Odd thing is, we pretty much agree as to what is to be done. The narcissism of small differences draws us together, keeps us apart. — Banno
The poverty of your position, as had been repeatedly demonstrated, is that you suppose that wonder, achievement, awe, adoration, love... are somehow incompatible with understanding of the physical world. — Banno
Physicalism is the position that everything that exists is physical (not material, in the sense of matter), or stands in some important relation (causation, supervenience, etc.) with the physical. — Seppo
Physicalism...is the claim that the entire world may be described and explained using the laws of nature, in other words, that all phenomena are natural phenomena. This leaves open the question of what is 'natural' (in physicalism 'natural' means procedural, causally coherent or all effects have particular causes regardless of human knowledge [like physics] and interpretation and it also means 'ontological reality' and not just a hypothesis or a calculational technique), but one common understanding of the claim is that everything in the world is ultimately explicable in the terms of physics. This is known as reductive physicalism. However, this type of physicalism in its turn leaves open the question of what we are to consider as the proper terms of physics. There seem to be two options here, and these options form the horns of Hempel's dilemma, because neither seems satisfactory.
On the one hand, we may define the physical as whatever is currently explained by our best physical theories, e.g., quantum mechanics, general relativity. Though many would find this definition unsatisfactory, some would accept that we have at least a general understanding of the physical based on these theories, and can use them to assess what is physical and what is not. And therein lies the rub, as a worked-out explanation of mentality currently lies outside the scope of such theories.
On the other hand, if we say that some future, "ideal" physics is what is meant, then the claim is rather empty, for we have no idea of what this means. The "ideal" physics may even come to define what we think of as mental as part of the physical world. In effect, physicalism by this second account becomes the circular claim that all phenomena are explicable in terms of physics because physics properly defined is whatever explains all phenomena. — Hempel's Dilemma
Remember, what is physical and measurable is not mere matter, but in-formed matter; so the physical is always hylomorphic, whereas matter as such is not necessarily. — Janus
That's not a "materialist theory of mind". That's a physicalist theory of mind. A materialist theory of mind would be that the mind = matter. Because materialism, in the sense that's being used so far in this thread, is the position that everything that exists is matter. And its a position that no one has held in a long time. Physicalism is the position that everything that exists is "describable in terms of the entities explored by science", specifically physics... not materialism.The Professor where I studied philosophy was D M Armstrong, whose magnum opus was on materialist theory of mind. He wouldn't have accepted that. He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained. — Wayfarer
If you don't find it interesting, then why barge in with inane commentary? — Wayfarer
He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained. — Wayfarer
The Professor where I studied philosophy was D M Armstrong, whose magnum opus was on materialist theory of mind. He wouldn't have accepted that. He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained. — Wayfarer
My view of philosophical religion, is that it is a form of therapy, specifically so as to awaken to the sense of wonder, and so on, that you refer to. — Wayfarer
He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained. — Wayfarer
But as soon as philosophical religion brings forth a proposal, it is found wanting. — Banno
Yet that sense of wonder is clearly evident in the thread on the James Webb Telescope. — Banno
He said the mind is strictly describable in terms of the entities explored by science, and that when this was complete, there would be nothing unexplained.
— Wayfarer
Do you think this is an impossibility? — Tom Storm
But as soon as philosophical religion brings forth a proposal, it is found wanting. — Banno
What's wanting is any understanding of it from you. — Wayfarer
Then why is there no entry on materialism in SEP? — Banno
Look harder. — Wayfarer
I like your approach to this discussion but I can't share this interpretation. The natural world has animals in it. They behave and do things. We can readily observe and explain this. Birds make nests. People make walls and houses. Not sure why we must accept intentionality (behaviour) as evidence of an enchanted world. — Tom Storm
The latter makes an unjustifiable jump from an extant world to God. Why God? Everything you argue could apply to the role of aliens in a creation story. Why could you not argue that aliens created the world using this reasoning? — Tom Storm
What you are railing against is elimininative materialism, which treats experience as an epiphenomenon. From the point of view of science it is an epiphenomenon, whereas from the point of view of phenomenology it is central. Two different disciplines which by no means need to be at odds with one another. — Janus
The jump is not unjustified if you understand it. All material existence is ordered, it is not just random parts in a random spatial-temporal order. — Metaphysician Undercover
What you are railing against is elimininative materialism — Janus
But we differ markedly in that he seems to think there is merit in religious conversations, which I take to be at best obscuritan and more often evil. — Banno
On the other hand if religion is understood to be a kind of poetry, then there is no problem, no? — Janus
But if you say there's something which can't be comprehended through such instruments, why, then you're being obscurantist. — Wayfarer
It's the role of philosophy to ask just those kinds of questions, and it has a common boundary with religion - or always did have — Wayfarer
Religious ideas are not to be taken literally; they are metaphors designed to inspire certain kinds of feelings and dispositions. The "role of philosophy" is diverse and ever-changing and is shown in the various domains of philosophy that have evolved, it is not something to be stipulated. — Janus
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