If there is no actual John, but only an imagined John, then I believed the statement was a about an actual John, but subsequently discovered I was mistaken, and that it was about an imagined or fictive John. — Janus
Who said (2) is inside your skull? — Isaac
You've just said that you believe the actual weather you're referring to goes on outside of your skull. ==>I don't.<== — Isaac
Not without begging the question.We can just take that as a given. — Isaac
What model? You've given me nothing meeting the conditions I've outlined.If you believe in such a model and I do too, — Isaac
The flower that is not inside the box?The flower you originally claimed you were talking about. — Isaac
...not just any weather. The weather as it is currently occurring outside my window."it's raining">"the weather is raining" — Isaac
Yep.You want to claim that "the weather is raining" is about the actual weather outside your skull (object), — Isaac
Nothing. The flower in the box does not exist.So when you find out you were deceived and there was no flower, what do you do about your expression at T1? — Isaac
Don't have to. I was just wrong about it at T1.Do you go back in time and change what it was about? — Isaac
It's about what's in the box. That's why on finding the box empty at T2 I can say "I guess I was wrong. (because) There was no flower in the box." The lack of flowers in the box is why there is no referent to "the flower", which makes "The flower is green" false.Do you not know what your expressions are about (only guess)? — Isaac
Nope. I don't say confused things like "The flower I knew was in the box that was green blinked out of existence and now retroactively I change my past knowledge to past non-knowledge". I don't say confused things like "At T1 I knew there was a flower in a box, but I was wrong". I just say "I thought I knew the flower (in the box) was green, but there wasn't even any flower there (in the box)".Do the outside-skull objects of your expressions blink in and out of existence depending on what's later believed about them? — Isaac
If you believe in such a model and I do too, — Isaac
What model? — InPitzotl
The flower that is not inside the box? — InPitzotl
...not just any weather. The weather as it is currently occurring outside my window. — InPitzotl
Nothing. The flower in the box does not exist. — InPitzotl
Don't have to. I was just wrong about it at T1. — InPitzotl
It's about what's in the box. That's why on finding the box empty at T2 I can say "I guess I was wrong. (because) There was no flower in the box." The lack of flowers in the box is why there is no referent to "the flower", which makes "The flower is green" false. — InPitzotl
So you don't know what your statements are about at the time you're making them? That's fine if that's your model. Seems perfectly consistent to me, but quite nonsensical. I prefer a model where I do know what I'm referring to in my expressions at the time I'm making them. — Isaac
If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible. — Janus
Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action. — sime
That depends on perspective. E.g, from my perspective, your perception of the moon and "the actual moon" are mostly unrelated concepts, even though I am forced to consider my perception of the moon as being in some sense fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon". — sime
If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible. — Janus
Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. — Janus
If you are uncomfortable with anything less than certainty, then you can opt for an impoverished understanding of knowledge — Janus
Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action. — sime
It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac
Paraphrased, "It's raining" is hocus. "What's happening outside my window" is pocus. Hocus can't be pocus because I don't have "direct access" to pocus.It cannot. It attempts to talk about what's happening outside of your window, it intends to talk about what's happening outside of your window. It cannot actually do so directly because you do not have direct access to what's going on outside your window. — Isaac
"It's raining" is hocus. "The actual weather" is hocus. "It's raining" cannot be "the actual weather" because they're both hocus?I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac
What flower? ...and no. I never claimed literally or any analog to the expression being about the flower. You're putting words in my mouth. Now, it is true that it's about a flower, but it's true in a different sense than anything discussed (with me at least) so far.You claimed your expression was about the flower. I'm asking you what becomes of that claim? — Isaac
It's not about being happy; it's a requirement. Not all claims are about something we believe or things we know exist. "Hat" in "Isaac's hat is a lovely shade of green today" may or may not have a referent; I don't particularly have any beliefs about it. Nevertheless, it means something; I know what to do to figure out if "hat" has a referent and, if it does, whether the claim is indeed true or not. I can simply, with your consent, head on over to your location and take a gander at your noggin. If there's a hat upon it, the statement asserts that it's green, and of a lovely shade. So should I find such hat, I just verify that it's green and that its shade is lovely. If there's no hat, that means there's nothing to assert the color of.Right, so, like Janus, you're happy with the notion that you don't know what your expressions are about when you utter them? — Isaac
I have no clue; how does one "trick me with a powerful hallucinogen" to say "the flower is green"? Also there's a contradiction; T0 and T2 cannot both be true. I'm guessing you don't literally mean both; and I'm supposed to per T2 infer that you did not in fact show me a flower, but in that case, what does that leave T0 as even saying then?T0 - I show you a flower
T1 - you say "the flower is green"
T2 - I reveal that I had tricked you with a powerful hallucinogen and there was in fact no flower.
What was your statement at T1 about? — Isaac
Why would your perception of the moon be any more "fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon"" than mine though? While it seems true that the properties of the moon are perceived properties; I don't think it follows that the moon must be dependent for its existence on being perceived. The way it appears depends on being perceived, but that is not the same as the ways in which it could be perceived. — Janus
Right. But you don't know what they actually are about, just what you hope they're about. — Isaac
Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. — Janus
Sounds like a contradiction. How can it consist in 'true' beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold, without requiring certainty? The 'true' bit requires certainty. Things are not 'true' by us beliving them to be (on your account). Otherwise it's just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold' (a definition I entirely agree with). — Isaac
It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. By your definition, the only correct answer to "do you know that?" is "no" (because we can't say if the belief is true).That seems to render the term useless. — Isaac
Because my concept of "the actual moon" is necessarily in relation to my experiences that constitute my frame of reference, and any powers of empathy i might have for pretending to understand the moon from your perspective cannot change this semantic fact. — sime
A belief can be true even if it isn't certain. — Michael
You've repeatedly accepted that our beliefs can be wrong (and even that the language community can be wrong), so it seems that at least sometimes you understand what it means for a belief to be true or false. — Michael
You just don't appear to be very consistent in this acceptance. — Michael
"It's raining" is hocus. "The actual weather" is hocus. "It's raining" cannot be "the actual weather" because they're both hocus? — InPitzotl
"The flower is green". Propositions assert conditions about a part of the world. — InPitzotl
how does one "trick me with a powerful hallucinogen" to say "the flower is green"? — InPitzotl
Try this: — InPitzotl
You can't just search high and low for some example where some mutation of a scenario is about belief and claim victory. — InPitzotl
the belief is revised to match the information — InPitzotl
According to a causal understanding of mind, each and every psychological state refers only to the situation that caused it, implying that "belief states" are necessarily infallible or that the notion of truth is superfluous. — sime
beliefs exist in relation to social-conventions for classifying thoughts and behaviour. To say "John's beliefs were shown to be false" is to say "Relative to our epistemic-conventions, the belief-behaviour exhibited by John was classified as "false" - which isn't to say anything about John per-se. — sime
I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know (which compromise the bulk of statements I make about people) are not about actual people. — Janus
What do you mean by certainty? A feeling of certainty? How could our subjective feelings of certainty determine whether or not statements we make, or beliefs we hold, are true? That just isn't what truth is commonly understood to consists in. The truth is the truth regardless of whether we believe it, or feel certain about it. — Janus
The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. — Janus
I can't determine just where the cause of your apparent confusion seems to originate on this point. — Janus
OK, so perhaps you should have said "fundamental to my definition of the actual moon" rather than "fundamental to the very definition of the actual moon"? — Janus
Still not following I'm afraid. 'Truth' is a predictive function, it says that if I act as if A I will get the response expected if A were the case. I don't see how a notion of mind-state causality affect this. We can model all the prior causes of the the belief that X and still find that acting as if X doesn't yield the results we'd expect if X were the case. — Isaac
So in "the cat believes the food is under the box" 'believes' should be replaced with what? Or do our epistemic conventions apply to cats? — Isaac
Do you mean a belief can be true even if the person whose belief it is isn't certain of that? If so, then I agree with that. — Isaac
It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac
On a causal account of belief states, the psychological state of expectation cannot be interpreted as being future directed. The object of this person's expectation isn't the future lottery, but merely the dream that they had. — sime
Requiring that a belief is true doesn't necessitate certainty. — Michael
If you claim...
"people use the expression 'I know x' when x is true"
...it requires that they are certain about x. Otherwise your claim becomes...
"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x is true".
Which deflates to..
"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x"...
(since 'x is true' is just to state 'x'). But that's the claim you're arguing against. — Isaac
They use the expression "I know X" when they believe that X is true... — Michael
If their belief is true then their claim of knowledge is true. If their belief is false then their claim of knowledge is false. — Michael
But this is just pie in the sky. It's not at all how we assess knowledge claims. We say someone has 'knowledge' when we believe that their claim is true. — Isaac
But this is just pie in the sky. It's not at all how we assess knowledge claims. We say someone has 'knowledge' when we believe that their claim is true. — Isaac
Maybe you're being fuzzy with your concepts? Both "it's raining" and "the actual weather condition" are asserted to be beliefs. Presumably we have "direct access" to our beliefs. But the problem was supposed to be that "It's raining" can't be about "the actual weather" because we don't have direct access to "the actual weather".Not sure how you're getting that out of what I wrote. — Isaac
Depends on the case. In the types of claims you're talking about, the claim presumes the part exists. That presumption is not part of the assertion; so if it fails, the truth value of the statement is undefined. There are other cases.Even when there is no such part? — Isaac
That it's a thought experiment is not the problem. The problem is that there's a hole in the thought experiment. Abstracting away details that don't matter is one thing; leaving out details that do is another. You have an entire part of your thought experiment that seems to boil down into absolutely nothing when fixing the contradiction... what the heck happened at T0? But it sounds like the alien example works for you, so we could talk about that.Really? Are you unfamiliar with thought experiments? — Isaac
Yep; pretty much. It's not like there is a meaning fairy that's going to prevent us from talking about things that don't exist; we're the ones that have to figure that out.So statements are about things in the world, except when they're not. Got it. — Isaac
That's an open ended question, and there isn't always an answer. But in your flower case all we need do is look in the box; and in the hat case, look at your head. The salient point here is that neither of these things are belief inspections; they are world inspections.Now, how do we tell which is which...? — Isaac
I don't see why not. There are psychological states regarding 'the actual lottery' as much as there are regarding 'my dream I had last night'. I can quite coherently now distinguish between my concept of what's actually in my cupboard and what I believe is in my cupboard, that's how I'm aware of the fact that I might be wrong, by holding those two concepts to be different. If someone says to me "what might be in that cupboard?" I could give them several answers, none of which correspond to what I believe is in that cupboard. I could even imagine myself opening the cupboard and being surprised by the contents. — Isaac
So when I say X is knowledge, I'm lying. X hasn't actually met the 'true' bit. I just think it has. But thinking it has is exactly the same as the 'good reason to hold' bit, so that can't be a new component. Your saying that to be knowledge, X has to have two properties...
1. Be true
2. Be justified
...but then you seem to say that certainty about 1 is not part of what knowledge is ("knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty"). You says that reasonable grounds to believe 1 is sufficient ("I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know ...are not about actual people"). But reasonable grounds to believe 1 is exactly what 2 is, making the addition of 1 redundant. — Isaac
The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. — Janus
'Correct' according to whom. I still haven't had an answer from any of my interlocutors here to this question that keeps arising. If the way we actually use a word in real conversations is not the measure of how it 'ought' to be used, then what is? — Isaac
We also say that someone's claims are true when we believe that their claims are true. But as you (sometimes) admit, our beliefs can be wrong. — Michael
I'll add; the reason we say that someone has knowledge when we believe that their claim is true is because we understand that being true is a requirement for knowledge. — Michael
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