The content of the belief includes a broken clock, but Joe's belief is not about broken clocks. — creativesoul

You asked for a distinction. There it is. Seems simple enough to me.

If all belief is an attitude towards some proposition — creativesoul

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude.

Yes. I made the same point many pages ago. It's remarkable how some threads can motor on needlessly fueled mostly by misunderstanding.

Yes. I made the same point many pages ago. It's remarkable how some threads can motor on needlessly fueled mostly by misunderstanding. — Janus

No doubt. Almost as though folks have a preference for disagreement. :smile:

Yep, I guess you have to have something to argue about, and if creativity fails...(willful?) misunderstanding may be resorted to,

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

What do you mean "not"? Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion.

Putting language less creatures' belief into the form of a propositional attitude does not make the belief have propositional content. It makes it able to be described using propositional content. Those are two very different claims, and you noted as much yourself, not long ago earlier today.

Yeah, I remember looking forward to replying to something you said earlier, then I could not find it. Could you repeat it, or link it, or somehow otherwise fill me in?

I do think you've set out something that can be used to help improve the discussion, and move it along.

I've no issue with claiming that some belief amounts to an attitude towards some proposition. To be clear. Just not all. We could say that such belief are linguistic - resulting from correlations including language use. Whereas non linguistic would be those resulting from correlations not including language use. I'm not married to that taxonomy, but there needs to be something of that sort.

Yet as long as beliefs are taken to be representational, then for me “content of belief”, “what belief is about” and “what belief is referring to” (so the referent of a belief) are interchangeable expressions. Is it not the case for you? — neomac

The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. Beliefs do not refer to anything. Names do that.

Yep, I guess you have to have something to argue about, and if creativity fails...(willful?) misunderstanding may be resorted to, — Janus

Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too.

Read the debate and see for yourself where belief was described as an attitude towards a proposition on at least one occasion. — creativesoul

Banno's been inconsistent in that regard.

So, could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect?

To be clear, I'm here because the topic is of great interest to me personally, and I'm fairly certain that understanding how belief works is imperative, crucial even, to understanding ourselves and the world around us. I'm here because I've found doing philosophy with certain individuals has provided enrichment to my life. Banno is one such individual, although certainly not the only one.

could you take the time to read my first few posts in the debate and offer a critique or some other summarization? Does anything jump out as suspect? — creativesoul

I appreciate the invitation. I'll have a look when I can.

I'm fairly certain that understanding how belief works is imperative, crucial even, to understanding ourselves and the world around us — creativesoul

To me, the psychology of belief seems important than the philosophy of belief. As regards understanding ourselves and the world around us.

I'm unsure of the difference between those. What do you mean?

I'm unsure of the difference between those. What do you mean? — creativesoul

Here we've been talking about the philosophy of belief: namely, what belief is, what a belief is, what kind of language we should use to talk about beliefs or belief, what can we know about the existential, epistemological, etc., parameters of beliefs and belief.

A psychology of belief would look at why we hold the beliefs we hold, what are the psychological motivations, why do folks hold beliefs for which there is scant to no supporting evidence, why do we become so entrenched in our beliefs, why do we defend our beliefs so passionately, why do people who hold beliefs contrary to our own seem sometimes like total fucking morons and/or cocks. Especially fascinating is the psychology of mass belief: why large groups of people come to believe ridiculous things and in ridiculous people. From Gilgamesh to Trump.

I mean what I write. Let's focus there. — creativesoul

Sure, but again I’m interested to understand better what kind of substantial issues your claims are supposed to address. For the same reason I asked you another question that you didn’t answer yet: how is your distinction (between what belief is about and content of belief) supposed to work when Jack, in a dream, believes that he’s talking about his dog (which he really never had) with a kid (which he never met or saw in his real life) in a place (which doesn’t resemble any places he remembers to have seen so far)?

Evidently, we've very different standards regarding what counts as a "better report" of Jack's belief — creativesoul

I don’t think so, despite your claim: indeed if we stick to your other claim - “I mean what I write” - in a previous post you reported Jack’s belief as “he believes that a broken clock was working” which is a contradictory belief, while now you report his belief as “he believed that that particular clock was working” (i.e. the same way I would do) which is not contradictory. Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe.
I can readily grant you that you can make a de re/de dicto distinction in Jack’s belief about the clock but it’s still the “de dicto” rendering that is supposed to better show what Jack believes based on his own understanding of the situation.

The broken clock shows that the content of belief is not equivalent to what belief is about. — creativesoul

Well so far it shows just your terminological preferences. What substantial issues they are supposed to clarify is another question.
Anyhow, I am familiar with the literature where “reference” is attributed to names (e.g. Frege “Sense and Reference”). But Frege has no problems to talk about the reference of sentences either. Now, I can stick to that terminology, yet the reason why I feel justified to export the term “reference” outside the realm of semantics, it’s because semantics is grounded in intentionality as much as belief in the realm of epistemology. And, if we can talk about the content of a sentence, or what a sentence is about, or the reference of a sentence as much as we can can talk about the content of a belief and what is the belief about, then I don’t see any strong substantial reasons to prevent us from talking about the reference of a belief.
Additionally, I don’t know how much the distinction you make between “the content of belief” and “what belief is about” is supported in the literature: can you pls provide some reference?

Might have to leave it there. After all, your posts are no more than scribbles. — Banno

Thats what you would say if i was speaking a different language. What does Arabic and Russian look like to you, compared to English? What do they sound like to you compared to English?

Sign language is adopting hand movements instead of scribbles to refer to things. How can a hand movement mean the same thing as a scribble when their use is different?

Truth is best understood through T-sentences: "P" is true iff P — Banno

"P" is the name for a proposition, P is the proposition. ""The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat. The first is mentioned, the second, used. The firs tis spoken about, the second, spoken with. — Banno

This is confusing. You're saying the name is true iff the proposition? What does that even mean? You seem to be saying that something is true if it is simply spoken. What is the difference between mentioning and use? Is not mentioning a type of use? What is the difference between speaking about and with?

Almost. Names are social. They work because of their use amongst a group of people, not one. Describing them as mental cannot work because it misses the collective use. — Banno

Then describe the beginning of how a new word is used. If we run the risk of talking past each other because we are using names differently then that seems to show that there is a mental aspect of associating a name with what it is about and THEN sharing that relationship with others. Agreement comes after use.

Not an attitude toward some proposition.

Able to be put in the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which has been shown to not be helpful in the slightest.

Banno injected truth into the equation:

Beliefs are not propositions. They are attitudes towards propositions. The belief is not "the cat is on the mat" but that "It is true that the cat is on the mat". — Banno

If the attitude is certainty, as certainty is the attitude that some belief is true, then animals certainly behave as if they are certain of what is the case is - like a wolf is nearby - sometimes better than humans as they may have better hearing or smelling than we do.

Was "propositional", "proposition" and "attitude" ever defined in this discussion?

Are there attitudes that are not propositional?

Some lack of clarity and consistency in Banno's presentation too — ZzzoneiroCosm

Which is to say that Banno doesnt know what he's talking about. Is his lack of consistency and clarity a characteristic of the propositions he makes or his attitude?

I would like to stress that the substantial issue is if, what and how classificatory intentional abilities “guide” behavior and make it intelligible in linguistic and non-linguistic creatures. — neomac

I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism.

Unless you have another reason to explain the way you reported Jack's belief, I take it to mean that the second report is better then the first one, as I too believe. — neomac

I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion...

Jack looked at a broken clock because he wanted to know the time. He carefully noted the time indicated on the face of the clock by looking at the clock's hands; i.e., by already knowing how to read a clock. The clock on the wall indicated 3 o'clock. Jack - in that very moment - believed that it was three o'clock because he believed that that particular clock was working. That particular clock was broken. — creativesoul

Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working.

My idea was that this:

If I were to say that I am choosing to use the term "belief" only for those things that can be put into the form of propositional attitudes, would you object? I doubt it. — Banno

(my bolds)

- might be a point of agreement or starting point for a new approach.

The put into the form of part is obviously essential and possibly not what Banno wants to underscore: in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put a belief into the form of a propositional attitude. There's some agenda behind such a strange phraseology.

*I don't mean writing it down, just to be clear. In his human mind already rife with propositions he apprehends or imagines the cat's behavior in the form of a propositional attitude.

I'm afraid I cannot help you there. I'm working on an understanding of belief that is amenable to evolutionary progression based upon the tenets of methodological naturalism. — creativesoul

I didn't ask for help, I asked you how you understand the relation between the notion of "belief" and the one of "concept". You retorted the question to me and I drafted an answer. Now should be your turn in answering the question I asked, right? If you are not interested to continue the exchange, just tell me. It's simpler, more honest and more respectful of each others' time.

I'm afraid that I left the reader to draw the conclusion... — creativesoul

Therefore, he believed that a broken clock was working. — creativesoul

If you don't care to argue better than this nor to address my points, I guess I'm done here.

[...] it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude.* It would be weird to argue a cat can put things into the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Rascal that I sometimes am, I’ll question the weirdness of so doing. As a commonly known example: a snarling dog with hairs on end and bared fangs seems to me to be holding a propositional attitude in so manifesting: basically expressing to its interlocuter the following proposition “I am capable of inflicting gravely unwanted pain upon you” - which can either be true or false - and furthermore holding the conviction that what it is conveying is true. It’s the dog’s momentarily held belief that it can inflict injury, a belief which the dog furthermore conveys to interlocutors. Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth.

To my mind, then, here are quite plausible examples of languageless creatures actually holding propositional attitudes which they convey, communicate, to other(s).

These examples can be made all the more complex belief wise were we to entertain the possibility that the lesser animal is bluffing: here believing that they will make the other believe the languageless proposition they are conveying though they themselves are at best uncertain of it’s truth.

Same then can be said of the cat cornered by a dog, with the cat hissing and spitting again with hairs on end and exposed teeth. — javra

in the case of a cat holding beliefs, it would take an actual human having first studied the cat's behavior to put the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it.

That's what I mean by an actual human putting the cat's belief into the form of a propositional attitude. You just did it. — ZzzoneiroCosm

OK, yea. I can't express my beliefs regarding the cat without doing so. I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures.

But, yea, I know: in order to so express I need to put both the cat's and dog's beliefs into the form of a propositional attitude. If only the circularity of it all could be somehow done away with ...

I was however aiming at the notion that the cat expresses its propositional attitude to the dog, sometimes quite successfully - this with both being languageless creatures. — javra

Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional."

It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.

It also commits one to the view that propositions, or at the very least propositional attitudes, can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda.

It sounds weird to me. Sounds like a stretch possibly deployed to serve some philosophical agenda.

It also commits one to the view that propositions or at the very least propositional attitudes can exist in the absence of language. That sounds weird too and (in my mind) points to an agenda. — ZzzoneiroCosm

If I do have an agenda, here it is: I uphold an evolutionary cline in the abilities of life. That's it. I don't uphold a miraculous metaphysical division between such abilities.

As to language, animals don't have (the human) language (wherein, for example, signs can be freely created to reference relatively advanced concepts). But mammals for example readily communicate via things such as body language all the time, not only within species but also between species.

Yeah, I get it. I suppose it's just a matter of opinion whether we should call certain attitudes of languageless creatures "propositional." — ZzzoneiroCosm

At the end of the day, though, I agree. And it's not high up on my list of priorities regarding beliefs/opinions that need to be maintained and justified. So it's known.