I guess I fail to see what is contradictory about an unknown truth. My truck has a certain weight. I don't know what it is, but it has one. So there is some truth, i.e. "my truck weighs X lbs/kg", I just don't know it. Similar examples aren't difficult to multiply: I don't know what the temperature is right now in Paris, but there is a temperature (and so a truth corresponding to that). I don't remember Wittgenstein's birth date, but there is some truth RE when he was born. So I don't see what is difficult about that. — Seppo

The proposition that, "My truck has an unknown weight," is true, but that proposition is known to be true, viz., you know that you don't know the weight. This is still a confusion, and it's not an example. You still haven't given a truth that you don't know is true.

I don't have time right now to answer the rest of your post. I'll answer later.

The proposition that, "My truck has an unknown weight," is true, but that proposition is known to be true, viz., you know that you don't know the weight. This is still a confusion, and it's not an example. You still haven't given a truth that you don't know is true.

Of course its an example. My truck does have a particular weight. So there is some truth corresponding to its weight, whatever it may be. But its a truth I don't know. Just like there is some truth of the form, "the temperature in Paris right now is X", for some value of X... I just don't know what it is.

So the idea of a unknown truth, or of a proposition whose truth we cannot evaluate, doesn't appear contradictory- its almost trivial. But knowledge and justification are a separate matter.

I'll try one more time. Statements/propositions have two possible values (true or false), i.e., they either match with the facts or they don't. The claim that your truck has a particular weight, is a claim about a fact or state-of-affairs; and it's the state-of-affairs that is unknown. A statement that is true, is one that would line up with the fact (the correct weight of the truck). There is no statement or claim that's true independent of the facts. There are statements that have the potential of being true, but they also have the potential of being false. I believe that what's happening here is that people are trying to separate statements that are true (not intentionally) from the corresponding fact, and it can't be done. Again, it's a linguistic confusion.

Its not that I don't know what you're saying; I don't agree. I don't see why we can't distinguish between the claim and the corresponding state of affairs- it seems we're doing so perfectly sensibly right now. And so whatever the weight of my truck, there is a true proposition corresponding to that value- if my truck weighs 2800 lbs, say, then "my truck weighs 2800 lbs" is true irrespective of whether I'm aware of it or not. And I'm not saying that the truth is "independent of the facts"- its certainly dependent on the facts, its only true in virtue of those facts.

And in any case the point is that we cannot evaluate the truth or falsity of hinge propositions not because they cannot be true or false (else they wouldn't be propositions, or the contents of belief), but because of the peculiar role they play in our epistemic process- the fact that they form the hinge or background, the part that is "held firm", around/against which we can evaluate propositions or beliefs. We cannot evaluate their truth or falsity because this involves us in a circularity. In other words, its not anything about their content, but about their role or function in our overall epistemic project.

Here's another way of making my point. If there is a proposition X that is an unknown truth, then the proposition, "X is true, but unknown" is true. If this is the case, then the proposition "X is true, but unknown," would be known to be true, leading, again, to a contradiction.

It seems we're ascribing some metaphysical existence to these "unknown truths," such that there is some future proposition X, that is not only true now, but true in the future, albeit unknown now, but known at some future time. It's as if the proposition is necessarily true, not contingently true. For if it were contingently true, then proposition could be false, which would violate the necessity of it being true.

I haven't completely thought the logic of this through, but there still seems to be a problem with this line of thinking.

Maybe hinge-propositions could have some third value, such that in some uses they are neither true or false, but have some other logical status.

To understand that the phrase "unknown truth" is nonsense or senseless, all we have to do is think of cases where in our ordinary use we speak like this. Ordinarily, we might say, "It's unknown what the weight of some random giant boulder is," not, there exists some unknown truth X, that is the weight of the boulder. This kind of talk is what Wittgenstein was fighting against, it's a kind of philosophical jargon that seems to say something, when in fact it represents a confusion.

I can't make any sense of the idea that there are propositions that are true, but I don't know if their true — Sam26

You would deny, upon seeing said boulder, that one of these is true?

The weight of the boulder is 5000 kg
The weight of the boulder is not 5000 kg

Before you tell me that we don't normally talk like that etc., try this one: there is life on other planets. It could be true as far as we know. If it is, then it's currently true but nobody knows it yet.

We sometimes seek to prove statements to be true. This doesn't make any sense without this concept of truth. Your position implies that a proposition becomes true only when we come to know it, which seems confused.

"It might be true that there is life on other planets", an everyday, conventional thing to say, is to say precisely that "there is life on other planets" might be true--not that it might be true in the future, exactly at the moment when we find out.

It's just how the concept works in the language.

You would deny, upon seeing said boulder, that one of these is true?

The weight of the boulder is 5000 kg
The weight of the boulder is not 5000 kg

Before you tell me that we don't normally talk like that etc., try this one: there is life on other planets. It could be true as far as we know. If it is, then it's currently true but nobody knows it yet.

We sometimes seek to prove statements to be true. This doesn't make any sense without this concept of truth. Your position implies that a proposition becomes true only when we come to know it, which seems confused. — jamalrob

No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm not denying that there are claims that are either true or false. I'm denying that there are unknown truths, there are facts that are unknown, but to say that X is a truth, but is unknown doesn't make sense. Ya, and we seek to prove statements to be true, but that's not what's being claimed here. We are not saying there is a claim, which can be true or false, and we are seeking to prove it's true. Here, what is implied is that there is a statement X, that is true, but we don't know it's true. How could you say it's true if you don't know it?

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm that are true, but we don't know their true. We can say that of facts, but not of truths, which are just claims by themselves that can be either true or false.

There are claims that I don't know are true, but others do, but that's still different from what's claimed here.

Nope, you've got this wrong.

there are facts that are unknown — Sam26

If I'm interpreting you correctly then you're agreeing to this. But this is to say that there are true statements that are not known. It's saying the same thing.

How could you say it's true if you don't know it? — Sam26

I can't say it's true, but it might be true. I think you need to look at this again.

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm — Sam26

No, this is coming from you alone.

Another application would be in religious language game, the question of the existence of God from a nonreligious person makes no sense in a religious game where the whole language is based around the usage of the word ,"God" . — Eskander

Only in a situation where the non-religious had never heard of the concept of God could there be no shared language game. — Joshs

Or in which "God" has not been properly defined by those that are using the term. If the users of the term don't know the rules then how do they expect to teach others how to play the game?

It's not just the term,"god", but also "exists", of which both the religious and non-religious know the rule for using the term. All conclusions reached by all domains of knowledge (religious, science, philosophy) must be integrated. So the rules for playing the religious game must not contradict the rules in the science game if we're talking about the same reality.

It's as if we have these propositions existing in some metaphysical realm that are true, but we don't know their true. We can say that of facts, but not of truths, which are just claims by themselves that can be either true or false. — Sam26

A fairer response to this...

As far as we can talk about the existence of propositions, then yes, they exist when they're stated, or rather, they're part of various language games. Statements are made about things we don't know, and those statements are either true or false (if they're sensical). That is, some of them are true, whether we know them or not.

To clarify Wittgenstein's "epistemology", background historical context is required with regards to "Wittgenstein's Verification Principle" in 1930 that the Vienna Circle enthusiastically adopted for several years, but that Wittgenstein came to reject shortly after he proposed it. According to the verification principle, the sense of a proposition is its means of verification.

Wittgenstein explained the verification principle to Schlick:

"If I say, for example , 'Up there on the cupboard there is a book', how do i set about verifying it? Is it sufficient if I glance at it, or if I look at it from different sides, or if I take it into my hands, touch it, open it, turn over its leaves, and so forth? There are two conceptions here. One of them says that however I set about it, I shall never be able to verify the proposition completely. A proposition always keeps a back-door open, as it were. Whatever we do, we are never sure that we are not mistaken.
The other conception, the one I want to hold, says, 'No, if I can never verify the sense of a proposition completely, then I cannot have meant anything by the proposition either. Then the proposition signifies nothing whatsoever.'
In order to determine the sense of a proposition, I should have to know a very specific procedure for when to count the proposition as verified. "

But, in line with a common tendency displayed in this forum, the logical positivists mistook his idea of verification for a dogmatic theory of meaning. Indeed Wittgenstein himself was briefly seduced by this principle in 1930 before abandoning it. Wittgenstein told the Moral Science Club in Cambridge:

"I used at one time to say that, in order to get clear how a sentence is used, it was a good idea to ask oneself the question: 'How would one try to verify such an assertion?' But that's just one way among others of getting clear about the use of a word or sentence. For example, another question which it is often very useful to ask oneself is: 'How is this word learned?' 'How would one set about teaching a child to use this word?' But some people have turned this suggestion about asking for the verification into a dogma - as if I'd been advancing a theory about meaning. "

Hopefully everyone here will see that abandoning the identity 'meaning is verification' as well as it's weaker cousin 'meaning is dependent upon some process of verification' implies abandoning every theory of meaning , including meaning is proof or derivation, meaning is convention, meaning is contingent upon social verification, meaning is falsification etc. For each of these cases involves appealing to case-specific criteria of meaning that aren't universally employed across all language-games, and are mostly of relevance to formal language-games in which meaning is directly defined identified with verification. Verification criteria aren't generally present in other use-cases of propositions. For example, many everyday uses of "2+2 = 4" don't involve any checking for equality beyond one's immediate first impression.

His rejection of the principle of verification also demolishes common misconceptions referred to as "Private language arguments" that argue for a rejection of private meaning on the basis of an absence of independent or external verification criteria. Wittgenstein gave an example of private meaning without verification criteria as early as may 1930 in Philosophical Remarks:

"How do I know that the colour of this paper, which I call 'white', is the same as the one I saw here yesterday? By recognizing it again; and recognizing it again is my only source of knowledge here. In that case, 'That it is the same' means that I recognize it again"

As for the status of philosophical skepticism. Wittgenstein did not believe that "hinge-propositions", had prescriptive value. His criticisms of Moore weren't criticisms about the truth of Moore's assertion that he has hands (which depending on one's interpretation of Moore's intended meaning could either be viewed as true, false, both or neither) but were criticisms pointing out the distinction between the use of propositions as auxilliary hypotheses, versus the use of propositions under evaluation.

:up:

Well said. I find Sam's position here sort of perplexing. The boulder has a weight, regardless of whether we know what it is or not. So one of these two propositions must necessarily be true... again, irrespective of whether we know which it is.

So again, hinge propositions aren't distinguished from other sorts of propositions in virtue of some peculiar inability to be true or false, but because of the pivotal epistemic role they play as the background assumptions against which we evaluate truth or falsity in general (and so therefore cannot themselves be so evaluated, on pain of circularity).

Yes. Hinges are not known, not because they are not true or false, but because they are not justified. That is, justification is not what we do with hinges.

The book is about certainty. Particularly, it's about those certainties that we hold to be true before we go on to know things. These certain beliefs do not stand in need of justification; justification here can never be as unquestionable as the belief you're trying to justify.

But I think I do understand the confusion. What is a belief? How can we talk of propositions (or propositional attitudes) that we somehow "have" but which we would never think to state, that obviously do not, as entities in the head or whatever, form an epistemic foundation for our knowing? If we can talk of such a basis then it is in the nature of ways of acting in a particular form of life. It's difficult to assign truth to something that really only exists as a set of practices.

The answer I think is to recognize that a belief just is a post-hoc rendering of these behaviours--and attitudes, in the sense of orientations--in the form of statements. To say that someone has a belief is not to say that they have an individuated statement-shaped object inside them. And yet, to talk about certainties and beliefs at all is to talk about statements/propositions.

And the fact is that we can and do pick out and individuate statements that we believe, that are true, even though it hadn't occurred to us to think of them before. I am certain that here is one hand and that the Earth did not pop into existence the moment I was born. These are true statements.

Make sense @Sam26?

I appreciate your take, but I don't think that is what Wittgenstein is saying in OC. Moreover, I don't think that hinge-propositions are propositions in the normal sense, i.e., they don't have a truth value (generally speaking). In other words, there are uses where we can assign a truth value, but if the proposition is being used as a hinge, bedrock, or basic belief, then not only can we not talk about them in terms of knowing, but we can't talk about them in terms of truths either. They are outside our epistemological language games, which means that any talk of knowing, and by extension any talk of truth or justification, is meaningless (again, generally speaking, there are exceptions). They are arational beliefs. These beliefs function as the building blocks of our language-games of epistemology, and of language generally.

If W. is saying that Moore's use of know is senseless, then by extension truth is included, for what are we talking about, if not the truth of Moore's propositions. To say that Moore knows X, is to say that Moore knows the truth of X. What else would knowing mean in Moore's context, if not, that his propositions are true? So, again, when W. attacks Moore's propositions, he is not only attacking the use of the word know, but all that goes along with it, including truth and justification (repeating for emphasis).

It would be like asking, while coming up with a rule in chess (as the game is invented), "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" It's just a rule. It's not about true or false. Now later, in a given context, you can speak of the truth of a rule, but note this is only after the rule has been established. The rule that bishops move diagonally is a kind of ground for the game, a bedrock statement. It has nothing to do with truth.

The status of W.'s hinge-propositions depends on it's status in a given language-game, which is why in some language-games it's appropriate to talk of these propositions in epistemological terms.

That's funny!

If W. is saying that Moore's use of know is senseless, then by extension truth is included, for what are we talking about, if not the truth of Moore's propositions. — Sam26

This is incorrect. W is talking about the claim to know, and your "by extension" isn't supported. It's precisely because we can say that the statements are true that there is an issue about whether Moore can also know them.

What else would knowing mean in Moore's context, if not, that his propositions are true? — Sam26

What else? Knowing is more than truth, it's justification as well.

So, again, when W. attacks Moore's propositions, he is not only attacking the use of the word know, but all that goes along with it, including truth and justification (repeating for emphasis). — Sam26

You haven't made an argument for this. It doesn't follow. It's also clearly not what W is saying. I was hoping not to have to get into exegesis.

It would be like asking, while coming up with a rule in chess (as the game is invented), "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" It's just a rule. It's not about true or false. Now later, in a given context, you can speak of the truth of a rule, but note this is only after the rule has been established. — Sam26

But hinges already have this kind of status. It makes sense to ask "Is it true that bishops move diagonally?" I don't understand why you've introduced this temporal dimension. We were not talking about the moment of hinge formation (and I wouldn't talk of such a thing anyway).

The rule that bishops move diagonally is a kind of ground for the game, a bedrock statement. It has nothing to do with truth. — Sam26

Again, this doesn't follow at all from anything else you said. Bedrock statements, as all statements, are true or false.

You can ditch truth only if you also ditch belief itself. That is, you can't take the route you're trying to take without abandoning the concept of belief.

:rofl:

It was true that Stan had two legs, even before there was any question about it.

Oh well, I know, everything I'm saying doesn't follow. From where I'm sitting it follows almost by necessity.

But it's obvious. From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital. To question a claim to know is not "by extension" to question the truth of what is claimed to be known.

Things are somewhat different in the case of hinges, but you haven't shown relevantly how. How does it follow "almost by necessity"?

I don't think that hinge-propositions are propositions in the normal sense, i.e., they don't have a truth value — Sam26

I hate to be the one to hand-wring over definitions, but I don't think I understand what you mean when you use the word "proposition" (and that is, perhaps, a source of our disagreement here): can you tell me how you define this term?

(At least in much contemporary analytic philosophy, a proposition just is something which can be true or false, and so the notion of a proposition that lacks a truth value would be a contradiction in terms.

And so, as both jamalrob and I have suggested, Moorean/hinge propositions are propositions- they can and do have a truth value- and are distinguished from ordinary propositions not by an inability to have a truth-value, but in their inability to be justified, and that inability to be justified isn't due to anything peculiar to themselves, but rather because of the role they play in our epistemic process)

But it's obvious. From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital. To question a claim to know is not "by extension" to question the truth of what is claimed to be known.

Things are somewhat different in the case of hinges, but you haven't shown relevantly how. How does it follow "almost by necessity"? — jamalrob

The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. This is why I believe it necessarily follows that to attack know, as W. does, is to also attack the truth of those same propositions. Otherwise, Wittgenstein's attack on Moore's use of know would be meaningless or vacuous.

By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text.

I hate to be the one to hand-wring over definitions, but I don't think I understand what you mean when you use the word "proposition" (and that is, perhaps, at the root of our disagreement here): can you tell me how you define this term? — Seppo

No, you're quite right to point this out. Wittgenstein's wording, viz., hinge-propositions, bedrock proposition, etc., is pointing out something special about these statements. They aren't normal propositions, or normal statements, they have a special standing in our language-games. This is why the normal definition of a proposition doesn't work when applied to these kinds of statements. This is why we should look at their function in our language. I happen to think, and so do other philosophers, that these statements form a kind of arational belief system that allows our language-games to take root. Without them there would be no talk of knowing, justification, or truth. They form the bedrock from which we form our linguistic acts.

Keep in mind that Wittgenstein never sorted this out, and it's difficult to say how much of what's written in these notes would have remained after he edited it.

Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. — Sam26

Or on these propositions ability to be justified. Knowledge entails not only truth, but justification, and it is our ability to justify hinge propositions that is lacking... due to the fact that hinge propositions are the background against which our process of justification takes place, and so justifying these propositions would become circular.

They aren't normal propositions, or normal statements, they have a special standing in our language-games — Sam26

On this we agree. But their special standing isn't due to anything intrinsic to the propositions themselves, but rather due to the role they play: hinge propositions form the bedrock upon which our entire process of knowing, evaluating, and justifying is built. But I (and jamalrob) are suggesting it is their inability to be justified, not an inability to true, which distinguishes them from ordinary propositions (and their inability to be justified is directly due to this peculiar role- or "special standing" as you say).

And there isn't anything contradictory about propositions or truths that cannot be justified, whereas the idea of a proposition which cannot be true is contradictory, or at least highly problematic (given the ordinary usage of the word "proposition").

Or on these propositions ability to be justified. Knowledge entails not only truth, but justification, and it is our ability to justify hinge propositions that is lacking... due to the fact that hinge propositions are the background against which our process of justification takes place, and so justifying these propositions would become circular. — Seppo

Yes, except, it's not a matter of them being circular, it's a matter of the statements being meaningful. Damn Seppo, it seems you have understood my point. I don't feel like I'm banging my head against a wall afterall.

:up:

On this we agree. But their special standing isn't due to anything intrinsic to the propositions themselves, but rather due to the role they play: hinge propositions form the bedrock upon which our entire process of knowing, evaluating, and justifying is built. But I (and jamalrob) are suggesting it is their inability to be justified, not an inability to true, which distinguishes them from ordinary propositions (and their inability to be justified is directly due to this peculiar role- or "special standing" as you say).

And there isn't anything contradictory about propositions or truths that cannot be justified, whereas the idea of a proposition which cannot be true is contradictory, or at least highly problematic (given the ordinary usage of the word "proposition"). — Seppo

Oh no, we've gone backwards. Truth is included with knowing and justification, because, again, knowing entails truth, and what is it that you're justifying, other than the truth of the statement. So, no knowledge, justification, or truth in terms of these Moorean statements.

Moorean beliefs are prior to epistemic (knowing, justification, and truth) talk. Just as the rules of chess provide the context whereby we can talk of the fact that bishops move diagonally. In other word, we can say, based on the rules, that it's true that bishops move diagonally. The rule provides the background that allows truth to get a foothold.