To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said. — Janus

I've no issue talking in terms of belief being about something.

when taken account of with naming and describing practices.
— creativesoul
I don't think you need this bit. I don't think the naming and taking account play a role. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Denying the role of naming and descriptive practices seems to miss the boat entirely.

From whence comes propositional form, if not as a direct result from naming and descriptive practices?

From whence comes propositional form, if not as a direct result from naming and descriptive practices? — creativesoul

Reality has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.

It's inherent in the real. No need to name or take accout.

So, before humans... reality took the form of a proposition: subject-predicate?

We know better.

So, before humans... reality took the form of a proposition: subject-predicate? — creativesoul

Yes, there were things (subjects) doing things (predicates).

While you both seem fine with not incorporating meaning into this discussion concerning the content and form of language less belief, I'm not. All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding it. So, it seems to me that meaning is always a part of belief.

You're conflating your account with what's being taken into account.

I'm not sure what you're doing here recently. The quality of your contributions has taken a sudden slide downhill... Too bad.

You're conflating your account with what's being taken into account. — creativesoul

I'm actually not.

Let's try again.


A proposition has this form: things doing things.

Reality has this form: things doing things.

So, before humans... reality took the form of a proposition: subject-predicate? — creativesoul

Yes, before humans, things were doing things. This is the propositional form: things doing things. X does Y. Subject-predicate.

I'm not sure what you're doing here recently. The quality of your contributions has taken a sudden slide downhill... Too bad. — creativesoul

I'm sorry you feel that way. It's likely that we just disagree. I won't be hurt if you step away from the exchange. I'm only here for fun and intellectual stimulation.

The starting point of belief formation — creativesoul

I meant the starting point for talking about languageless beliefs.

"The cup is in the cupboard" is a statement (dropping the word proposition, which seems to be causing difficulty). .

What would make it a belief?

Isn't it that someone holds it to be true? It becomes a belief when Fred thinks that the cup is in the cupboard; when Fred thinks that the statement "The cup is in the cupboard" is true.

The proposition is not a belief on it's own. Beliefs are held by individuals or groups; hence a belief is a particular relation between a statement and an individual, such that the individual holds the statement to be true.

The individual has an attitude towards the statement such that they take the statement to be true.

Without the attitude, the statement cannot be a belief.

There are other attitudes one might adopt. One might know that the cup is in the cupboard; one might doubt it; one might be certain; one might wonder if it is so. Each represents a relation between an actor and a state of affairs.

So, what was it you thought problematic about attitudes?

It seems worth pointing out that there is not a lot that hangs on the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude". It's an historical term, coming form a time somewhat prior to the analytic criticism of proposition, and can be readily replaced by "statement" if one prefers. I'm using it because it is a standard term.

The very first line of the SEP article on belief is:

Contemporary Anglophone philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true. — SEP

attitudes — Banno

It was the expression "propositional attitude" that seemed murky.

The individual has an attitude towards the statement such that they take the statement to be true. — Banno

This is clear. It's confusing to tack on "propositional," likely because I have no knowledge of the history of that expression.

dropping the word proposition — Banno

To my view, it's more accurate to invite a little of Moore's definition into the mix: a proposition is "the sort of thing which is apprehended" in a statement. (In his example the statements are "twice two are four" and "twice four are eight" and the proposition is "the [ ] thing which is apprehended" in those two statements.)



Do you see an issue with this?

dropping the word proposition — Banno

Proposition: the sort of thing which is apprehended in a statement.

This is the propositional form: existents doing things. X does Y. Subject-predicate.

Any issues?

A proposition has this form: existents doing things.

Reality has this form: existents doing things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Does this seem accurate to you?

"the sort of thing which is apprehended" — ZzzoneiroCosm

Where does "apprehended" get you?

We do have a pretty good notion of how to use propositions or statements. Their grammar is a commonplace, and is well set out in first order logic. While there are any number of problems with reports of propositional attitudes, these result form iteration, and I don't think they pose any direct problems here.

...existents doing things... — ZzzoneiroCosm

As if we understood "existent" better than, say, individuals, predicates and quantifiers.

Where does "apprehended" get you? — Banno

"What is apprehended" seems to give us "what is common between" the three statements below.

Propositions are [ ] what is common between certain statements. So "the cup is on the shelf", "la taza está en el estante" and "bikarinn er í hillunni"... — Banno

What would you say "is common between" these three statements apart from what can be apprehended in them?

As if we understood "existent" better than, say, individuals, predicates and quantifiers. — Banno

Existent: something (anything) that exists. I don't see a problem.

DO we go there...?
I don't think they have any thing in common.

My preference would be to talk in terms of propositions as statements that can be either true or false...

It's just that, mostly,

"the cup is on the shelf" if and only if "la taza está en el estante" if and only if "bikarinn er í hillunni"

And that's all. Propositional calculus shows us the grammar.

Seems to me you are overthinking propositions, and that this line of thought is not directly related tot he topic of belief.

Existent: something that exists. I don't see a problem. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Despite the innumerable thread on that topic?

Propositions are a more abstract entity, being supposed as what is common between certain statements. — Banno

I don't think they have any thing in common. — Banno

Is there something "common between certain statements," or not?

Despite the innumerable thread on that topic? — Banno

Sure.

In this context, 'existent' is a word I define as: something (anything) that exists.

Do we really need to question what it means to exist in the context of this thread?

In this context, 'existent' is a word I define as: something (anything) that exists. — ZzzoneiroCosm

A proposition has this form: existents doing things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

SO how will you deal with "unicorns do not exist", let alone "Fred believes unicorns do not exist"?

Seems to me you are overthinking propositions — Banno

Maybe.

As foundational as they are to this kind of discourse, it seems important to know exactly what a proposition is.

Moore wants to center on what is apprehended in a statement. This makes sense to me: the proposition isn't the words or a statement but rather what is apprehended in a statement.

Banno wants to eschew definitions and focus on how propositions are used.

SO how will you deal with "Fred believes unicorns do not exist"? — Banno

Fred is the existent. The thing he is doing is believing unicorns do not exist. An existent doing something.

This makes sense to me: the proposition isn't the words or a statement but rather what is apprehended in a statement. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Only thing is, if I ask you what the "what" is, in "what is apprehended in a statement", what is your answer? A proposition? Then the definition is circular. A possible state of affairs? then you've given me nothing that is not found in statements.

Again, the way we can use propositions and statements is set out for us in the predicate calculus - in first order logic. It's not complete, it has it's own issues, but it is better than anything set up here.

See edit: How does your account of propositions as "existents doing things" deal with "Unicorns do not exist". Your existent - the unicorn - does not exist; is doing not existing.

Compare the simple first order version: for all x, x is not a unicorn.

SO again, why bother trying to invent a new theory when we have a more than adequate grammar already?

@ZzzoneiroCosm, Have a read of the SEP article you yourself cited, immediately after the piece you quote. It ends with:

Moore’s doubts led him to postulate what appear to be merely possible facts as the objects of the propositional attitudes. When a subject believes that x is F and x is not F, the object of belief is the non-existent but possible fact that x is F. See section below for further discussion of possible facts and their relations to propositions.

Hence the modal notion of propositions as possible facts. that might suit your needs better. I won't disagree with it.

Edit: This also shows how the notion of propositional attitudes led to a better understanding of propositions... it was Moore's consideration of propositional attitudes that led him to the modal approach. So a possible state of affairs is a suitable content for knowledge, for hope, for doubt, as well as for belief.

I see what

How does your account of propositions as "existents doing things" deal with "Unicorns do not exist". Your existent - the unicorn - does not exist; is doing not existing. — Banno

I see what you're saying.

It's actually my account of the form of propositions. I'll have to think it over and try again.

"Unicorns only exist in the imagination" is more accurate than "unicorns do not exist." They do exist, but only in the imagination. Of course, that raises other issues. :)

why bother trying to invent a new theory when we have a more than adequate grammar already? — Banno

I'm not trying to invent a theory, only to understand what a proposition is and how best to talk about them.