever take the time to read my posts through to the end? Because of this you commonly misrepresent me.

Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you work out what it is you are claiming, then your posts might be worth addressing.

When you work out what it is that I am claiming, then you might be capable of making an intelligent reply, instead of off the cuff ad hominem, like the following:

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. — Banno

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist?

When you work out what it is you are claiming, then your posts might be worth addressing. — Banno

If you want to look at the issue I brought up, as a civilized, rational human being, without resort to insult, then follow me here.

I was enquiring as to what Wittgenstein means when he suggests that a word could have a "home". It is implied that when a word is used in many different language games, one particular language game might be the game which is "home" to the word. How could we ever determine which game is the home game for any given word?

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist? — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you go from having a "congenital logical problem," to racism? All he means is you have a persistent or chronic problem. That's kind of a low blow, don't you think? People just love to throw this word around to make people look bad. The only people who look bad are the people using it without a good reason.

You brought up this issue of "the language game that is its [a word's] home". But if you'd prefer not to discuss it then just say so.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

Since a word has a place in numerous different language-games, would we be correct in saying that the word has a number of different "homes"? You seem to imply that for Wittgenstein, only one of the language-games is the word's true "home". If this is the case, then what is the word's position in another language-game? How is it possible that we look to a word's home language-game to understand its meaning in a completely different language-game? Obviously, the situation I described, that the word is a distinct and different word in each different language-game, with its own home in that game, is not the case, if a word has a one "home" game that determines its meaning.

So, what is the case? If any particular instance of a word's meaning is not dependent on its use in that specific game in which it is being used at that time, and it is actually required that we determine the word's "home" game to know its meaning in that other game, how do we determine its "home" game? I assume that if we do not know with certainty, the word's "home" game, we cannot know with certainty the word's true meaning. Do you agree with this?

Or, is this idea of a "home" game just a ruse? One might search forever, trying to confirm the word's "home" never really being sure which game is the word's "home", therefore never really being sure of the word's meaning. Perhaps the idea that there is one "home" game is just wrong, and the word has a home in each different game which it is used. Then shouldn't we say that these are distinct words, like homonyms, each with its own home in its own game? On what principle then do we say that it is "the same word" used in different games? Oughtn't we say that a word is homeless, and is free to go and find a place wherever one wants it to be?

I don't see that any progress can be made, so I don't see the point. More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction.

One might search forever, trying to confirm the word's "home" never really being sure which game is the word's "home", therefore never really being sure of the word's meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m sympathetic to your thinking in this post, but this is backwards. That is, you’re talking here about reflecting on the meaning of a word, analysing it, theorizing it, rather than using it. When it comes to use, either a word will do for your purpose or it won’t — or it can be made to work the way you want or it can’t. Think first of cases of trying to use a word for some purpose rather than of scrutinizing the word; the point of a tool is to use it when it will get the job done, not to contemplate it.

Perhaps the idea that there is one "home" game is just wrong, and the word has a home in each different game which it is used. Then shouldn't we say that these are distinct words, like homonyms, each with its own home in its own game? On what principle then do we say that it is "the same word" used in different games? Oughtn't we say that a word is homeless, and is free to go and find a place wherever one wants it to be? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think at the end here your view has something in common with @Joshs’s: he talks about each use of a word as something like inventing a new use for that word on the fly, extending or redefining its meaning with each new ‘application’.

But doesn’t the ‘words are homeless’ line of argument contradict the ‘homonym’ argument? It is the same hammer you use to drive this nail and that, to remove the pin from a hinge, to knock a dent out of your wheelbarrow. So what do we want to say? That it’s a poor tool, or maybe no tool at all, that has only a single use-case? Or that all of these uses are in some (analyzable, theorizable) sense ‘the same’ — maybe, striking an object so as to cause it to move? (But of course you can do more than that with a hammer.)

I think we do better to take in more rather than less of what’s going on, so that we can see the hammer being a part of — being ‘at home’ in — each ensemble of tools and practices where it is useful (cabinetmaking, house framing, tractor maintenance, surveying, etc.), but not part of others where it is not. I’d lean toward multiple homes, with both hammers and words. Someone used to using a hammer in only one way for one sort of job might be surprised to find other people think of it quite differently, and the same thing happens with words sometimes. (Someone might use a chisel as a doorstop for years without the slightest idea what it’s ‘really’ for.)

More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction. — Sam26

Which one of my interpretations? I offered two completely different. You are the one who brought up a word's "home". How do you interpret this concept? Does a word have only one "home" in one language game, or does it have a "home" in every language game which it is used in? If the former, how would we know which game is the home game? If the latter why would we call this the same word, if it has many different homes? And what sense is there to saying that something has numerous homes?

I’m sympathetic to your thinking in this post, but this is backwards. That is, you’re talking here about reflecting on the meaning of a word, analysing it, theorizing it, rather than using it. When it comes to use, either a word will do for your purpose or it won’t — or it can be made to work the way you want or it can’t. Think first of cases of trying to use a word for some purpose rather than of scrutinizing the word; the point of a tool is to use it when it will get the job done, not to contemplate it. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so when deciding on what words to use, making the judgement as to whether the word will serve the purpose or not, Sam26 said we need to "think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home". So, if the word is a tool, to make that judgement as to whether it will get the job done or not, we need to find the language game which is the word's home. Whether or not this is "scrutinizing the word" is irrelevant, but this is what is suggested that we need to do. One cannot just pick up any tool, and expect that it will get the job done, so we look at a word's 'home game' to determine whether it will get the job done. How do we determine the word's 'home game'?

But doesn’t the ‘words are homeless’ line of argument contradict the ‘homonym’ argument? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that is the point. They are two very distinct, perhaps even contradictory perspectives. That's why I started off with the suggestion that there's a sort of paradox here. The homonym argument says that since each different game in which a word is used is a distinct "home", then really these ought to be considered as distinct words. But then we might annihilate the relations between one game and another, which Banno pointed out is an important part of meaning, in the article on family resemblances. Now, in this homonym scenario each game is a distinct game, as a distinct home for the words within it, and every word in a different game, even though they might sound and be spelled the same, are different words. You can see that this is an unrealistic scenario because it denies the importance of the relations between one game and another.

However, if we go to the other option, that the same word is used in many games and one of the games is the word's home game, which validates the word's meaning, we have an equally unrealistic scenario. We have no way of knowing which game is the home game, and then the word becomes "homeless" completely free from constraints, like a tool we might be able to pick up and use for any purpose.

I think we do better to take in more rather than less of what’s going on, so that we can see the hammer being a part of — being ‘at home’ in — each ensemble of tools and practices where it is useful (cabinetmaking, house framing, tractor maintenance, surveying, etc.), but not part of others where it is not. I’d lean toward multiple homes, with both hammers and words. Someone used to using a hammer in only one way for one sort of job might be surprised to find other people think of it quite differently, and the same thing happens with words sometimes. (Someone might use a chisel as a doorstop for years without the slightest idea what it’s ‘really’ for.) — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the other two ways I mentioned are both completely unrealistic, being like two extremes, neither of which properly describes the reality of the situation. Now you propose a word has "multiple homes". I would say now, that the word "home" does not serve any purpose any more. The same word, like the hammer, has a different job, in many different games. We can't say that any particular game is the home, so it's rather meaningless to say that every game in which it appears is a "home" for it.

Now we're right back to square one, having resolved nothing. Suppose one wants to decide whether a word will serve a particular purpose or not, how could one proceed? I have a job to do and I want to know whether the hammer will serve the purpose. Each job, or purpose is unique, distinct from every other one so it doesn't make sense to start looking through all the different language games that the word has appeared in, or all the different things I've ever done with a hammer. How do you think the judgement is made? If I do not look at one game as the home game, and I do not consider all the different games, what do I do, take a few games and make an average or something?

We can't say that any particular game is the home, so it's rather meaningless to say that every game in which it appears is a "home" for it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don’t think so. I think there are strong objections to the single home theory, but they don’t touch the idea of a word being at home in a language-game, having a role or a function. It’s easier to see in the negative: if you’re working on a bit of carpentry and you have the wood, hammer, nails, screws, drill, ruler, sandpaper, and so on, then the soldering iron doesn’t belong here.

With words, it’s a little harder to be that simplistic because there’s a chance almost any word might find some use in a given language-game, but there are telltale signs that it doesn’t already have a use — one being that it is only allowed in as metaphor. Still, you can say that when discussing politics you’ll have ‘rights’, ‘elections’, ‘freedom’, ‘policy’, ‘legitimacy’, all sorts of words, but probably not ‘chlorophyll’ or ‘aubade’. And within a particular sort of discussion, say, a nitty-gritty-detail policy discussion, people may see a phrase like ‘the public good’ as so vague in this context as to be useless and thus unwelcome.

The homonym business — eh, it’s almost semantics. The one argument against it would be that in introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in, you’re relying to some degree on people’s understanding of how the word is used elsewhere — either for the metaphor, or by making a case that there’s a strong analogy between the known use and the new one. It would be hard to pitch a known word as an empty vessel you can add a new meaning to at will. (A somewhat outlandish metaphor can do the trick. Timothy Williamson got mainstream philosophers to talk about “luminosity”.)

One point from the other direction doesn’t seem to be brought up much: must a word have a single use in a language-game? Why couldn’t a word have multiple uses in the same language-game?

I don’t think so. I think there are strong objections to the single home theory, but they don’t touch the idea of a word being at home in a language-game, having a role or a function. It’s easier to see in the negative: if you’re working on a bit of carpentry and you have the wood, hammer, nails, screws, drill, ruler, sandpaper, and so on, then the soldering iron doesn’t belong here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are changing the subject by switching to the negative. The issue is the affirmation that a word has a home (or possibly more than one home). By proceeding in the negative, as you suggest, all you can do is keep saying 'this is not the word's home', and 'that is not the word's home', so on and so forth. You would always be left with a multitude of possibilities such that if meaning is directly related to the home, as Sam26 suggested, we could never have certainty of meaning.

I know that we are not necessarily looking for certainty, as you say, we are simply looking to accomplish a purpose. However, the context of Sam's post indicates that the issue we are dealing with is the question of distinguishing one "sense" from another, and in the case of logic, certainty is the purpose. So the problem is well exemplified with the way that people use the word "know". There is an epistemological sense of "know" which implies justified. Justification requires logical proof, and this requires that a word's use be limited by a definition. Ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation nullifies any attempt at justification.

So you might really be talking about something completely different from me. You are saying, so long as we can exclude misuse of the tool, we can proceed with the tool in a vast multitude of correct uses. Excluding misuse will exclude the possibility of mistake, and the tool will always serve the intended purpose. But you do not appear to be considering the fact that word usage has at least two sides, the person who hears is distinct from the person who speaks. And, the person speaking cannot exclude the possibility of mistake by the person hearing, in the way you propose, because where the word "doesn't belong" varies from one person to another.

Look at Sam's interpretation of Banno's chosen word, "congenital", a few posts back, in relation to my interpretation. I think that this word does not belong in that context, there is no language game which supports that use, and Banno is wrong to use that what in that way. But Sam, in my opinion fabricates a game which supports that use, and claims that Banno is simply within the rules of that game. As demonstrated by this example, and multitudes of other similar examples which abound in this world, your proposal, that we might just decide that a word "doesn't belong here", is completely inaccurate, because someone else will come along and use it there. And this incompatibility between one person saying it doesn't belong, and another saying it does, will result in the word not serving the intended purpose, and misunderstanding.

The homonym business — eh, it’s almost semantics. The one argument against it would be that in introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in, you’re relying to some degree on people’s understanding of how the word is used elsewhere — either for the metaphor, or by making a case that there’s a strong analogy between the known use and the new one. It would be hard to pitch a known word as an empty vessel you can add a new meaning to at will. (A somewhat outlandish metaphor can do the trick. Timothy Williamson got mainstream philosophers to talk about “luminosity”.) — Srap Tasmaner

I don't agree with this at all, and I believe that this is why this issue is so "tricky". I think we have to distinguish between two very different "ways" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in". If you are relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, then you are not actually introducing the word to a new game, you are forming an extension on an old game. This is the sort of overlap which Banno referred to with "family resemblances". But this is where the game analogy breaks down and fails, though people like Banno will refuse to accept this fact. What Wittgenstein represents as a game, is one specific way of using the word. If we allow now, that "a game" consists of two distinct ways, even if one is related to the other by a family resemblance, we contradict the premise of "a game". Therefore distinct uses must be distinct games despite the reality of "overlap" This is the age old issue in Plato's Parmenides, of the incompatibility between One and Many.

That is the one "way" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in", allowing that the two games have a relationship (family) with each other. And the problem is that this really negates the effectiveness of the game analogy. Meaning is attributable to this relationship between games, not to any game. We now have to assume something within language, which is very significant and important to meaning, which is outside any particular game, as the relating of one game to another. This is equivalent to "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts". We have to allow that there is something which makes a whole a whole, which is not a part of the whole. It's a sort of dilemma, and the solution is to reject the analogy. Language-games are proposed as the parts, but the whole which is "a language" is not a congregate of such parts. Therefore the proposal is unacceptable.

That "way" we might call the natural way. The other "way," we might call the logical way. The logical way is to strictly define the word, making the usage specific to one particular game, thereby excluding all relations with other games. Excluding relations with other games is very important, to avoid the tendency to equivocate. This way is exactly opposed to relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, because that way of understanding consists of a multitude of relations between games (which "game" fails to capture because the understanding lies in the relations, not in the games) and this sort of understanding is extremely conducive to equivocation.

With respect to the two "ways", the logical way is consistent with the "language-game" analogy, but the natural way is not. So the language-game description really fails to capture the true nature of natural language, being based in the logical way which is opposed to the natural way.

One point from the other direction doesn’t seem to be brought up much: must a word have a single use in a language-game? Why couldn’t a word have multiple uses in the same language-game? — Srap Tasmaner

In essence, this is exactly why the game analogy fails in accounting for natural language. "A game" as demonstrated by Wittgenstein is a single type of usage. To avoid violating, or contradicting that premise, a double usage cannot be one game. So a usage is a game, and this principle allows for the reality of logical proceedings, free from equivocation. However, natural language is directly opposed to this, deriving meaning from a multitude of very distinct usages. One might portray these distinct usages as distinct games, but that's really a step in the wrong direction. The real production of distinct games is the artificial process of creating distinct logical premises, and distinct logical proceedings. The natural process of deriving meaning is a comparison of individual, particular, instances of use, which cannot be portrayed as games. They cannot be portrayed as games because the game representation assumes that each instance of usage proceeds with the intent of establishing a rule for general usage. Natural language use does not often proceed with the intent of establishing a rule, it just proceeds with the intent of accomplishing the purpose in that particular instance. So when a person compares distinct instances of usage to derive meaning, this is not a matter of comparing distinct games, because that intent, of demonstrating a game is not necessarily there in these distinct instances.

If I'm correct, every philosophy should condense into a single word e.g. Buddhism can be summed up as anicca (impermanence/change). If so Wittgenstein's philosophy too should boil down to a single concept, say, use (from meaning is use). However, use implies a lack of essence; in other words, there's no right view to Wittgenstein - one manner in which you use Wittgenstein is as correct as any other.

This then brings us to the notion of a private language: the concept of correctness vanishes with the paradox "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule."

Wittgenstein's theory is itself a private language.

the concept of correctness vanishes with the paradox "no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." — Agent Smith

Wittgenstein solved the paradox for you:

“It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.”

Wittgenstein, on pain of a contradiction, simply can't possess an essence; no essence, a free for all, no holds barred, law of the jungle, anything goes. In essence, you're right but so am I and so is anyone else.

no essence, a free for all, no holds barred, law of the jungle, anything goes. In essence, you're right but so am I and so is anyone else. — Agent Smith

Are you saying that you believe Wittgenstein’s is a no holds barred, anything goes approach? A radical relativism?