Have a read of the SEP article you yourself cited, immediately after the piece you quote. It ends with: — Banno

Sounds good. I'll have a look.

It seems worth pointing out that there is not a lot that hangs on the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude". It's an historical term, coming form a time somewhat prior to the analytic criticism of proposition, and can be readily replaced by "statement" if one prefers. I'm using it because it is a standard term. — Banno

Can you clarify this?

How can the word "propositional" in "propositional attitude" be replaced by the word "statement"? The former is an adjective, the latter is a noun and the substitution would read: "statement attitude".

I'm not sure if that's really what you meant.

So a possible state of affairs is a suitable content for knowledge, for hope, for doubt, as well as for belief. — Banno

What is the relation between the unknown and the ("merely") possible? Is there a link?

An attitude towards a statement instead of an attitude towards a proposition. Or if you prefer, an attitude towards a possible state of affairs.

Point being, choose whatever you like. It's of little relevance to the thrust of the discussion. A side issue.

Have a read of the SEP article you yourself cited — Banno

If possible worlds are understood in this way, however, it is important to distinguish two meanings for talk of ‘the actual world’. This may refer either to the totality of what exists, to what Lewis calls “I and all my surroundings”, or to the maximal consistent set which includes all the true propositions. The latter is part of I and all my surroundings, but only a proper part.


Do you know what the word "proper" signifies in the last clause? Looks like a technical usage but I'm not sure how to look it up.

Trying to scare it out.

"proper" — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think it is a subset that does not include all of the elements of the set in question. So {A,B} is a proper subset of {A,B,C}; but not a proper subset of {A.B}.

I think it is a subset that does not include all of the elements of the set in question. So {A,B} is a proper subset of {A,B,C}; but not a proper subset of {A.B}.
6m — Banno

Thanks :smile:

Only thing is, if I ask you what the "what" is, in "what is apprehended in a statement", what is your answer? A proposition? Then the definition is circular. A possible state of affairs? then you've given me nothing that is not found in statements. — Banno

If you ask me what is apprehended in a statement I might say: information of one kind or another.

Then I could say: the content of a proposition is information.

I know you want to reduce it to its usage and say we know how to use propositions and that's that.

Do you think it's a mistake to ask what a proposition is? What is its form and how does it have content?











Modal logic, fascinating as it may be, is too much for me. I don't have the time or aptitude.

I'm taking a less dilletantish look at the Tractatus. The language is beautiful. Thanks for your help.

Statements are combinations of nouns and verbs and such like; Some statements are either true or false, and we can call these propositions. So, "The present King of France is bald" is a statement, but not a proposition.



"unicorns do not exist", — Banno

This distinction between a statement and a proposition is what I'm looking at.





Is the statement "unicorns do not exist" of the same order as "the present King of France does not exist"?

If I say "the present King of France does not exist" have I said something true or something nonsensical?

In short: Is "the present King of France does not exist" a proposition?

As a result of watching it happen, a cat and it's owner both believe that a mouse is behind a tree. Only the owner(assuming they are a competent language user) holds "a mouse is behind a tree" as true. Both have the belief about the events and situation, but only one holds the belief to be true, for the other simply does not have the capability to do so. — creativesoul

Then the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true, but you've only explained the truth value of the statement, not the belief.

Propositions are in the form of scribbles or sounds and are determined to be true if the scribbles represent what is the case.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form?

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. Like ZzzoneiroCosm, you are only describing how you can put beliefs into a propositional form after the fact of having a belief.

I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into.

The fact that propositions are scribbles and sounds and obtained visually and audibly, how did the cat obtain the state-of-affairs of the mouse being behind the tree if not visually and audibly (saw it run behind the tree and it can hear it behind the tree)?

So i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed.

What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds?

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language? If so, then you can hold beliefs as true prior to knowing how to create propositions.

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

The form of images or memories of objects, sensations, emotions, feelings, and their relationships. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think you're confusing the form the subject-predicate (proposition/statement) takes with the form the belief takes. Going back to what you said about beliefs being put into the form of a proposition, I explained that there is a temporal separation between the belief as it exists and the proposition as it exists, and that one is not the other. Instead one is the cause and one is the effect. Can you put into propositional form a belief that you don't have?

I'm muddling through this and now think the word attitude is problematic and should be dropped.

Instead, in regard to belief, I might say: a belief has the form of a proposition: subject-predicate.

Nevermind the attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if belief and proposition are the same thing, the belief has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. So if you are agreeing that words are a particular type of image (scribbles), then the cat can believe the mouse is behind the tree using some other type of imagery and sensations. Therefore, propositions are not useful in describing beliefs because beliefs can be in the form of imagery that is not in the form of a proposition (scribbles).

What form does the subject-predicate take in the mind if not the form of scribbles and sounds?
— Harry Hindu

So I can believe it raining without using any words at all. I simply look out the window.
— Harry Hindu

This seems to be you answering your question. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I was asking you to see if you agree. It appears that you do - that beliefs take the form of many types of sensations, not just sensations of scribbles and the sounds of spoken words. And that scribbles and sounds refer to those other images and sensations that are not scribbles and sounds, but are images of it raining outside and of a mouse running behind a tree.

I was really looking forward to an answer to this - the question that made Banno abandon our conversation and that you avoided:

Can you point to a subject-predicate in a language that you don't know? What do languages that you don't know look like and sound like? How does that change when you learn the language? Do the scribbles and sounds cease to be scribbles and sounds, or is it that you now know the rules to use those scribbles and sounds? — Harry Hindu

Before learning a language, did you have a belief that scribbles can be used? If not, then how did you ever get around to learning a language?

the belief exists before holding some string of scribbles as true — Harry Hindu

Yes.

As you have shown, beliefs exist prior to putting them into propositional form, so what form do beliefs take before being placed in propositional form? — Harry Hindu

Correlations.

Does the cat believe that a mouse is behind the tree - without words? — Harry Hindu

Yes.

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, are you not implying that the cat's belief is true and not that some scribbles are true? If so, then words are not necessary for describing beliefs. — Harry Hindu

In saying that the cat believes there is a mouse behind the tree, I'm saying that language is not necessary for holding the belief. I'm implying nothing at all with regard to whether or not the cat's belief is true, nor am I implying anything at all regarding whether or not the description of the cat's belief is true. What I'm saying is that if one believes there is a mouse behind the tree, and they are capable of reporting their own belief, then they will believe the statement is true as a result of believing there is a mouse behind the tree and knowing how to talk about it.

What I'm saying is that there is an actual distinction between what it takes to hold the belief and what it takes to hold the belief as true, or hold something to be true. There is an actual difference between holding a belief, and holding something to be true.

I think the temporal sequence of holding a belief and then putting it in propositional form needs to be taken into account because people in this thread keep talking about what forms beliefs can be put into when the thread is about what form beliefs are prior to, or independent of, the forms it can be put into. — Harry Hindu

Indeed.

...i have a belief when the mouse runs behind the tree and can confirm my belief by looking behind the tree - no propositions needed. — Harry Hindu

No. Checking to see if a belief is true is checking on the belief. Checking on the belief is thinking about the belief. Thinking about the belief requires language.

A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true.

To talk in terms of intension (I think this is the proper spelling) just is to talk in terms of being about or of something. For me terminology is not so important as what's being said. — Janus

There are some crucial distinctions to be drawn and maintained when discussing belief.

If Jack wants to know what time it is, and he unknowingly looks at a clock that has stopped working at 3 o'clock, and by coincidence it was 3 when he looked, then Jack will believe it is 3 o'clock. But that's not the end of the story here regarding Jack's relevant belief, for belief is not equivalent to a single statement/proposition that can severed and isolated from the individual's worldview as a means for examination. That's what convention does and has done. It's been a mistake to do so, for beliefs are far more entwined with one another, and sometimes when we sever them, we do so at the peril of our own understanding. Russell's clock shows this well.

Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. So, he did not have an attitude such that he held that proposition to be true, but he clearly must have believed that that clock was working, otherwise he could not have arrived at the belief that it was 3 o'clock. Change the time on the stopped clock in the example, and what I'm saying becomes undeniable.

This poses significant issues for the notion of belief as propositional attitude, for the belief when put into propositional form, would not be held as true by the believer. However, it would be if and when Jack became aware of his mistake(his own false belief). If it was pointed out to Jack, he would certainly agree that he had believed that the broken clock was working.

Jack also believed that that stopped clock was working, but clearly did not believe that "the stopped clock is working" is true. — creativesoul

If you say it this way, it works:

Jack believed that the clock was working and believed that "the clock is working" is true. Your insertion of the adjective 'stopped' muddies the waters: it adds a perspective: it adds the perspective of some X that knows the clock is stopped.


(Again, I won't be hurt if you don't want to engage. If I can't play with others I'm content to play with myself :sweat: )

But you just said that the proposition (subject-predicate) has the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships. — Harry Hindu

Form is being used in two ways in this discussion:

I've said:

The form of a proposition is: subject-predicate.

and


A languageless proposition takes the form of images, sensations, emotions, feelings and their relationships.

In the second statement the expression "takes the form" is confusing in light of the previous usage of the word "form." It might be clearer to say: the content of a languageless proposition is images....etc

But I'm not sure it's correct to say a proposition has content.




I'm backing up until I understand what a proposition is.
I'm still a bit confused about it, namely whether it's correct to try to divide it into form and content. Something circular might be happening there.

In short, I don't think I have much to contribute to your more in-depth discussion.

A cat can believe that a mouse is behind the tree, and go look for the mouse, but they are looking for the mouse, not looking to check and see if their belief about the mouse is true. — creativesoul

Here you make a knowledge claim about the psychology of the cat. You say: I know that the mind of a cat is such that it's unable to check on a belief.

That's speculative animal psychology presented as knowledge.



I'm beginning to think it's a mistake to talk about the minds of languageless creatures as though we have knowledge of them; as though things can be said about them. It might be more appropriate to have recourse to silence here.

We are thinking about belief here. So, the meta-perspective is par for the course. It's not a flaw, it's a feature of our doing so. We can know that Jack's belief is false without Jack knowing it. Moore's paradox is also relevant here, for the exact same reasons. The task at hand is an accurate accounting practice of another's belief. When another's belief is false, they do not - cannot - know that much. We can.

That said...

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working? — creativesoul

I see what you're saying but it seems to me that the meta-perspective is the problem. I'm not sure what the solution is.

Would you like to see the basic ontological arguments/framework grounding the claims regarding language less belief? We were heading there earlier, but then you changed your line of pursuit. No problem from here. You're free to do as you please, of course.

Are you saying that Jack did not believe that a stopped clock was working?
— creativesoul

I see what you're saying... — ZzzoneiroCosm

Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form?

:smirk:

Do you see that I've just negated the notion of Jack's belief being equivalent to Jack's attitude towards that belief, when that belief is put into propositional form? — creativesoul

Yeah, I see that. It's clear.

Would you like to see the basic ontological arguments/framework grounding the claims regarding language less belief? — creativesoul

Sounds interesting, I'd like to see it.

There's much to be read here

Thanks. Is this your own work or is it something from the canon? If it's your own work, what philosophers influenced this?

My own...

Influence? The scope is far too broad to say. Some influence is unknown as well.

:wink:

There are arguments made throughout that thread. It's been quite a while since I've read it, but I am confident that the outline could be put to good use here, for I'm rather certain that it's past use has influenced my contributions.

Sounds good, I'll enjoy reading it, I'm sure.

I'm curious what Banno has to say, if anything, about the broken clock example.

As am I.

What twaddle.