So one can't wish for something without deciding and moving to obtain it? I desire chips, but I've not the will to get up and go to the shop. — Banno

No, you simply have a stronger desire to stay on the couch than to go to the store to get chips. This is really quite simple.

The problem obviously, is that the author of the article has not provided a cogent definition of "will". It is this faulty description of "will" which produces the appearance of your "strange little paradox". In reality there is no such paradox, just the proposal of an unacceptable definition of "will". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, but I, on the other hand, have not only supplied multiple definitions, but the ones that are THE current working definitions and not a single person on this thread has responded it. Yet, everyone keeps saying there isn't a definition. Yes, there are multiple definitions, all related, of both will and freedom. I have them listed, all of them.

The quote is from Hana Arendt's essay on Freedom. I came across it in an article from the Ethics Institute, Freedom and disagreement: How we move forward. The article makes the obvious point that
When debates are being waged over freedom, we must begin with the acknowledgement that we (as individuals) are only ever as free as the broader communities in which we operate. Our own freedoms are contingent upon the political systems that we exist in, actively engage with, and mutually construct.
This is obviously in tune with the point I've found myself obliged to make a few times recently, that ethics begins not when one considers oneself, but when one considers others.

Anyway, I'm linking to the Arendt essay in order to ask again her question: What is freedom?, and to give a space for considering her essay. Given the "freedom convoy" that trickled into Canberra yesterday, and the somewhat more effective equivalent in Canada, It seems appropriate. — Banno

Thanks Banno, for the chance to consider this essay. So many here take it as a stepping stone to discuss free will. That is not what the essay is about. It is indeed about the history of the notion of freedom and raises the question what political freedom, philosophically understood, looks like.

I also do not see the paradox you bring up and over which so many of the writers here trip. The question you ask presupposes a notion of freedom Arendt rejects, namely freedom as a kind of faculty of the will. The paradox she highlights is another one in my opinion and one that reveals itself when one views the concept of freedom in a historical light. Freedom for the Greeks was political, a concept which played in political life, contrary to philosophical life. Arendt apparently sees as philosophical life as singular, lonely, a-political. I think here she follows Heidegger, but also a lot of the Western tradition as seeing philosophical knowledge as self knowledge.

When freedom became a problem, in Christian philosophy in the context of conversion and the ability to embrace Christ, freedom was 'married' so to speak, to this lonely philosophical life and became seen as a kind of mastery, mastery over oneself. Mastery requires power and so freedom became drawn in a register of power, control, subordination and sovereignty. So much so that freedom became equated with sovereignty as it still is apparently for @Judaka.

The paradox here is that freedom as sovereignty immediately distorts the notion of freedom. Only the soveriegnty is truly free, but that means my freedom is dependent upon the unfreedom of others. It has become antithetical to the communal, reciprocal life of a community. So I think her idea is to rethink freedom and locate it less into a discourse of singular mastery and in the political realm of communal relations. Only if we establish relationships towards others that are free, might we be free. That requires relinquishing sovereignty. (I read the Arendt essay, not the article you also linked to).

For those of you who get all horny about free will, it is not unlike Strawson's concept of it, who is firmly rooted in the analytic tradition. However also for him free will resides in a relation to the other, not in some sort of mastery over oneself. I am not going to dwell further on it, because it detracts from the topic of freedom in a broader sense.

@Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political.

The paradox here is that freedom as sovereignty immediately distorts the notion of freedom. Only the soveriegnty is truly free, but that means my freedom is dependent upon the unfreedom of others. It has become antithetical to the communal, reciprocal life of a community. — Tobias

How is this so? Freedom is dependent only on the non-advance of univited interaction between peoples. Meaning, respected sovereignty between people is tantamount to freedom for all those participating in the respect of boundaries. Where does the unfreedom of others come in? I suspect you're going to introduce one of a number of different perceptions of freedom to explain this, that have nothing to do with the working definitions of the word that I have published here in this thread. But, in the importance of being fair to you, I shall give you the benefit you need to properly answer that question, if you so choose to freely.

Only if we establish relationships towards others that are free, might we be free. That requires relinquishing sovereignty. — Tobias

I was freely operating in the confines of my home, away from all uninvited intereference with my life, even this very morning, before you ever presented yourself to me as someone who even existed. Meaning, the exact opposite of the above statement is true. Relationships with other REQUIRES the acknowldegement of individual boundaries on the of part of each-the-other person in said relationship. A consideration that is made prior to entering a public domain where relationships can be formed.

For those of you who get all horny about free will, it is not unlike Strawson's concept of it, who is firmly rooted in the analytic tradition. However also for him free will resides in a relation to the other, not in some sort of mastery over oneself. I am not going to dwell further on it, because it detracts from the topic of freedom in a broader sense. — Tobias

"Free" will, doesn't exist. 99% of our cognition is subconscious. But, we do have executive function that works in tandem with cingulate cortex, amygdala, basal ganglia, and the hippocumpus to form the emotion processing network. Which allows for us to initiate decision making protocols based on external stimuli that is processed through the entire network. The control center of course being the prefrontal cortex that is quiteliterally connected to all of those structures of the brain and when operating in symphony, give rise to the sum total of human action and thought, or will. Or, as I like to call it, 'limited agency.' Will is properly defined in a thread I posted above. More on executive function here: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnins.2017.00431/full

How is this so? Freedom is dependent only on the non-advance of univited interaction between peoples. Meaning, respected sovereignty between people is tantamount to freedom for all those participating in the respect of boundaries. Where does the unfreedom of others come in? I suspect you're going to introduce one of a number of different perceptions of freedom to explain this, that have nothing to do with the working definitions of the word that I have published here in this thread. But, in the importance of being fair to you, I shall give you the benefit you need to properly answer that question, if you so choose to freely. — Garrett Travers

I do not care what you have published in the thread Garrett, I was reading Arendt. You are already working with some kind of definition of freedom. Apparently the non-invited interaction between peoples. God knows why, but you might have a reason for it. However, I am reading Arendt's genealogy of freedom and was commenting on what she tried to do. I do not need any benefit from you to answer any question you might have. Out of my sight, shu.

"Free" will, doesn't exist. 99% of our cognition is subconscious. — Garrett Travers

As if that explains something....

But, we do have executive function that works in tandem with cingulate cortex, amygdala, basal ganglia, and the hippocumpus to form the emotion processing network. — Garrett Travers

Ohh great we have a medical doctor in the room. I am doing philosophy not neurscience. I suggest www.theneuroscienceforum.com

It is clear to me that she thinks freedom is not to be identified with sovereignty... Do we at the least agree here? That Arendt, for better or worse, thinks freedom is to do with choice and novelty within the re publica? As opposed to the capacity to achieve what one wills without regard for the public space?

The discussion of "inner freedom" at about p146-7 seemed to be an oblique reference to stoicism. The implication is that Stoic ideals such as control of one's passions or acting in accord with nature morphed under the influence of Augustin and Paul into something closer to modern ideas of freedom as acting in accord with one's will. I take the change to which she refers to be between a more ancient notion of the freedom to choose within a polity to a supposed freedom to chose despite a polity. — Banno

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article.

I don't think the Stoics were all that concerned about freedom of any kind, except perhaps to the extent that it was necessary to act in accordance with nature. Virtue was the good for the Stoics. One could be virtuous without being free to do whatever one likes. For them it was quite unnecessary, and even improper, to exercise sovereignty over anyone--for Epictetus I'd say in particular, as others are not within our control. Epictetus was a slave and if one believes he said what Arrian says he said, it didn't matter to him that he wasn't free for much of his life. He thought it unimportant that Emperors and others could punish or kill him if he chose to act virtuously (so it seems did certain Roman Senators who were Stoics, who were executed by Emperors). Stoics didn't associate themselves with any polity, believing with Diogenes the Dog that they were citizens of the world.

Ciceronianus might be happy to note the essay can also be read as criticism of Heidegger, who still holds on very much to an idea of freedom and authenticity in conversation with oneself. Arendt invokes the political. — Tobias

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did.

The question is where freedom fits in relation tot his Stoic enterprise of overcoming unreasonable or unnatural desire. I don't know enough of the topic to be sure, but at first blush freedom does not look to be of great significance to the Stoics. — Banno

Not much significance at all. It's more a concern for those who desire or disturb themselves over things or matters which aren't in their control.

I rejoice in any criticism of Heidegger, but frankly wish he had spent far more time "in conversation with himself" than he did. — Ciceronianus

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history.

I do not care what you have published in the thread Garrett, I was reading Arendt. You are already working with some kind of definition of freedom. Apparently the non-invited interaction between peoples. God knows why, but you might have a reason for it. — Tobias

Yes, I do, in fact. It's called the working definition: the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint/absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government/the state of not being imprisoned or enslaved

To say, "I don't care," doesn't make sense within the context of this specific conversation. We are having a discussion ABOUT that.

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. — Ciceronianus

It gets confusing because it's complete bullshit, and a trained philosopher knows better than to spread this nonsense. As if Cartesian duality hasn't been addressed, and dispensed with, by philosophy and neuroscience alike. It's confusing because there is only, and objectively, ONE you, irrespective of the dialogues that take place in your head. Which emerge as a result of your emotion processing network running constantly across multiple structures of the brain, including the endocrine system, governed by the prefrontal cortex. Also information I listed above.

I don't think the Stoics were all that concerned about freedom of any kind, except perhaps to the extent that it was necessary to act in accordance with nature. Virtue was the good for the Stoics. One could be virtuous without being free to do whatever one likes. For them it was quite unnecessary, and even improper, to exercise sovereignty over anyone--for Epictetus I'd say in particular, as others are not within our control. — Ciceronianus

Spot on.

Epictetus was a slave and if one believes he said what Arrian says he said, it didn't matter to him that he wasn't free for much of his life. He thought it unimportant that Emperors and others could punish or kill him if he chose to act virtuously (so it seems did certain Roman Senators who were Stoics, who were executed by Emperors). — Ciceronianus

He believed it not only absurd, but counter-productive to one's happiness and virtue to desire that which could not be controlled. All of the Stoics have my most profound respect for viewing life in this manner.

Stoics didn't associate themselves with any polity, believing with Diogenes the Dog that they were citizens of the world. — Ciceronianus

How can one, when one sees the nature of those who comprise said polities? It's like staring into the heart of Nietzsche himself and having a legion of men, women, and children stare right back at you.

I'm under the impression that she speaks of "individual freedom" or "inner freedom" as if it's a kind of "sovereignty" over oneself, which it would seem is consistent with what appears, to me, to be a tendency on her part to believe in a kind of inner dialogue or conflict between one me and another me, one me being the will, one being desire, another me being acting-me, yet another being acted-upon-me; I don't know, it gets confusing (not enough mees in me to comprehend this, perhaps). But I may be wrong. I find it difficult to follow her thought, distracted as I am by the names she so relentlessly drops throughout the article. — Ciceronianus

I do not think that that is what she is after. I rather think that this is what she considers freedom defined in the Justinian and Christian tradition, amounts to. We find it playing in the history of philosophy as well. There is a dychotomy between will and knowledge where knowledge is supposed to be in control of will, or, one has to will in accordance with knowledge. That would be rather Kantian. It all makes freedom an inner experience, one aligns one's knowledge and one's will and is free from desire. (remember the old Gala song?) Her point is that freedom is not an individual experience, but a political category. One is free within a certain system. I read in the essay a more communitarian critique of a liberal conception of freedom, but I might be wrong of course. Streelight seems to have a different take on it.

despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history. — Tobias

That kind of does the trick. It's a bit like reading Lenin; sure, it's interesting, but was it worth the bodies? Many more interesting philosophers than both.

Yes, I do, in fact. It's called the working definition: the power or right to act, speak, or think as one wants without hindrance or restraint/absence of subjection to foreign domination or despotic government/the state of not being imprisoned or enslaved — Garrett Travers

There is no such thing as 'the working definition'. Philosophy is not an excercise in dictionary writing. There might be working definitions of philosopher x or y, or in the context of Kantianianism, utilitarianism and so on. Arendt opens the discussion on what freedom is, then telling her, here I have 'the working defintion, does not make any sense.

To say, "I don't care," doesn't make sense within the context of this specific conversation. We are having a discussion ABOUT that. — Garrett Travers

No, we are having a conversation about Arendt's essay. You have a tendency to want to set the terms. However, why would I be playing along? You also have a tendency for using capital letters I see.

That kind of does the trick. It's a bit like reading Lenin; sure, it's interesting, but was it woth the bodies? Many more interesting philosophers than both. — Garrett Travers

I see it as totally unrelated. What they argued about philosophy is for me removed from their politics. A good argument is a good argument irrespective of the political views of the one who brings it forth. It may be a warning and invites thorough investigation of the work in question to see if any ideas within it prefigured mass murder. If anything it is a reason to read both very carefully, something I doubt you both have done. And no, I am not taking your word for it that there are more interesting philosophers. Why would I?

There is no such thing as 'the working definition'. Philosophy is not an excercise in dictionary writing. There might be working definitions of philosopher x or y, or in the context of Kantianianism, utilitarianism and so on. Arendt opens the discussion on what freedom is, then telling her, here I have 'the working defintion, does not make any sense. — Tobias

Um... No, you've got this completely backwards. To change the working definition of a word in english, which is an adaptive langauge where word definitions change through time and usage, to be used to conceptualize something that the current, standing, working definition defines as something entirely separate, is completely unphilosophical. She doesn't "open" any discussion, she quite clearly says that defining the term is impossible, even thought there is a definition for it, and provides no argument for the assertion that can with stand logical, or scientific scrutiny. She does this while making claims about the nature of freedom that are ambiguous and derived from multiple "understandings" of freedom that have nothing to do with actually, clear usage of the term that has been in place and in active usage for a good long while. Arednt's attempt here is little more than an exercise in fallacy that seems to be being bitten, hook, line, and sinker. And you might ask, "well, Garrett, what fallacy could you be talking about, given you're so pompous as to assert such a thing about a respected philosopher?" Easy, this one: https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Equivocation

No, we are having a conversation about Arendt's essay. You have a most irritating tendency to want to set the terms. However, why would I be playing along? — Tobias

And the topic of that essay, and by extension the topic of this discussion - as described by the title of this discussion - is on the nature of freedom, sovereignty, and by ambiguous extention, purposely asserted in the essay, will and it's associated degrees of freedom. I changed no terms, I merely have upheld them.

I see it as totally unrelated. What they argued about philosophy is for me removed from their politics. A good argument is a good argument irrespective of the political views of the one who brings it forth. It may be a warning and invites thorough investigation of the work in question to see if any ideas within it prefigured mass murder. If anything it is a reason to read both very carefully, something I doubt you both have done. — Tobias

A completely fair assessment.

And no, I am not taking your word for it that there are more interesting philosophers. Why would I? — Tobias

Never said to take my word for, but now that you bring it up, trust me, take my word for it, you'll thank me, there are far more interesting and less destructive people who have graced the field of philosophy; a lot more interesting, too.

There is no working definition of freedom accepted by all in philosophy. Moreover the word freedom is bandied about by all and everyone in different ways. We see a likeness in the usage, but not at all a common usage accepted by all as in the word table for instance or doorknob.

Can someone tell Garrett Travers that just because he states there is some sort of definition that does not make it the case? Philosophy does not do dictionary. Maybe it is just your objectivist leanings, but not in any tradition worth its salt is a concept such as freedom off limits because there is some sort of definition of it.

"well, Garrett, what fallacy could you be talking about, given you're so pompous as to assert such a thing about a respected philosopher?" — Garrett Travers

No I I would not ask such a question because it is of no interest to me in the least. I am actually not asking you any questions, nor am I engaging with any of the points you made in the thread accept those directed at me, because I am not seeing anything in there that are remotely worth my time. Perhaps a discussion of whether your definition is viable might be interesting in itself, but I have to admit I find Arendt's approach a lot more interesting then the analysis of some kind of definition.

And the topic of that essay, and by extension the topic of this discussion - as described by the title of this discussion - is on the nature of freedom, sovereignty, and by ambiguous extention, purposely asserted in the essay, will and it's associated degrees of freedom. I changed no terms, I merely have upheld them. — Garrett Travers

Indeed those are the topics of the essay, apart from free will, which in my opinion is not. However, you refuse to engage with the essay because it does not play by your rules aka your working definition of freedom. However, no one gave you any authority to set those rules.

Never said to take my word for, but now that you bring it up, trust me, take my word for it, you'll thank me, there are far more interesting and less destructive people who have graced the field of philosophy; a lot more interesting, too. — Garrett Travers

The way you do philosophy, actually the way you not do philosophy, gives me no incentive to trust you on just about anything remotely related to the subject.

Please o lord deliver us from evil....

There is no working definition of freedom accepted by all in philosophy. Moreover the word freedom is bandied about by all and everyone in different ways. We see a likeness in the usage, but not at all a common usage accepted by all as in the word table for instance or doorknob. — Tobias

This is simply a statment of non-truth. Nothing else to it. It would not take you more than two google searches to realize that the predominantly held view of freedom within the domain of philosophy is a 1-to-1 comparison to the working definition of the word. The idea that a word's usage must be accepted by all, is a standard you are simply fabricating for no other reason than you do not want to contend with the clear rebuttal that I presented against the argument of this psuedo-philosopher. Neither is broad improper usage of a clearly defined term, both linguistically and philosophically, a standard for which one might reasonably begin the fallacious process of saturating a term with ambiguity for reasons unknown.

Can someone tell Garrett Travers that just because he states there is some sort of definition that does not make it the case? Philosophy does not do dictionary, or maybe it is just your objectivist leanings, but no, not in any tradition worth its salt is a concept such as freedom off limits because there is some sort of definition of it. — Tobias

Never said it was off limits. I said the claim that "it becomes impossible" to define, is simply not true. There are plenty of definitions provided as a matter of linguistics, as well as philosophy, that are in accord with one another and all generally confirm the same principle. And I don't know what Objectivist leanings means. What about might Stoic leanings? Or, my Virtue Ethics leanings? Or, my Utilitarian leanings? Would any of those dictate whether or not I could read a definition clearly defined and clearly expounded upon within the philosophical tradition over the course of thousands of years? Seems a strange thing to toss into a question about reading comprehension.

No I I would not ask such a question because it is of no interest to me in the least. I am actually not asking you any questions, nor am I engaging with any of the points you made in the thread accept those directed at me, because I am not seeing anything in there that are remotely worth my time. — Tobias

By not seeing arguments that are "not worth my time," you mean to say, "you have clearly refuted the original claims of the essay in question, using both modern cognitive neuroscience, logicical argumentation, and clear definitions of a word that has long had the same basic understanding informing its description, thus I would rather not engage with you and instead insult you, even though you've done no such thing to me." That's quite literally the only thing I read in this tantrum.

The way you do philosophy, actually the way you not do philosophy, gives me no incentive to trust you on just about anything remotely related to the subject. — Tobias

Yes, by clearly defining terms, because to not do so would be a fallacy of ambiguity - that's something you learn in introductory logic, supporting those definitions with a description of how the brain operates as per cited academic journals provided by frontiers in science, and actually addressing every single critique of my assessment sent in my direction..... How do you do philosophy? And tell me, when you describe said methodology, will you please do me the favor of just showing me how you do it, while leaving the insults to yourself; it's kind of not a philosophical approach to discussions, it's actually a fallacy, which makes it unphilosophical.

The first page or so brings out a strange little paradox for those who insist they have free will: Are you free to act against your own will?

Hence the "Oppression of the will". — Banno

Even though that is a neat little paradox, I think this is the best part of the portion of Arendt's essay I have read:

"The rise of totalitarianism, its claim to having subordinated all spheres of life to the demands of politics and its consistent nonrecognition of civil rights, above all the rights of privacy and the right to freedom from politics, makes us doubt not only the coincidence of politics and freedom but their very compatibility."

If, as she states earlier, freedom is known only through tangible realities - such as our interactions with others - not through some sort of apparatus of self-reflection, then how can those who live under the thumb of totalitarianism, in which all spheres of life are dominated by the political, be thought to be free at all? Does this limitation of the will extend to all legislation directed at curtailing freedoms, whatever their ends may be?

Moreover, I find myself wondering if the recognition of privacy and freedom from politics is more desirable than the legislated freedom (such as the second amendment), if the two are not compatible.

Will try to finish the essay, but it's a difficult read for me. How do you get through slogs like that, Banno? I can hardly understand anything that's being said without reading it like five times.

The idea that a word's usage must be accepted by all, is a standard you are simply fabricating for no other reason than you do not want to contend with the clear rebuttal that I presented against the argument of this psuedo-philosopher. — Garrett Travers

I hold no such view. I just hold the view that philosophers does not need to accept a working definition, also not when that definition is held by many other philosophers. She enters into a genealogical exploration of a philosophical concept and finds different meanings. What is wrong with that? The analytic tradition and continental tradition also may have a different definition of freedom. This I got from an article on Kant: "Kant formulated the positive conception of freedom as the free capacity for choice. It asserts the unconditional value of the freedom to set one’s own ends. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and a necessary condition of moral agency." here

Hegel's definition of freedom: "So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions." here

And here Heidegger on freedom: "In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being." taken from here

All different articulations, none of which correspond to your working definition whatever that may be. In any case I am sure I can find many others and a google search like assert is no sound basis either. On such concepts such as freedom even if definitions seem alike, there may be worlds of difference. In political philosophy the term freedom is still hotly debated even though there may be definitions that are more or less dominant. I do recognize your definition, that is not the point, there are many others though and Arendt's essay might well be insightful even if she does not share your definition.

And I don't know what Objectivist leanings means. What about might Stoic leanings? Or, my Virtue Ethics leanings? Or, my Utilitarian leanings? Would any of those dictate whether or not I could read a definition clearly defined and clearly expounded upon within the philosophical tradition over the course of thousands of years? Seems a strange thing to toss into a question about reading comprehension. — Garrett Travers

I do not know which one of those makes you incapable of engaging with a philosophical genealogy of the concept of freedom. I suspected objectivism, that is all. It is not about reading a definition, it is about thinking that that is what philosophy is.

By not seeing arguments that are "not worth my time," you mean to say, "you have clearly refuted the original claims of the essay in question, using both modern cognitive neuroscience, logicical argumentation, and clear definitions of a word that has long had the same basic understanding informing its description, thus I would rather not engage with you and instead insult you, even though you've done no such thing to me." — Garrett Travers

No, apply your own definition: not worth my time, means not worth my time. I am not saying that assessment is necessarily correct. Maybe I am missing a brilliant rebuttal of Arendt, might be. But your responses have not given me any new insight or made any contribution to my understanding of it.

Yes, by clearly defining terms, because to not do so would be a fallacy of ambiguity - that's something you learn in introductory logic, supporting those definitions with a description of how the brain operates as per cited academic journals provided by frontiers in science, and actually addressing every single critique of my assessment sent in my direction..... How do you do philosophy? And tell me, when you describe said methodology, will you please do me the favor of just showing me how you do it, while leaving the insults to yourself; it's kind of not a philosophical approach to discussions, it's actually a fallacy, which makes it unphilosophical. — Garrett Travers

No, philosophy is not 'clrearly defining terms'. I had a class on introductory logic, all well and good. It is by no means the only approach to philosophy. Not even the dominant approach anymore, it seems. How the brain operates has never been a philosophical topic, but one for neuro-science. I take my bearings in philosophical methodology from Michel Foucault, who stands in a Heideggerian tradition. I conduct genealogical enquiries in the history of concepts mostly. Moreover, I also tend to take an approach taken from G.R.G. Collingwood, namely the identification of absolute presupositions. But in any case, do it as you want it, try to get published. But again, that is not an insult but a statement of fact, you have not said anything I find worth my time. Take that statement from the perspective of ordinary language philosophy.

And yes, you do insult me. You do not engage in dialogue, you merely wish to set the terms of it and expect everyone to agree. You do so in a very condescending way. That I find insulting and indeed provokes counter barbs, from which I should and will refrain.

Interesting. An uncomfortable reliance on George Michael. I like the phrase "delusions of opportunity"...

She enters into a genealogical exploration of a philosophical concept and finds different meanings. What is wrong with that? — Tobias

There's nothing wrong with that approach, she was wrong both in her approach, as it was fallacious, as was her conlcuision, which I provided, as of yet, arguments that haven't been overcome.

Kant formulated the positive conception of freedom as the free capacity for choice. It asserts the unconditional value of the freedom to set one’s own ends. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and a necessary condition of moral agency." — Tobias

This definition, the definitions I provided from the dictionary, and the description I gave in my own words are exactly the same. It is Arendt that does not agree with this statement from Kant. As it stands, you'd be hard pressed to find a definition of freedom, as provided by a philosopher, that isn't some variation of this exact idea. Meaning, you just reiterated my position by using Kant's description.

So a philosophy of right is necessarily a philosophy of freedom that seeks to comprehend freedom actualized in how we relate to each other and construct social and political institutions." — Tobias

And what does he describe as being freedom? “the free will which wills the free will." Same thing, freedom of the will to will. He agrees with my definition and Kant's.

In Heidegger's late thinking, human freedom is determined not any more by the obligation of choosing oneself but by the necessity of clearing the truth of Being." — Tobias

This is not an intelligible sentence, and Heidegger is not a philosopher.

No, apply your own definition: not worth my time, means not worth my time. — Tobias

That's not something people say in a philosophical discussion when one person (me) has presented well supported arguments with science, logic, and clear communication that haven't been overcome. To say "not worth my time," means you have no business here discussing this topic in a forum designed specifically for philosophical discussion.

No, philosophy is not 'clrearly defining terms'. I had a class on introductory logic, all well and good, though by no means the only approach to philosophy. Not even the dominant approach anymore it seems. How the brain operates has never been a philosophical topic, but one for neuro-science. I take my bearings in philosophical methodology from Michel Foucault, who stands in a Heideggerian tradition. — Tobias

Oh, I see what's going on with you then. Foucault's not a philosopher, dude. He was nihilistic child predator who hated the world and everyone in it, especially the people he could confuse to the point neurotic derangement. And Heidegger was fucking Nazi. The idea that you would even remotely have an urge to critique my philosophical approach, without providing even a single argument against my position, when your ideological leaders are the most immoral, disgusting specimens among men imaginable, is next level self-myopia. And yes, it actually is the case the clearly defined terms are a elemental in philosophizing. Foucault has abused you, as well, it seems.

Freedom is individual human action, as is demanded by your nature, independent of interpersonal coercion. — Garrett Travers

This was your definition of freedom. Kant disagrees. For him freedom is a victory of ratio over nature. It s not being compelled by your desires but choosing the moral law freely. So no, they do not agree with you, nor with a dictionary definition.

And no Arendt does not agree with Kant or you either. I find what Arendt says interesting, you do not. That is fine.

You have not presented anything worth my time, really. I think you just do not like to hear that. Please go on doing things your way, but do not compel me to read it as I find philosophy by dictionary simply boring.

Foucault's not a philosopher, dude. He was nihilistic child predator who hated the world and everyone in it, especially the people he could confuse to the point neurotic derangement. And Heidegger was fucking Nazi. The idea that you would even remotely have an urge to critique my philosophical approach, without providing even a single argument against my position, when your ideological leaders are the most immoral, disgusting specimens among men imaginable, is next level self-myopia. And yes, it actually is the case the clearly defined terms are a elemental in philosophizing. Foucault has abused you, as well, it seems. — Garrett Travers

Perhaps you forget I am under no obligation to engage with you at all. In the above statement your true colors show. Whoever does not do philosophy your way is no philosopher. You are fond of fallacies right? Look up 'no true Scotsman'. While you are at it also read up on the argumentum ad hominem and please stop annoying me.

Freedom is individual human action, as is demanded by your nature, independent of interpersonal coercion. — Garrett Travers

the free capacity for choice. It asserts the unconditional value of the freedom to set one’s own ends. Autonomy of the will is the supreme principle of morality and a necessary condition of moral agency." — Tobias

These statements are logically equivalent. They mean the exact same thing. Human action free of coercion is the free capacity for choice and autonomy of will, will being the sum of all action demanded of you by your nature. You are wrong.

You have not presented anything worth my time, really. I think you just do not like to hear that. Please go on doing things your way, but do not compel me to read it as I find philosophy by dictionary simply boring. — Tobias

Wouldn't compel anyone to do anything, I'm not a Nazi or a sexual predator hiding behind the philosophical tradition. And "philosophy by dictionary" isn't what has happened here. I presented the current definitions and defended them with academic journals, my own logical arguments, and by highlighting the fallacy she used to make the argument in her essay. You're having trouble analyzing things.

Perhaps you forget I am under no obligation to engage with you at all. In the above statement your true colors show. Whoever does not do philosophy your way is no philosopher. You are fond of fallacies right? Look up 'no true Scotsman'. While you are at it also read up on the argumentum ad hominem and please stop annoying me. — Tobias

I hope they do. Understand this, if you appear as a philosophical underling of such trash, you've already been dismissed as not-to-be-regarded by reasonable people. And, it may be wise to familiarize yourself with that fallacy, as you don't know when it's being used. I actually brought to your attention that you were insulting me, instead addressing my arguments that were "NoT WoRth mY TimE." You require a great deal of help here, man.

I welcome any contribution to engage with the content of Arendt's essay. I find it worthwhile and interesting. Unfortunately it has been completely buried under all kind of mud slinging. I apologize for my part in it.

As the character played by the incomparable Strother Martin in Cool Hand Luke said (the Captain?), what we have here, is failure to communicate. Not on your part, but on the part of Arendt.

If she is saying what you think she's saying, it would be a relatively simple thing to express, I believe. I don't think she does do so with any clarity, and leaves us to wonder what's going on with freedom and what it has to do with sovereignty and why giving up sovereignty will make us free. I think she gets caught up in the avalanche of references, names, debates on causes and free will, and dualisms she unleashes on the unwary reader. But perhaps I'm too impatient. Or, perhaps I've been a lawyer for too long, and so am suspicious of what seems to be a set-up, or an effort to "baffle them with bullshit."

I understand she's making a distinction between ancient and modern points of view regarding freedom. I don't necessarily agree with the distinction I think she makes, but believe there is a difference.

My guess is status and position were more important in Graeco-Roman times than freedom. Julius Caesar was assassinated because he usurped the authority and honors, the imperium, of the Senate, not because the people of Rome longed to be free. His much wiser grand-nephew created a new form of government, the Principate, in which the form of the rights and privileges historically held by the Senate was preserved and honored, while actual authority was held by Augustus and his successors.

Totalitarianism is at least as old as the work of its first and possibly greatest proponent, Plato. Freedom wasn't an issue to him because it was insignificant at best, an inconvenience at worst. Plato dreamed of the ruthless and regimented imposition of perfection. The Christian conception of freedom would be much the same during the time the Church dominated society, though the Church likely thought freedom more dangerous and opposed it with greater zeal. There was one truth, one goal.

That began to change, though, and my guess is that concerns regarding freedom as we understand it now began to arise in the conflict among nations and sects that arose when theocracy failed. Just a guess, though.

If, as she states earlier, freedom is known only through tangible realities - such as our interactions with others - not through some sort of apparatus of self-reflection, then how can those who live under the thumb of totalitarianism, in which all spheres of life are dominated by the political, be thought to be free at all? — ToothyMaw

Even better, the individual experiences his/her own tangible realities independent of force that would threaten it. If a human is left to their own devices, their will shall simply emerge of it's own accord; it is of itself so. Meaning, freedom is intrinsic to the nature of the individual being qua being, irrespective of whether or not something has threatend said freedom, which only serves to increase the individual's desire for freedom, it doesn't define it. What defines it is the fact that, left to it's own devices, consciousness and conscious experience is self-sustaining and self-generating; freedom defined. And as far as governments are concerned, you're asking the right question, my astute friend. How can one be free, if one's labor isn't their own to keep exclusively? How is one free if they need to verify that they have crossed an imaginary line, arbitrarily drawn by the people paying the guy to force such verification with labor stolen from me by taxation? How am I free , if to renounce citizenship I must flee the country and swear fealty to another freedom stifling organization, which is current law by the way? To the degree that your actions and thoughts (will) are limited by external forces, and not as the result of you limiting another's, you are not free.

Moreover, I find myself wondering if the recognition of privacy and freedom from politics is more desirable than the legislated freedom (such as the second amendment), if the two are not compatible. — ToothyMaw

Legislated freedom, as outlined by the founders of the U.S. was always meant to fulfill the philosophical framework of freedom that logically follows one assessing human nature, its requirements, and what reasonably constitutes his rights as an individual, sovereign entity in the world. Such a framework means nothing to the world of power seekers if that philosophical framework is dismissed in the minds of the constituents, in favor of one that promotes self-sacrifice, property as an example of theft, production as a right, and humans as non-individuals. Which is fundamentally the predilections of 9 out of 10 of the average person sample.

I can hardly understand anything that's being said without reading it like five times. — ToothyMaw

That's exactly how she wants you to feel. She's a worm. She's employing the fallacy of ambiguity on you in the hopes that you don't pick up on it, and are simply rendered confused and slightly neurotic. That's always when the Sophist has you, and that's precisely why the Sophist's arguments are always laced with fallacies. No exceptions.

So, determining the nature of observed phenomena influences it, whereas describing it does not? I would have thought you have to determine the nature of something before you can describe it. Or else the description of the nature of something is its determination; but then that cannot be quite right, since description of determinable phenomena continue to abound long after the initial determination. I suppose if new descriptions add information then determinations becomes more complete, though.

So when I said this:

A definition that describes it would be a definition that determines it(s nature), would it not? — Janus

It should have been expanded: A definition that describes it would be a definition that (purports to) determine it(s nature), or is (purported to be) based on a prior determination of it(s nature) would it not?

I welcome any contribution to engage with the content of Arendt's essay. I find it worthwhile and interesting. Unfortunately it has been completely buried under all kind of mud slinging. I apologize for my part in it. — Tobias

Apology accepted. Now can we address my arguments?

:rofl: I do know he is a national socialist and that is, of course, uncomely. However, I do wonder why you always react so strongly to him. He is also a very interesting thinker. He really is, despite his unwelcome affiliation with some of the most heinous villains in history. — Tobias

Well, perhaps something more than uncomely.

I don't find him interesting, I'm afraid. I confess I find it very hard to read his work--his student, the young woman he seduced while her teacher, who wrote the essay being discussed in this thread, was a model of clarity in comparison to him. I find him, to the extent I can understand him, to be romantic, mystical, muddled; inclined to obfuscate if it suits his purposes, inclined to pontificate, a "self-infatuated blowhard" as it seems Don Idhe called him in reviewing his rhapsodic musings on the Parthenon while ranting about modern technology (Heidegger was apparently not content with merely likening the manner in which the Jews were killed by the Nazis in the camps to the mechanisms employed in modern agriculture in his critique of technology--his only mention of the Holocaust, apparently).

H.L. Mencken used to call William Jenning Bryan "the Great Mountebank." I feel much the same about Heidegger.

But to be frank I like to poke at sacred cows, and there's none more sacred in philosophy.

Apology accepted. Now can we address my arguments — Garrett Travers

Present something worth considering and we'll consider it.

Well, no I've already done that. The numerous, thoroughly argued positions I presented above haven't been addressed. I confess, that it's growing apparent that my fellow thread-people simply don't have the ability, or are reluctant to do address them. This being evinced by the fact that they reliably choose the path of insult, instead of the path of argument, when no such form of intellectual dishonesty has been shown to them by me. Which, of course, is very telling. So, can you address the fallacy of ambiguity that accurately characterizes Arendt's argument? Here's a source on it that I already posted, just in case you need it: https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Ambiguity-Fallacy