If there is no actual John, but only an imagined John, then I believed the statement was a about an actual John, but subsequently discovered I was mistaken, and that it was about an imagined or fictive John. — Janus

So you don't know what your statements are about at the time you're making them? That's fine if that's your model. Seems perfectly consistent to me, but quite nonsensical. I prefer a model where I do know what I'm referring to in my expressions at the time I'm making them.

Who said (2) is inside your skull? — Isaac

You've just said that you believe the actual weather you're referring to goes on outside of your skull. ==>I don't.<== — Isaac

We can just take that as a given. — Isaac

Not without begging the question.

If you believe in such a model and I do too, — Isaac

What model? You've given me nothing meeting the conditions I've outlined.

The flower you originally claimed you were talking about. — Isaac

The flower that is not inside the box?

"it's raining">"the weather is raining" — Isaac

...not just any weather. The weather as it is currently occurring outside my window.

You want to claim that "the weather is raining" is about the actual weather outside your skull (object), — Isaac

Yep.

So when you find out you were deceived and there was no flower, what do you do about your expression at T1? — Isaac

Nothing. The flower in the box does not exist.

Do you go back in time and change what it was about? — Isaac

Don't have to. I was just wrong about it at T1.

Do you not know what your expressions are about (only guess)? — Isaac

It's about what's in the box. That's why on finding the box empty at T2 I can say "I guess I was wrong. (because) There was no flower in the box." The lack of flowers in the box is why there is no referent to "the flower", which makes "The flower is green" false.

Do the outside-skull objects of your expressions blink in and out of existence depending on what's later believed about them? — Isaac

Nope. I don't say confused things like "The flower I knew was in the box that was green blinked out of existence and now retroactively I change my past knowledge to past non-knowledge". I don't say confused things like "At T1 I knew there was a flower in a box, but I was wrong". I just say "I thought I knew the flower (in the box) was green, but there wasn't even any flower there (in the box)".

And it doesn't depend on who believes in it. That's why I can test "the flower is green" by looking in the box, despite believing "The flower is green"... and why I change my beliefs on discovering the box is empty. My beliefs aren't authoritative because I'm not talking about the belief. My beliefs defer to what's actually in the box. Which is to say, "The flower is green" is about what's in the box, not about what I believe.

This is no different than a captain sailing a ship on the oceans using a map. The captain isn't traveling on a map; the captain is traveling on the ocean. So should the captain see an island that is not on the map, the island is there because it's the map that's wrong, not the island. Likewise should the captain not see an island that is on a map, the island isn't there because it's also the map that's wrong, not the location on the ocean.

It's extremely difficult to respond to your post given that it's so terse and cluttered. I'll do my best

1. You seem to be claiming that I've said the weather is in your skull by quoting me saying "You've just said that you believe the actual weather you're referring to goes on outside of your skull. ==>I don't.<=="? If so, then try reading the entire expression rather than just the underlined bits. Expressions make sense as a whole, not in parts. I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull.

Either that or you did indeed catch me out in a stunning coup de grâce and I did truly believe that you had rain, wind and snow inside your skull. A second's thought about which was most likely would have eliminated this entire pointless digression.

If you believe in such a model and I do too, — Isaac

What model? — InPitzotl

The one I outlined in the preceding sentences.

The flower that is not inside the box? — InPitzotl

Yes, that's correct.

...not just any weather. The weather as it is currently occurring outside my window. — InPitzotl

Fine.

Nothing. The flower in the box does not exist. — InPitzotl

You claimed your expression was about the flower. I'm asking you what becomes of that claim?

Don't have to. I was just wrong about it at T1. — InPitzotl

Right, so, like Janus, you're happy with the notion that you don't know what your expressions are about when you utter them? That seems daft to me, but is at least coherent.

It's about what's in the box. That's why on finding the box empty at T2 I can say "I guess I was wrong. (because) There was no flower in the box." The lack of flowers in the box is why there is no referent to "the flower", which makes "The flower is green" false. — InPitzotl

Forget the box, it was a device I thought might make the thought experiment clearer, but it has clearly not.

T0 - I show you a flower
T1 - you say "the flower is green"
T2 - I reveal that I had tricked you with a powerful hallucinogen and there was in fact no flower.

What was your statement at T1 about?

So you don't know what your statements are about at the time you're making them? That's fine if that's your model. Seems perfectly consistent to me, but quite nonsensical. I prefer a model where I do know what I'm referring to in my expressions at the time I'm making them. — Isaac

You're conflating the idea of what statements are about tout court, with what they are intended to be about. If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible.

Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. So we can never know with absolute certainty that we possess knowledge.The possibility of being mistaken, however small it might be, is always there.

If you are uncomfortable with anything less than certainty, then you can opt for an impoverished understanding of knowledge, clinging to the illusory hope that you have thereby attained certainty. Personally I'm quite comfortable with uncertainty.

Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action.

If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible. — Janus

That depends on perspective. E.g, from my perspective, your perception of the moon and "the actual moon" are mostly unrelated concepts, even though I am forced to consider my perception of the moon as being in some sense fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon".

Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action. — sime

I agree. It would be a category error to say that beliefs are properties of brains. beliefs are held by persons.

That depends on perspective. E.g, from my perspective, your perception of the moon and "the actual moon" are mostly unrelated concepts, even though I am forced to consider my perception of the moon as being in some sense fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon". — sime

Why would your perception of the moon be any more "fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon"" than mine though? While it seems true that the properties of the moon are perceived properties; I don't think it follows that the moon must be dependent for its existence on being perceived. The way it appears depends on being perceived, but that is not the same as the ways in which it could be perceived.

If I think John exists and I make a statement about John, then it is intended to be about an actual John. So I know what my statements are intended to be about. But I am not infallible. — Janus

Right. But you don't know what they actually are about, just what you hope they're about.

Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. — Janus

Sounds like a contradiction. How can it consist in 'true' beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold, without requiring certainty? The 'true' bit requires certainty. Things are not 'true' by us beliving them to be (on your account). Otherwise it's just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold' (a definition I entirely agree with).

If you are uncomfortable with anything less than certainty, then you can opt for an impoverished understanding of knowledge — Janus

It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. By your definition, the only correct answer to "do you know that?" is "no" (because we can't say if the belief is true).That seems to render the term useless.

Beliefs cannot be real properties of brains, because the notion of epistemic-error is under-determined with respect to the neurological and physical facts of perception and action. — sime

Could you expand on that?

It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac

A belief can be true even if it isn't certain. The money I have in my bag can be real money even if I'm not certain that it's real money.

You've repeatedly accepted that our beliefs can be wrong (and even that the language community can be wrong), so it seems that at least sometimes you understand what it means for a belief to be true or false. You just don't appear to be very consistent in this acceptance.

(Re)posting this here because I don't know how exactly how merging a discussion works

I propose that we should first make a distinction between perfect justification, partially imperfect justification and completely imperfect justification. A perfect justification would be one where the justification completely rules out the possibility of the belief being false, for example, 1 + 1 = 2 completely rules out the possibilty of 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples being false.

Partially imperfect justification is justification that decreases the probabilty of the belief being false, but that does not completely rule it out. there are better and worse partially imperfect justifications. For example, looking at a clock and inferring that it is 12 o'clock is partially imperfect justification.

Completely imperfect justification is justification that does not affect the probability of the blief being false at all. For example, "roses are red" does not affect the probability of "John has a dog" being false at all.

Now, I'm not sure for what to do next. Based on that, we could make a distinction between perfect knowledge, partially imperfect knowledge, and completely imperfect knwoledge, or we could consider one or both of the two later as not knowledge at all.

(As I am a layman, I am aware that some philosopher I haven't read or heard about could already have proposed those ideas, so please inform me if it is the case)

Rewind... we have this:

It cannot. It attempts to talk about what's happening outside of your window, it intends to talk about what's happening outside of your window. It cannot actually do so directly because you do not have direct access to what's going on outside your window. — Isaac

Paraphrased, "It's raining" is hocus. "What's happening outside my window" is pocus. Hocus can't be pocus because I don't have "direct access" to pocus.

In theory, best I can tell from what you wrote, you're at least supposed to be arguing that pocus is a thing and hocus can't be pocus because of direct access. But:

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

"It's raining" is hocus. "The actual weather" is hocus. "It's raining" cannot be "the actual weather" because they're both hocus?

You claimed your expression was about the flower. I'm asking you what becomes of that claim? — Isaac

What flower? ...and no. I never claimed literally or any analog to the expression being about the flower. You're putting words in my mouth. Now, it is true that it's about a flower, but it's true in a different sense than anything discussed (with me at least) so far.

"Flower" is a noun; but "It's raining" is a proposition; as is "The flower is green". Propositions assert conditions about a part of the world. A statement being about a part of the world means there's a part of the world you can look at relevant to what the statement is asserting. "It's raining" and "the flower is green" are slightly different (aka, not truly analogous), but they both have parts of the world you can look at that are relevant.

Right, so, like Janus, you're happy with the notion that you don't know what your expressions are about when you utter them? — Isaac

It's not about being happy; it's a requirement. Not all claims are about something we believe or things we know exist. "Hat" in "Isaac's hat is a lovely shade of green today" may or may not have a referent; I don't particularly have any beliefs about it. Nevertheless, it means something; I know what to do to figure out if "hat" has a referent and, if it does, whether the claim is indeed true or not. I can simply, with your consent, head on over to your location and take a gander at your noggin. If there's a hat upon it, the statement asserts that it's green, and of a lovely shade. So should I find such hat, I just verify that it's green and that its shade is lovely. If there's no hat, that means there's nothing to assert the color of.

I've said all of this before, but what I'm highlighting here is that belief in the claim is completely irrelevant. I don't come into this with a belief that you're wearing a hat or it's green. And it would be a complete waste of time to take a survey to find someone who might believe such a thing, because that has nothing to do with what the statement is about (even if I find such a person, what then? What has that got to do with the hat on your head or its color?)

T0 - I show you a flower
T1 - you say "the flower is green"
T2 - I reveal that I had tricked you with a powerful hallucinogen and there was in fact no flower.
What was your statement at T1 about? — Isaac

I have no clue; how does one "trick me with a powerful hallucinogen" to say "the flower is green"? Also there's a contradiction; T0 and T2 cannot both be true. I'm guessing you don't literally mean both; and I'm supposed to per T2 infer that you did not in fact show me a flower, but in that case, what does that leave T0 as even saying then?

Are you trying to come up with a scenario where someone has a belief without being about a part of the world? Try this:
T0 - I had a hypnagogic experience of being held down by aliens.
T1 - I said "the aliens are gray"
T2 - Someone convinces me that this was just a hypnagogic experience
...even here, "the aliens are gray" is not about my belief; but my experience.

I don't see how to make it about a belief (in this form) other than to propose the belief was formed irrationally. That's certainly possible, but the entire exercise is fundamentally misguided... it is in essence an attempt to "find" a scenario where something is a belief, whereas you're allegedly trying to say it's always about beliefs. The phrase "cherry picking" comes to mind.

You can't just search high and low for some example where some mutation of a scenario is about belief and claim victory. You have to back up why "it's raining" in the scenario being discussed is about belief. And the fact that said claim is subject to revision counts dramatically against your argument, not for it as you claim (supposedly the doubt means we're not sure of the condition and that implies it's not about the condition; but quite contrarily, the fact that the belief is revised to match the information demonstrates exactly the opposite... that it's about the thing we're informed of, not the belief... were it about the belief, we would revise the information to match the belief).

According to a causal understanding of mind, each and every psychological state refers only to the situation that caused it, implying that "belief states" are necessarily infallible or that the notion of truth is superfluous. Therefore, since beliefs aren't generally considered to be infallible, they cannot be reducible to psychological states.

Rather, beliefs exist in relation to social-conventions for classifying thoughts and behaviour. To say "John's beliefs were shown to be false" is to say "Relative to our epistemic-conventions, the belief-behaviour exhibited by John was classified as "false" - which isn't to say anything about John per-se.

Why would your perception of the moon be any more "fundamental to the very definition of "the actual moon"" than mine though? While it seems true that the properties of the moon are perceived properties; I don't think it follows that the moon must be dependent for its existence on being perceived. The way it appears depends on being perceived, but that is not the same as the ways in which it could be perceived. — Janus

Because my concept of "the actual moon" is necessarily in relation to my experiences that constitute my frame of reference, and any powers of empathy i might have for pretending to understand the moon from your perspective cannot change this semantic fact.

Right. But you don't know what they actually are about, just what you hope they're about. — Isaac

I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know (which compromise the bulk of statements I make about people) are not about actual people. If the statements I make are true, and the people they are made about are actual then the statements will be knowledgeable.

Remember that knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold. — Janus


Sounds like a contradiction. How can it consist in 'true' beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold, without requiring certainty? The 'true' bit requires certainty. Things are not 'true' by us beliving them to be (on your account). Otherwise it's just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold' (a definition I entirely agree with). — Isaac

What do you mean by certainty? A feeling of certainty? How could our subjective feelings of certainty determine whether or not statements we make, or beliefs we hold, are true? That just isn't what truth is commonly understood to consists in. The truth is the truth regardless of whether we believe it, or feel certain about it.

It seems the other way around. I'm saying that 'knowledge' is just 'beliefs we take ourselves to have (specific) good reason(s) to hold'. That seems to acknowledge uncertainty and match the actual use of the term in real life. It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. By your definition, the only correct answer to "do you know that?" is "no" (because we can't say if the belief is true).That seems to render the term useless. — Isaac

What we take to be knowledge is beliefs that we take ourselves to have good reasons to hold. But we might be wrong, in which case what we took to be knowledge turns out not to be. That beliefs must be true to constitute knowledge has nothing to do with subjective feelings of certainty.

The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. The acknowledgement that knowledge must be true belief held for true reasons carries with it a humility that acknowledges the possibility of being wrong (which would only be possible if our beliefs can be true or false, and we cannot attain absolute certainty about anything).

I can't determine just where the cause of your apparent confusion seems to originate on this point.

Because my concept of "the actual moon" is necessarily in relation to my experiences that constitute my frame of reference, and any powers of empathy i might have for pretending to understand the moon from your perspective cannot change this semantic fact. — sime

OK, so perhaps you should have said "fundamental to my definition of the actual moon" rather than "fundamental to the very definition of the actual moon"?

A belief can be true even if it isn't certain. — Michael

I don't follow. Certain (to me) is a state of a person, "I'm certain", not a belief. Do you mean a belief can be true even if the person whose belief it is isn't certain of that? If so, then I agree with that.

You've repeatedly accepted that our beliefs can be wrong (and even that the language community can be wrong), so it seems that at least sometimes you understand what it means for a belief to be true or false. — Michael

Yep, or at least, I hope so.

You just don't appear to be very consistent in this acceptance. — Michael

Not incredibly helpful without the examples!

"It's raining" is hocus. "The actual weather" is hocus. "It's raining" cannot be "the actual weather" because they're both hocus? — InPitzotl

Not sure how you're getting that out of what I wrote.

"The flower is green". Propositions assert conditions about a part of the world. — InPitzotl

Even when there is no such part?

how does one "trick me with a powerful hallucinogen" to say "the flower is green"? — InPitzotl

Really? Are you unfamiliar with thought experiments? It's not generally considered within the scope to explain the detail of the mechanisms involved... "imagine you're on trolly speeding toward a junction...", "wait, how exactly does the brake mechanism work?"

Try this: — InPitzotl

Yeah, good example.

You can't just search high and low for some example where some mutation of a scenario is about belief and claim victory. — InPitzotl

So statements are about things in the world, except when they're not. Got it.

Now, how do we tell which is which...?

the belief is revised to match the information — InPitzotl

When do we get 'the information' as opposed to just another belief?

According to a causal understanding of mind, each and every psychological state refers only to the situation that caused it, implying that "belief states" are necessarily infallible or that the notion of truth is superfluous. — sime

Still not following I'm afraid. 'Truth' is a predictive function, it says that if I act as if A I will get the response expected if A were the case. I don't see how a notion of mind-state causality affect this. We can model all the prior causes of the the belief that X and still find that acting as if X doesn't yield the results we'd expect if X were the case.

beliefs exist in relation to social-conventions for classifying thoughts and behaviour. To say "John's beliefs were shown to be false" is to say "Relative to our epistemic-conventions, the belief-behaviour exhibited by John was classified as "false" - which isn't to say anything about John per-se. — sime

So in "the cat believes the food is under the box" 'believes' should be replaced with what? Or do our epistemic conventions apply to cats?

I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know (which compromise the bulk of statements I make about people) are not about actual people. — Janus

Right. But vanishingly little is not none.

If, in a Dog show, there's a single tiny category for 'best cat', you'd be well within the remit of being understood to say "it's a dog show, it's about dogs". The point here is when someone says "there's a 'best cat' section " You don't say "no there isn't it's about dogs", you say "yeah, I know, it's really about popular pets, but mainly about dogs".

What do you mean by certainty? A feeling of certainty? How could our subjective feelings of certainty determine whether or not statements we make, or beliefs we hold, are true? That just isn't what truth is commonly understood to consists in. The truth is the truth regardless of whether we believe it, or feel certain about it. — Janus

I'd dispute your definition of 'truth', but that's not relevant here, I don't think. The point is you said "knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty, but in true beliefs we take ourselves to have good reason to hold" So when I say X is knowledge, I'm lying. X hasn't actually met the 'true' bit. I just think it has. But thinking it has is exactly the same as the 'good reason to hold' bit, so that can't be a new component. Your saying that to be knowledge, X has to have two properties...

1. Be true
2. Be justified

...but then you seem to say that certainty about 1 is not part of what knowledge is ("knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty"). You says that reasonable grounds to believe 1 is sufficient ("I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know ...are not about actual people"). But reasonable grounds to believe 1 is exactly what 2 is, making the addition of 1 redundant.

The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. — Janus

'Correct' according to whom. I still haven't had an answer from any of my interlocutors here to this question that keeps arising. If the way we actually use a word in real conversations is not the measure of how it 'ought' to be used, then what is?

I can't determine just where the cause of your apparent confusion seems to originate on this point. — Janus

...and yet steadfast about whose apparent confusion it is. That epistemic humility you spoke of not two sentences prior seems to have proven somewhat ephemeral.

OK, so perhaps you should have said "fundamental to my definition of the actual moon" rather than "fundamental to the very definition of the actual moon"? — Janus

Yes, I'm of the view that the object of a predicate loses intelligibility if the subject responsible for the predication is dropped or replaced with the mythical subject "we".

Still not following I'm afraid. 'Truth' is a predictive function, it says that if I act as if A I will get the response expected if A were the case. I don't see how a notion of mind-state causality affect this. We can model all the prior causes of the the belief that X and still find that acting as if X doesn't yield the results we'd expect if X were the case. — Isaac

We predicate truth about people's behaviour, e.g. "John's opinion was discovered to be true", but this shouldn't be taken to imply that truth is a property of their thoughts and actions.

Suppose a person says "I expect that if I buy a ticket I will win the lottery tomorrow, because I had a vivid dream of winning it last night".

On a causal account of belief states, the psychological state of expectation cannot be interpreted as being future directed. The object of this person's expectation isn't the future lottery, but merely the dream that they had.

So in "the cat believes the food is under the box" 'believes' should be replaced with what? Or do our epistemic conventions apply to cats? — Isaac

We interpret the cat in the manner that suits our purposes, i.e. using the same approach as we do a human being. In both cases, we aren't predicating a property about the agent concerned.

Do you mean a belief can be true even if the person whose belief it is isn't certain of that? If so, then I agree with that. — Isaac

Then why did you say the below in that very comment I was responding to?

It's your additional requirement that the beliefs be 'true' that necessitates certainty and renders all actual use incorrect. — Isaac

Requiring that a belief is true doesn't necessitate certainty.

On a causal account of belief states, the psychological state of expectation cannot be interpreted as being future directed. The object of this person's expectation isn't the future lottery, but merely the dream that they had. — sime

I don't see why not. There are psychological states regarding 'the actual lottery' as much as there are regarding 'my dream I had last night'. I can quite coherently now distinguish between my concept of what's actually in my cupboard and what I believe is in my cupboard, that's how I'm aware of the fact that I might be wrong, by holding those two concepts to be different. If someone says to me "what might be in that cupboard?" I could give them several answers, none of which correspond to what I believe is in that cupboard. I could even imagine myself opening the cupboard and being surprised by the contents.

Imagine we were discussing the meaning of terms around the sorties paradox. You might say "a 'pile' is when there's more than 103 objects". I'd say "that's not how we use the word 'pile' because we definitely don't actually count the objects". You seem to be responding with "but there either are 103 objects or there aren't, are you saying us using the word 'pile' determines how many objects there are?"

It is one question whether there are objective facts which pertain regardless of our beliefs about them.

It is an entirely unrelated second question as to whether we refer to these facts when we use the expression "I know that x".

My answer to the first is 'yes'. My answer to the second is 'no'.

Requiring that a belief is true doesn't necessitate certainty. — Michael

If you claim...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when x is true"

...it requires that they are certain about x. Otherwise your claim becomes...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x is true".

Which deflates to..

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x"...

(since 'x is true' is just to state 'x'). But that's the claim you're arguing against.

If you claim...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when x is true"

...it requires that they are certain about x. Otherwise your claim becomes...

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x is true".

Which deflates to..

"people use the expression 'I know x' when they believe x"...

(since 'x is true' is just to state 'x'). But that's the claim you're arguing against. — Isaac

They use the expression "I know X" when they believe that X is true, but as you (sometimes) admit, sometimes our beliefs are wrong.

If their belief is true then their claim of knowledge is true. If their belief is false then their claim of knowledge is false.

Alternatively...

From a deflationary point of view, "'the grass is green', is true" is the same as "the grass is green".

JTB wants to say "I know the grass is green" is equivalent to "I believe the grass is green" and "'the grass is green' is true".

But "I know the grass is green" and "I believe the grass is green" can't be distinguished by saying "'the grass is green' is true" is part of the claim in (1), where it isn't in (2), because both claims use the expression "the grass is green", which we've just established is equivalent to "'the grass is green' is true"

They use the expression "I know X" when they believe that X is true... — Michael

So, if that's how people use the word 'knowledge' then in what sense can you claim that "I know x", doesn't mean "I believe x is true"?, making the meaning of 'to know', 'stuff I believe is true', not 'stuff that actually is true'.

If their belief is true then their claim of knowledge is true. If their belief is false then their claim of knowledge is false. — Michael

But this is just pie in the sky. It's not at all how we assess knowledge claims. We say someone has 'knowledge' when we believe that their claim is true.

But this is just pie in the sky. It's not at all how we assess knowledge claims. We say someone has 'knowledge' when we believe that their claim is true. — Isaac

We also say that someone's claims are true when we believe that their claims are true. But as you (sometimes) admit, our beliefs can be wrong.

Believing or saying that something is true doesn't entail that it is true. Believing or saying that someone has knowledge doesn't entail that they have knowledge.

But this is just pie in the sky. It's not at all how we assess knowledge claims. We say someone has 'knowledge' when we believe that their claim is true. — Isaac

I'll add; the reason we say that someone has knowledge when we believe that their claim is true is because we understand that being true is a requirement for knowledge.

Not sure how you're getting that out of what I wrote. — Isaac

Maybe you're being fuzzy with your concepts? Both "it's raining" and "the actual weather condition" are asserted to be beliefs. Presumably we have "direct access" to our beliefs. But the problem was supposed to be that "It's raining" can't be about "the actual weather" because we don't have direct access to "the actual weather".

I think you're confusing your "fix" with your problem statement. But the problem with your problem statement is that you have to find a way to simultaneously recognize that I can talk about "it's raining" (hocus) and not talk about "the actual weather condition" (pocus).

Even when there is no such part? — Isaac

Depends on the case. In the types of claims you're talking about, the claim presumes the part exists. That presumption is not part of the assertion; so if it fails, the truth value of the statement is undefined. There are other cases.

Really? Are you unfamiliar with thought experiments? — Isaac

That it's a thought experiment is not the problem. The problem is that there's a hole in the thought experiment. Abstracting away details that don't matter is one thing; leaving out details that do is another. You have an entire part of your thought experiment that seems to boil down into absolutely nothing when fixing the contradiction... what the heck happened at T0? But it sounds like the alien example works for you, so we could talk about that.

So statements are about things in the world, except when they're not. Got it. — Isaac

Yep; pretty much. It's not like there is a meaning fairy that's going to prevent us from talking about things that don't exist; we're the ones that have to figure that out.

Now, how do we tell which is which...? — Isaac

That's an open ended question, and there isn't always an answer. But in your flower case all we need do is look in the box; and in the hat case, look at your head. The salient point here is that neither of these things are belief inspections; they are world inspections.

I don't see why not. There are psychological states regarding 'the actual lottery' as much as there are regarding 'my dream I had last night'. I can quite coherently now distinguish between my concept of what's actually in my cupboard and what I believe is in my cupboard, that's how I'm aware of the fact that I might be wrong, by holding those two concepts to be different. If someone says to me "what might be in that cupboard?" I could give them several answers, none of which correspond to what I believe is in that cupboard. I could even imagine myself opening the cupboard and being surprised by the contents. — Isaac

Right, but what has your present psychological state of uncertainty, including your memories, imagination and thought experiments, got to do with a future interaction with your cupboard?

Doesn't your self-professed ability to distinguish your beliefs from actuality preclude you from interpreting the objects of your beliefs as being in the future?

So when I say X is knowledge, I'm lying. X hasn't actually met the 'true' bit. I just think it has. But thinking it has is exactly the same as the 'good reason to hold' bit, so that can't be a new component. Your saying that to be knowledge, X has to have two properties...

1. Be true
2. Be justified

...but then you seem to say that certainty about 1 is not part of what knowledge is ("knowledge cannot consist in absolute certainty"). You says that reasonable grounds to believe 1 is sufficient ("I have vanishingly little reason to believe that the statements I make about people I know ...are not about actual people"). But reasonable grounds to believe 1 is exactly what 2 is, making the addition of 1 redundant. — Isaac

As I see it you are still conflating what is involved with taking ourselves to possess knowledge and what is involved with our actually possessing knowledge, and that seems to be causing your confusion. From the point of view of requir8ing absolute certainty we never possess knowledge, but merely belief. My point has been that the ordinary conception of knowledge does not require absolute certainty, but only "no (or sufficiently little) reason not to think that we know". I'm also not claiming that the "sufficiently little" is precisely determinable, and I don't think the ordinary conception of knowledge requires that it should be so.

So to take ourselves to possess knowledge is to take our belief to be both true and justified (i.e. believed for the right reasons). I think that is the common understanding of what knowledge is.

But then, if they are the criteria, it seems obvious that we cannot be absolutely certain that we possess knowledge, even in the most mundane contexts. But depending on the context we may still have more or less reason to think that we might be mistaken, and in the situations where there seem to be "vanishingly little" reason to think that we do not possess knowledge, then it does not seem unreasonable to believe that we have knowledge.

The correct answer to "do you know that" (if you do take yourself to know that) is 'I have no reason to believe that I don't know that'. — Janus


'Correct' according to whom. I still haven't had an answer from any of my interlocutors here to this question that keeps arising. If the way we actually use a word in real conversations is not the measure of how it 'ought' to be used, then what is? — Isaac

Correct according to the common understanding of knowledge; you know, like the legal "beyond reasonable doubt". Perhaps you think the common understanding is something else; if so, on that we will disagree.

Yes, I'm of the view that the object of a predicate loses intelligibility if the subject responsible for the predication is dropped or replaced with the mythical subject "we". — sime

But don't "we" agree about the attributes of the moon?

We also say that someone's claims are true when we believe that their claims are true. But as you (sometimes) admit, our beliefs can be wrong. — Michael

Yeah, our beliefs can be wrong, where 'wrong' here means l (the speaker) believe that acting as if it were the case will yield surprising results. I believe the beliefs of others are sometimes of that sort, ie sometimes wrong.

For me...

"I believe the grass is green"
"I know the grass is green"
"It's true that the grass is green"
"It's not wrong that the grass is green"
"The grass is green"

...are all just different ways of saying the grass is green with different emphases for different contexts. If I'm confident I might use 'know', if I'm hesitant I might say 'believe'. If you first doubted me, I'd repeat using 'it's true', if you said I'm wrong I might retort that 'it's not wrong'...

They're still all just expressing that I have a belief that the grass is green, which in turn means that I've a strong tendency to act as if the grass is green.

I'm not normally in the habit of insisting that when I use the word 'tree' I really mean 'thing I believe is a tree' because I think it's implied in normal conversation (as above). "That tree" is sufficient. The problem with JTB is that it tries to occupy this 'normal' level in one condition (justification) and then jumps to a meta-level with 'true'. It's incoherent. We end up with nonsense sentences like "I know it's true" (I'm justified to believe it's true and it's true that it's true), or "he has absolutely exhaustive and flawless justification to believe X but X is not true" (what grounds for 'X is not true' that wouldn't constitute a lack of, or flaw, in justification?)

I'll add; the reason we say that someone has knowledge when we believe that their claim is true is because we understand that being true is a requirement for knowledge. — Michael

If that were the case then we'd wait until X was true before describing the belief as such.

Let's say that the factor which distinguishes a 'tree' from a 'shrub' was whether it had a particular molecular structure in it's Xylem cells. Are you seriously suggesting that in such a case we would merrily go around labelling things 'tree' and 'shrub' regardless of our clear understanding that the distinction is hidden from us (without specialist equipment in this case)? It's not how we normally approach such things. The distinction betweenAgrimonia eupatoria and Agrimonia procera (two wildflowers in my neck of the woods) is in their seed. If we can't see their seed we call it Agrimonia spp because we lack the information required to make the distinction - in other words, we come up with a new word (or expression) to reflect our uncertainty).