By language, here, I mean meaningful sentences (MSs) of the general form S is P. For an MS to be true, it must accurately describe some aspect of reality, that is, be descriptive of a thing. — tim wood
MSs like 2+2=4, because they work perfectly, are here deemed perfectly true, or completely and absolutely true. — tim wood
The idea of "table" is certain, so that if it were ever possible to determine that the thing is entirely a table, then the MS that asserts it is a table would be a descriptive MS that was absolutely and completely true. — tim wood
The difficulty - my difficulty - is with people who represent their beliefs as being true, and acting on them as if they were. — tim wood
1. Reality is real.
a. Only reality is real
b. Only things are real
i. For the moment the test of thingness is if in principle it can be felt, seen, smelled, heard, or tasted. Here, at least, neither numbers, love, justice, nor any ideas at all, are things. — tim wood
Let's see if some rules help. It seems to me there are really just three ways to respond to rules:
1. agree with them
2. modify and improve them
3. demonstrate where they're wrong.
Of course one may also dislike them, but that's neither here nor there. — tim wood
3) Within language, rules matter. We can start with the rules of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle. Call it logic, for that's what it is. — tim wood
i. For the moment the test of thingness is if in principle it can be felt, seen, smelled, heard, or tasted. Here, at least, neither numbers, love, justice, nor any ideas at all, are things. — tim wood
"True" and "truth" are words that are not so easy to define (even though we use them all the time and may even think they're simple). In an attempt to gain some clarity about them, I want to try to restrict them to what is clearly the case, and where they turn out to be limited in scope - or where they seem to be maybe not so clearly the case - try to sharpen the focus on them so that they can still be used, even if with some limitation. Let's see if some rules help. It seems to me there are really just three ways to respond to rules:
1. agree with them
2. modify and improve them
3. demonstrate where they're wrong.
Of course one may also dislike them, but that's neither here nor there. If we can establish or agree to some rules, then maybe we can test some things some of us think are true. If the rules are any good, perhaps we can learn something. — tim wood
Here goes:
1. Reality is real.
a. Only reality is real
b. Only things are real
i. For the moment the test of thingness is if in principle it can be felt, seen, smelled, heard, or tasted. Here, at least, neither numbers, love, justice, nor any ideas at all, are things.
2. Language qua language is descriptive only. By language, here, I mean meaningful sentences (MSs) of the general form S is P. For an MS to be true, it must accurately describe some aspect of reality, that is, be descriptive of a thing. Because no description can be perfectly accurate, no MS can be completely and absolutely true. And any MS can only be as true as the description is accurate.
However, read on.
3) Within language, rules matter. We can start with the rules of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle. Call it logic, for that's what it is.
4. Language applied to ideas can also be true, e.g., 2+2=4. But "true," here, needs clarification, imho. Let's say that the test of the truth of language about ideas - not real things - is whether it works and how well it works. MSs like 2+2=4, because they work perfectly, are here deemed perfectly true, or completely and absolutely true. MSs like "Justice is good," maybe are not perfectly true, or at least not without a lot of work on understanding what is meant by both "justice" and "good."
5) What complicates matters is that descriptive language is always expressed in concepts - ideas. It is easily possible, then, for an MS about reality to have a quality of absolute truth. For example, "That is a table," is true only insofar as the "that " described just is a table. It may not be a table; it may be a table-like thing of some kind. (Keeping in mind that the law of the excluded middle applies only to MSs within language, logic, not descriptive MSs about reality.) So it may not be entirely true that the thing is a table. On the other hand, the idea of "table" is certain, so that if it were ever possible to determine that the thing is entirely a table, then the MS that asserts it is a table would be a descriptive MS that was absolutely and completely true.
And that's it. My goal is a tool to handle beliefs. Beliefs do not have to be true at all to be beliefs. They merely need to be believed. The difficulty - my difficulty - is with people who represent their beliefs as being true, and acting on them as if they were.
I do not think there is anything new or difficult or original here, but I like the idea of limiting "truth" to preserve its strength, by not applying it to ideas or things that are not or cannot be true.
While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty' is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory. The extrapolation of this axiom is the creation of the scientific method, which is designed to define the minimum number of observations necessary to corroborate a theory. As per the rules for causal truth, theories can only be corroborated and not be proven true; but modern science theory might still call a theory true based on the axiom of probabilistic certainty.
Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.
Truth in theology, morality, ethics, law, and metaphysics
Much confusion about truth has arisen in these fields, but by the above schema, the nature of truth itself is relatively simple. Theological systems make assertions about that which cannot ultimately be proven; morality strives to define that which is good or bad for an individual; ethics defines that which is good or bad for a society; law strives to define that which is right or wrong; and metaphysics strives to define that which is real. In all these cases the absolute truth of the assertions they make is undefinable. However within each of these disciplines, it is possible to evaluate the propositional consistency of statements within formal systems that they define; and from that, to evaluate the truth of their propositions empirically, within the formal systems themselves. so again, when different propositions within, or across, these disciplines contradict each other, it is not possible to evaluate which are true or false in absolute terms. It is only possible to demonstrate whether the claims by each system are coherent.
2. Language qua language is descriptive only. By language, here, I mean meaningful sentences (MSs) of the general form S is P. For an MS to be true, it must accurately describe some aspect of reality, that is, be descriptive of a thing. Because no description can be perfectly accurate, no MS can be completely and absolutely true. And any MS can only be as true as the description is accurate. — tim wood
The difficulty - my difficulty - is with people who represent their beliefs as being true, and acting on them as if they were. — tim wood
Or you may get the idea that truth is actually something more, perhaps a quality of some kind in its own right. Now here I have a problem: what, exactly, would that property be? — tim wood
I simply don't believe it is true that you believe anything that you don't believe to be true.
So - what is more true than the truth? Is that what you're asking?
The bad news is: there aren't any.... but not so much with truth, as that is not simply a verbal matter.
Answer: anything true. Again, I'm distinguishing between "truth" as merely meaning, "has the quality of being true," which is to me inoffensive, except as it is misleading because it implies a second meaning of "truth" as something apart from the particular true in question; and that second sense that I think a chimerical.[W]hat is more true than the truth?
.every notion of truth rests on some intuition of what must be the case, that admits of no further explication
I disagree. This might be a critique of the true, and you can make it if you like, although I think you're mistaken. Consider these:
1) This (table here) is a table.
2) 7+5=12
3) triangles have three sides
4) Julius Caeser was a ruler of Rome.
These are true, no intuition about it — tim wood
Consider these:
1) This (table here) is a table.
2) 7+5=12
3) triangles have three sides
4) Julius Caeser was a ruler of Rome.
These are true, no intuition about it. But as to the proposition that they all have truth, that I find difficult. Again, no intuition about it. And I think we agree only on this: that "truth" doesn't mean much, if anything. — tim wood
in no way do those statements have the property of truth. — A Seagull
Or you may get the idea that truth is actually something more, perhaps a quality of some kind in its own right. Now here I have a problem: what, exactly, would that property be?
Of course this means that anyone talking about "the truth," or the "absolute truth" (beyond just what in particular makes MS1, or MS2, etc., true), or any of a large number of formulations of this kind, is just talking nonsense. — tim wood
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