"the actual weather condition" are asserted to be beliefs — InPitzotl
In the types of claims you're talking about, the claim presumes the part exists. That presumption is not part of the assertion; so if it fails, the truth value of the statement is undefined. There are other cases. — InPitzotl
But it sounds like the alien example works for you, so we could talk about that. — InPitzotl
It's not like there is a meaning fairy that's going to prevent us from talking about things that don't exist; we're the ones that have to figure that out. — InPitzotl
in your flower case all we need do is look in the box; and in the hat case, look at your head. — InPitzotl
Right, but what has your present psychological state of uncertainty, including your memories, imagination and thought experiments, got to do with a future interaction with your cupboard? — sime
Doesn't your self-professed ability to distinguish your beliefs from actuality preclude you from interpreting the objects of your beliefs as being in the future? — sime
As I see it you are still conflating what is involved with taking ourselves to possess knowledge and what is involved with our actually possessing knowledge — Janus
So to take ourselves to possess knowledge is to take our belief to be both true and justified — Janus
Correct according to the common understanding of knowledge; you know, like the legal "beyond reasonable doubt". — Janus
I don't see how. You seem to be saying that I can't have a belief about the result of a coin flip because it hasn't happened yet but I'm not seeing why. — Isaac
Yeah, our beliefs can be wrong, where 'wrong' here means l (the speaker) believe that acting as if it were the case will yield surprising results. — Isaac
Here:Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief? — Isaac
You were very explicit not only in saying this, but in specifically saying that you were saying it.I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac
"The claim presumes x" is an anthropomorphic abstraction; what it means is that x is a prerequisite for the assertion. The prerequisite need not be believed for the claim to be true; so long as there's some way to identify the part of the world meant, and the condition does indeed hold, the claim is true. Hence, "Isaac's hat is a lovely shade of green today".The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. — Isaac
Big "if". Even if I presume the flower exists, that does not compel you to agree it exists.If we first 'assume the flower exists' and then describe it's properties, the properties we're describing are those of the assumed flower. — Isaac
No, the assumption is a prerequisite. It might be a belief; it's probably typically a belief (at least in the case of standalone claims); but the belief is optional for aboutness. Again, there's the hat on your head that's a lovely shade of green.The assumption is a belief - "I believe there is a flower" — Isaac
In terms of JTB, this is just a matter of T.But your claim is that (for JTB purposes) "the grass is green" is not about a belief, but rather about the actual grass. — Isaac
Yes. That the actual grass is green doesn't magically cause it to poof into our beliefs. We must find out what the T is through J. JTB per se abstracts this out, but sanely speaking, you look at the grass.Now you're saying we have to 'figure that out'. — Isaac
The question is ambiguous, but reasonably enumerable. Sanely speaking, assuming it's previously unexplored wild grass to ignore a detail and presuming realism, the grass is green (T) before anyone sees it, which implies it exists. If Joe knows it's green, then Joe has J that it is green which implies Joe has J that it exists. If someone wants to verify the T that it's green, whether or not that someone is Joe, before or after Joe knows it, they can test it by looking at said grass; on passing said test they have attained J that the grass is green. The test may also fail, in which case they (again, possibly being Joe) attain J that the grass is not green.Do we do so first, or later? — Isaac
The statement is about a part of the world meeting a condition. The part of the world should be specified somehow at the time of the statement (it is not "grass"; there's grass outside my window that's green right now that likely has nothing to do with what the statement is about; rather it is what the definite article "the" refers to in the noun phrase "the grass", and that's generally always given by a context).If later, then what was the statement about at the time? — Isaac
So "when pressed" and "admit" is just spin; narrative; dysphemism. The spin reflects your bias, which is severely interfering with your comprehension. I do not "admit" "when pressed" that we could still be wrong, I emphasize it. The reason I keep coming back to this is that you keep missing the same point. You demonstrate that yourself:You keep coming back to 'just look' and then when pressed admit that we could still be wrong even after looking, so I don't know why you keep coming back to it. — Isaac
Correct.I believe the flower is green because John told me so
I believe the flower is green because all flowers I've ever seen are green
I believe the flower is green because I looked and it seemed green to me
These are all just justifications for believing the flower is green, — Isaac
And this is precisely what I mean. You've used spin, narrative, and dysphemism to reformulate this into a red herring argument about certainty. It is, in fact, a direct response to and refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about a belief.the last one isn't of some magically different sort which distinguishes the 'truth' of the matter. — Isaac
'Knowledge' is just a word, it's not an external object with properties we discover by scientific investigation. Something 'actually' being knowledge (as opposed to us treating it as if it were) is a nonsense, — Isaac
You can have a belief in the manner you describe that refers to your psychological concept of "future". But from a physical and causal perspective, your beliefs cannot refer to the physical future and can only refer to your physical history, making your beliefs a conceptually redundant way of talking about the causes of your perceptions, from a physical perspective. — sime
...implying that "belief states" are necessarily infallible or that the notion of truth is superfluous. — sime
now you’re trying to say that truth and being wrong have nothing to do with the facts or the actual weather? — Michael
A more straightforward position is that there are facts - like the actual weather - that are independent of what we believe or claim or experience. When the facts are as we experience them to be then our experience is veridical. When the facts are as we believe or claim them to be then what we believe or claim is true. — Michael
yet everything you’re saying contradicts this. I don’t even understand what you’re arguing. — Michael
Do you not see the incoherency here? — Michael
...our beliefs have nothing to do with the facts... — Michael
Where have I asserted that the actual weather is a belief? — Isaac
Here:
I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac
You were very explicit not only in saying this, but in specifically saying that you were saying it.
The underlined is exactly the claim I'm making. — InPitzotl
I'm saying that the 'actual weather' you're referring to is inside your skull ie what you claim is the 'actual weather' in that sentence is, in fact, a belief about it inside your skull. — Isaac
The prerequisite need not be believed for the claim to be true — InPitzotl
Big "if". — InPitzotl
Even if I presume the flower exists, that does not compel you to agree it exists. — InPitzotl
No, the assumption is a prerequisite. It might be a belief; it's probably typically a belief (at least in the case of standalone claims); but the belief is optional for aboutness. — InPitzotl
We must find out what the T is through J. — InPitzotl
If someone wants to verify the T that it's green, whether or not that someone is Joe, before or after Joe knows it, they can test it by looking at said grass; on passing said test they have attained J that the grass is green. The test may also fail, in which case they (again, possibly being Joe) attain J that the grass is not green. — InPitzotl
The statement is about a part of the world meeting a condition. The part of the world should be specified somehow at the time of the statement — InPitzotl
So "when pressed" and "admit" is just spin; narrative; dysphemism. The spin reflects your bias, which is severely interfering with your comprehension. — InPitzotl
You've used spin, narrative, and dysphemism to reformulate this into a red herring argument about certainty. It is, in fact, a direct response to and refutation of your pet theory that the claim is about a belief. — InPitzotl
it is a test whose results are measured by observations, not beliefs. — InPitzotl
Now I think I understand just where your confusion is. — Janus
So, justified belief is not enough to constitute knowledge because the belief must be true. When people thought the world was a flat disc that was not knowledge because it was subsequently discovered that the world is (roughly) a sphere. — Janus
It may seem for all the world to be justified according to our experience, but does it follow from that that it is is in fact justified?. Perhaps the JTB formula could be modified to become 'knowledge consists in truly justified belief' which incorporates the 'justified' and the 'true' such that it follows that any belief which is not true is not justified and any belief which is not justified cannot be true. — Janus
None of this changes the fact that we can never be absolutely sure we possess knowledge. I think the idea of dropping the 'true' part is fine if you are also happy with dropping the 'knowledge' part. Then we would never claim to have knowledge at all, but merely beliefs which seem more or less justified, or not justified at all, depending on what we take to be the criteria for saying what constitutes evidence. — Janus
A more straightforward position is that there are facts - like the actual weather - that are independent of what we believe or claim or experience. When the facts are as we experience them to be then our experience is veridical. When the facts are as we believe or claim them to be then what we believe or claim is true. — Michael
I agree with that position. — Isaac
1. There are facts, independent of beliefs and statements — Michael
2. If the facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are true, otherwise they're false — Michael
When I say "the grass is green" I'm attempting to refer to the grass, I'm actually referring to my belief about the grass (there might be no grass, yet I still refer). — Isaac
Imagine "the grass is green" is false, then imagine it's true. Describe the difference between the two states you're imagining. — Isaac
1. If there is no grass, how can I have a belief “about the grass”? What would such a belief be about? — Srap Tasmaner
2. If I am referring not to the grass but to my belief, then am I predicating, of my belief not the grass, that it is green? My beliefs can be green? — Srap Tasmaner
That the grass is not green, is the case when, for instance, it’s brown. — Srap Tasmaner
Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to not be as we believe them to be? Do you understand the difference between them? — Michael
If it's simpler, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB. — Michael
My claim, in the above sense, is simply that 'truth' (the word) has the same meaning in speech acts as 'justified' (the word)* — Isaac
It doesn't in the context of the JTB theory of knowledge. The "true" in "justified true belief" is to be understood as the facts being as they are believed to be. — Michael
So, again, forget the words "true" and "false". If the belief-independent facts are as we believe them to be then our beliefs are X, otherwise they're Y. Knowledge is JXB. — Michael
Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? Do you understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to not be as we believe them to be? Do you understand the difference between them? — Michael
I'm not sure how to judge whether I 'understand' I think I do (obviously). — Isaac
So you do understand what it means for the belief-independent facts to be as we believe them to be? — Michael
how is it “incoherent” to argue that this is a requirement for knowedge? — Michael
1. If there is no grass, how can I have a belief “about the grass”? What would such a belief be about?
— Srap Tasmaner
Whatever it is I'm modelling as 'the grass'. — Isaac
There is more to the world than just our beliefs. The facts do not depend on us being able to justify them. — Michael
You seem to think that fact requiring someone to believe them in order to be talked about somehow makes those facts belief dependant and I'm not seeing why. — Isaac
You want to say there’s no grass ‘out there’ — Srap Tasmaner
it’s meaningless to say you’re modeling anything as grass. — Srap Tasmaner
My beliefs about the weather have no impact on the weather, it is what it is despite any belief I might have about it. — Isaac
And the T in JTB is saying that the weather must be as you believe it to be. If it isn't as you believe it to be then your belief is false and you don't have knowledge. — Michael
At best JTB could be an account of what 'knowledge' could mean, or ought to mean. In which case... thanks, but no thanks. — Isaac
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