I write something that you agree with. You change what I write. You disagree with and denounce the change, not what I wrote. Evidently, you cannot see. — creativesoul
How are propositions made? if they are made by writing or typing then they are the color of the ink or font you choose to write or type with. If they are spoken then they don't have color - they have volume, pitch, etc.What is the content of a proposition? And is it propositional?
— bongo fury
What is the colour of a proposition? — Banno
Really? What does a language that you don't know look like? And when describing what a language you know looks like, are you describing the language or your knowledge of the language? — Harry Hindu
I don't see how this answers my question. I entertained you with your silly question, so I'm waiting on you to return the favor.If the limits of my language mean the limits of my world, it means I do not have freedom of thought. It means there are things I'm bound to believe simply because that's how my language structures my world.
If all that is true, what is a philosophical debate? What's actually happening with philosophy? — frank
If we say that Jack believes of that broken clock that it is working, what is the content of Jack's belief, and what is Jack's belief about? — creativesoul
What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox? — creativesoul
If you are agreeing with me that strings of scribbles is an image then there could be many descriptions that could correspond to the same image of strings of scribbles, meaning that words (as an image of strings of scribbles) would be subject to the same ambiguity that you are ascribing to images that are not scribbles.No, I’m talking about images. Images are visual entities like strings of letters written on a paper, yet we can take images and strings to represent something (again intentionality is a presupposition here for understanding images and textual strings as representational). If we were to describe with sentences what images can represent, we would notice that there can be many descriptions that could correspond to the same image (this is particularly evident in the case of so called “ambiguous images” - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ambiguous_image), yet they do not share the same proposition. And so on with the other remarks I made. Don’t forget that my brainstorming was about the propositional nature of images. — neomac
Yeah, I've been having the same problem with neomac with us continually talking past each other. Their posts are mostly highbrow word salad.Great job denouncing shit that I've not said. — creativesoul
I don't see how this answers my question. I entertained you with your silly question, so I'm waiting on you to return the favor.
When you say that your language limits your thoughts, are you saying that you don't have the freedom to learn new words and new ways of expressing yourself? Are you saying that pre-language babies are more free than you are? — Harry Hindu
I haven't thought about those specifics. Off the top of my head I'd say that Jack's belief is about a clock and it's condition of working, which begs the question as to whether the clock and its condition of working together form the content of the belief. What else could Jack's belief be about? — Janus
Get it now? — neomac
What's your view regarding Russell's clock, Gettier's cases, and Moore's paradox?
— creativesoul
Not sure about it, also because knowledge is a wider issue. — neomac
You agreed with what I wrote — creativesoul
changed that, and then denounced the change — creativesoul
If you wish to see how they could be rendered similarly...
It was raining outside and I did not believe it. The clock was broken, and I did not believe it. — creativesoul
Do you agree that in the Russell and Gettier cases that the belief was properly accounted for? — creativesoul
Why do some fuckers believe the limits of their languages are the limits of their worlds? — frank
A broken clock. — creativesoul
From Jack's point of view he doesn't believe anything about a broken clock, obviously, since he thinks the clock is not broken. Of course we can say that he believes of a broken clock that it is working. But so what; people entertain mistaken beliefs all the time? — Janus
...the problem I have is with "Jack believed that a broken clock was working" since your are insisting on it. — neomac
You came up with this rendering based on the propositional calculus suggested here: “Can Jack look at a broken clock? Surely. Can Jack believe what the clock says? Surely. Why then, can he not believe that a broken clock is working?”.
So I proposed you the following propositional calculus: if one can render “I did/did not believed that p” as “p and I did/did not believe it” and vice versa. And asked you: why can’t we do the same with p="Jack believed that a broken clock was working"?
So I'm challenging you to explain why your propositional calculus is correct, and mine is wrong based on your own assumptions. This is the problem you should address, hopefully in a non ad-hoc way.
Mary's room is based upon the dubious presupposition that we can learn anything about seeing red without seeing red.
— creativesoul
In other words, qualia is ineffable. Why else can't Mary learn everything about red without seeing red? — Agent Smith
I'm not sure what possesses you to see this as problematic. — creativesoul
As I said, this is the kind of de re belief ascription that we can use when we are not sure about a de dicto belief ascription (i.e. we don’t know what someone else’s beliefs are really about, see the case of the kid in the park). In the case of Jack, I would prefer that form of rendering, if e.g. I’m not sure whether Jack is holding contradictory beliefs or he simply ignores that that clock is not working. Certainly, if I knew that Jack ignores that clock is not working, I would prefer to say “Jack believes that clock is working” or “Jack mistakenly believes that clock is working” instead of “Jack believes of that broken clock that is working”, or worse, “Jack believes that broken clock is working”. — neomac
No. Not in other words 'qualia is ineffable'.
What qualia?
:worry: — creativesoul
You have been levying charges against the claim. — creativesoul
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