I don't think not harming others is sufficient.

This is a radical, and overarching openness that runs through all things, and is overwhelmingly alien to familiar thinking. — Astrophel

That is the phenomenological approach. There is no statement of what is or isn't only constant reorientation through consciousness.

You said it yoursef: your taste will vary due to mood, etc. I am not a mood. When a mood comes to me, I can deal with it, true, but the mood and its alternatives are givens. You are thrown into a world of givens. Choice intervenes, but choices are only among what is given to choose; and so many are now beyond choice: I can't choose to hate chocolate or adore traffic noise. — Astrophel

Where does the 'mood' come from? France? Make sense or don't speak. What is it you are 'dealing with' and what does this 'dealing with it' entail? Note: I'm not trying to be funny or evasive here nor am I expecting an answer ... that is counter productive to disentangling oneself from 'ethics' as a reasonable quest.

You can choose to hate chocolate or adore traffic noise. Saying you cannot does not make the plasticity of your taste disappear it merely covers it up. You may or may not be predisposed towards x more than y but that doesn't necessarily make x a certain choice over y.

If you say you cannot choose it is because you don't wish that to be the case because it is upsetting on some level of rationality (which includes emotional aspects too as it must ... unless I'm wrong!).

Ethics is something to do with behavior, and in particular something to do with our behavior towards one another, but there are many ways to describe two (or more) persons in relation to each other without an ethical ‘dimension’, as we might say — biological, economic, and so on.

I’m tempted to say something like this: suppose we start not with persons only, but with another element, something like The Good. Seriously, full-on Plato. Suppose we think the minimum configuration we’re interested in is two people in relation to each other and also in relation to The Good. This, rather than just taking “good” as a way we might categorize the relations obtaining between people, because we want more than that: an ethical act, an ethical moment would be one that is not just a matter of what I do to you “being good” or not, but also of my “being good”, of my acting out of goodness, of my sharing in goodness with you, inviting you also to be good, of inviting you also to take up a relation to The Good as I have, recognizing your capacity to relate to The Good as I do, and so on. Not a matter only of categorizing an action, but of a multifaceted interaction with this third thing.

Reifying it like this can also serve to cut off the temptation to ‘finish’ good instrumentally — that is, as “good for” something or other. An ethical action is one that is good, full-stop, not good for you, or for your happiness, or your well-being, or for society, or for anything. Not in furtherance of some purpose, higher or lower, something we might eventually attribute simply to individual (or social, or biological) preference or habit or desire, but only in relation to The Good. If I act with one eye on you and the other on this third thing, The Good, with a commitment to you but also to this other thing, that is ethical. It’s not just you that has a claim on me, but this other thing as well.

I generally go in fear of Platonism, but off the top of my head I can’t really think of another way adequately to convey the absoluteness of the ethical, if you see what I mean. And I can’t imagine how we give substance to this third thing, The Good. I’ve no idea what to say about it. Maybe it’s just a way of throwing everything that touches our ways of behaving toward each other into one basket — all the biological, social, cultural factors, all those little hints and warnings and exhortations about what is good. All of that taken together seems to have a life, or at least an existence, of its own, that we find ourselves beholden to as much as we are beholden to ourselves and to each other. — Srap Tasmaner

Well, you sound you would very much enjoy Emanuel Levinas. It's a tough nut to crack, requires patience if you've not read anything like this. But his Totality and Infinity is a revelation.
When we think of the Platonic Good, we think of the Republic, right? And the cave, the shadows, the sun and so on. Now, Plato was, I guess, the father of rational realism, and we think of the Good, it is some IDEA that all instantiations of good are of.

There is only one way to reify the Good, and that is, find what is Good (and Bad) in the fabric of things: just what is so bad about, say, a toothache?

When we think of the Platonic Good, we think of the Republic, right? And the cave, the shadows, the sun and so on. Now, Plato was, I guess, the father of rational realism, and we think of the Good, it is some IDEA that all instantiations of good are of. — Astrophel

Well yes - we kind of have two loose options - taking the Platonic ideal that all balance, goodness, order is located in the Logos and knowledge of this is available to all of us if we have the right teaching. Or we can take a more Nietzschian view, that all human truth is perspectival. Nietzsche has that great line - if you believe in grammar, you're a theist.

Ethics doesn’t exist. The illusion is believing in a system of laws to the point that it overrules what you actually want/need/wish to do with your life.

The selfless man is spineless, selfish man is spineless. But the man who cares for being neither one nor the other … is the Self. — I like sushi

But to see this point, you have ask analytic questions. Sure, a system of laws. Now, why do we have laws? Asking why will eventually lead to foundational justifications. Indeed, all contingent goods and bads eventually go this way: It a great lamp because it's bright and so on. What good is brightness? Well, it good for this and that. And what good are these? It may sound tedious, but note where this line of questioning ends up: with some claim of inherent goodness. If this is not there, then you have a mere abstraction, nothing can be good for no reason that does not have its implicit foundational claim in the fabric of existence. Of course, it is not as if this being a good couch or that a bad pair of shoes is written in stone....or is it? The goodness of the couch is certainly tied to the vagaries my likes and dislikes, but the liking itself, the occurrent affair of liking something, something AT ALL, this is is beyond contingency. It doesn't matter why, or in what circumstance, or how evil one's intent is--- liking something, adoring it, despising it, and so forth, have in every case an existential counterpart: that which is in the world which is adored, despised and the rest.

Just to add, the argument for moral realism I defend is quite involved. This is but an iceberg's tip.

Well yes - we kind of have two loose options - taking the Platonic ideal that all balance, goodness, order is located in the Logos and knowledge of this is available to all of us if we have the right teaching. Or we can take a more Nietzschian view, that all human truth is perspectival. Nietzsche has that great line - if you believe in grammar, you're a theist? — Tom Storm

But you make it all so complicated. As for me, I observe the world, not at all like a scientist would. What is there, in the ethical case. There is the old lady, and there is Raskolnikov, there is the bludgeoning. What about this is there of Plato or the logos?If not here, in this typical case, then nowhere. One should not think down from established ideas to and interpretation of a particular; one has to first discover what is IN the particular given case that might warrant a dramatic move toward metaphysics.

This answer seeks to smuggle a specific position on metaethics into the very definition of the subject matter — SophistiCat

And this specific position is? — hypericin

This:

What it is is a codification, elaboration, ossification, (and in some cases, perversion),of innate concepts and feelings of fairness and justice that are inborn in most of us, and in most social species. — hypericin

This doesn't just tell us what the subject of ethics is, but states a thesis about what ethics is (emphasis in the original). This thesis may be right or wrong - I am not going to argue about it here - but it can't be right or wrong by definition - that would be cheating.

Kant and Bentham-Mill would've never formulates their theories sans a definition i.e. answering the question "what's ethics?" is first and foremost.

For Kant, ethics is simply a universal law! Consequences, ergo what an act leads to, whether happiness/sorrow, are immaterial.

For Bentham-Mill ethics is grounded in the happiness-suffering duo! Consequence, happiness/suffering to be specific, matter.

Are these not the same thing?

My best guess: Bentham-Mill ethics is basically an interim solution to ethical problems/dilemmas until such a point when Kantian ethics becomes practicable/implementable. — Agent Smith

I've always thought Kant's imperative rested with utility, notwithstanding the "good will". How can I universalize my maxim in any meaningful way unless the principle details the specifics of the case? And what is a case if not for the real value that is in play? Act utilitarianism seems right.

I've always thought Kant's imperative rested with utility, notwithstanding the "good will". How can I universalize my maxim in any meaningful way unless the principle details the specifics of the case? And what is a case if not for the real value that is in play? Act utilitarianism seems right. — Astrophel

I don't think Kant would've agreed; unfortunately, he (Kant) is no more and all we can do is guess his responses. I'm too ignorant to comment on that matter.

There is the old lady, and there is Raskolnikov, there is the bludgeoning. What about this is there of Plato or the logos?If not here, in this typical case, then nowhere. — Astrophel

This one seems uncomplicated (however I confess to finding Dostoevsky dull). Are you a Jordan Peterson neophyte?

If you believe in moral realism (derived via God or some kind of idealism) then you are likely to think killing is wrong.

If you believe there is no foundation, then you need to approach such questions existentially - what do you consider right and why. Maybe virtue can guide you, or principles like human flourishing - it's an open question.

Asking why will eventually lead to foundational justifications. — Astrophel

Because you say so. I don't buy it. I'm not into atomisation. This is literally one of the main contentions Husserl had.

It doesn't matter why, or in what circumstance, or how evil one's intent is--- liking something, adoring it, despising it, and so forth, have in every case an existential counterpart: that which is in the world which is adored, despised and the rest. — Astrophel

I don't believe this via certain experiences I've had. I cannot share those experiences though only state that I cannot fully justify what you are saying or really hold to it with a large degree of seriousness. Nor should you care about my experiences too much just go about your business splitting things in half and you'll find the loop eventually or deny it (or maybe I denied it?).

Just to add, the argument for moral realism I defend is quite involved. This is but an iceberg's tip. — Astrophel

I find immoral to argue for a moral position. I think the term is far too suspect being entwined with social norms, claims of justification, reducing life to formulas and embedded in a medium (this one of words) that exists in a social format rather than one which is orientated about the individual being (Selfhood).

Humans are Legions whether alone or together.

As an exercise of thought anything can be justified and some things more easily than others. Understand it is a game though and not much more - that is probably the heart of what you are asking so there it is ... ethics is a game and it becomes more about what a game is ... you can go round and round, and so you should, until some of the parts and perspectives make more sense. What ever the hodgepodge conclusion you arrive at as sufficient will be nebulous and avoid precise articulation because we're not just words bundled up in a mindball.

@Astrophel Here's a thought. If there is some underlying principle (core elements of) 'ethics' then can an alien species exist and have a completely different set of ethical views/rules? At the heart here is is basically about ways of valuing things.

Example: Maybe in an alien culture the females would select males based on how well they kill dolphins or build temples made of wood ... this would lay out a 'value system' upon which ethical schemes are based. In such a society maybe they question the underlying value of caring about temples made of wood or killing dolphins BUT they would still care about them to the point that such things have gone hand in hand, or tentacle in tentacle, with their evolutionary history.

When we look at humans we could take this tack too. How do females select mates? How do males select mates? How have such choices laid out the evolutionary groundwork for our ethical views via our biological predispositions and how influential are these 'innate' parts when it comes to us living out our lives?

You mean like a boxing ring? A fighting arena? — god must be atheist

Yeah, that was the intention. Seems my joke wasn't a KO...

So, I am an ethical agent in so far as I am rational, and it is rationality out of which ethics comes into existence.
Something like that? — Astrophel

Oh no, actually it was the opposite haha. I meant that ethical behaviour has a tend to not follow rationality.

Ethics, on the other hand, seems to involve taking the concerns of others into account. — Banno

Hm, I think I get the gist of it.

Seems my joke wasn't a KO... — john27

Seeing that we are talking ethics, I had to make sure...not to mistake it for Geiges' ring. (Plato refers to it in the Republic.) It made perfect sense in the context. But I still had to make it sure.

Oh no, actually it was the opposite haha. I meant that ethical behaviour has a tendency to not follow rationality. — john27

Ethics, on the other hand, seems to involve taking the concerns of others into account. — Banno

When I was fifteen, I worked out that ethics -- though a noble and grand feeling, and praised by society -- is an insidiously selfish act in each case of its manifestations. I figured some sort of a sacrifice is always part of an ethical behaviour. This, put together with the inherent aim of ethics to always benefit some other, it seems like the most unselfish, noble act.

BUT!! But. But the truth is that these unselfish acts invariably protect not the self, true, but the tribe, the family, the nation, the species. In other words, the derivatives of one's own DNA. And the beneficiary is invariably is also a protector of the person who sacrifices for the community.

This is sort of a scenario that plays out this way: "I pay a sacrifice to the community to help the community survive, so then they can protect me and help me survive too."

People help blind people across the street, and expect no reward; but the tribe has not lost a blind member, who is weak and not very useful for the survival of the tribe, and therefore of the individual, yet the blind DOES represent some value. He can do things that others can't or won't.

So... now there you go, John27, and tell us that ethics often contradict reason. I am sure that is how it is on the surface.. and the reason may be hidden from the person acting ethically... yet the final result (if such a thing exists... "final") or the intended final result is the most precisely and accurately formed best way to achieve with a seemingly unreasonable act.

Much like the selfishness is hidden in appearing unselfish, the reason is hidden (even from the person who acts morally) behind the apparent lack of reason.

These two totally hidden and yet invariably underlying concepts have been formed by evolution, whereby an unreasonable act is performed to carry out the reason down the road. The behaviour is randomly formed, yet of all randomly formed behaviours this is one that supplied survival superiority. So the reason and the selfishness are hidden, but the behaviour still serves them.

I think when one looks closely at an ethical matter, and puts aside all else that would otherwise intrude into an interpretation of what is there, one will "see" that matter for what it is, and it is not a discursive discovery, it is intuitive. — Astrophel

Yes, I would agree with all that, considering your disposition towards consequentialism. On the other hand, from another disposition rather than yours, ethics in itself, as a doctrine, is neither discursive nor intuitive; it is aesthetic. This follows from the notion that ethics presupposes morality. Whether or not that presuppositions holds, is what the philosophy is all about.

The key, I think, is your “what is there” is in need of something that says how “what is there” got to be there, and perhaps more importantly, what the “what” actually is.

To put aside intrusions into matters by interpretations of them, is counter to basic human epistemological nature. We want to know stuff, always have, always will. Even granting that intrusions, re: analysis, of matters sometimes just makes the matter less explained, isn’t going to prevent us from doing it.

There is no ‘foundation’ for phenomenological investigations. That is basically one of the greatest benefits of phenomenology. It doesn’t adhere to any particular ‘foundation’ although it was created (by Husserl) to provide a better grounding for science (not ethics). It is a ‘science’ of consciousness.

If it was used for ethics it would have to take on other forms. Heidegger and others (the hermeneutical types) probably go there in part with their slither the greater phenomenological body (meaning based principally on interpretations of mere words tangential to experience). — I like sushi

This is rather to the point. What does one do with a phenomenology of ethics? I opened with the idea of attending to the case itself that stands there for determination, like a star to the astronomer. An astronomer will deploy paradigms of normal science, and this is not at all unlike what we do all the time: we observe a blade of grass and already the interpretative resources are in play, making the encounter a "regionalized" event. The assumption you bring to light is that this regionalized event of a singular apprehension fills the horizon of understanding. Kant was there before Heidegger: (sensory) intuitions without concepts are empty. But Husserl was revived after Heidegger and in spite of Derrida: Even in this hermeneutically saturated world, we still defer to what is there and it would be ac hoc to dismiss something that is firmly in our intuiitive midst. Husserl reduction is a method for discovery which he believed uncovered the intuitive world that stands before us unregarded (a Douglas Adams word that deserves respect!) There is trouble defending this, for intuitions are "of a piece" with interpretation and it cannot be otherwise. I think this right, but..
Enter ethics. In the analysis of a exemplar of ethical affairs, there is something there, int he intuition that is affective in nature, while certainly conceived AS (as Heidegger would put it) in the language taking it up, an existential residuum that defies deconstruction, tha t is, is analytically unassailable for it is not contignent, not a thing "of parts". Obviously, we understand it contextually, but IN all of this, something tht is not contingent stands before us.
Wittgenstein (in Culture and Values) says his idea of the Good is divinity. WITTGENSTEIN said this!! Why would he? I mean, there is a very good reason he went to al that trouble in the Tractatus to speak "nonsense".

I suspect many are built into our lizards brains and may not be related to rational thought. Some are about survival and procreation. I hate it when people rest all things on evolution but I suspect that we are repulsed and attracted by biological imperatives which then work their way up over history into predilections and imperatives.

Curious point - many animals have strong codes of behaviour. Where does that come from? Same as above I'd say. They keep it simple, they clearly don't go on the lecture circuit advocating mindfulness or contemplative prayer. — Tom Storm

I agree. And animals are, in my thinking, ethically included in our concerns about others. I also agree that "all things resting on evolution" is not the way to go. To me, evolution is a well established body of theories, but there is nothing in these that tell us anything about the qualitative nature of what is experienced beyond, This here was able to win out in the competition with alternatives for survival and reproduction. Pain is an evolutionary plus, but all this says is that pain is useful.

The question in my mind is, pain (and pleasure) was there, in the possibilities of genetic construction (randomly "chosen", of course). What is something like a living hell even there......AT ALL?

Of course, it is almost just a rhetorical question because there is no answer, one might say. I think there is an answer, but it lies in metaphysics; it isintimated here.

All ethical systems are designed to keep people from undesired action or stimulate desired action. Be it the ethics in the medical world, the morals of science (methodologies, be it that of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, or a general method), the ethics of war or crime, Kant's objective imperative, etc. Take your pick.

Now why should one ethical system preferred above another one? This meta-ethical question obviously can't be based on the ethical systems to be chosen from. There is no overarching ethical system giving a morally justified answer. All we can say is that the ethical systems exist (or are absent) in the people following them, and that it's amoral to impose them on people with force.

An astronomer will deploy paradigms of normal science — Astrophel

This is already a moral imperative. Who says the astronomer has to deploy "paradigms of normal science"? Kuhn may have analyzed science improperly.

Yes, I would agree with all that, considering your disposition towards consequentialism. On the other hand, from another disposition rather than yours, ethics in itself, as a doctrine, is neither discursive nor intuitive; it is aesthetic. This follows from the notion that ethics presupposes morality. Whether or not that presuppositions holds, is what the philosophy is all about.

The key, I think, is your “what is there” is in need of something that says how “what is there” got to be there, and perhaps more importantly, what the “what” actually is.

To put aside intrusions into matters by interpretations of them, is counter to basic human epistemological nature. We want to know stuff, always have, always will. Even granting that intrusions, re: analysis, of matters sometimes just makes the matter less explained, isn’t going to prevent us from doing it. — Mww

Aesthetics and ethics Wittgenstein puts in the same bin. They are value generated. (Note how modern art aligns with ethical complexities: ANYTHING that can have an impact of an affective nature is both ethically and aesthetically viable.)

I have never appreciated any meaningful distinction between ethics and morality. They are the same problematic. there are "dictionary differences" I am aware.

This last is stickier. The history you refer to, the "how it got there" is important, for nothing meaningful is ever presented ex nihilo. That is, there is history in the understanding-- the acquisition of language, the acculturation process, and so on, and encounters we have bring that history to bear for interpretation. This is, roughly, the issue. Do I ever observe anything at all that is free of the temporal structure (the anticipation of a recollection that is projected into a future) of perceiving? Is all perceiving apperceiving?

The answer seems to be, yes, all that can be understood about what stands right before us is, if you will, an historical event. BUT: does this mean one cannot apprehend IN the language and culture matrix, something that stands outside of it?

It depends on what you mean by "apprehend". I know there is a cup on the table because I learned about cups and tables all my life and this recognition is actually a occurrent recollection. Repetition is what we are! But in the ethical problem, there is this unknown X, call it, in the spirit of Kant. As is, and this is a big point, I believe, speaking of Kant: where did Kant ever get that idea of noumena? He grudgingly had to postulate it, but why? It is because he could "see" the noumenal IN the phenomenon.
Noumena is not some impossible "out there"; it is an impossible "in here". This then moves to ethics, putting Kant aside, completely.

Don't do things to others [which] you wouldn't want done to you.. This "don't want it done to us" can be generally deemed as "harm", or "suffering". Don't do it to others is a good place to start. — schopenhauer1

:up: An intelligible-pragmatic formulation of "the golden rule" (e.g. Confucius, Hillel the Elder, Buddha, Epicurus).

The counter to that is that people have different opinions on what is good or bad. — schopenhauer1

I think this is only a half right. We (can) know what is bad for our kind – h. sapiens as a species – that is, what harms us and makes us suffer. This makes disutilitarianism (especially as a normative modality of aretaic-eudaimonism) much more applicable to –reflectively practical for – flourishing than utilitarianism, deontologism, emotivism, etc.

This one seems uncomplicated (however I confess to finding Dostoevsky dull). Are you a Jordan Peterson neophyte?

If you believe in moral realism (derived via God or some kind of idealism) then you are likely to think killing is wrong.

If you believe there is no foundation, then you need to approach such questions existentially - what do you consider right and why. Maybe virtue can guide you, or principles like human flourishing - it's an open question. — Tom Storm

No, I despise Jordan Peterson. Too smart for a conservative, and that makes conservative views sound better than they are.

Moral realism is not about this or that idea. It is a discovery in the analysis of what makes ethics, ethics. Is there something that defies contextuality that also makes ethics what it is? This is like asking, is there something in the nature of ethics that is absolute, that is there, logically prior to any ethical situation or discussion about it? the answer is: well, we all know there is something that is not us, and it "shows itself" in our affairs, imposes upon us needs to pragmatically engage. But all that is imposed is taken up in our world AS part of the way we deal with things. This "being taken up AS" is language and culture. So, I have a bit of moral reasoning, should I assault the old lady for her cookies? The context is the incidentals, how cruel she is, how she is a serial killer and deserves to die, but then, there is no solid proof of this, and she is owns an animal shelter, but those cookies are sooo good. And so on. The question is, in an analysis of this ethical case, is there anything that is to be conceived that is not defined by context? Most think this is an invitation to talk about evolution or biology, but then those are contexts. What about affective meaning? The pain of the bludgeoning qua pain?
Human fourishing simply begs the question: why should humans flourish? Something more basic is required. Something that cannot be analyzed because it issues from t he world itself.

I think I'm trying to say that we experience the ethical as absolute, as something beyond our opinions, not up to us, something in a way external.**

There is a word for this experience: 'conscience'. Maybe it's more phenomenologically sound to start with conscience than with The Good, which looks a little theorized already.


** There’s a nice bit of writing in “The Train Job” (Firefly, episode 2) that captures a difference I’m interested in:

“Sheriff: When a man finds out more about a situation like ours, well, then he faces a choice.
Mal: I don’t believe he does.”

What the Sheriff says is nice, spotlights individual responsibility — things don’t just happen, people do them. Acknowledge your part. That’s a solid starting point, certainly. Mal’s not disagreeing with that, but shifting the locus of responsibility away from the choice. If you know what is right, the real question is whether you will do it. It’s not a matter of choice but of character.

You see that sort of thing all through Confucius, as well: there are no moral dilemmas, there’s only degrees of courage and fortitude in doing what everyone acknowledges is right.

:fire:

I don't think not harming others is sufficient. — Banno

And so you reject a suffering-focused ethics as insufficient for judging 'what to do and what not to do to / with others'?

Is there anything that can survive, that is, be intuitively free of, the "play of difference and deference," free of "taking something AS"? The answer, it seems, is yes nd no. No, because, and I am still working on the way to caste this, no, because language is the "through which" the given is given. Yes, because language does not construct affectivity (to speak broadly of feelings, likes, dislikes, etc.).
I don't want to freeze history. I want to discover what is "presuppositionless" in historically structured occurrent affairs, and affectivity (broadly conceived) is this. — Astrophel

You mention the taking of something AS something, Heidegger’s depiction of the interpretive mode of understanding, and you use it as an example of contextual, contingent play. You oppose this contingency and historical relativity to affectivity, which you say is presuppositionless. But the ‘as’ structure not only depicts interpretation , it depicts temporality.

“ Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment, and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a
peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)

Because the basis of affectivity for Heidegger is temporality, the ‘as’ structure at the same time depicts the origin of affectivity. In experiencing something as something, Dasein comes back to its having been from its future, which is to say, it interprets a global context of relevance via the ‘as’ structure. In so doing, it “takes apart’ the relation between what it encounters and a previous instance of it by coming back to it from a fresh context of relevance. Seeing something as something makes sense of what is encountered in a new way, on the basis of a freshly modified totality of relevance. It is produced rather than discovered.

"The essence of something is not at all to be discovered simply like a fact; on the contrary, it must be brought forth. To bring forth is a kind of making, and so there resides in all grasping and positing of the essence something creative…. To bring forth means to bring out into the light, to bring something in sight which was up to then not seen at all, and specifically such that the seeing of it is not simply a gaping at something already lying there but a seeing which, in seeing, first brings forth what is to be seen, i.e., a productive seeing. "(Heidegger 1994)

Beings can only be produced because the foundation of their being is created anew as a ‘ground-laying’ every time we see something as something. The creative re-making of the ground, which Heidegger says is the essence of feeling, is at the same time the productive seeing of an intentional object.

“Every “foundation” in the sense we discussed comes too late with regard to the positing of the essence, because the productive seeing of the essence is itself a productive seeing of that in which the essence has its ground—a productive seeing of what its ground is. Knowledge of the essence is in itself a ground-laying. It is the positing of what lies under as ground“(Heidegger 1994)

Heidegger(1994) refers to this ground-laying as displacement, because the act of laying a ground is the displacing of a previous ground. This self-transcendending movement is the basis of all attunement( affectivity)

“What we are now calling displacement is the essential character of what we know under the name of disposition or feeling. A deep-rooted and very old habit of experience and speech stipulates that we interpret feelings and dispositions—as well as willing and thinking—in a psychological-anthropological sense as occurrences and processes within an organism, as psychic lived experiences, ones we either have or do not have. This also means that we are “subjects,” present at hand, who are displaced into these or those dispositions by “getting” them. In truth, however, it is the disposition that displaces us, displaces us into such and such a relation to the world, into this or that understanding or disclosure of the world, into such and such a resolve or occlusion of one’s self, a self which is essentially a being-in-the-world.”

So affectivity cannot be presuppositionless. Rather, it is the change in the frame of presuppositions( a way of comporting ourselves) that interpretation develops further in our everyday dealings with others. And the frame is always being reframed.

But it is not up to me, I mean, I don't decide what is delicious, disgusting, joyful, wretched and so on. I may choose among things, but choices all presuppose an established value, which is there, in the ethical matter, and ethics and all of its complications turns on this. — Astrophel

Well its strange, there are people who find the phenomenological perspective intuitively appealing, and others just don't understand why. Perhaps there is a phenomenological explanation for that, but it's beyond me. lol.

It's far too arbitrary to make into doctrine