I pretty much agree with this...

Hence freedom turns out to be a mirage the moment psychology looks into what is supposedly its innermost domain; for "the part which force plays in nature, as the cause of motion, has its counterpart in the mental sphere in motive as the cause of conduct."

...even were we to replace "psychology" with "neuroscience". If you explain your choices in terms of neuroscience, you have to change what you mean by "free", or leave it out altogether.

...even were we to replace "psychology" with "neuroscience". If you explain your choices in terms of neuroscience, you have to change what you mean by "free", or leave it out altogether. — Banno

No, although for most that would be correct. If you remember, I regard freedom as nothing more than the freedom of the self-generated will (all actions and thoughts produced by the brain) to emerge, independent of interpersonal threat. I've said so numerous times, and have also said that absolute freedom is nonsense, that we have limited agency in accordance with executive function, which gives us a measurable degree of control over actions, thoughts, and memory retrieval. It is not I who has to adapt, it is in fact the rest of you who must integrate modern science and reconcile your views with these concepts. However, if you do not wish to do all of the intellectual heavy-lifting necessary, I happen to have done so for you here in this thread. The views I have presented to you here are the views of these concepts having been reconciled with modern science. But, who knows what other info will come in the future. You adapt to what is shown in science, and the most salient and sophisticted arguments.

You're deflecting. The passage quoted from SEP was merely to show the facile and spurious claim that the idea of free will originated with the church fathers for what it is.

it's the outside world that the brain is computing data from data presented to it that goes by-by forever, because the brain computing the outside world has been damaged. — Garrett Travers

The brain contains an inside version of the outside world. If the Sun goes red giant your outside world is destroyed. You can't life in it anymore. The brain doesn't compute. Outside physical structures can run around analogous on the neuron network. Space is the medium for physical processes, the neural network for the analogue process. For all physical processes there is a possible process on your neuron network. The number of paths the currents in your brain can run is enormous: about 10exp(10exp20)! A 1 followed by 10exp20 zeroes...

The brain contains an inside version of the outside world. If the Sun goes red giant your outside world is destroyed. You can't life in it anymore. The brain doesn't compute. Outside physical structures can run around analogous on the neuron network. Space is the medium for physical processes, the neural network for the analogue process. For all physical processes there is a possible process on your neuron network. The number of paths the currents in your brain can run is enormous: about 10exp(10exp20)! A 1 followed by 10exp20 zeroes... — Dijkgraf

None of this is an argument against what I said.

The passage quoted from SEP was merely to show the facile and spurious claim that the idea of free will originated with the Church fathers for what it is. — Janus

You could make an interesting point then, if what you say is so, by showing the relation to the article instaed of just claiming it.

Well, you are not the first person here to claim that they have solved the problem of consciousness.

But you are claiming that we have free will and yet are not free?

Was the claim that the idea of free will originated with the church fathers in the article or was it exclusively yours?

Except that I consider the neuron processes as well as the processes around me as not being part of me. I have a relation to them but they don't constitute me. The brain world has the same relation to me as the physical world. I can think about the stars or see them.

Questions of moral responsibility and freedom are inevitable in any society where a tradition of thinking about the human situation arises. — Janus

Possibly, but the SEP article paints too broad strokes. There might be questions of control of the will, Plato's discussion of the tripartite nature of the soul comes to mind, but to be an objection against Arendt, it must be discussed in terms of freedom. The same word, freedom, must be used to designate the control of desire and the notion of will must be used, instead of for instance the faculty of ratio. The SEP article merely claims that questions of control over our own choices is a perennial question, not that they are couched in the terms freedom and will, which is Arendt's contention.

Was the claim that the idea of free will originated with the church fathers in the article or was it exclusively yours? — Janus

Have a read an let me know.

, @Janus The nuance here is the distinction between freedom and free will. To my understanding the Greeks thought in terms of freedom, but Arendt argues free will was introduced by St Peter to explain the internal conflict required by sin. SO perhaps, the rticle is correct but does not address the point made by Arendt.

So... where are you?

I between...

Then perhaps you are lost?

I am my thoughts and my feelings and my brain and my heart and my liver and my shoes and my actions and whatever else might be required...

Well, you are not the first person here to claim that they have solved the problem of consciousness.

But you are claiming that we have free will and yet are not free? — Banno

No on both of these. I'm not claiming I have solved any problem. I'm saying I have created, using only the definitions, the historical understandings of the concepts, the relavent neuroscience, and my own logical capacities, a way to make freedom and will compatible as concepts, nothing more. Often times that is enough to shed light on something important.

I am saying that will is the result of all functions of the brain working and producing action, thought, emotion, and activity. That will is the sum total of all individual human action and thought. That the brain is perpetually producing these characteristics, even under duress. In the sense of perpetual brain activity, the will is always free, as the will is always being generated, unless one is dead, or brain dead. You might think of me holding a gun to your head and forcing you to do something, but if you do it it is infact your body doing it as directed by the brain and is still your will. Freedom from external human interference is what makes will free, in the sense that the natural emergence of will, within the context of its own evolutionary environment, can only be interupted by the will of another. Thus, free will is a workable concept, but total freedom of choice is not. The brain produces only a limited capacity for executive agency.

Then perhaps you are lost? — Banno

Indeed. In between. But that's in the eyes of the beholder only. I dance freely between my brain and the world and thank god that my heart still beats, my dreams still dream, my thoughts still think, and the ground beneath my feet is solid.

Except that I consider the neuron processes as well as the processes around me as not being part of me. I have a relation to them but they don't constitute me. — Dijkgraf

If the sum total of all your thought and action do not constitute you, then what possibly can?

If the sum total of all your thought and action do not constitute you, then what possibly can? — Garrett Travers

The one I see in the mirror. I operate between my brain and the world.

The one I see in the mirror. I operate between my brain and the world. — Dijkgraf

No, your brain controls the entire body you see in the mirror. In fact, that which you are seeing in the mirror, is quite literally the sum total of all of your action and thought right then and there. All of which is controlled by the brain.

Frankly, this is simply disregarding established science. There's no way to address what you're saying. You are simply saying things that you wish to be true when no evidence exists to suggest that your body is separate from the brain that it is controlling and generating all of your perceptions, thoughts, and actions.

That will is the sum total of all individual human action and thought. — Garrett Travers

Yeah, I read that before and ignored it. Looks too Motherhood to be of much use. Might leave it there.

Might leave it there. — Banno

You quite literally cannot do anything you will not do. Including generate an argument.

No, your brain controls the entire body you see in the mirror. In fact, that which you are seeing in the mirror, is quite literally the sum total of all of your action and thought right then and there. All of which is controlled by the brain. — Garrett Travers

Yes, but I only use these functions. If you consider yourself to be your body, I just exist between the brain and the outside world. The outside world is projected into the brain inside (via the sensory organs) me and the brain actively shapes its appearance.

I think it's fair to say that if we have any capability of control at all, then that is a quantum of freedom. If we never could have done otherwise than we did, then freedom is an illusion; our lives are pre-determined or at least not determined by us.

That said, in the absence of external political or social forces controlling us, we can enjoy a felt freedom; would it matter if, on some externalist perspective alien to our actual lives, the feeling of freedom were thought to be an illusion?

Anyway it seems obvious to me that the question of agency or free will has a history which predates the deliberations and deliverance of the church fathers, and that was all I was responding to. I haven't made bold to comment on the article, since I haven't read it, but only on the generalized comments of others. I don't intend to read the article, so I won't discover whether Arendt makes the claim that the idea of free will originated with the church fathers, and that's OK.

Edit: I see @Banno now says the Arendt article does claim that "free will was introduced by St Peter to explain the internal conflict required by sin", and that there is a distinction to be made between the idea of free will and the idea of freedom. It's not clear to me what such a distinction could be if it is not merely the distinction between being subject, and not being subject, to externally imposed human constraint.

Yes, but I only use these functions. If you consider yourself to be your body, I just exist between the brain and the outside world. The outside world is projected into the brain inside (via the sensory organs) me and the brain actively shapes its appearance. — Dijkgraf

You shape the appearance of the outside world? In what manner? You make things change form, color? Telekinesis? Lou Kang style fire balls? Petronus charms? What are we talking about here?

You shape the appearance of the outside world? In what manner? You make things change form, color? Telekinesis? Lou Kang style fire balls? Petronus charms? What are we talking about here? — Garrett Travers

No. The brain just shapes the sensory perceptions. Colors, shapes, sounds, motions, etc. The perceptions can also appear on their own, say in thoughts or dreams.

I think it's fair to say that if we have any capability of control at all, then that is a quantum of freedom. If we never could have done otherwise than we did, then freedom is an illusion; — Janus

Yes, that's right. Your unique experiences and the values you adopt are used by the brain to inform future action. Overtime, the greater the reward (reward from a cognitive perspective) for behaviors informed by adopted values, the more often those preferred behaviors that align with values adopted through executive function are prioritized in the mental hierarchy of competing interests that are fighting for the brain's limited computing power. Meaning, the limited agency we do have can be used, and is used to build coherent systems of behavior that align with values we adopt ourselves consciously. Just look up neuroeconomics.

No. The brain just shapes the sensory perceptions. Colors, shapes, sounds, motions, etc. The perceptions can also appear on their own, say in thoughts or dreams. — Dijkgraf

Okay, this aligns with what I've discussed. The brain controls colors, shapes, sounds, and motions. Where does the "you" part come in that you were mentioning?

Where does the "you" part come in that you were mentioning? — Garrett Travers

Like I said, the you and me are the bodies in between.

The will IS itself and cannot will itself to be anything else. — Garrett Travers

It easy to say "the will is itself", but unless we can demonstrate that there is actually something real which is being referred to as "the will", such an assertion is pointless.

I beg to differ, within the combined context of the historical views, linguistic common usage, and modern cognitive neuroscience I am 100% confident that we can agree that will is the sum total of all human thought and action, the emergent expression of the content of the information that the brain processes, integrates, values, and enacts, and all activities of the brain that contribute to that process. I will be happy to build my argument again for you, which.... again, still has not been attempted to be challenged by more than one person, or so. And hasn't been bested in argument. — Garrett Travers

This makes absolutely no sense to me, to say that "will is the sum total of...". How can you add up a whole bunch of distinct things and say the total of all those things is what is called "will". That's like saying the sum total of all living things is the soul. It makes no sense. If you were adding a bunch of the same type of things, like when we say the sum total of all human beings equals "humanity", it would sort of make sense. But you are proposing to add together a whole bunch of different things, thoughts, activities, values, etc., and say all these different things together is "will". You might as well just say the human being is will, but that makes no sense.

Why do you speak of a 'passage presented by me' rather than address it as what St. Augustine says? To my knowledge, it is representative of what he says in other places. If you find this statement of his problematic, should that not be taken up as a challenge to his intent? — Paine

It's been a long time since I've read any Augustine, and I'm not sure of the context of the passage you presented, therefore I am not able to address his intent. So I refer to the quoted passage as what is presented by you, through your intent.

I disagree that turning 'toward its private good' is equivalent to "turning inward towards the maintenance of one's own well-being." Augustine says, " It turns to its own private good when it desires to be its own master. The will wanting to be its own master is not a concept in Aristotle's practical art of distinguishing what is good from what only seems to be. Turning 'inward' for Augustine is accepting that one must choose one life or another. The experience of the conflict is given through Paul's terms in the Letter to the Romans: — Paine

Right, as I explained, "the will wanting to be its own master" is a faulty description, for the reasons I described. It is expressed in the passage with the distinction between "common good" and "private good", such that the "private good" is always sinful. This means that there is an inherent incompatibility between the common good and the private good. But this is faulty by Aristotelian principles, and those expressed by Aquinas, which were later accepted by Catholic moralists. According to this moral philosophy the apparent good may be consistent with the real good, and this is their stated goal of moral philosophy, to create such a consistency. So Augustine's expression here of a "private good" (described as the will wanting to be its own master) which is incompatible with the common good, is an unacceptable description, which was rejected by Catholic moralists, in favour of Aristotle's apparent good and real good, which are not a dichotomy, but may be compatible with each other. Then "wanting to be its own master" can be left as inappropriate because it's not the will itself which "wants".

Please give an example of that language in Plato. — Paine

In The Republic of Plato, the good is what makes intelligible objects intelligible, just like the sun makes visible objects visible. By that analogy, we can say that the good is what drives, or inspires understanding, as the will to understand, because understanding is what makes intelligible objects intelligible..

In so far as doing bad things is the result of ignorance, isn't a 'faculty of choice' an idea that Socrates makes problematic? — Paine

What Socrates demonstrated as problematic, is the idea that doing bad things is necessarily the result of ignorance. It is argued in many places by Plato, that we knowingly do what is wrong. This is his refutation of the idea that virtue is a sort of knowledge, and his method of discrediting the sophists who claim that virtue can be taught. Plato demonstrates that virtue is knowledge plus something else, and the something else turns out to be similar to will.

The distance between Plato and Paul on these matters causes me to think that the term "Christian Platonism" is an oxymoron. — Paine

Paul was Jewish, and Paul played a big role in early Christianity. Accordingly, early Christianity adopted its moral principles from the Jewish tradition, not from either Plato nor Aristotle. I think it wasn't until Augustine, that Platonist moral principles were starting to be introduced into Christianity, but Plato didn't provide a coherent ethics, just some general practical principles of guidance. And it wasn't until even later that Aristotelian principles were introduced. Even in an evolving society, moral traditions can be very slow to change.

Christianity appears to me, to have a special feature which allows for indeterminate ethics. Instead of having a vast code of 'ought nots' like the ten commandments for example, it has one simple 'ought', 'love thy neighbour'. This allows that a wide variety of moral principles may be compatible and integrated into the religion as required, producing an evolving ethic. The indeterminateness in the ruling ideology is consistent with, and allows for the influence of, the free will. I think it is only later Christianity, the Inquisition, etc., that strict adherence to doctrine was enforced.

This highlights the problem with making general rules for future acts. In producing such general rules, the particular conditions of future situations cannot be foreseen. So it is more productive to create a general outline of the good, than trying to list all the particular instances of bad.

Are you saying that Arendt’s own notion of freedom as action is deterministic, or that her representation of Enlightenment concepts of intellect and will that she is critiquing are deterministic? — Joshs

I haven't read Arendt directly, only the article referenced in the op, and I think that article definitely expresses a determinist perspective, because it rejects freedom of choice as not even worth considering as a valid form of freedom. Statements like "Freedom is not located within the individual, but rather in the systems, or community, within which an individual operates", are clearly deterministic. This states that human beings are inherently unfree, but may provide themselves some illusion of freedom through the creation of required institutions.

Much of our behavior is ‘habituated’ in that our desires are expectations projected forward from previous experience. But this is as true of motivation by ‘internal forces’ as it is of allegedly rote habit. In both cases, an into oak action is involved which implies both past history( habit) and a novel, creative element. Whether i eat out of huger for for some other reason, as long as the act is conscious, it matters to me in some way and has some sense to it. — Joshs

I agree, probably well over ninety nine percent of our activity is habituated in one way or another. Or, any given action is ninety nine percent habit. But to have a proper understanding of ourselves, we still need to account for that other creative aspect as well.