I loved the way Plato/Socrates talked about ethics in the Republic.

They ramble on with different arguments here and there with different people, finally Socrates puts on the table his version of ethics: Ideals, Forms, and the cave.

WTF? Where is the ethics in there, old foker? WHERE'S THE BEEF??

Socrates is the most misguiding and most over-rated philosopher of all times.

Let's ask him if he meant to say that.

Apostrophel, did you mean to say what we came up with speculatively trying to understand you?

I'll have to come back tomorrow to check. I got a plane to catch, and I need my beauty sleep.

Good luck in the ring.

Good luck in the ring. — john27

What ring? It does not ring a bell.

You mean like a boxing ring? A fighting arena?

I think before we can talk about Mill or Kant, or the nature of moral obligation or how moral attitudes figure into morality itself, and so on, we have to ask a more fundamental question: what IS ethics? — Astrophel

What is a proper analysis of the "parts" of an ethical problem? — Astrophel

What makes you think we should talk about ethics ‘in general’ before talking about Mill or Kant? This reminds me of what Foucault does with concepts like sexuality
or morality. Rather than giving us a history of something , which pre-supposes the meaning and then inserts it into the history, he gives us a genealogy of a concept, showing us that its history isn’t a history of changing applications or attitudes towards what has already been assumed in its basic structure. Rather, a genealogical analysis reveals a thoroughgoing transformation of the concept itself from one historical
period to the next. So in looking for the ‘parts’ of ethics which are transcendent to cultural contingency, we have to ask what it is that belongs to the genealogical structure in general. That may bring us to something on the order of local systems of intelligibility and their transformations. Ethics ‘in general’ may then be analyzed in terms of a drive toward creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation oriented around diversification of values.

If good is not known to be a universal, then how one acts "good" is relegated to subjective standards, which kind of defeats the point of making a list on "how" to do things. — john27

Only some ethical theories involve a list of how to do things. Seems an add approach, I agree; as if this or that rule might be formulated that would work in all cases.

Talk of universals looks like a hang over from talk of what is the case - and never worked that well there.

Subjective standards - whatever they are - won't be of much help. Ethics, on the other hand, seems to involve taking the concerns of others into account.

Well, this just a tad general, don't you think? — Astrophel

Sure it is, but so was the question to which it referred.

Reason could be here substituted for ethics and it would still be true. — Astrophel

To ask “what IS reason, you mean? Otherwise, I don’t understand the question. Anyway, not so sure it makes sense to ask what reason is. To reason about reason is intrinsically circular, whereas to reason from an ethical...or more accurately, a moral, predisposition.....is not. Ethics presupposes reason; reason does not presupposes ethics. So I don’t think there’s sufficient justification to substitute one for the other.

What kind of doctrine would an ethical doctrine be? — Astrophel

If ethics in general is the nature of man, then an ethical doctrine would be the kind premised on whatever one thinks the nature of man to be, then develops a metaphysics that relates one to the other. Pick a starting point, go from there.

what are the assumptions built into it that would expose a deeper understanding of ethics? — Astrophel

A deeper understanding of what ethics is, would be given as logical derivative of the metaphysics. It’s a metaphysical domain.....there are no proofs beyond the logical. So maybe something is always assumed, somewhere in the system.

The problem of ethics is not "what is the case" but "What do we do"? — Banno

Both. You need to know what is and what is not, and also what is better, what worse. Two differing logics, rhetoric and dialectic. One exhorting, arguing for agreement to a course of action; the other demonstrating, to which one assents. Both.

Yep. But the bit about what to do is the part that makes it ethics, not physics.

And again, I'g put it in terms of direction of fit rather than rhetoric and dialectic.

But the bit about what to do is the part that makes it ethics, not physics. — Banno

Fair enough. I accept.

But the distinction I pointed out to Mww seems pivotal: ethics is not about what is the case but what to do. It is not to be found by looking around at the world, but in deciding what actions one will take.

SO there's a start. — Banno

But you already know how this goes. One doesn't do until one know what lies before one. And further: the question cares nothing about what to do. It assumes one has an issue and things are in the balance. Philosophy steps in with its inexhaustible curiosity and asks the question about a thing's nature or essence. Asking such a question may not solve any particular ethical problem, but that is not the point. The point is, what IS an ethical problem qua ethical? The answer may reveal something that has meaning beyond actions, for in this analysis, the inquiry at one point has to be about ethical agency. Asking what ethics is implicitly asks what ethical agency is, and things get far more interesting.

I wrote the following two papers explaining why ethics can't be defined. The thrust of my thesis was that ethics in fact comprises two separate and irreconcilable systems, each of which can be defined, but the two are always lumped together into one, and that causes a lot of confusion for philosophers. There are distinct similarities and differences between the two systems which I tried to describe in the papers.

Everyone on this site poo-pooed on these papers, those who criticized them, but mainly those who never even bothered to look at them.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10744/ethics-explained-to-smooth-out-all-wrinkles-in-current-debates-neo-darwinist-approach/p1

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/10903/shortened-version-of-theory-of-morality-some-objected-to-the-conversational-style-of-my-paper — god must be atheist

I'll read one. Then I'll get back to you.

Thanks.

Ethics seems to me the study of how to discern adaptive conduct which optimizes – from maladaptive conduct which fails to optimize – habits/customs of (i.e. individual preferences/social priorities for) non-reciprocal helping. — 180 Proof

What is non reciprocal helping? I, mean, someone is not reciprocating in their .....help?

One doesn't do until one know what lies before one. — Astrophel

I'm not sure that is right. We often - even mostly - are obliged to act before having a clear account of what is the case.

I recall an excellent analysis of institutions that suggested that the need to be seen to act usually overwhelmed the need to collect information; resulting in irrational decisions justified post-hoc.

Philosophy steps in with its inexhaustible curiosity and asks the question about a thing's nature or essence. — Astrophel

In that regard philosophy is must unhelpful. No sooner is an essence found than some bugger undermines it.

So I remain unconvinced that any general ethics setting out rules for moral action could be applicable to all situations.

Sorry, I couldn't make sense of this. — john27

You said, "Meh. Ethical actions tend to betray rationality more often then not, I'd think." I take this to mean you think talk about ethics is reducible to what reason can say qua reason. So, I am an ethical agent in so far as I am rational, and it is rationality out of which ethics comes into existence.
Something like that?

Socrates is the most misguiding and most over-rated philosopher of all times. — god must be atheist

That's a ballsy statement. Nietzsche would have agreed but he was... Nietzsche. What's your excuse? :razz:

I ask, in order tp have a moral theory at all, you have to have something before you to theorize about. What is it there, in the reduced analysis of actual moral affair, that can make moral theorizing possible? — Astrophel

Human beings are meaning making creatures. We can't help but contrive and codify, systems, rules, positions, behaviours. Why is ethics different to any other human behaviour? Or are you coming at this from a foundational position?

Apostrophel, did you mean to say what we came up with speculatively trying to understand you? — god must be atheist

Not much in the way of speculation is called for. Merely description. When we want to philosophically analyze ethical issues, we generally look to theory. I am asking that this be put off until we actually know what it is that sits before you that you are theorizing about. Is there an objection to this?

But those inborn concepts and feelings, how inborn are they? — Astrophel

To the extent that we see them expressed in even 'unintelligent' and very nonhuman species, such as fish, we can guess: quite.

what is the separation between what is acculturated and what is "natural"? — Astrophel

The innate ethical tendencies are shaped and directed by culture in very varied ways. The same as with our innate linguistic tendencies, sexual tendencies, etc.

That is, if I have a feeling, a pang of conscience, isn't this to be brought up under review to see if it's right? — Astrophel

Except, our innate moral intuitions already underlie any such review. Reason here can only rationalize what we already feel to be true.

I think ethics is Real, not just a construct. All constructs are constructs OF something. All meaningful affairs are meaningful only to the extent that there is a material basis for them. — Astrophel

You are one of many who feels compelled to believe that ethics is Real with a capital R. I don't sympathize. Do you seriously think there is a material basis for ethics? This is
philosophically naive.

I am asking that this be put off until we actually know what it is that sits before you that you are theorizing about. Is there an objection to this? — Astrophel

Good. What does phenomenology make of ethics - isn't this the approach you are suggesting? For my money what sits before ethics is behaviour that either repels or attracts us. Then comes the postulation.

What makes you think we should talk about ethics ‘in general’ before talking about Mill or Kant? This reminds me of what Foucault does with concepts like sexuality
or morality. Rather than giving us a history of something , which pre-supposes the meaning and then inserts it into the history, he gives us a genealogy of a concept, showing us that its history isn’t a history of changing applications or attitudes towards what has already been assumed in its basic structure. Rather, a genealogical analysis reveals a thoroughgoing transformation of the concept itself from one historical
period to the next. So in looking for the ‘parts’ of ethics which are transcendent to cultural contingency, we have to ask what it is that belongs to the genealogical structure in general. That may bring us to something on the order of local systems of intelligibility and their transformations. Ethics ‘in general’ may then be analyzed in terms of a drive toward creating new futures, an impetus to societal transformation oriented around diversification of values. — Joshs

But you know what I'm going to say already, I suspect. In what I have read of Husserl and his intuitive foundation as a bedrock of philosophical analysis, I do not find a suitable account in the reduction of ethical issues. Only Levinas sees this. All matters bow low to ethics/aesthetics, for here is existential basis for all conceivable matters. And studies in the principles of historical progressions presuppose something more basic, and this is the intuited presence of value-in-the-world.

Is this to say that ethics is grounded in something apodictic, intuitively insisting, like the principle of sufficient cause? Yes, I actually believe this is the case.

To ask “what IS reason, you mean? Otherwise, I don’t understand the question. Anyway, not so sure it makes sense to ask what reason is. To reason about reason is intrinsically circular, whereas to reason from an ethical...or more accurately, a moral, predisposition.....is not. Ethics presupposes reason; reason does not presupposes ethics. So I don’t think there’s sufficient justification to substitute one for the other. — Mww

I don't wish to discuss reason beyond saying, with Hume, that reason is just a vessel (and Kant did analyze reason, calling it a synthetic principle, but then, you are quite right to say, as Wittgenstein would tell us, that this would be an analysis that presupposes exactly what is to be questioned. That's most egregious question begging. Then again, it is well understood that that Kant was not assuming the perspective of God. He was very clear about this).
The point I was making is that rationality as such, as principled thinking, is not sufficient for an analysis of ethics. But, one can say the same for anything at all one an think of; it's trivially true, for anything that can be thought at all requires reason, making reason always a necessary but insufficient condition.

Reason does not presuppose ethics? True. But it is more interesting than this in actuality. Not ethics, but value, and value is a presupposition of both ethics and aesthetics. Reason is, after all, an abstraction from the experience. There is no "reason" as an observable existence. There is judgment, then there is abstraction from judgment, which we call reason. Nor is there value which can be laid before our eyes. Value is rather an abstraction from experience.

So, to make the point I m defending, I think when one looks closely at an ethical matter, and puts aside all else that would otherwise intrude into an interpretation of what is there, one will "see" that matter for what it is, and it is not a discursive discovery, it is intuitive. Ethics has an intuitive dimension that exceeds the contingencies of theory.

The underlying principle of any ethical disposition is orientation. Such orientation is based on what we value and how we value it. The ‘ethical’ is built upon speculative ‘moralism’ - opinions and theories that serve us to navigate through wants and needs.

Any idea of ‘ethical nihilism’ is rather stupid because it is like saying I cannot measure the concept of ‘string’ therefore the concept of ‘string’ is of no value whatsoever. We can actually measure the length of a piece of string though and understand various ways to use a piece of string.

I haven’t read any posts here but just noticed you saying the same thing above briefly so I’ll leave it there. It is obvious. What is obvious some people stubbornly struggle with because it doesn’t map onto their current scheme of the world.

Rationality follows these terms rather than dictating them. — Astrophel

Why? I don’t see any solid evidence to suggest that ‘rationality’ is somehow distinct from ethics let alone prior to it? These are just terms we use for convenience and what is convenient in one situation is meaningless in another … I think this is ‘another’.

It is not to be found by looking around at the world, but in deciding what actions one will take. — Banno

Not necessarily true. Often enough, for us pathetic humans, we are passengers to our ‘actions’ then justify them after the effect deferring authorship dependent upon the perceived value of the outcome.

We (the passing judgement) is merely pushing against the wave of what has happened in order to better equip (or try to) for future events. As we’re temporally focused/confused we often do this in a hindsight sense too much and stagnate. Letting go of time is not something we seem to recognise or understand. We live with a repeated pattern (memory) that is constantly rewriting itself and implanting ‘errors’ that suit our wants/needs.

Most, if not all ‘ethical’ views, are done after the matter of fact. This is probably where the nihilism can slip in … but it is still mistaken because it is contrary by its ‘principles’.

studies in the principles of historical progressions presuppose something more basic, and this is the intuited presence of value-in-the-world. — Astrophel

If these studies conclude that history is a progression, then they are already assuming a fixed basis of the movement of history, a founding value defining the progress as progress rather than mere change. Progress is a ‘good’ kind of change, a change that conserves its origin. This conserving of the good isn’t a placing of ethics in first position as Levinas thinks, it’s a confusion of ethics with Nietzsche’s aesthetic ideal, the attempt to freeze history by keeping the ethical impulse at a distance from the contingency of time.

Ethics has an intuitive dimension that exceeds the contingencies of theory. — Astrophel

What we believe will nearly always overwhelm what we observe. This is especially the case for pillars upon which we orientate our lives - rightly or wrongly. We need to be delusional and misinformed in order to grasp at understanding as if some ultimate understanding exists … that is basically the core of ‘ethics’.

Sure, all that.

The salient point is that what separates Ethics (with an "E")from other studies is the focus on changing the way things are, not on describing the way things are.

That ethics tends to post hoc rationalisation adds to the need for cultivating the habits of virtue.

Ethics is something to do with behavior, and in particular something to do with our behavior towards one another, but there are many ways to describe two (or more) persons in relation to each other without an ethical ‘dimension’, as we might say — biological, economic, and so on.

I’m tempted to say something like this: suppose we start not with persons only, but with another element, something like The Good. Seriously, full-on Plato. Suppose we think the minimum configuration we’re interested in is two people in relation to each other and also in relation to The Good. This, rather than just taking “good” as a way we might categorize the relations obtaining between people, because we want more than that: an ethical act, an ethical moment would be one that is not just a matter of what I do to you “being good” or not, but also of my “being good”, of my acting out of goodness, of my sharing in goodness with you, inviting you also to be good, of inviting you also to take up a relation to The Good as I have, recognizing your capacity to relate to The Good as I do, and so on. Not a matter only of categorizing an action, but of a multifaceted interaction with this third thing.

Reifying it like this can also serve to cut off the temptation to ‘finish’ good instrumentally — that is, as “good for” something or other. An ethical action is one that is good, full-stop, not good for you, or for your happiness, or your well-being, or for society, or for anything. Not in furtherance of some purpose, higher or lower, something we might eventually attribute simply to individual (or social, or biological) preference or habit or desire, but only in relation to The Good. If I act with one eye on you and the other on this third thing, The Good, with a commitment to you but also to this other thing, that is ethical. It’s not just you that has a claim on me, but this other thing as well.

I generally go in fear of Platonism, but off the top of my head I can’t really think of another way adequately to convey the absoluteness of the ethical, if you see what I mean. And I can’t imagine how we give substance to this third thing, The Good. I’ve no idea what to say about it. Maybe it’s just a way of throwing everything that touches our ways of behaving toward each other into one basket — all the biological, social, cultural factors, all those little hints and warnings and exhortations about what is good. All of that taken together seems to have a life, or at least an existence, of its own, that we find ourselves beholden to as much as we are beholden to ourselves and to each other.

The ethic is based on the individual moral positions of peoples in societies/communities. There is also an underlying/innate predisposition to ‘animate’ objects experienced - empathy is innate.

Ethics is about presupposing a set of rules and means to live by that suit ALL people OR enough people to help the most people in the long run … or even to help humanity in the long run rather than the most people (hence how genocides and war are ‘justified’ by some).

I am against ‘ethics’ in this sense. I am against rules set out by others regardless of there use to me. My view is my view and if I think something is okay then I’m good. Sometimes this upsets others and that is just something I have to live with rather than ‘justify’. I think moral justification is probably the singular most dangerous element of human cultures.

The moral journey is an individual one and all make the necessary mistake of looking for public backing for their views rather than operating and adjusting them as suits experienced living. Thankfully enough people are too sheeplike most of the time so the minority have more clout. In more recent times this has become imbalanced and we’ve seen dozens of examples of this since history began (and likely further back than that?). When I said ‘recent’ I was talking on an evolutionary scale! I do still view the modern era as shedding more light on this problem because of the population explosion, but my view is myopic because I’ve not even been alive for half a century yet and just because I believe I am ‘better’ than most at viewing the human species with a good degree of objective indifference it doesn’t make it so :D