The fact that you're saying, "From your not knowing that the capital of Vanuatu is Port Vila it doesn't follow that it isn't true that it's the capital," demonstrates that you're not following my point. Obviously not knowing the truth of a statement, doesn't mean the statement isn't true. It just means that you have no justification, or no epistemic right to claim it's true. Any claim, without some kind of justification, is a claim that can either be true or false, not just true, as some want to say about Moore's propositions.
Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions. — Sam26
Knowledge entails truth, by definition, so if knowledge entails truth, then Wittgenstein's attack of Moore's use of know is also an attack on the truth of those same propositions — Sam26
By the way, this interpretation, which is an interpretation I primarily arrived at on my own, is confirmed by other philosophers, who have arrived at the same interpretation. This doesn't make the interpretation right or wrong, but does, I think, show that it certainly seems to follow from one's reading of the text. — Sam26
Can you point me in the direction of the relevant philosophers and their work? — jamalrob
(OC 152)I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
(OC 248)And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house
(OC 305)Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.
(OC 96-99)It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.
The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is
right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at
another as a rule of testing.
And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited.
(OC 108)But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.
Of course, their being ineffable does not prevent our hinges from showing themselves in what we say, but here too, certainty is animal. My hinge certainty that 'I have a body' is much the same as a lion's instinctive certainty of having a body. — Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, p8
You seem to think that hinge propositions are neither true nor false...
How can you validly make a deduction from a proposition that is neither true nor false? — Banno
because jamalrob wanted to know what other philosophers thought that hinge's were neither true nor false. — Sam26
(OC 402)In the beginning was the deed.
(OC 359)But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.
(OC 475)I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of
communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of
ratiocination.
I think what Wittgenstein demonstrates, is that the idea of hinge propositions is fundamentally mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover
(OC 166)The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
(OC 152)This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.
I think it is also a mistake to think that hinges can be neither true nor false. We do not generally question whether they are true or false. If we did they would not function as hinges, but it is possible to be wrong. We do not ordinarily question the ground beneath our feet, we simply stand and walk, but what is ordinary is not what is beyond being true or false. — Fooloso4
Isn’t the hinge proposition the condition of possibility for determinations of truth and falsity? — Joshs
(OC 341)That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
(OC 342)That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.
(OC 343).If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.
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