:up:

— creativesoul

In other words: your statement about Jack's belief is incorrectly formulated because it elides the mental parameters of Jack's belief.

Belief is, at least in part, a psychological thing: to be accurate, the formulation of a person's belief must be to some extent informed by his perceptions.

... and ideas.

Again, it makes me think of Skinner: your formulation treats Jack like an X, an empty variable, instead of like a person with a mental life (with views, perspective, perception, thoughts, etc.)

eh

The floor is mine: exeunt all but Zzz and every night playground has a recess of ghosts to sing and mingle with.

I'm on about Jack still so I'll put this here. Jack is a lubricating friend. (Gay daygadfly still choking.)



Jack believes a stopped clock is working.

A first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?

To my view the two should match. If the two fail to match something must be amiss in your account as there can be nothing amiss in what Jack knows about his belief. Only in the denotations, connotations and suggestions of your account (languge can be very - suggestive) can there be something amiss.

So:

What does Jack know about his belief?

He knows there is a clock.

What does your account say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?

He knows there is a stopped clock.



No match.

So: The word 'stopped' should not be included in your account of Jack's belief.

It's tacked-on, extraneous, and supports your argument. When you see something that looks tacked-on, extraneous, at the center of an argument it's wise to beware of that thing. The words want to play games and we want to play with them.

Since this is to no one and no one will ever read it I want to say that this is about wisdom not about winning if this is philosophy we're at here I want to sit Marcus and Jack side-by-side and see if a philosophical dialogue can express a nobility of mind. Marcus is also a philosopher.

Since we're in belief territory, we're at liberty to believe anything we want (justification is about knowledge, not belief).

Ergo, I believe that the content of belief is not propositional!

JTB theory of knowledge:

S (a person) knows P (a proposition) iff

1. S believes P
2. P is true
3. P is justified

When (1) S believes P it means, for S, P is true or S thinks P is true.

The JTB theory of knowledge:

S knows P iff
1. S thinks P is true (S believes P)
2. P is true
3. P is justified

The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true.

How about this:

First, lets substitute 'a' for 'the'.

Jack believes a stopped clock is working.

What is Jack's belief about? We have to say: A stopped clock.

Can Jack have a belief about a stopped clock if he doesn't know that he's looking at a stopped clock? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I've seen no good reason for denying that we can. Available evidence proves we do. I would venture to say that surveys would show us that it happens far too frequently to deny without sticking our heads in the sand.

Here's my question to anyone who denies this much...

What reasoning and/or justificatory ground could we possibly offer for doubting that we can look at a stopped clock and mistakenly believe that it is working? Surely, we do not surmise such a counterintuitive thought based upon the fact that we do not know it has stopped. That's makes no effin sense at all. As if we must know that a clock is not working in order to believe that it is?

That's patent nonsense. Reductio ad absurdum.

Jack believed that a stopped clock was working. His belief was about a stopped clock, despite the fact that he did not know it had stopped. We cannot say the same about ourselves...

Cue Moore's paradox...

The reason 'why' we can say that it is raining outside, and that another person does not believe it but we cannot say the same thing about ourselves is simple. We cannot know when we're mistaken unless the mistake is somehow pointed out to us and/or otherwise brought to our attention. It always takes another, in some way shape or form, to show us our mistakes. Another's explanation is necessary for us to become aware of our own false belief.


Occam's razor applies.

In other words: even though the clock is stopped, Jack's belief isn't about - a stopped clock. it's about a clock. — ZzzoneiroCosm

See if this helps at all...

Jack does not know that the clock he believes to be running has stopped. Jack does not know that his belief about the broken clock is false. We do.

The first question: What does Jack know about his belief? A second question: What does your account of Jack say or imply or suggest Jack knows about his belief?

To my view the two should match. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working?

Surely not.

The importance of rigid designators...

Are you saying that Jack should know that the clock is broken in order to believe it is working? — creativesoul

No. I'm not.

I'm saying one thing:


Your account of Jack's belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief.



If you disagree, that's okay. But my wording is what I mean and your wording isn't what I mean.

I'm comparing your account to what your account is said to be taking account of and saying your account isn't taking account of what your account is said to be taking account of.

Some Trump followers believe a lie. They do not know that there was not wide-spread election fraud significant enough to have altered the outcome of the 2020 election. They believe there was. Their belief is false. We know this about their belief. They do not. Cannot. It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood.

Believing that a stopped clock is working is no different in that regard. We can know Jack's belief is false. Jack cannot. The clock was stopped. His belief was about that stopped clock. He did not know it was stopped. Hence, otherwise he would not be able to believe that it was working.

It's not that difficult to understand...

Is it?

Your account of what Jack knows about his belief should reflect what Jack knows about his belief. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Jack's belief is false. Jack does not know that. My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't.

My account of what Jack knows about his belief does reflect what he knows about his belief, as well as what he doesn't. — creativesoul

Should your account of Jack's belief reflect what he doesn't know about his belief?

I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same.

Should your account of Jack's belief reflect what he doesn't know about his belief? — ZzzoneiroCosm

It should if Jack's belief is false.

So that's where we disagree. That's a fundamental disagreement.

Jack is an interesting case. :smile:

So you're including what you know about Jack's belief in your account of Jack's belief. What justification do you have for doing that?

Mary believes the red sky is blue.

Who in this case knows the sky is actually red? It's the omniscient narrator. Why should the omniscient narrator be included in an account of Mary's belief?

Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic so I think it's a mistake. It's a fun puzzle. :smile:

I'd be interested in seeing some sort of logical argument from you that supports the otherwise gratuitous assertions. I've already provided the same. — creativesoul

I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion?

Adding that adjective just seems to dizzy up the logic... — ZzzoneiroCosm

That's one way to put it. It's not the job of common language to take proper account of propositional logic. If common language talks about things that propositional logic is incapable of, then we ought not fault the common language, for common language is not the accounting practice that has been found lacking...

I'm sure you know more about the burden of proof than I do. If you want to include this tricky adjective in your account of Jack's belief, is the burden on me to prove you shouldn't? Or is the burden on you to justify the inclusion? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm the one making the positive assertion. The burden of proof is mine. Should you say I'm wrong, the burden of showing how is on you. I've more than satisfied my burden.

showing how is on you — creativesoul

And folks who come here and read the exchange will make that determination. :smile:

If your side of this debate became orthodoxy, what would the implications be for this branch of philosophy?

So you're including what you know about Jack's belief in your account of Jack's belief. What justification do you have for including that? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Why would what I know about Jack's belief not be included in my account thereof? It's my account afterall.

If your side of this debate became orthodoxy, what would the implications be for this branch of philosophy? — ZzzoneiroCosm

The position I've been putting forth spans several branches.

The position I've been putting forth spans several branches. — creativesoul

And the implications?

The scope of possible rightful application would be any and all claims and/or positions that are about human thought and belief, and any and all claims based upon those.

Scope could not be much broader.

The implications become known only as a result of critically assessing the aforementioned positions in light of what I've been arguing. I've done much of the work already here, in this thread. Moore. Gettier. Russell. All three simplified while adding some much needed clarity. Occam's razor applies.

The content of belief is propositional for the simple reason that only propositions can be true. — Agent Smith

If that is the case, then it is also the case that either language less creatures cannot have belief or propositions do not need language. Seems to me that a proposition is what is being proposed. We always propose things using language. So, holding that the content of belief is propositional leads one to the conclusion that language less creatures cannot have belief.

That conclusion is false. Language less animals can have belief. So...

Either propositions do not require language, which they do, or it is not the case that belief content is propositional. It is not the case that all belief content is propositional.

That conclusion is false — creativesoul

If you say so...