Phenomenology is indeterminate on the issue of foundational knowledge claims, — Astrophel

Depend on whose phenomenology you have in mind. Husserl, the originator of modern phenomenology, was quite determinate on knowledge claims. The only apodictically certain science is transcendental phenomenology. All other scientific results are contingent and relative.

Anyway, never listen to a scientist turned philosopher. All they produce is dogmatic reassurances that everything is okay and w — Astrophel

I put Searle in a similar category to Dennett concerning his understanding of phenomenology, and unfortunately Hubert Dreyfus also. I say unfortunately because he influenced a whole generation of Husserl and Heidegger scholars.

I say unfortunately because he influenced a whole generation of Husserl and Heidegger scholars. — Joshs

In your view did Searle fail to understand phenomenology or did he have a particularly tendentious reading of the source material?

Right, so you obviously believe Dennett did not understand traditional phenomenology. I'm inclined to agree, insofar as Dennett claims that it consists in mere introspection; which is what I take Zahavi to be arguing.

So, the question that follows is as to what else phenomenology consists in (because it seems that introspection is definitely part of it). Off the top of my head seems to consist in extending the kind of synthetic a priori thinking that began with Descartes and was improved by Kant into more corporeal areas of inquiry.

So this is what I had in mind with the reference to the synthetic a priori:

The only apodictically certain science is transcendental phenomenology. All other scientific results are contingent and relative. — Joshs

Is there even more than that going on?

What you say about Searle I can understand, but I'm also interested to know hear your criticism of Dreyfus' understanding of phenomenology.

mere introspection — Janus

I keep wondering what the force of this 'accusation' is supposed to be.

Why does it sound so much like saying phenomenology is "merely philosophy"?

say about Searle I can understand, but I'm also interested to know hear your criticism of Dreyfus' understanding of phenomenology. — Janus

I’m going to be lazy and quote Evan Thompson from his recent book:

READERS FAMILIAR WITH MY EARLIER BOOK, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991), might be surprised by the importance I give to Husserlian phe-nomenology here, given the cridcal attitude toward Husserl that book expressed. What accounts for this change of atdtude? The purpose of this Appendix is to clarify this matter.

In The Embodied Mind, we asserted (i) that Husserl was a method-ological solipsist (p. 16); (ii) that his theory ignored "both the consen-sual aspect and the direct embodied aspect of experience" (p. 17); (iii) that his theory of intentionality was a representational theory (p. 68); (iv) that his theory' of the life-world was reductionistic and representa-tionalist (that he tried to analyze the life-world "into a more funda-mental set of constituents" (p. 117) consisting of beliefs understood as mental representations (p. 18)); and (v) that his phenomenology was a purely abstract, theoretical project lacking a pragmatic dimension (pp. 19,117). We concluded that the Husserlian project was a "failure" (p. 19) and even wrote about the "breakdown of phenomenology" more generally (p. 19). This assessment then motivated our turn to the tradition of Buddhist philosophy and mindfulness-awareness medita-tion as a more promising phenomenological partner for cognitive sci-ence.

As Chapter 2 indicates, however, I no longer subscribe to this assess-ment of Husserlian phenomenology. Our earlier interpretation of Husserl was mistaken. Husserlian phenomenology has far more re sources than we realized for productive cross-fertilization with both the sciences of mind (Petitot et al. 1999; Varela 1996) and Buddhist thought (Thompson 2005; Varela 2000b; Varela and Depraz 2003). In particular, I now believe (i) that Husserl was not a methodological solipsist; (ii) that he was greatly concerned with the intersubjective and embodied aspects of experience; (iii) diat his theory of intentionality was not a representational theory; and (iv) that his theory of the life-world was not reductionistic and representationalist. Furthermore, al-though I think phenomenology has tended to overemphasize theoret-ical discussion in the form of textual interpretation (to the neglect of phenomenological pragmatics as well as original phenomenological analyses and philosophical argumentation), I think it is too facile to say simply that phenomenology is a purely abstract, theoretical project lacking a pragmatic dimension. It follows that I would now not charac-terize Husserlian phenomenology as a "failure." Nor would I assert that phenomenology suffered a "breakdown" owing to its neglect of phenomenological pragmatics.

My viewpoint has changed for two reasons. The first is that when Varela and I were writing The Embodied Mind (during 1986-1989; Eleanor Rosen joined the project near the end of 1989) our knowl-edge of Husserl was limited. We were familiar with the main published works in English translation (Logical Investigations, Ideas I, Cartesian Meditations, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-nology) but had not studied them carefully enough, and we did not know about Husserl's writings on passive synthesis (then untranslated) and intersubjectivity (still untranslated). We were both more familiar with Heidegger and were influenced by his (largely uncharitable) reading of Husserl. We also had little knowledge of other phenomeno-logical thinkers who were deeply influenced by Husserl (Merleau-Ponty excepted), and we had studied only a litde of the secondary lit-erature on Husserl.

The second reason is that we accepted Hubert Dreyfus's (1982) in-fluential interpretation of Husserl as a representationalist and pro-tocognitivist philosopher, as well as his Heideggerian critique of Husserl thus interpreted. Dreyfus has been a pioneer in bringing the phenomenological tradition into the heardand of the cognitive sci-ences through his important critique of artificial intelligence (Dreyfus 1972, 1992) and his groundbreaking studies on skillful knowledge and action (Dreyfus 2002; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). Yet his work is also marked by a peculiar interpretation of Husserl. Dreyfus presents Husserl's phenomenology as a form of representationalism that antici-pates cognitivist and computational theories of mind. He then re-hearses Heidegger's criticisms of Husserl thus understood and deploys them against cognitivism and artificial intelligence. Dreyfus reads Husserl largely through a combination of Heidegger's interpretation and a particular analytic (Fregean) reconstruction of one aspect of Husserl's thought—Husserl's notion of the noema. Thus the Husserl Dreyfus presents to cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind is a problematic interpretive construct and should not be taken at face value.

For a while Dreyfus's interpretation functioned as a received view in the cognitive science community of Husserl's thought and its relation-ship to cognitive science. This interpretation has since been seriously challenged by a number of Husserl scholars and philosophers. 1 This is not the place to review these conuoversies at length. Suffice it to say that I take these studies to have demonstrated the following points:

1. Husserl does not subscribe to a representational theory of mind, and certainly not a representational theory of the sort Dreyfus wishes to criticize. Intentional experiences do not acquire their directedness in virtue of "a special realm of representational entities" (Dreyfus 1982, p. 1). Rather, the intentional openness of consciousness is an in-tegral part of its being (Zahavi 2003a, p. 21). 2

2. Husserl is not a methodological solipsist. The transcendental phe-nomenological reduction is not a way of trying to characterize the con-tents of consciousness purely internally, apart from their relation to the world. It is a way of characterizing the world, namely, at the phe-nomenal level at which it is experienced, and of studying the relation of the world so characterized to our subjectivity.

3. Husserl does not assimilate all intentionality to object-directed in-tentionality; he does not "claim that all mental life, even our awareness of practical activity and our sense of existing in a shared world, must be a form of object-directedness" (Dreyfus 1982, p. 9; see also Dreyfus 1988). On the contrary, as the above discussion of passive synthesis in-dicates, die notion of a precognitive and non-object-directed "opera-tive intentionality" is central to the subject matter of Husserl's phe-nomenology in its genetic register.

I keep wondering what the force of this 'accusation' is supposed to be.

Why does it sound so much like saying phenomenology is "merely philosophy"? — Srap Tasmaner

Right, that is what it sounds like. Which is why I wrote in an earlier post, referring to first to phenomenology, and then to the rest of philosophy:

I think it is more of an art than a science in that narrow sense of "science', and that it has much value on that account. I mean the rest of philosophy doesn't count as science in that narrow sense, either; so could there be a reason to dismiss phenomenology that doesn't apply to all the other domains of philosophy? — Janus

I think this raises a question as to what the analytic tradition consists in if not some kind of introspection and synthetic a priori analysis, that is some kind of phenomenology. I mean it doesn't seem to be doing empirical science.

Goodness, talk about a radical rethink of his position. Well expressed. I guess it is not hard to see how phenomenology might be difficult to 'read' if even Thompson has had to radically reconsider his understanding of it (with help).

That's interesting thanks. I seem to remember reading something by Zahavi a few years ago where he was saying that Husserl is not a representational thinker and that Heidegger's critique of Husserl as repeating a "Cartesian" error by failing to think in terms prior to the subject/object distinction is misplaced. It's not clear whether you were implying that Dreyfus also misunderstood Heidegger.

I guess it is not hard to see how phenomenology might be difficult to 'read' if even Thompson has had to radically reconsider his understanding of it (with help). — Tom Storm

I was thinking the same thing. It shows, among others things , the gap between Anglo-American and continental styles of philosophical thinking, and how only in recent years have we begun to be able to ‘read’ the continental authors.

It's not clear whether you were implying that Dreyfus also misunderstood Heidegger. — Janus

Oh yeah, big time. Dreyfus wanted to turn heidegger into Kierkegaard. I think Heidegger makes some good points against Husserl , but they are much more subtle than it might first appear.

Oh yeah, big time. Dreyfus wanted to turn heidegger into Kierkegaard. — Joshs

Right, so a predominantly existentialist reading of Heidegger?

Indeed. It’s interesting that Dreyfus’ reading of Merleau-Pony is also getting picked apart by embodied cognitive writers like Alva Noe.

Dennett is a philosopher — Gregory

:rofl:

I keep wondering what the force of this 'accusation' is supposed to be. — Srap Tasmaner

It is that introspection is notoriously difficult to schematise. It originated with Wilhelm Wundt, a German-American who was one of the founders of psychology. Its method was to have patients report on their inner states. But the problem was that the terminology and criteria for assessing such reports were so slippery that it seemed utterly impossible to codify in any objective way.

Zahavi's paper notes:

In his book Being No One Metzinger has recently argued in a similar fashion and has concluded that “phenomenology is impossible” (Metzinger, 2003, 83). What kind of argument does Metzinger provide? The basic argument seems to concern the epistemological difficulties connected to any first-person approach to data generation. If inconsistencies in two individual data sets should appear there is no way to settle the conflict. More specifically, Metzinger takes data to be things that are extracted from the physical world by technical measuring devices. This data-extraction involves a well-defined intersubjective procedure, it takes place within a scientific community, it is open to criticism, and it constantly seeks independent means of verification. The problem with phenomenology is that first-person access to the phenomenal content of one’s own mental state does not fulfill these defining criteria for the concept of data. In fact, the very notion of first-personal data is a contradiction in terms.

But then Zahavi goes on to show that the phenomenological reduction is not the kind of introspective analysis that Wundt's method demonstrated the failure of.
--

If that is so, is his attitude based on a misunderstanding of traditional phenomenology as Zahavi argues? — Janus

I have read the paper now, if anything it's quite a good primer on phenomenology overall.

On the first couple of pages Zahavi summarises Dennett's approach:

...from the fact that people believe that they have experiences, it doesn’t follow that they do in fact have experiences....we shouldn' t simply assume that every apparent feature or object of our conscious lives is really there, as a real element of experience. By adopting the heterophenomenological attitude of neutrality, we do not prejudge the issue about whether the apparent subject is a liar, a zombie, a computer, a dressed up parrot, or a real conscious being (Dennett, 1991,81). Thus, heterophenomenology can remain neutral about whether the subject is conscious or a mere zombie (Dennett, 1982, 160), or to be more precise, since heterophenomenology is a way of interpreting behavior, and since zombies, per definition, behave like real conscious people, there is no relevant difference between zombies and real conscious people as far as heterophenomenology is concerned (Dennett, 1991, 95). But from this alleged stance of neutrality where we bracket the question of whether or not there is a difference between a zombie and a non-zombie, Dennett quickly moves a step further, and denies that there is any such difference. As he puts it, zombies are not just possible; they are real, since all of us are zombies. If we think we are more than zombies, this is simply due to the fact that we have been misled or bewitched by the defective set of metaphors that we use to thinkabout the mind. It is important not to misunderstand Dennett at this point. He is not arguing that nobody is conscious. Rather he is claiming that consciousness does not have the first-person phenomenal properties it is commonly thought to have, which is why there is in fact no such thing as actual phenomenology. — Dan Zahavi

I think this passage summarises many of the disagreements we have had in threads about Dennett. I say that Dennett believes that humans are no different to zombies, to which you generally reply that I haven't read Dennett, that I don't understand him. But as Zahavi says, Dennett is not saying that 'nobody is conscious', but rather that the first-person element of experience is not what we take it to be. He denies that the first-person nature of experience is significant.

A metaphysical reflection

Let's revisit a basic word - 'phenomena'. This word is liberally sprinkled through that document. But I question whether first-person experience is 'a phenomenon' or among phenomena. Phenomena are 'that which appears'. And first-person consciousness does not appear - my consciousness of myself is not appearance. Rather, one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness is that it knows that it is. This is where any conscious being, even a very simple organism, differs from any non-conscious object, although (as Schopenhauer says) it is only in the human that this becomes an object of conscious reflection.

It's not as if it has to make a judgement about the existence of something called 'consciousness', or that there can be a question about whether my own existence is real or not; were my own consciousness not real, I would be unconscious. (This is obviously reminiscent of Descartes.) But, furthermore, this self-knowing attribute of consciousness is not a phenomenal reality. Whereas Dennett says, in effect, that there are only phenomena, or rather that the scope of what can be considered real is what is amenable to phenomenal analysis. Which is why his critics said his book 'Consciousness Explained' should be called 'Consciousness Ignored' or 'Consciousness Explained Away'.

But it doesn't matter what his critics say - Zahavi, or David Chalmers, or John Searle, or Galen Strawson. You can't kill a zombie.

I remember listening to a podcast lecture series on Merleau Ponty given by Dreyfus years ago, and I didn't get much out of it at the time. Other than than I know little or nothing about Dreyfus' take on Merleau Ponty. He was also counted as an existentialist as well as a phenomenologist if I remember correctly.

I think this passage summarises many of the disagreements we have had in threads about Dennett. I say that Dennett believes that humans are no different to zombies, to which you generally reply that I haven't read Dennett, that I don't understand him. — Wayfarer

The point we disagreed on was your claim that Dennett denied that consciousness exists. That's it. You certainly said that was what you are claiming in several of our exchanges; so if that was not what you were saying you have either changed your mind about that, or you are contradicting yourself.

I don't dismiss Dennett's approach, and (of course) I don't dismiss phenomenology, because I have more interest in that approach than Dennett's. I try to take a more balanced view, which involves thinking that all approaches are worth following because we cannot pre-determine what they will turn up.

But it doesn't matter what his critics say - Zahavi, or David Chalmers, or John Searle, or Galen Strawson. You can't kill a zombie. — Wayfarer

That's a lame, low blow! :roll:

I think this raises a question as to what the analytic tradition consists in if not some kind of introspection and synthetic a priori analysis, that is some kind of phenomenology. I mean it doesn't seem to be doing empirical science. — Janus

Yes, I think the idea is quite simply that if it’s introspection then it’s not science, and there’s an optional detour through philosophy. (If introspection, then philosophy, and if that then not science.)

There is still a part of world in which introspection is considered a good thing, a praiseworthy thing, perhaps even a thing one ought to do or one must do to lead a rich and fulfilling life. (We get threads about it here.) Still, it’s not science, which makes it — from a point-of-view I’ll cheerfully admit is made of straw — something like a ‘hobby’, all well and good but not something ‘serious’.

I don’t think this puts only the “analytic tradition” in question. What was Aristotle up to? Or Kant?

Anyway, what you (not you, @Janus) call ‘introspection’ I might just call ‘thinking’ and some people might call ‘reason’. Or ‘reflection’.

I almost feel tempted to let science win whatever argument it wants to have with philosophy. If science wants to claim it’s the only sound or reliable way of producing knowledge systematically — sure, you can have that; philosophy can produce something else, understanding maybe.

(In this context, I always thought it odd that the new biologically sophisticated version of psychology ends up being called “cognitive science”, as if knowledge is the only mental phenomenon that matters.)

There is still a part of world in which introspection is considered a good thing, a praiseworthy thing, perhaps even a thing one ought to do or one must do to lead a rich and fulfilling life. (We get threads about it here.) Still, it’s not science, which makes it — from a point-of-view I’ll cheerfully admit is made of straw — something like a ‘hobby’, all well and good but not something ‘serious’. — Srap Tasmaner

Interesting. This is not my area so forgive my clumsy wording. Is it not the case that through an introspective approach phenomenology enhances our appreciation of just how much of what we call knowledge is a kind of intersubjective agreement and truth building exercise between individuals and communities? It strikes me that so much of what what have names for is actually poorly understood, it's as if the act of naming passes for an explanation.

I would think that phenomenology would be of assistance in broadening our understanding of how experience and perceptions become opinions and how groups come to conclusions about values and truth.

I almost feel tempted to let science win whatever argument it wants to have with philosophy. If science wants to claim it’s the only sound or reliable way of producing knowledge systematically — sure, you can have that; philosophy can produce something else, understanding maybe.

(In this context, I always thought it odd that the new biologically sophisticated version of psychology ends up being called “cognitive science”, as if knowledge is the only mental phenomenon that matters.) — Srap Tasmaner

It may be a bit simplistic to distinguish science as a single unified enterprise from philosophy in general or phenomenology in particular. Husserl argued that psychological sciences incorporating Brentano’s intentional stance , like gestalt theory, were forms of phenomenological investigation, only lacking the transcendental element.

I might add that first generation cognitivism ignored the biological body, but embodied cognitivism treats the whole body with its affectivity inputs as part and parcel of cognition. In many of these accounts , affectivity matters more than cognition.

I question whether first-person experience is 'a phenomenon' or among phenomena. Phenomena are 'that which appears'. And first-person consciousness does not appear - my consciousness of myself is not appearance. Rather, one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness is that it knows that it is. — Wayfarer

This is indeed Zahavi’s stance, but I don’t believe it is Husserl’s, and it certainly isn’t Merleau-Ponty’s or Heidegger’s. Zahavi believes that the subjective dimension of the subject-object interaction is not contingently but transcendentally self-identical, non-horizontal and non­ecstatic. In other words, I know that I am because there is an identical feeling of self that accompanies all of my intentional experiences of objects.

I, along with a number of other interpreters of Husserl, don’t believe that such a self-identical feeling of self exists for him. Instead, Husserl argues that “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes this pure ego pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. This suggests that for Husserl, the pure ego may function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity rather than a consciously sensed feeling of any kind.

A coherently unified sense of self for Husserl is an intentional accomplishment, not an a priori. A pre-given sense of self would not be phenomenology, but neo-Kantianism. Thus, one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness is not that it knows that it is , but that what it is is what it does.

Yes, I think the idea is quite simply that if it’s introspection then it’s not science, and there’s an optional detour through philosophy. (If introspection, then philosophy, and if that then not science.) — Srap Tasmaner

I would like to examine this statement a bit. When you say that introspection isn't science, do you mean that introspection can't be studied by science. That's clearly wrong. If you mean that introspection has to be a fundamentally different method of gaining knowledge than science, I think I disagree. First, clearly introspection is required to study introspection scientifically. Also, a personal report of introspection can be verified, or at least corroborated, by looking at other reports of introspection, examination of brain activity, evaluation of differences in behavior, and other pretty standard psychological testing methods. Or are you saying, as many here do, that psychology isn't science?

Much of my way of knowing the world is based on introspection. That's certainly true of mental processes, but also more objectively observable phenomena (do I believe that?) and, certainly, philosophical approaches.

There is still a part of world in which introspection is considered a good thing, a praiseworthy thing, perhaps even a thing one ought to do or one must do to lead a rich and fulfilling life. (We get threads about it here.) Still, it’s not science, which makes it — from a point-of-view I’ll cheerfully admit is made of straw — something like a ‘hobby’, all well and good but not something ‘serious’. — Srap Tasmaner

If this actually does represent a common view here on the forum and in philosophy in general, it represents a massive failure of introspection in itself. If you think that you know things just based on reason and logic, you are not even aware of how you know things. Is knowing how you know things science?

I almost feel tempted to let science win whatever argument it wants to have with philosophy. If science wants to claim it’s the only sound or reliable way of producing knowledge systematically — sure, you can have that; philosophy can produce something else, understanding maybe. — Srap Tasmaner

Science has no argument with introspection, just some scientists.

(In this context, I always thought it odd that the new biologically sophisticated version of psychology ends up being called “cognitive science”, as if knowledge is the only mental phenomenon that matters.) — Srap Tasmaner

It pleases me that you recognize that cognitive science is psychology. Many people who like to denigrate psychology as not a science are unwilling to acknowledge that. Perhaps if they were a bit more introspective they wouldn't.

A question that just popped into my head - is introspection the same as intuition? I think the answer is clearly "no," but I think they are painted with the same brush by many.

To tell you the truth, phenomenology is not something new. Logic (Aristotle, Chrysippus) for example is inherently phenomenological for it's the study of (patterns in) thought (consciousness) as it appears to us with no attempt to reduce it to something more simpler/more basic. Logic confines/restricts itself to thoughts - the stuff of consciousness - and how they relate to one another, how one follows from another to be precise.

Here's where it gets interesting: logic is part of the objectivity approach (science?) to consciousness which is considered as the antithesis of phenomenology. Doesn't it strike you as odd that science utilizes a phenemonological tool/entity (logic) to study consciousness and then claims phenomenology is bogus? Isn't that like drinking Pepsi and claiming that Pepsi is no good? :chin:

The point we disagreed on was your claim that Dennett denied that consciousness exists. — Janus

Whereas, as Zahavi says, he claims that he doesn’t deny that consciousness exists, but then proceeds to define it out of existence anyway.

As he puts it, zombies are not just possible; they are real, since all of us are zombies. If we think we are more than zombies, this is simply due to the fact that we have been misled or bewitched by the defective set of metaphors that we use to think about the mind. — Dan Zahavi

That's a lame, low blow! — Janus

Don’t worry, that feeling is a mere artefact of folk psychology.

This is indeed Zahavi’s stance, but I don’t believe it is Husserl’s. — Joshs

Interesting, but I don’t really understand the distinction you’re trying to describe.

Thus, one of the fundamental attributes of consciousness is not that it knows that it is, but that what it is is what it does. — Joshs

I’m not trying to come up with a glorified description of ego. I’m simply saying that any kind of being has one fundamental attribute, which is a sense that it is. Of course that is not articulated or reflective in bacteria or algae but it is still germinally present. Whereas there’s not even an analogy for that in inorganic matter. Which is why living things are broadly designated as ‘beings’ and not as ‘objects’, which I say is a genuine ontological distinction; beings have something that objects do not. To me it is just the requirement to deny this that leads to eliminativism, which is at bottom the conviction that there is no difference between beings and things. Which is an inevitable consequence of any kind of consistent materialism, for which the very existence of the mind is an insuperable stumbling block, which must therefore be elimated.

Husserl, the originator of modern phenomenology, was quite determinate on knowledge claims. The only apodictically certain science is transcendental phenomenology. All other scientific results are contingent and relative. — Joshs

In what way is "apodictic certainty" applicable to any modern science? What does a (like Kant, unsound) 'transcendental' deduction of "the essential structure of consciousness" from "apodicity" have to do with hypothetico-deductive explanations of nature or history?

(Yeah, a lifetime ago I'd read Cartesian Meditations & The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.)

In German-speaking culture, there is Giesteswissenschaften, the ‘sciences of spirit’. There’s no direct equivalent in the Anglosphere.

IIRC "woo-woo" in the OED, 2nd ed.

You’re a dualist, right? All knowledge comprises either science or woo, which are exhaustive and mutually exclusive.

Whereas, as Zahavi says, he claims that he doesn’t deny that consciousness exists, but then proceeds to define it out of existence anyway. — Wayfarer

He doesn't define consciousnesses out of existence; he defines what he understands to be the folk conception of consciousness out of existence. I don't agree with him about that; but I don't dismiss his position, since his position is equally an imaginable possibility as the folk understanding, or phenomenological understandings are.

Don’t worry, that feeling is a mere artefact of folk psychology. — Wayfarer

No it's not; it's an artifact of your inability to accept that there are other imaginable positions than your own; the inability to accept that those who disagree with you actually do understand what your position consists in but just happen to think it is the the less plausible of the possibilities.

So you agree that we’re zombies?

:up:

No, I'm not a dualist. All knowledge consists of explanations for facts of the matter. On the other hand, woo is either "pseudo-knowledge" or (mostly) "fact-free just-so stories" (H. Frankfurt) – not to be confused with poetry or other literary forms. And whereas sophistry dogmatizes the latter, philosophy interprets the former by exposing its own traces of sophistry. Btw, Wayf, I'm an immanentist (i.e. emergentist).