Are you saying that you believe Wittgenstein’s is a no holds barred, anything goes approach? A radical relativism? — Joshs

Yep, Wittgenstein is a form of relativism:the language game, the form of life has no rationale, it can be anything we want it to be (meaning is use, the rule following paradox). There is no correct Wittgenstein, there's only Wittgenstein just like there's no correct taste, there's only taste.

Yep, Wittgenstein is a form of relativism:the language game, the form of life has no rationale, it can be anything we want it to be (meaning is use, the rule following paradox). There is no correct Wittgenstein, there's only Wittgenstein just like there's no correct taste, there's only taste. — Agent Smith

To the extent that Derrida has also been accused of ‘anything goes’ radical relativism, I think his response to this charge is relevant to the understanding of Wittgenstein’s language games, because they share much in their analysis of social conventions and the role of language in creating and sustaining such conventions.

“ For of course there is a "right track" , a better way, and let it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the use or abuse of the following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood, simplified, deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this definition of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread.

Then perhaps it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive contexts (that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example, socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith, lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy.”

To the extent it can be said I grasped Wittgenstein, I reaffirm my position which is there's no samyak-dṛṣṭi (right view) when it comes to Wittgenstein; in fact I would take this a step further - Wittgenstein wishes to endorse anekantavada (many-sidedness/perspectivism)

I reaffirm my position which is there's no samyak-dṛṣṭi (right view) when it comes to Wittgenstein; in fact I would take this a step further - Wittgenstein wishes to endorse anekantavada (many-sidedness/perspectivism) — Agent Smith

Derrida’s and my point is that there is a difference between ‘no right view’ and anything goes. For both him and Wittgenstein, what is correct and right can be constrained and determined in quite precise ways in relation to linguistic contexts of interaction within communities and cultures. What they deny is the idea that rightness can be fixed from some
culture-independent view from nowhere.

Derrida’s and my point is that there is a difference between ‘no right view’ and anything goes. For both him and Wittgenstein, what is correct and right can be constrained and determined in quite precise ways in relation to linguistic contexts of interaction within communities and cultures. What they deny is the idea that rightness can be fixed from some
culture-independent view from nowhere. — Joshs

Yes! Discernment of subtlety/nuance isn't my strong suit. I'd like to hear more if you feel so disposed.