"the actual weather condition" are asserted to be beliefs — InPitzotl

Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief?

In the types of claims you're talking about, the claim presumes the part exists. That presumption is not part of the assertion; so if it fails, the truth value of the statement is undefined. There are other cases. — InPitzotl

The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. If we first 'assume the flower exists' and then describe it's properties, the properties we're describing are those of the assumed flower. The assumption is a belief - "I believe there is a flower"

But it sounds like the alien example works for you, so we could talk about that. — InPitzotl

Yes, I prefer your example.

It's not like there is a meaning fairy that's going to prevent us from talking about things that don't exist; we're the ones that have to figure that out. — InPitzotl

But your claim is that (for JTB purposes) "the grass is green" is not about a belief, but rather about the actual grass. Now you're saying we have to 'figure that out'. Do we do so first, or later? If later, then what was the statement about at the time?

in your flower case all we need do is look in the box; and in the hat case, look at your head. — InPitzotl

You keep coming back to 'just look' and then when pressed admit that we could still be wrong even after looking, so I don't know why you keep coming back to it.

I believe the flower is green because John told me so
I believe the flower is green because all flowers I've ever seen are green
I believe the flower is green because I looked and it seemed green to me

These are all just justifications for believing the flower is green, the last one isn't of some magically different sort which distinguishes the 'truth' of the matter. It's just

Right, but what has your present psychological state of uncertainty, including your memories, imagination and thought experiments, got to do with a future interaction with your cupboard? — sime

Prediction of it.

Doesn't your self-professed ability to distinguish your beliefs from actuality preclude you from interpreting the objects of your beliefs as being in the future? — sime

I don't see how. You seem to be saying that I can't have a belief about the result of a coin flip because it hasn't happened yet but I'm not seeing why.

As I see it you are still conflating what is involved with taking ourselves to possess knowledge and what is involved with our actually possessing knowledge — Janus

'Knowledge' is just a word, it's not an external object with properties we discover by scientific investigation. Something 'actually' being knowledge (as opposed to us treating it as if it were) is a nonsense, it assumes that some external reality determines the sorts of things we call 'knowledge' and we can all be wrong about it. We invented the word 'knowledge', we decide what sorts of thing go into the category, it's our category. It's like you saying "actually we've all been using the word 'tree' wrong - we assume 'trees' are those tall woody plants, but actually they're a type of washing machine".

The sorts of things which are 'knowledge' are exactly the sorts of things we use the word 'knowledge' felicitously to describe. There's no God-given 'real' meaning behind that.

So to take ourselves to possess knowledge is to take our belief to be both true and justified — Janus

How exactly do we 'take' a belief to be true? This is the crux of the issue. We 'take' a belief to be true when we have sufficient justification to believe it. So all you've said is that we take ourselves to possess knowledge is to take our belief to be both justified and justified.

Correct according to the common understanding of knowledge; you know, like the legal "beyond reasonable doubt". — Janus

The legal "beyond reasonable doubt" is exactly what I'm claiming. You're adding 'true'.

I don't see how. You seem to be saying that I can't have a belief about the result of a coin flip because it hasn't happened yet but I'm not seeing why. — Isaac

You can have a belief in the manner you describe that refers to your psychological concept of "future". But from a physical and causal perspective, your beliefs cannot refer to the physical future and can only refer to your physical history, making your beliefs a conceptually redundant way of talking about the causes of your perceptions, from a physical perspective.

Haven't you ever had an experience where you have thought "this wasn't what I was expecting!".

What makes you think this isn't literally the case?

Yeah, our beliefs can be wrong, where 'wrong' here means l (the speaker) believe that acting as if it were the case will yield surprising results. — Isaac

We’ve talked before about access to facts. You’ve drawn a distinction between beliefs and the actual weather. And now you’re trying to say that truth and being wrong have nothing to do with the facts or the actual weather? Your position is incredibly confusing.

A more straightforward position is that there are facts - like the actual weather - that are independent of what we believe or claim or experience. When the facts are as we experience them to be then our experience is veridical. When the facts are as we believe or claim them to be then what we believe or claim is true.

This is the common sense realist position - the position that you agreed to argue from. And yet everything you’re saying contradicts this. I don’t even understand what you’re arguing. That our beliefs about the weather aren’t wrong even if the actual weather isn’t as we believe it to be?

It seems that in the very same sentence you argue that our words only refer to our beliefs, and that our beliefs have nothing to do with the facts, but also reference an “actual weather” that you accept is external to our beliefs (and sometimes inaccessible, but not always) that at least has something to do with what we believe and say (such that it is the actual weather, and not actual flowers, that are related to our beliefs and claims about the weather). Do you not see the incoherency here?

Gettier problem, it's about luck and how it can throw a spanner in the works. I didn't realize this but it, if taken seriously, undermines the entire edifice of knowledge we have so painstakingly built over countless generations, much like a relay race, each runner, presumably, taking humanity that much closer to the finish line (omniscience).

It appears, as far as I can see, the problem posed by Gettier is actually just another way of making a case for skepticism, if, of course, we're to be rigorous with our criterion for knowledge.

Interestingly, skepticism given due consideration, Gettier problems doesn't imply that we could be wrong or that we have false beliefs for, as is obvious, the proposition in question has to be true for it to be part of a Gettier case.

In short, so what if we got it right by fluke (SPL :up: )? We got it right and that's what counts, no? Justification and logic be damned! :grin:

Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief? — Isaac

Here:

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

You were very explicit not only in saying this, but in specifically saying that you were saying it.

The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. — Isaac

"The claim presumes x" is an anthropomorphic abstraction; what it means is that x is a prerequisite for the assertion. The prerequisite need not be believed for the claim to be true; so long as there's some way to identify the part of the world meant, and the condition does indeed hold, the claim is true. Hence, "Isaac's hat is a lovely shade of green today".

If we first 'assume the flower exists' and then describe it's properties, the properties we're describing are those of the assumed flower. — Isaac

Big "if". Even if I presume the flower exists, that does not compel you to agree it exists.

The assumption is a belief - "I believe there is a flower" — Isaac

No, the assumption is a prerequisite. It might be a belief; it's probably typically a belief (at least in the case of standalone claims); but the belief is optional for aboutness. Again, there's the hat on your head that's a lovely shade of green.

But your claim is that (for JTB purposes) "the grass is green" is not about a belief, but rather about the actual grass. — Isaac

In terms of JTB, this is just a matter of T.

Now you're saying we have to 'figure that out'. — Isaac

Yes. That the actual grass is green doesn't magically cause it to poof into our beliefs. We must find out what the T is through J. JTB per se abstracts this out, but sanely speaking, you look at the grass.

Do we do so first, or later? — Isaac

The question is ambiguous, but reasonably enumerable. Sanely speaking, assuming it's previously unexplored wild grass to ignore a detail and presuming realism, the grass is green (T) before anyone sees it, which implies it exists. If Joe knows it's green, then Joe has J that it is green which implies Joe has J that it exists. If someone wants to verify the T that it's green, whether or not that someone is Joe, before or after Joe knows it, they can test it by looking at said grass; on passing said test they have attained J that the grass is green. The test may also fail, in which case they (again, possibly being Joe) attain J that the grass is not green.

If later, then what was the statement about at the time? — Isaac

The statement is about a part of the world meeting a condition. The part of the world should be specified somehow at the time of the statement (it is not "grass"; there's grass outside my window that's green right now that likely has nothing to do with what the statement is about; rather it is what the definite article "the" refers to in the noun phrase "the grass", and that's generally always given by a context).

You keep coming back to 'just look' and then when pressed admit that we could still be wrong even after looking, so I don't know why you keep coming back to it. — Isaac

So "when pressed" and "admit" is just spin; narrative; dysphemism. The spin reflects your bias, which is severely interfering with your comprehension. I do not "admit" "when pressed" that we could still be wrong, I emphasize it. The reason I keep coming back to this is that you keep missing the same point. You demonstrate that yourself:

I believe the flower is green because John told me so
I believe the flower is green because all flowers I've ever seen are green
I believe the flower is green because I looked and it seemed green to me

These are all just justifications for believing the flower is green, — Isaac

Correct.

the last one isn't of some magically different sort which distinguishes the 'truth' of the matter. — Isaac

And this is precisely what I mean. You've used spin, narrative, and dysphemism to reformulate this into a red herring argument about certainty. It is, in fact, a direct response to and refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about a belief.

As a refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about belief, the significance of the third type of justification is that it is a test whose results are measured by observations, not beliefs. The fact that, when these observations conflict with beliefs, we update the beliefs to match the observations proves that it is the principle of reality that determines which result we would observe (aka truth), NOT the belief (as claimed), that the claims are about. The pet theory that the claims are about beliefs fails to account for why we defer to the observations as authoritative... i.e., why we bother becoming convinced that the flower is pink because we looked at it and it appeared pink, despite just believing it was green because John said so. But we do, therefore your pet theory is wrong.

'Knowledge' is just a word, it's not an external object with properties we discover by scientific investigation. Something 'actually' being knowledge (as opposed to us treating it as if it were) is a nonsense, — Isaac

Now I think I understand just where your confusion is. Knowledge is of course not an external object,with properties we discover. What we do discover, by looking at and thinking about our linguistic practices, is what we mean when we say that we have (propositional) knowledge. It certainly seems to me that the JTB model comes closest to elucidating what we mean.

So it is still the case that there is a distinction between what it means to take ourselves in some actual instance to have knowledge, (which is subject to correction) and the formula, knowledge consisting in justified true belief, that allows us to be wrong about claiming to have knowledge in any instance.

So, justified belief is not enough to constitute knowledge because the belief must be true. When people thought the world was a flat disc that was not knowledge because it was subsequently discovered that the world is (roughly) a sphere. So, the earlier belief was not knowledge because the belief was not true. We may or may not think that earlier belief was justified.

Personally I think the 'justified' part is the trickiest. Is any belief justified if it is not true? It may seem for all the world to be justified according to our experience, but does it follow from that that it is is in fact justified?. Perhaps the JTB formula could be modified to become 'knowledge consists in truly justified belief' which incorporates the 'justified' and the 'true' such that it follows that any belief which is not true is not justified and any belief which is not justified cannot be true.

None of this changes the fact that we can never be absolutely sure we possess knowledge. I think the idea of dropping the 'true' part is fine if you are also happy with dropping the 'knowledge' part. Then we would never claim to have knowledge at all, but merely beliefs which seem more or less justified, or not justified at all, depending on what we take to be the criteria for saying what constitutes evidence.

To sum up, Gettier Problems demonstrate that justified true beliefs can be fallible, leading to scepticism about the existence of knowledge.

But I argue that there are equally valid reasons to deny that beliefs can refer to anything but the truth, leading to scepticism about the existence of false beliefs, and hence the utility of the concept.

In my opinion, having scepticism of the second sort doesn't nullify the epistemic scepticism provoked by Gettier problems, or vice versa. After all, denying the existence of false beliefs cannot deny the reality of one's mistakes.

Arguments of the second sort are really an instance of meta-epistemological scepticism, which is to doubt the meaningfulness of epistemology as an enterprise and the idea of inter-subjective theories of truth, belief and knowledge.

You can have a belief in the manner you describe that refers to your psychological concept of "future". But from a physical and causal perspective, your beliefs cannot refer to the physical future and can only refer to your physical history, making your beliefs a conceptually redundant way of talking about the causes of your perceptions, from a physical perspective. — sime

Yeah, I see what you're saying. I agree with the analysis, but not the conclusion.

When I say "the grass is green" I'm attempting to refer to the grass, I'm actually referring to my belief about the grass (there might be no grass, yet I still refer). The former is important for realism, the latter for meaning.

So when I say "I'll win the lottery tomorrow". It doesn't seem to be any different. I'm attempting to refer to the actual lottery, I'm actually referring to my belief about the actual lottery.

So I don't see how this leads to...

...implying that "belief states" are necessarily infallible or that the notion of truth is superfluous. — sime

now you’re trying to say that truth and being wrong have nothing to do with the facts or the actual weather? — Michael

No. Not 'nothing to do with', the actual weather is a major contributor to our beliefs about it, to which we then refer in our knowledge claims. That's not nothing.

A more straightforward position is that there are facts - like the actual weather - that are independent of what we believe or claim or experience. When the facts are as we experience them to be then our experience is veridical. When the facts are as we believe or claim them to be then what we believe or claim is true. — Michael

I agree with that position. It doesn't mention the meaning of our expressions.

yet everything you’re saying contradicts this. I don’t even understand what you’re arguing. — Michael

Seems an oxymoron.

Do you not see the incoherency here? — Michael

No, because of the error in attribution in...

...our beliefs have nothing to do with the facts... — Michael

...as mentioned above.

Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief? — Isaac

Here:

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

You were very explicit not only in saying this, but in specifically saying that you were saying it.

The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. — InPitzotl

...and yet despite my being so explicit you've taken no notice of the underlined as indicated. I don't really know there's much more I can do, I'll try one more time...

I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac

Look at the writing in bold...

...or alternatively, continue flogging the notion thatI do actually believe the weather is just a belief, but am now denying it out of, what? Capriciousness. No reason at all? Honestly, if you think that little of your interlocutors then I can't honestly see what interest you'd get out of continuing to engage with them.

The prerequisite need not be believed for the claim to be true — InPitzotl

Maybe not. I'm not sure what that's got to do with my argument. You'll have to make clear the connection.

Big "if". — InPitzotl

Not really, it seems irrefutable. Perhaps you could explain why you see it as so 'big'.

Even if I presume the flower exists, that does not compel you to agree it exists. — InPitzotl

No indeed not. Again, whsg this fscg has to do with my argument remains opaque.

No, the assumption is a prerequisite. It might be a belief; it's probably typically a belief (at least in the case of standalone claims); but the belief is optional for aboutness. — InPitzotl

Granted. The proposition might sometimes be about an imagined object. I'm not seeing how that helps your case.

We must find out what the T is through J. — InPitzotl

Which is exactly, and only, what I'm arguing. T is just more J, not something different.

If someone wants to verify the T that it's green, whether or not that someone is Joe, before or after Joe knows it, they can test it by looking at said grass; on passing said test they have attained J that the grass is green. The test may also fail, in which case they (again, possibly being Joe) attain J that the grass is not green. — InPitzotl

All of which talks about J. The question is about T.

The statement is about a part of the world meeting a condition. The part of the world should be specified somehow at the time of the statement — InPitzotl

But I'm talking about expressions where it later turns out that that part of the world doesn't exist - the flower, the alien...

So "when pressed" and "admit" is just spin; narrative; dysphemism. The spin reflects your bias, which is severely interfering with your comprehension. — InPitzotl

Do you really want to open up psychological analysis as fair game in these discussions. It's literally what I do for a living. Quite happy to to a discussion about the possible psychological motivations for our positions, if that's what you're interested in, but I expect citations Otherwise we could just charitably assume each other to be genuine and relatively unbiased.

You've used spin, narrative, and dysphemism to reformulate this into a red herring argument about certainty. It is, in fact, a direct response to and refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about a belief. — InPitzotl

...or alternatively, it's the conclusion that seems to make most sense to me, as yours is to you...

Again, if you're going to treat your interlocutors with such condescending disrespect, I really don't know why you'd bother engaging at all.

it is a test whose results are measured by observations, not beliefs. — InPitzotl

OK, so there's some aspect of neuroscience that I've missed because everything I've been studying for the last decade or so absolutely necessitate that observations form beliefs in order to be used for judgements. There's no neural network I know of that directly connects the early regions of the visual cortex with the frontal lobe. Can you explain the route an observation takes to the formation of a judgement without passing through the stage where a belief is formed?

Now I think I understand just where your confusion is. — Janus

Last I checked, you and I were at least epistemic peers. If you're only here to find out where (not if) I'm confused, then this conversation's not for me. If I wanted to check where my understanding of JTB was confused on this matter, I'd return to the text, or just ask someone in the Philosophy department.

So, justified belief is not enough to constitute knowledge because the belief must be true. When people thought the world was a flat disc that was not knowledge because it was subsequently discovered that the world is (roughly) a sphere. — Janus

They subsequently came to believe it's a sphere. They could still be wrong. They believe it to be a sphere using exactly the same fundamental process those who believed it to be flat used - justification. We've not gained some magic additional access. We just have much, much better justifications than the flat-earthers had.

It may seem for all the world to be justified according to our experience, but does it follow from that that it is is in fact justified?. Perhaps the JTB formula could be modified to become 'knowledge consists in truly justified belief' which incorporates the 'justified' and the 'true' such that it follows that any belief which is not true is not justified and any belief which is not justified cannot be true. — Janus

Then we'd be in no better boat. No-one would use the word knowledge because everyone would be quite aware that they could not demonstrate their belief was 'truly' justified. Since we do use the word knowledge, it must be some other threshold that we mean by it.

None of this changes the fact that we can never be absolutely sure we possess knowledge. I think the idea of dropping the 'true' part is fine if you are also happy with dropping the 'knowledge' part. Then we would never claim to have knowledge at all, but merely beliefs which seem more or less justified, or not justified at all, depending on what we take to be the criteria for saying what constitutes evidence. — Janus

How odd. You're so wedded to a particular definition that you'd rather we just never use the word than admit that since we do use the word, the definition must be wrong. Is that how you see the rest of language working. Some philosophers decide what the definition really is and and if we're not using it right then we don't get to use the word at all, they'll just take their ball home if we're not going to play by their rules?

A more straightforward position is that there are facts - like the actual weather - that are independent of what we believe or claim or experience. When the facts are as we experience them to be then our experience is veridical. When the facts are as we believe or claim them to be then what we believe or claim is true. — Michael

I agree with that position. — Isaac

So you accept the following:

1. There are belief-independent facts
2. If these facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are true, otherwise they're false

If so then you should understand the T in JTB.

1. There are facts, independent of beliefs and statements — Michael

Yes.

2. If the facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are true, otherwise they're false — Michael

According to us, yes. Despite anyone's protestations to the contrary, I don't see it as possible to genuinely conceive of a notion of 'true' that is not simply the same as 'well justified'. When I imagine some proposition being 'true', all I have is the idea of a proposition which survives any interrogation of it. But that's the same as 'justified'.

"I went out to look and saw that the grass was green", is a justification.

"I checked with my spectrometer and it said the grass was green", is another justification.

"The grass is green" being true, just means that it will survive all such interrogations ie, it is maximally justified. There's nothing more to a thing being 'true' than this, for me.

If I'm missing something, then perhaps you could put it into words for me. Imagine "the grass is green" is false, then imagine it's true. Describe the difference between the two states you're imagining.

Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to not be as we believe them to be? Do you understand the difference between them?

If it's simpler, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB.

When I say "the grass is green" I'm attempting to refer to the grass, I'm actually referring to my belief about the grass (there might be no grass, yet I still refer). — Isaac

1. If there is no grass, how can I have a belief “about the grass”? What would such a belief be about?
2. If I am referring not to the grass but to my belief, then am I predicating, of my belief not the grass, that it is green? My beliefs can be green?

Imagine "the grass is green" is false, then imagine it's true. Describe the difference between the two states you're imagining. — Isaac

That the grass is not green, is the case when, for instance, it’s brown.

I think you wanted: what’s the difference between ‘Today is Wednesday’ and ‘It’s true that today is Wednesday’?

1. If there is no grass, how can I have a belief “about the grass”? What would such a belief be about? — Srap Tasmaner

Whatever it is I'm modelling as 'the grass'. My model, in this scenario, turns out to be so bad that there isn't even anything other people are also attempting to model as grass, I'm on my own, so I scrap that model and start again.

Imagine we're looking at the stars. I point out Orion and say "look, there's his belt, there's his bow" etc. You can either say "yes, I see, that would be his dagger then..." or you could say "nope, I'm seeing a dog, look, there's his teeth". If everyone in your language community is seeing Orion, you might want to scrap your dog idea. Equally, if, you keep looking and find all sorts on non-dog stars, you might ditch your dog idea.

The thing we're attempting to refer to is the hidden states (like the pattern in the stars). 'The grass' is the model (like Orion).

"Orion has a dagger" is true if I can look at Orion and see his dagger (and any other test I can think of). "Orion has a dagger" is false if I look at Orion and can't see any dagger (nor any other test I can think of). But If I'm thinking the whole thing is a dog, then there is no Orion at all.

But the stars were always there either way.

2. If I am referring not to the grass but to my belief, then am I predicating, of my belief not the grass, that it is green? My beliefs can be green? — Srap Tasmaner

I wouldn't say you're referring to the belief (in the sense of some arrangement of neurons or mental state), rather the content of it. I can ask you to imagine a car, and then ask you what colour it is, no? There's no actual car, only your mental state in which you picture one. Yet there's still a coherent answer to the question "what colour is it?" The modelling process does not need to be triggered by external sense data.

That the grass is not green, is the case when, for instance, it’s brown. — Srap Tasmaner

What exactly. You look at the grass and find it doesn't seem green? Someone tells you the grass isn't green?

What I'm asking here is, in your mind, what does a true statement seem like. What distinguishes it, in your mind, from a false one? What is it about "I am the President of the United Sates" that feels different to "Joe Biden is President of the United States", why exactly would you say one is true and the other isn't? What mental resources would you engage to supply the right answer?

Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to not be as we believe them to be? Do you understand the difference between them? — Michael

I'm not sure how to judge whether I 'understand' I think I do (obviously). Is there some aspect of the understanding I've presented here that you could specify?

If it's simpler, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB. — Michael

The belief independent facts can't be any way without us believing them to be that way. You seem to think that fact requiring someone to believe them in order to be talked about somehow makes those facts belief dependant and I'm not seeing why.

Let's say the cat either is or is not on the mat. It's on-the-matness is belief independent. That has nothing to do with my claim that we can't talk about the cat's on-the-matness without someone holding a belief about it. 'Knowledge' is a word. 'Truth' is a word. These only have any meaning at all in speech acts between people. People who have beliefs about things like whether cats are on mats.

My claim, in the above sense, is simply that 'truth' (the word) has the same meaning in speech acts as 'justified' (the word)*

*more accurately, it's that 'truth' is a species of justification, but I don't want to muddy the water too much.

My claim, in the above sense, is simply that 'truth' (the word) has the same meaning in speech acts as 'justified' (the word)* — Isaac

It doesn't in the context of the JTB theory of knowledge. The "true" in "justified true belief" is to be understood as the facts being as they are believed to be.

So, again, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB.

Or more simply, one has knowledge iff the facts are as one justifiably believes them to be.

It doesn't in the context of the JTB theory of knowledge. The "true" in "justified true belief" is to be understood as the facts being as they are believed to be. — Michael

Yes. Which makes JTB incoherent because we can't talk about the facts simply being as we believe them to be yet both 'knowledge' and 'truth' are words... used in talking.

At best JTB could be an account of what 'knowledge' could mean, or ought to mean. In which case... thanks, but no thanks.

So, again, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB. — Michael

Makes no difference because 'X' and 'Y' are just stand-ins for words, else they have no meaning at all. And all words suffer the same constraint. To have any meaning at all they must be actually spoken in some act of communication. They're just collections of letters otherwise.

When I asked this:

Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to not be as we believe them to be? Do you understand the difference between them? — Michael

You responded with:

I'm not sure how to judge whether I 'understand' I think I do (obviously). — Isaac

So you do understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? So how is it “incoherent” to argue that this is a requirement for knowedge?

So you do understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? — Michael

As I said. I think I understand. I doubt my understanding is the one you're looking for.

For a mind-independent fact to be as I believe it to be is for it to survive all the tests I could throw at it.

So...

how is it “incoherent” to argue that this is a requirement for knowedge? — Michael

It's not. It's just that surviving all the tests I could throw at it is the same thing as justification. That it survives all the tests I throw at it is a justification for believing it. The J bit of JTB. Making the T bit superfluous.

The understanding I'm looking for is the common sense realist understanding. There is more to the world than our beliefs. The facts do not depend on us being able to justify them. Gravity affected us before we understood it, and not just retroactively after Newton published his theory.

1. If there is no grass, how can I have a belief “about the grass”? What would such a belief be about?
— Srap Tasmaner

Whatever it is I'm modelling as 'the grass'. — Isaac

As you mean it, that's incoherent. You want to say there’s no grass ‘out there’, that ‘grass’ is only a term of your model, but then it’s meaningless to say you’re modeling anything as grass. It’s not the “whatever it is” that’s the problem; it’s the “as grass”. You have to pay your semantic debts at some point, and if ‘grass’ doesn’t square your accounts, something else will have to.

There is more to the world than just our beliefs. The facts do not depend on us being able to justify them. — Michael

Agreed. We seem to be going round in circles. Perhaps you could address the issue I raised last time you made this point.

You seem to think that fact requiring someone to believe them in order to be talked about somehow makes those facts belief dependant and I'm not seeing why. — Isaac

My beliefs about the weather have no impact on the weather, it is what it is despite any belief I might have about it.

My beliefs about the weather do impact everything that can be said about the weather, including whether I use the word 'true', knowledge' or 'belief' when referring to propositions about it, including what I use as the object of those prepositions, the words I reach for, the very use of the term 'the weather' (as in the sentence above this one). Every response I make to 'the weather' is entirely dependant on my beliefs about it.

You want to say there’s no grass ‘out there’ — Srap Tasmaner

No, I'm pretty sure there's grass out there. I model it as grass, my wife models it as grass. In fact, everyone I speak to models it as gras, so I'm quite confident there's grass out there. If I model it as grass and everyone else models it as carpet, I might have my doubts.

it’s meaningless to say you’re modeling anything as grass. — Srap Tasmaner

'Grass' is the name of the model that seems to me to be the one where we mow the stuff, feed it to cows, that sort of thing. That model we call grass. So I can't see how modelling some hidden states as grass is meaningless. It means (to me, anyway) what I just explained.

My beliefs about the weather have no impact on the weather, it is what it is despite any belief I might have about it. — Isaac

And the T in JTB is saying that the weather must be as you believe it to be. If it isn't as you believe it to be then your belief is false and you don't have knowledge.

And the T in JTB is saying that the weather must be as you believe it to be. If it isn't as you believe it to be then your belief is false and you don't have knowledge. — Michael

As I said...

At best JTB could be an account of what 'knowledge' could mean, or ought to mean. In which case... thanks, but no thanks. — Isaac